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Emotional intelligence has attracted a considerable amount of attention over the past few years 
specifically with regard to the nature of the underlying construct and the reliability and validity of 
the psychometric tools used to measure the construct. The present study explored the reliability 
and validity of a trait measure of EI in relation to an ability measure in order to determine whether 
the tools can be considered as measuring conceptually valid constructs within an occupational 
environment. The study also examined the overlap with a trait measure of cognitive thinking 
styles to determine the potential for separating the trait and ability EI into two unique and 
distinguishable constructs. Participants included 308 employees from four different workforces 
within a diverse South African consulting firm. The results of the study identified a number of 
psychometric concerns regarding the structural fidelity of the instruments as well as concerns 
about the cultural bias evident in both measurement instruments. Evidence for the discriminant 
and incremental validity of the two instruments was, however, provided and recommendations are 
made for the reconceptualisation of trait EI as an emotional competence and ability EI as an 
emotional intelligence.  
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
  
 
 
In the modern world there is growing emphasis on finding characteristics that can moderate effective 
functioning within increasingly complex workplaces. Career environments are extending across global 
borders to include teams that routinely work across time zones and cultures within completely virtual 
environments. More and more organisations globally are moving towards mobile workforces and home 
based employment, resulting in decreased face-to-face contact with colleagues and superiors and greater 
isolation. The advent of social networking and new technological developments such as Web 2.0 (Carter, 
2007) has also placed pressure on traditional conceptions of relationships between people and norms 
surrounding social interaction. People of the 21st century interact differently with each other, work 
differently and have different values to generations of the past. As a result, these changes may impact on 
traditional theories of human and social psychology, raising demands for methods that can facilitate 
coping of individuals within changing societal boundaries (Jones & Holton, 2006; Ellison, 2004).  
 
Emotional intelligence or El is one of these facets that has been acclaimed as mediating functioning in a 
number of life dimensions, and has received attention due to the possibility that emotions may moderate 
intelligence behaviour by influencing an individual's reaction to, and interpretation of information (Salovey 
& Mayer, 1990). El has been credited as the reason for why some people are more successful than 
others in positions of leadership (Day, Newsome & Catano, 2002) or aspects of workplace functioning, 
such as coping in high pressure work environments (Caruso, 1999).  
 
The interaction between emotions and intelligence has previously been investigated in part by theories of 
social and personal intelligence, however, Salovey and Mayer (1990) were the first theorists to attempt to 
concentrate on the ability to use and manage emotions within a hierarchical psychometric model of 
intelligence. The earliest concept of El was defined as “the ability to perceive emotions, to access and 
generate emotions so as to assist thought, to understand emotions and emotional knowledge and to 
reflectively regulate emotions so as to promote emotional and intellectual growth” (Mayer & Salovey, 
1997, p. 10).  
 
  
 2 
From the earliest conception, Salovey and Mayer (1990) have insisted that El qualifies as a form of 
intelligence that will broaden the traditional conceptualisation of intelligence. They further argued that it is 
a form of intelligence that may be learned or taught and may account for individual differences in many 
important human facets such as psychological well-being, occupational and academic success, life 
satisfaction and the quality of interpersonal relationships (Palmer, 2003, p. 1). With the immense interest 
generated by El and the plethora of alternative El tools and theories that followed on Salovey and Mayer's 
model, this conceptualisation soon became the source of endless debate and confusion regarding the 
nature of El and the best way to measure it (Roberts, Zeidner & Matthews, 2001).  
 
Debate rages about the definition, nature, measurement and application of El. Controversy exists not only 
between El researchers and their critics who doubt the value of the concept, but also among El 
researchers themselves, who differ in their views of the nature and the measurement of El. Exaggerated 
claims for the importance of El in job performance, leadership and other areas of organizational life have 
assisted in fuelling scepticism towards the entire concept of EI. Much of the debate has to do with the 
face validity of El as emotions have traditionally been viewed as indicative of irrational thought processes 
and disruptive to mental activity. Additional criticism arises from the difficulty in objectively measuring a 
construct as complicated as emotions. It has been argued that there are no right or wrong ways to feel in 
any given situation and, therefore, to determine truly right and wrong answers for tests of El in the same 
way that intelligence would be measured, is a problematic ideal (Landy, 2005; Matthews, Zeidner & 
Roberts, 2003).  
 
There are a number of definitions and models of El and research has indicated that EI may have 
interesting and valuable relationships with a number of important interpersonal success factors, such as 
social network size and quality (Ciarrochi, Chan, & Bajgar, 2001), positive relations with others (Lopes, 
Salovey & Straus, 2003) and life satisfaction (Palmer, Donaldson, & Stough, 2002; Saklofske, Austin, & 
Minski, 2003). The concept of El however, is still in its infancy and debate regarding the actual existence 
of a distinction from either personality or intelligence is still rife. Additional work is required to explore the 
foundations on which the El construct rests by determining the space that El occupies distinctly from both 
personality and intelligence. 
  
The world has become a swiftly changing and complex place and there is pressure to respond with 
alternative tools and ways of thinking, to support adaptation within changing occupational, social and 
environmental spheres of life. Trends such as virtual workplaces and transformative social networking, 
mobile or home based working, trans-nationalisation, and global citizenship, are escalating challenges 
that require the development of innovative solutions to facilitate coping within changing times. As much 
promising research has been conducted that divulges the potential for El to facilitate success in many life 
spheres, clarifying the boundaries of theories of El has the potential to facilitate the empowerment of 
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organisations, social institutions and individuals in succeeding within the complex boundaries of the 
modern world. 
 
 
1.1.1. Personality, intelligence and emotion 
 
 
A question that has always been central to the study of individual differences is whether or not personality 
traits and intellectual abilities are related and how they are related. This question has been debated by 
many of the original theorists involved in the study of personality and intelligence (see for instance Cattell, 
1941; Spearman, 1927; Wechsler, 1940, 1943, 1950; Whipple, 1922), however, in the last few years 
interest in the personality-intelligence interface has intensified due to increased emphasis on the 
interaction of emotions with personality and intelligence in theories such as those of Damasio (1997). 
 
Personality is explained in the context of this study as a hierarchical trait model, made up of a number of 
behavioural tendencies, dispositions or characteristics which impart consistency to behaviour (Eysench, 
1994; Sternberg, 1998). The most widely accepted core traits identified in personality are referred to as 
extraversion, neuroticism, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness (Eysench, 1994; Sternberg, 
1998). This theory of personality is referred to as the Big Five theory of personality traits. Traits are 
defined as “stable sources of individual differences that characterize a persona and that may originate in 
the person's nature (heredity characteristics) or the person's nurture (environmental influences)” 
(Sternberg, 1998, p. 583). 
 
Contemporary theories maintain that the term intelligence consists of three major meanings: biological 
intelligence, psychometric intelligence and social intelligence (Eysench, 1994). Biological intelligence 
refers to the neural networks and physiological processes of the brain. Psychometric intelligence refers to 
cognitive ability and constitutes factors such as Spearman's g (general intelligence) which can be 
measured by intelligence tests (IQ). Social or practical intelligence is defined as the application of IQ to 
adaptation in life and includes aspects such as the use of emotion in facilitating success and the role of 
personality in mediating the use of cognitive intelligence (Eysench, 1994). Current thinking about 
intelligence theories is elaborated on in Chapter 2.  
 
Humans are innately predisposed to experience emotions which are mediated by neural structures such 
as the amygdala in the brain (Damasio, 1994). The association between emotions and environmental 
situations or reactions is further strengthened during social development. Emotions have been described 
as an evolutionary adaptive function, which assists humans in adapting to changing environments both in 
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terms of their needs and circumstances. Emotions are a crucial aspect of social interaction that allows 
people to communicate feelings and regulate interactions in social situations (Sternberg, 1998).  
 
Emotions are theorised to be capable of influencing and directing thinking activity (Smirnov, 1994). 
Differences in emotional expression have been related to variations in intelligence and thinking, for 
example, emotion has been directly related to the solving of intellectual tasks (Tikhomirov cited in 
Smirnov, 1994, p. 242). The tendency to experience negative emotion over positive emotion has been 
related to a high performance IQ and a low verbal IQ as measured by the Wechsler scales (Kepalaite 
cited in Smirnov, 1994, p. 242).  
 
The term social intelligence was first devised by E.L. Thorndike (1920) to refer to the ability that people 
have to understand and manage other people and engage in adaptive social interactions. Social 
cognition refers to the thought processes which occur in social situations, specifically with regard to how 
people perceive and interpret information from themselves and other people whom they are interacting 
with. Social cognition draws on emotion, motivation, personality and thought processes. Emerging 
theories on the relationship between cognition and emotion are moving away from the traditional belief 
that the mind acts like a computer and that logical processing is uninfluenced by emotion. Contemporary 
theories such as those proposed by Damasio (1994), describe emotions as essential to rational decision-
making processes.  
 
Damasio’s theories are based on the standard neuroscientific conceptualisation of brain function which 
maintains that thinking is a function of patterns of nerve cell activation or cognitive representations that 
are activated in correspondence with patterns in the external world. Damasio suggests that emotions are 
similarly nerve activation patterns that correspond to the internal world. According to Damasio's (1994, 
1999) somatic marker hypothesis (SMH), positive and negative emotional experiences result in the 
somatic consequences being marked in the mind and then reproduced when that event reoccurs, thus 
allowing the mind to simulate physiological emotional reactions in split-second decision making. The 
changes in body states that are elicited by these experiences lead to patterns of nerve cell activation in 
the brain. Emotions are considered to be cognitive representations of body states that strongly aid future 
adaptive learning by producing signals to warn against or affirm behavioural options. In effect the body 
can be bypassed as the brain is exposed to the psychosomatic responses of emotional situations and 
learns to mimic these responses to aid in the making of speedy decisions in similar situations (Damasio, 
1994). Emotions are, therefore, input to the brain from the internal body environment, similarly to visual 
and auditory stimuli which serve as input to the brain from the external environment (Dunn, Dalgleish & 
Lawrence, 2006).  
 
This theory is supported by emerging neuroscience evidence that suggests that rational decision making 
is dependent on prior accurate emotional processing. Research into this theory has reported that the 
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process of feeling emotions requires the participation of certain brain regions, such as the limbic system 
and particularly the amygdala (Damasio, Grabowski, Bechara, Damasio, Ponto, Parvizi & Hichwa, 2000) 
and that there are discernable neural systems responsible for recognising emotions (Adolphs, Tranel & 
Damasio, 2002). Adolphs et al., (2002) found that the recognition of emotions was controlled by separate 
brain regions, depending on whether the emotional stimulus which the person was exposed to was static 
or explicitly conveyed information regarding actions. 
 
Damasio’s theory demonstrates that emotion is capable of actively guiding reasoning process, and 
connects the lower level brain regions such as the hypothalamus and brain stem, which are responsible 
for the regulation of emotions and feelings, as well as the higher level prefrontal cortices responsible for 
language and abstract intellectual skills (Dunn et al., 2006). For example Bechara and Damasio (2005) 
identified that people with damage to the ventro-medial part of the pre-frontal cortex may be able to 
perform to a high level on most language and intelligence tests, but they display gross defects of 
planning, judgement and social appropriateness. They argued that the defects identified were due to the 
inability to use emotion-based signals or somatic markers generated from the body when appraising 
different response options.  
 
The purpose of the SMH is to refute the popular assumption that the mind and body are separate entities 
and to postulate instead that the two combine to interact with the environment as a whole. The somatic 
marker mechanism is seen as the way in which cognitive representations of the external world interact 
with cognitive representations of the internal world. Decision making is, therefore, viewed as a 
combination of cognitive reasoning such as a logical cost-benefit analysis of a given action, and signals 
from somatic markers that provide the individual with an indication of how advantaged or 
disadvantageous a situation may be in complex or uncertain situations where a complete logical decision 
making process may not be possible (Dunn et al., 2006).  
 
El has been endorsed as the link between emotion and intelligence which facilitates success within a 
number of life domains including work, study and personal relationships (Goleman, 1995; Mayer, Salovey 
& Caruso, 2000a). El is viewed as the reason why individuals differ in the extent to which they attend to, 
process and use emotional information from within themselves and from others during interaction 
(Petrides & Furnham, 2003). Theories of El were thus developed to explain some of the non-cognitive 
contributions to intelligence (Salovey & Mayer, 1990) and to fill some of the gaps in contemporary 
understanding of intelligence. 
 
Arising from Damasio’s SMH theory is the argument that the capacity to be emotional is synonymous with 
being socially intelligent and provides powerful evidence that thinking and feelings are components of 
similar neural processes. Damasio’s SMH theory offers neuroscientific evidence of the interaction 
between emotions and reasoning in modifying social responses. Theories of emotional intelligence are 
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seen as relating to a specific set of emotional abilities and the potential for social functioning or 
behaviour. EI theories could result in an explanation for individual differences in successfully interpreting 
or applying decisions to circumstances based on emotional responses. If we were to integrate the 
perspective that Damasio’s theory provides a neurological basis for the link between thought and 
emotion, emotional intelligence could be viewed as the ability of the individual to translate somatic 
messages into successful adaptive responses to environmental stimuli.  
 
 
 
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH AIMS 
 
 
 
1.2.1. Distinguishing emotional intelligence as a trait from emotional intelligence as an 
ability 
 
 
Early models (see Goleman, 1995; Bar-On, 1997) that followed Salovey and Mayer's (1990) theory of El 
as an intelligence were not sufficiently detailed and did not distinguish adequately between personality 
factors and cognitive processes. Early research on El failed to draw a distinction between the 
measurement of El as a component of personality and as a form of intelligence, resulting in a great deal 
of misunderstanding about the impact of El on everyday life and how the concept should be measured. 
The models that integrated elements of personality elicited much criticism because firstly, incorporating 
personality aspects is contrary to purist traditional cognitive definitions of intelligence, and secondly 
because there was not enough conceptual overlap observed between the different instruments used to 
measure this construct (Matthews et al., 2003).  
 
In order to move beyond the problems with measurement consistency, a number of theorists sought to 
separate the different types of theories into different taxonomies. Mayer, Caruso and Salovey (1999) 
firstly separated the models by distinguishing between mixed and ability El. According to Mayer et al., 
(1999) mixed models incorporate a wide variety of personality variables along with cognitive abilities, as 
opposed to Mayer and Salovey's (1997) ability model which is a purely cognitive definition of El. Petrides 
and Furnham (2000a), however, established an alternative model of EI that distinguishes between trait El 
and information-processing El, which takes into account the different measurement approaches and 
operational definitions adopted by mixed and ability model theorists. Trait El is concerned with cross-
situational consistencies that are present in specific traits or behaviours, such as empathy, assertiveness 
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and optimism, thereby drawing heavily on personality variables (e.g., Bar-On, 1997; Goleman, 2000) as 
opposed to information-processing El, which concerns abilities such as being able to identify, express 
and label emotions, and includes models that have attempted to incorporate El into the overall 
psychometric structure of intelligence (e.g. Mayer, et al., 1999; Palmer, 2003).  
 
Trait El, referred to by Petrides and Furnham (2001) as emotional self-efficacy, is defined for the 
purposes of this research as a constellation of emotion-related self-perceptions and dispositions relating 
to the ability to recognise, express, understand and evaluate one's own emotions, as well as the 
emotions of others, to use emotions to direct reasoning and to manage one's own emotions and the 
emotions of others, in order to guide thinking and action to assist with successful adaptation to 
environmental demands and pressures (Palmer, 2003; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). Trait measures 
are distinct from ability measures due to the emphasis on self-perceived abilities, rather than objective 
assessment, and are assessed through self-report inventories that measure typical behaviour (e.g. Bar-
On, 1997; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey & Palfai, 1995; Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, 
Golden, & Dornheim, 1998). The precise composition of these self-perceptions and dispositions varies 
across different conceptualizations, with some being broader than others. This approach to El research 
includes various dispositions from the personality domain, such as motivation, assertiveness (Goleman, 
1995), elements of social intelligence (Thorndike, 1920) as well as emotional intelligence as an ability 
(Salovey & Mayer, 1990), which is distinct from concepts of cognitive ability. 
 
The information-processing approach referred to as cognitive-emotional ability by Petrides and Furnham 
(2001) is more focused on the constituent parts of El and its relationship to traditional intelligence. Ability 
El is therefore defined for the purposes of this research as the capacity to perceive emotions, assimilate 
emotion-related feelings, understand the information of those emotions and manage them (Mayer & 
Salovey, 1997). Existing measures of ability El have attempted to assess El levels, using measures of 
maximal performance, however, the development of objectively correct responses to test items is a 
difficult task and there are only three instruments that have been developed, each a new version of the 
previous one.  
 
The development of various models and measures of El has provided a number of alternatives to 
measuring and conceptualising the construct. This has, however, resulted in confusion regarding the 
nature of El, resulting in El being described as a badly defined construct with diffuse boundaries (Palmer, 
2003). Variables that fall both within the domains of personality theory and cognitive abilities have been 
incorporated in theories of El, resulting in difficulties establishing the distinct space occupied by the 
construct. A number of critics have even claimed that El as a concept does not exist, and that the 
measures that have been developed are merely identifying constructs that belong within the sphere of 
personality or mental ability and which are measured more appropriately by established methods within 
these domains (Landy, 2005).  
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In order to systematically validate the distinction between trait and ability El, the discriminant validity of 
the two different measures of El needs to be established within the framework in which the measures 
were developed (Petrides & Furnham, 2000a). Research regarding the relation between ability and trait 
measures of El has yielded low correlations between the two types of instruments (Brackett & Mayer, 
2003; Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2002; Lopes et al., 2003) however, the lack of relationships between 
these self-report and ability instruments is consistent with findings in relation to the assessment of 
intelligence in general (Goldenberg, Matheson & Mantler, 2006).  
 
Goldenberg et al., (2006) state that due to the extent that these measures tap into common constructs, 
their patterns of convergent validity should be similar. The validity of trait versus ability measures of El 
therefore needs to be confirmed by examining relationships with established measurements of 
personality traits and intelligence or cognitive abilities. Validating one speculative measure of trait El 
against another trait El measure will only result in inflated correlations between variables, due to the 
similar semantic content of the instruments (Petrides & Furnham, 2000a). This study therefore aims at 
examining the degree of convergence between the trait and ability El models, by establishing potential 
overlap or relationship between a self-report (SSREIT) and a performance based measure of El 
(MSCEIT). 
 
 
1.2.2. Relations between emotional intelligence and thinking styles 
 
 
Theories on cognitive thinking styles were developed to explain why people differ in their approaches to 
solving problems. A 'cognitive thinking style' can be defined as a person's preference for a certain 
thinking process (Sternberg, 1997). Thinking styles are seen in the context of this study as specific 
reasoning and problem solving strategies that help to elucidate why people respond in different ways to 
problems that need to be solved in the context of studies or work, or respond differently in social 
interactions with other people.  
 
Theories of cognitive thinking styles have been developed as a link between personality trait theory and 
cognitive ability. Sternberg (1997) defines thinking styles as preferred ways of thinking, which are not 
considered to represent actual cognitive abilities, but rather a method for using and expressing thinking 
abilities or processes. Theories of thinking styles attempt to explain why people approach solving 
problems in different ways, and to provide an understanding of individual preferences for different thinking 
styles (Sternberg, 1997). Cognitive thinking styles are therefore seen as traits rather than abilities and are 
as a result partially related to personality (Balkis & Isiker, 2005; Zhang & Huang, 2001).  
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From this perspective there should be predictable relationships between trait El and cognitive thinking 
styles. There has only been one study conducted to date which examines the relationship between EI 
and cognitive thinking styles, by comparing a self-report measure of trait El (SSREIT) to a self-report 
measure of thinking styles (TSI) (Murphy, 2006). The research reported a number of significant 
correlations between the overall scales and subscales of thinking styles and trait El. Specific findings 
revealed that high El was correlated with complex thinking styles, suggesting that people with high EI are 
generally able to juggle multiple tasks without losing sight of priorities, solve problems and deal with 
situations in new and creative ways that require complex thought, and are group oriented, preferring to 
work with other people. Low El was found to correlate with conservative thinking styles, suggesting that 
people with low El prefer conventions and approach tasks according to standard ways of doing things. In 
light of the association found between trait El and thinking styles, the validity of ability measure versus 
trait measures of El can be further examined by exploring the relationships between these two 
measurement approaches and thinking styles. In this way the study aims at imparting greater clarity to 
the boundaries between trait and ability El.  
 
 
1.2.3. The potential influence of emotional intelligence and thinking styles on job 
satisfaction within the workplace 
 
 
An important criterion for establishing the validity of a measure of El is whether it is able to predict life 
success in various domains related to emotional functioning (Goldenberg, et al., 2006). A major postulate 
of El models is that El is primarily associated with effective regulation of emotions in stressful situations 
and resultant adaptive coping (Zeidner, Matthews & Roberts, 2000). It is credited with providing the 
individual with an advantage within an occupational environment, as people with high EI have been found 
to be more self aware and more likely to monitor their emotions and reactions (Schutte, Malouff, Bobik, 
Coston, Greeson, Jedlicka, Rhodes & Wendorf, 2001), and therefore better equipped to adapt to 
complicated environments. Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2000b) have found that individuals who are high 
in El are expert at identifying and responding appropriately to the emotions of co-workers, customers and 
superiors. Research has reported that both trait and ability El is related to life satisfaction after controlling 
for other aspects such as personality or IQ (Martinez-Pons, 1997; Ciarrochi, Chan & Caputi, 2000). As a 
consequence of the relationship with life satisfaction and the described benefits for succeeding in 
occupational environments, it is expected that both ability and trait El should be able to mediate job 
satisfaction. A further aim of this research is therefore to examine the predictive validity of a trait versus 
an ability measure of El, by examining the relationships of these measures with job satisfaction.  
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The study also includes an exploratory dimension that seeks to facilitate the relationships between 
thinking styles and job functions within the workplace. Work environments differ in terms of the 
information processing requirements that are placed on individuals and research has suggested that 
people within many groups in organisations will share similar cognitive styles which are related to the 
information-processing requirements of their work (Hayes & Allinson, 1998). Previous research has 
reported that analytical thinkers prefer to work in well-defined, stable, structured, ordered, and relatively 
impersonal situations, where they can function within existing rules and procedures and prevailing 
structures. People with a more intuitive style on the other hand have been found to favour unstructured, 
changing, highly involving, innovative, flexible, dynamic, and relatively personalised environments, where 
they can work autonomously and in freedom from rules and regulations (Cools & Van Den Broeck, 2007). 
The following study examines the thinking styles of employees in three groups separated according to the 
cognitive climate of their occupations according to the typology identified by Cools and Van Den Broeck 
(2007) which encompasses a knowing-oriented cognitive climate that includes employees involved in 
finance, outsourced business processes, application management and information technology, and 
research functions, a planning-oriented cognitive climate such as administrative and technical or IT 
development staff who are responsible for applying technical skills and capabilities to build and maintain 
technology solutions, and a creating-oriented cognitive climate which incorporates functions such as 
consulting, sales and marketing.  
 
Research into the relationship between various careers and EI is limited, although there are a number of 
careers or study fields that have been found to correlate with high levels of EI. Van Staaden (2001), for 
example, reported that psychology students exhibited higher levels of EI than engineering students and 
Caruso (1999) reported that high levels of EI was related to people with intensive career fields such as 
the mental health field as well as management. The present study examines difference in emotional 
intelligence for different job functions by comparing employees who are considered as working in job 
functions requiring greater emotional problem solving such as consulting, creative services or human 
resources divisions, to employees who are considered as working in occupations such as IT development 
that deal primarily with technical information required for building and maintaining technology solutions. 
 
In addition, the study will explore differences between generations, genders and ethnic groups within the 
workplace in order to examine whether there are differences in El and thinking styles between these 
groups. A further component that will be examined will be the differences between management levels 
compared to non-management staff, to determine the potential relationship between El and thinking 
styles with levels of leadership. 
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1.3. MOTIVATION FOR CONDUCTING THE STUDY 
 
 
 
Research shows that the number of virtual workers continues to increase and the percentage of 
companies that define themselves as virtual workplaces has increased from 57% in 2006 to 83% in 2007 
(Johnson, 2007). The impact of this is a major change in the complexity of corporate workplaces and 
demands for effective employee profiles that are no longer solely focused on a set of narrowly defined 
skills suited specifically to an occupation, such as analytical abilities, knowledge of the content domain 
and the ability to carry out the function of the position. Rather, more and more employers are demanding 
a greater range of interpersonal and adaptive skills such as team work, communication and critical 
thinking. Performance and innovation have become leading goals in modern organisations and 
employees are expected to develop innovative solutions to projects, interact effectively in complex virtual 
teams and perform optimally in high pressure environments (Bar-On, Brown, Kirkcaldy & Thome, 2000). 
Accompanying these situations is an increasing need for employees to have good social skills, to be able 
to manage conflict effectively and to cope with stress and tension appropriately in the workplace. 
Organisations and learning institutions are as a result faced with an increased challenge to impart these 
skills to employees globally (Cilliers & Sternberg, 2001; Horak & Du Toit, 2002; Sternberg, 1997). 
 
For a person to have a high El means that the person knows how to manipulate his or her own emotions 
adaptively or in such a way as to avoid counter-productive outcomes to situations (Salovey, Mayer & 
Caruso, 2002). It is also alleged that El is a construct that can be learnt or taught (Palmer, 2003) which 
suggests that an improved understanding of the processes underlying El could facilitate the development 
of training programs aimed at enhancing the El skills of individuals. The debates surrounding El and its 
key assumptions thus have implications for many areas of daily life, including those of educational styles, 
academic achievement, life satisfaction, personal happiness and career and occupational success.  
 
With increasing emphasis being placed on the importance of emotional health, employee satisfaction and 
interpersonal interaction both within and outside the company, there is a greater need to provide people 
with the skills required to function adaptively within their chosen career environment. El has been widely 
advertised as a self-help tool with a number of websites and El organizations offering El testing and 
workshops to measure and improve El.  
 
Similarly to personality theory, El is a construct that is difficult to measure and define due to the variability 
involved in defining subjective abilities (Pérez, Petrides & Furnham, 2005). Although studies have 
obtained correlations between El and real life criteria, these correlations have been found to be moderate 
(Petrides, Furnham & Frederickson, 2004b), and media hype often results in a distorted picture of the true 
influence of El. Before extreme claims can be made regarding the influence of El on occupational and 
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academic success, additional research is required to confirm the validity of the measurement instruments 
as well as the core definitions of the underlying constructs.  
 
According to Petrides and Furnham in 2000 (2000a), the existence of a coherent research domain of El 
had not yet been demonstrated and this holds true still today. Few studies have examined both trait and 
ability-based El measures to examine the extent of the overlap between these constructs (Conte, 2005). 
In general, both types of EI measures have demonstrated adequate reliability, Conte and Dean (2006) 
however, argue that these findings provide no indication about whether EI measures are simply 
measuring constructs already measured by other, more established psychological constructs.  
 
El defined as an ability appears to be the most comprehensive and empirically valid measure of El 
(Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005), on the other hand El defined as a trait has been shown to relate strongly to 
important life criteria, and has potential value as the concept is based on a recognition of the importance 
of multiple aspects of personality that relate to emotion (Goldenberg et al., 2006). Petrides et al., (2004b) 
argue that as trait EI encompasses behavioural tendencies and self-perceived abilities rather than actual 
cognitive abilities, it belongs in the realm of personality. Ability EI, on the other hand, should be 
considered as belonging primarily in the domain of cognitive ability as it is allegedly encompasses actual 
abilities surrounding the use, understanding, management and perception of emotions. In Chapter 2 and 
3, the difference between El conceptualised as an ability compared to El conceptualised as a trait will be 
explored, based on the postulation that the two models should rather be separated and conceptualised 
as an emotional intelligence versus an emotional competence. It is therefore important to validate the 
proposed taxonomy regarding the nature of El.  
 
Establishing the reliability and validity of a taxonomy of emotional intelligence is important to both realise 
the potential value of El in contributing towards predicting aspects of life success, as well as ensuring the 
sustainability of the construct itself. With the looming skills crisis in many countries across the world 
caused by aging populations and migration of skilled workers (Gundling & Zanchettin, 2007), 
development of reliable and valid measures of El could aid in the understanding of the nature and cause 
of individual differences in El, and possibly assist in enhancing workplace productivity and satisfaction by 
targeted training and remedial programs aimed at improving interpersonal interaction between people 
functioning in complex working environments.  
 
Research on the value of El with respect to work-related behaviour is also an area of research that has 
been neglected. A review conducted by Landy (2005) indicated that research done on El over the past 
decade has predominantly occurred with children, adolescents and college students as participants and 
very few research studies have been conducted with non-U.S. participants. The same is true of research 
about thinking styles. Given the importance placed on employee satisfaction in improving attraction, 
recruitment, motivation and retention of high quality employees, this study further investigates whether 
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people who have a higher level of EI will show higher levels of job satisfaction and lower levels of actual 
resignation behaviour. This study therefore provides additional research into the impact of El and thinking 
styles within workplace environments. 
 
Further understanding is required regarding the relationship that El has to emotions and thought. The way 
in which people think has been reported to be a crucial determinant of personal success especially with 
regard to career choice and occupational satisfaction (Sternberg, 1997). An investigation into the 
interaction between styles of thought and the ability to adaptively use and respond to emotions could 
offer insight into the relationship between thought and emotion, as well as assist in explaining the 
relationship between flexibility in thinking styles and El.  
 
This study expands on previous research into the validity of trait El and thinking styles. This study also 
examines differences in ability, trait El and thinking styles within occupational environments. Although this 
study does not address the relationship between El and work performance, it may stimulate further 
research into issues such as whether training in El and flexibility of thinking styles could assist employees 
in attaining high performance. This would provide beneficial information to guide the implementation of 
skills enhancement programs. 
 
 
 
 
1.4. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
 
 
 
This study is reported in six chapters:  
 
 
The purpose of the present study is to examine how measurement formats affect the psychometric and 
theoretical property of the El construct. The introductory chapter begins with a brief overview of the origin, 
nature and controversy surrounding emotional intelligence and the potential place for EI in the modern 
working world. Thereafter the nature of personality, intelligence and emotion and the possibilities for 
interrelationships between these constructs are briefly discussed. Following this section, the aims and 
research problem is examined. The primary aim of the study is identified as an exploration of the potential 
for separating El measured with self-report instruments from El measured with ability tools into two 
Chapter 1: General overview  
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unique and distinguishable constructs or facets of El. A secondary aim of the study is identified as 
providing evidence of discriminant validity, by comparing a measure of trait and ability El to a measure of 
cognitive thinking styles, which is also defined as a trait. The third and final aim of the study is to provide 
predicative validity of El in the workplace, by determining the extent to which ability or trait El can predict 
job satisfaction. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the significance and motivation for 
conducting the study.  
 
 
Chapter 2: The theoretical framework underlying emotional intelligence and cognitive thinking 
styles  
 
The chapter begins with a review of the origins of intelligence theory and the potential for intelligence in 
emotions. Thereafter the emergence of El and the conceptualisation of the construct are discussed. The 
body of the chapter reviews the features that distinguish emotional intelligence as an ability versus 
emotional intelligence as a trait. The chapter concludes with an overview of nature and theoretical 
properties of cognitive thinking styles.  
 
 
Chapter 3: Reliability and validity issues in relation to the emotional intelligence and cognitive 
style measurement instruments 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review and discuss issues with reliability and validity that have been 
identified in previous research studies with measures of trait and ability EI. The chapter will focus on the 
most prominent measures of EI specifically the measurement instruments that are used in the present 
study. The properties of performance versus self-report measures that define this distinction are 
examined in light of corresponding research findings to date. In addition, a critical review is presented of 
previous research that supports or refutes the hypothesis that self-report and ability El instruments are 
able to measure El constructs beyond that which is explained by existing measures of personality and 
intelligence. The chapter concludes with the research questions and hypotheses to be tested.  
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the empirical research study. The chapter begins by reviewing 
the aims of the research. Following this is a discussion of the research design and reasons for the choice 
of the design, the sample, the measuring instruments, method of data-collection and the statistical 
methods used. This chapter provides a comparative analysis of evidence provided by previous research 
Chapter 4: Methodology  
 
  
 15 
studies, regarding the reliability and validity of the instruments used and provides justification for the 
research procedure and methods employed.  
 
 
Chapter 5: Analysis of results  
 
The analysis of results chapter reports the results of the study, arrived at through analysis of the data. 
The chapter commences with a description of the demographic profile of the sample. The validity and 
reliability of the measures are reported thereafter, followed by the results of the research hypotheses 
identified in Chapter 3.  
 
 
1.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter 6: Discussion of the results and conclusion  
 
The final chapter provides a discussion of the study findings, with regard to the hypothesis examined and 
the implication for properties of the El construct. The implication of results for application in the workplace 
is also discussed. The chapter concludes by discussing some limitations of the present study and 
recommendations for future research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter provided background to the research and an overview of the relevant constructs. The 
purpose of this study is to provide construct validity for the distinction between the two proposed 
dimensions of EI, as well as discriminant validity, by examining the relationships with a trait measure of 
cognitive thinking styles and predictive validity, by examining the extent to which El can predict job 
satisfaction. The chapter concluded with significance and motivation for conducting the study and an 
outline of the chapters to follow.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK UNDERLYING EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COGNITIVE 
THINKING STYLES  
 
 
 
 
Research findings are frequently reported suggesting that El is a distinct construct that can be reliably 
measured (Mayer et al., 1999; Petrides, & Furnham, 2003; Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Saklofske et al., 
2003) yet critical questions remain about the concept, theory and measurement of El. There is still 
insufficient research that addresses the distinction between trait and ability El, and researchers do not 
adequately conceptualise the distinct space between intelligence and personality in which these 
constructs operate. If trait and ability El measure two distinct constructs, the differences between the two 
theories need to be clarified, and the domains they address should be distinguished clearly. 
  
The roots of the El model can be traced back to the theory of social intelligence, developed by E.L. 
Thorndike in 1920 and Gardner's (1983; 1993) interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences. The 
abundance with which El models and methodology were released after the first formal definition of the 
term El by Salovey and Mayer in 1990, led to a haphazard development of the construct and numerous 
conflicting findings (Petrides et al., 2004b). Petrides et al., (2004b) argue that the lack of coherence and 
ambiguity stems from a failure to take into account the fundamental difference between self-report 
measurement and measurement using behavioural performance, and to consider the implications of 
these types of measurements in demarcating the boundaries of El. Self-report measurement results in the 
operationalisation of a construct as a personality trait whereas behavioural or maximum-performance 
measurement would lead to the operationalisation of a construct as a cognitive ability (Furnham, 2006). 
Furnham (2006) contends therefore, that it is important to realise that these are two different constructs 
because the procedures used in the operational definitions of trait EI and ability EI are fundamentally 
different, even though the theoretical domains on which the definitions are based may overlap. A concern 
continually expressed by a number of researchers is that training and measurement tools are being 
developed and sold in educational, social and workplace contexts before satisfactory definitions, reliability 
and validity of the underlying models have been recorded (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; Landy 2005). 
 
Petrides and Furnham (2000a) first conceptualised the distinction between trait and ability El, and 
although there has been some research done on establishing the structure of El in this regard (Petrides & 
Furnham, 2001; Petrides et al., 2004b), additional research studies are required that use both a measure 
of trait El and a measure of ability El, to determine how these measures overlap with instruments that 
have previously been shown to share theoretical space with one or both of these instruments. Petrides 
and Furnham consider ability and trait El to be two conceptually different theories which measure distinct 
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constructs, and predict very different facets of life. By obtaining an increased understanding of the 
relationship between measures of ability El and trait El, and the potential for shared variance in predicting 
life space criteria such as cognitive thinking styles, additional evidence can be gathered which will 
demonstrate either the distinctiveness or interrelationship between these two constructs.  
 
The purpose of the present study is to explore how the impact of the self-report versus ability procedures 
by which EI is measured impacts on the psychometric and theoretical properties of the El construct. Trait 
EI is hypothesised to be orthogonal to ability EI, and should therefore be unrelated to proxies of cognitive 
ability (Furnham, 2006). As a result, trait EI is considered to be oblique to personality constructs as it is 
partially determined by several personality dimensions and therefore lies at the lower level of personality 
hierarchies (Petrides, Pita, & Kokkinaki, 2007b). Ability EI, however, is expected to be related to general 
intelligence as well as specific personality dimensions that reflect basic differences in human emotionality 
such as neuroticism (Furnham, 2006), as ability EI concerns emotion-related cognitive abilities measured 
via performance-based tests (Petrides et al., 2007b). This chapter outlines the theoretical basis for the 
distinction between trait and ability EI within the context of intelligence research. The chapter also 
provides an overview of the nature and theoretical properties of cognitive thinking styles.  
 
 
 
2.1. A BROADER VIEW OF INTELLIGENCE 
 
 
 
2.1.1 The historical development and theoretical conceptualisation of intelligence 
 
 
Speculation about the relationship between thought and emotion is an age old topic. Classical theory 
from the 1900's focused on the argument that thought and emotions are relatively separate. In this era 
intelligence theory emerged, and intelligence tests were conceptualised and developed. From 1970 
onwards however, more and more theorists began to research the interrelationship between intelligence 
and emotion, and the field of cognition and affect was developed (Sternberg, 1998).  
 
Intelligence has been conceptualised in a number of different ways, and there is as yet little consensus 
on a general definition of intelligence. Intelligence is considered to be the reason for individual differences 
in the ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from 
experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning and to overcome obstacles using thought (Neisser, 
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Boodoo, Bouchard, Boykin, Brody, Ceci, Halpern, Loehlin, Perloff, Sternberg, Urbina, 1996). Theorists 
are generally in agreement that intelligence consists of a hierarchy of abilities needed to solve abstract 
reasoning problems (Brody, 2000), and is referred to by a number of terms including cognitive ability, 
intelligence, general mental ability (GMA) and general intelligence (g). In general, cognitive ability has 
been reported to be the best predictor of overall performance and task performance across different 
careers as well as a number of important life outcomes such as years of education, social status and 
occupational income (Neisser et al., 1996). 
  
The dominant theory of intelligence is the psychometric approach, which is the theory of intelligence that 
has been chiefly researched as well as used most widely in practical settings (Neisser et al., 1996). Tests 
to measure Intelligence Quotient (I.Q) were developed during the initial part of the 20th century as one of 
the primary measures of intelligence. Since the development of the first test of intelligence by French 
psychologist, Alfred Binet, many tests have been developed to measure some aspect of individual 
differences in cognitive functioning (Roberts et al., 2001). Spearman argued for the existence of a primary 
general factor, g, that was evident in the positive nature of the correlations measured across a number 
ability factors (Brody, 2006). Spearman maintained that there was a structure to intelligence, and that the 
structure could be captured in a single number (Hubey, 2002). The foundation for existence of the g 
construct is based on research findings that performance on any one test of cognitive ability is positively 
related to performance on any other test of ability. The psychometric approach is therefore based on the 
occurrence of a common element that is present in all tests of cognitive ability (Brody, 2006) that were not 
specifically designed to measure intelligence, but rather closely related constructs such as scholastic 
aptitude, school achievement and specific abilities that were developed primarily for selection purposes 
(Neisser et al., 1996). 
 
The psychometric approach is seen as the most influential yet controversial of all the theories of 
intelligence. A number of contemporary researchers believe that general intelligence does not explain all 
of the relationships among different abilities and that g is an unstable construct whose composition varies 
with the items in a test battery (Brody, 2006). Additional criticism levied against the general psychometric 
measures of intelligence relates to the lack of consideration for situational factors, such as environment or 
cultural setting when predicting achievement. One of the predominant concerns arises from group 
differences reported in general intelligence mean scores especially across different ethnic groups (Van 
Rooy, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Ones, 2006).  
 
A primary hypothesis of critics of the psychometric approach is that cognitive intelligence as measured by 
g does not fully explain intelligence in its entirety and that there is potential for several types of 
intelligences to co-exist within one person (Stys & Brown, 2004). Theories such as Gardner’s theory of 
multiple intelligences, Sternberg’s triarchic theory of intelligence and even the different versions of 
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emotional intelligence theory (Brody, 2006) were all developed to emphasise that general intelligence 
may not be the primary component in explaining individual differences in cognitive ability.  
 
As early as in 1920, E.L. Thorndike proposed that intelligence may consist of three facets: abstract, 
mechanical and social intelligence (Landy, 2006). Thorndike described social intelligence as a form of 
intelligence that is distinct from abstract or academic intelligence and defined social intelligence as ‘the 
ability to manage and understand men and women, boys and girls, to act wisely in human relations’ 
(Thorndike in Landy, 2006, p.85). Thorndike’s suggestion in 1920 that there may be three facets of 
intelligence: abstract, mechanical and social, arose in an attempt to caution against the narrowness of the 
psychometric instruments used to measure intelligence by demonstrating that intelligence could be 
measured in a number of different ways and revealed in a number of different venues (Landy, 2006). 
Social intelligence was considered to be distinct from abstract or academic intelligence as it was 
proposed to include the comprehension of social behaviour and norms and the regulation of social 
conduct, whereas abstract intelligence involved the ability to understand ideas and symbolic principles, 
and mechanical intelligence involved the ability to learn to understand and manage things and 
mechanisms (Landy, 2006).  
 
Howard Gardner argued that standard tests of intelligence focus extensively on tasks that are not 
relevant to real-life accomplishments (Brody, 2006). Gardner developed a theory of multiple intelligences 
that consisted of six different and independent intelligences: linguistic intelligence, logical mathematical 
intelligence, spatial intelligence, bodily-kinaesthetic intelligence and two forms of personal intelligence: 
interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligence (Brody, 2006). Gardner viewed intelligence as consisting of 
the ability to adapt and solve problems within a large number of contexts, and maintained that human 
intelligence should be defined as a set of abilities rather than as a single construct (Gardner, 1983).  
 
Gardner’s concepts of personal intelligence laid the foundation for later theories of EI. Gardner described 
intrapersonal intelligence as “access to one’s own feeling life” (Gardner, 1983, p. 239) which refers to a 
person's ability to access his or her own range of emotions, to discriminate between these feelings, label 
them and to transform them into symbolism. In this way a person would be able to understand and guide 
his or her own behaviour, thereby effectively regulating his or her life. Gardner also described 
interpersonal intelligence as one’s “ability to notice and make distinctions among other individuals” 
(Gardner, 1983, p. 239). This involves the ability to interpret the intentions, motivations and desires of 
others and to react accordingly by using this knowledge to work effectively with them. Gardner's multiple 
intelligence theory has been supported by findings in neuroscience through the identification of many 
specific neural systems mediating capacities such as theory of mind, recognition of natural kinds, 
understanding of self and understanding of others (Gardner & Moran, 2006). 
 
  
 20 
The theorisation of intelligence as a process is a more modern perception piloted by Sternberg who in his 
book, “Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of human intelligence” (1985), maintains that there are three aspects 
of human information processing: our sensory organs that convert real world occurrences into 
interpretable forms for the brain, the classifying of real world problems into groups or schemes and the 
use of these schemes to live and be successful in the world by adapting to the environment, shaping the 
environment or selecting a new environment. Although Sternberg accepts the evidence for the 
importance of a general intelligence, he believes that standard tests used to assess intelligence fail to 
sample the entire range of human abilities (Brody, 2006). Sternberg’s triarchic theory suggests the need 
for a balance between three fundamental abilities: analytical ability, which is synonymous with the 
conventional measures of cognitive ability, practical intelligence and creative intelligence which are 
perceived to be independent of general intelligence (Brody, 2006).  
 
Landy (2005, 2006) argues that although Thorndike has been credited with first using the phrase ‘social 
intelligence’, his intention was not to separate intelligence into multiple frames of references, which is the 
way in which the theory has been interpreted in previous research on El, but rather to discourage the use 
of only one type of intelligence test as a base for making inferences about the intelligence of an 
individual. Garner also never intended that multiple intelligence theory should represent the definitive 
description of cognitive capacity, but rather that independent yet interacting intelligences provide a better 
understanding of the variety and scope of human adaptability than a singular cognitive intelligence 
(Gardner & Moran, 2006). Gardner’s opinion was that traditional theories of intelligence are too narrow in 
scope and he was trying to develop an alternative, broader conceptualisation rather than just addressing 
criticisms of ‘general intelligence’ (Thingujam, 2002). 
 
Two common themes run through all definitions of intelligence, the ability to learn from experience and 
the ability to adapt to the environment (Sternberg, 1998). Contemporary definitions, however, also include 
aspects of metacognition which refers to the individual's own understanding and control of their thinking 
processes during problem solving, reasoning and decision making, which is lacking in more classical 
definitions.  
 
Thingujam (2002, p. 55) cites Spinoza (1677), who stated that "both emotion and intellect together 
contribute to the ultimate cognitive tool" and Ellis (1962), who maintains that "human emotion and 
thinking are not separate processes, but that they significantly overlap and can never be viewed as 
completely apart from each other". What these classical theorists refer to, is one reason why theorists are 
cautious about the nature of emotional intelligence, as it is possibly only another venue through which the 
actual intelligence of an individual is manifested rather than a unique concept on its own. What makes IQ 
testing in the form of verbal, perceptual speed, number, word fluency, space or visualization and 
mechanical acumen so desirable, is that these abilities are easy to test experimentally. The dominant 
criticisms against theories of intelligence that move beyond simply including cognitive factors, is that the 
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emphasis placed on personal skills and emotional issues clouds the definition of intelligence and blurs the 
distinction between intelligence and other human characteristics such as personality (Hubey, 2002).  
 
The apparent complexity of intelligence, if seen as more than just cognitive factors, brings into question 
the legitimacy of measuring intelligence in a singular objective manner. Mayer et al., (1999) maintain that 
for emotional intelligence to be considered as an intelligence, the testing of El should meet certain 
objective criteria similar to that which is imposed on measures of traditional intelligence. Nevertheless, 
there are theorists who maintain that the psychometric criteria developed in studies of cognitive ability 
may not be applicable to other domains of intelligence, such as managing emotion (Roberts et al., 2001). 
Considering the limitations of traditional testing methods in explaining the neurological and psychological 
complexity of intelligence, the criteria imposed on measures of El may be premature and potentially 
restrict the true complexity of the construct. For that reason, the question arises with regard to whether El 
should be measured as a single construct that exists in its own space, or whether the construct is merely 
too integrated within either intelligence or personality, and existing measures are simply tapping into that 
space. This is, however, a difficult question to examine or demonstrate, primarily due to the identified 
limitations of existing objective ability measures of intelligence, and the difficulty in developing measures 
of EI that can be said to reliably and conclusively predict the existence of the construct (Matthews, et al., 
2003).  
 
The challenge for research is to determine whether there is value in continuing to work with measures of 
El, or whether the overlap with existing measures is so great that the concept becomes redundant. An 
additional question is whether the field of El is not simply rephrasing the theories of Social Intelligence 
developed by Thorndike, or Multiple Intelligences, developed by Gardner, and thereby just 'old wine in 
new bottles' (Landy & Mayer, 2005, para. 19). Sternberg (1988) maintains that intellectual abilities cannot 
be fully understood unless there is also an understanding of how individuals apply them in adapting to the 
demands of their environment. Present research with El, therefore, still has a role in facilitating the 
understanding of human adaptation and interaction. More work, however, needs to be done with the trait-
ability distinction, in order to understand whether research into intelligence can be supplemented by El or 
whether the constructs overlap too extensively with existing personality or trait measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 22 
2.1.2 Can emotions be intelligent? 
 
 
Emotions form a very powerful part of our lives as they mediate not only our interactions, but constitute 
the frame of reference through which we perceive our daily lives and manage interactions from the very 
stressful to the highly mundane. Emotions provide the means with which we coordinate the diverse 
mental and physical components required to respond coherently to the world (Gratch & Marsella, 2004). 
Emotions are a mental and physiological state associated with a wide variety of feelings, thoughts and 
behaviours (Sternberg, 1998).  
 
There are many definitions of emotions, and similarly to intelligence, there is much controversy 
concerning how emotions should be defined and classified. Oatley (2004) argues that the key to 
understanding emotion and similar constructs does not lie in defining them, but in understanding them 
and their implications for everyday life. Premature narrowing and simplifying of emotions will lead to the 
same complications experienced in the field of intelligence, such as the belief that “intelligence is what 
intelligence tests measure” (Boring, cited in Bartholomew, 2004, p. 30). Far greater value can be obtained 
from research into emotions and emotional intelligence, by using research findings to obtain an 
understanding of emotions and intelligence about emotions, in terms of skills that can be put to everyday 
use.  
 
Emotions are regarded as consisting of two components: a physiological component which results in 
distinctive physical reactions to emotions, and a cognitive component that involves interpretation of 
emotions (Sternberg, 1998). Classical philosophers such as Plato viewed emotions as disorganized and 
disruptive to mental activity. Rationalistic values linger in today's cultural beliefs and values, influencing 
social norms and the way in which we communicate and understand emotions (Goleman, 1995).  
 
Leeper in 1984 was one of the first voices to challenge these restrictive views by theorising that emotions 
are organised responses that interact with cognition in a meaningful way, and constitute an essential part 
of people's lives (Sternberg, 1998). Leeper paved the way for psychologists to examine the interaction 
between emotions and cognitions, specifically with regard to the manner in which emotions underlie and 
guide thought. Leeper's view (as cited in Salovey & Mayer, 1990) influenced present impressions of 
emotions as an organizing response that adaptively focuses cognitive activities and subsequent feelings. 
This position ties into Salovey and Mayer's standpoint that emotions are intrinsic to intelligence. They 
view emotions as organized responses which cross the boundaries of many psychological subsystems, 
including the physiological, cognitive, motivational and experiential systems (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). 
Later approaches therefore agree that emotion and cognition are closely linked, yet theorists still disagree 
with regard to which comes first and the exact nature of the interaction between them (Sternberg, 1998).  
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There is no universally accepted consensus concerning the underlying processes that constitute emotion. 
The primary argument revolves around the question of whether emotions arise from physiological 
processes in the body that impact on cognition (e.g. the James-Lange theory), or whether physiological 
processes result in emotions (e.g. Lazarus, 1991). More contemporary theorists such as Damasio (1994) 
maintain that emotions are the result of a combination of physiological and cognitive processes (Gratch & 
Marsella, 2004). Researchers such as Damasio (1997) and Adolphs et al., (2002) hypothesise that there 
is a close relationship between the somatic ability to reconstruct what emotions would feel like and the 
ability to retrieve knowledge about the emotion.  
 
El is one way to reconceptualise the relationship between cognition and emotion. The theory put forward 
by Gratch and Marsella (2004) argues that emotional behaviour is the result of appraisal mechanisms 
which evaluates the individual's present circumstances and coping mechanisms. These appraisal 
mechanisms play the role of associating emotion-relevant information with cognitive operators, which use 
this information to guide responses to the assessment, and bias processing. Emotion is therefore seen as 
playing an essential role in informing cognition in ways not taken into account by traditional intelligence 
models.  
 
This model ties in with Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) view of emotions as adaptive and organized 
responses to internal and external events that have positive or negative consequences for the individual. 
Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2004) conceptualise the relationship between emotion and intelligence in 
terms of five key assumptions:  
a) Emotions share certain essential features that are biologically based. 
b) Simpler emotion may combine to form more complex emotions. 
c) Emotion may be regulated but not fundamentally altered by display rules. 
d) Emotions have the functional purpose of signalling relationships and changes in relationships, 
real or imagined, between people and their environments. 
e) Emotions and cognitions represent different functions of the mind, but interact and are expressed 
in an integrated form.  
 
The biological basis of emotions is being increasingly investigated and accepted by researchers due to 
neurological studies such as those carried out by LeDoux (1996) on the brain activity in rats and other 
animals when experiencing basic and physiologically detectable emotions such as fear. Earlier research 
on the neural basis of emotions was dominated by the theory that the limbic system, a specific circuit 
centred upon the hippocampus, cingulated cortex, prefrontal cortex, septum, amygdala and 
hypothalamus, underpinned emotional behaviour and emotional experience. LeDoux (1996) maintains, 
however, that the limbic system does not in fact exist as there are no formal criteria for identifying it and 
no clear evidence in support of its operation as a system specialised for emotional processing.  
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LeDoux (1996) asserts that different emotions have evolved for different purposes, such as defending 
against danger or caring for offspring, and each emotional function is dependent on different neural 
systems. Research by LeDoux has identified that the amygdala is primarily involved in mediating the 
brain’s fear system, receiving sensory information about the outside world via the thalamus and sensory 
cortex, and projecting to the hypothalamus and brainstem through which behavioural, endocrine and 
autonomic responses are coordinated. At the neurophysiological level, emotion may also influence the 
storage and recall of memories through the interaction between the Amygdala and the hippocampus. 
Both memory and emotion, therefore, seem to be involved in different but interrelated cycles of brain 
activity (Phelps, 2004).  
 
The interactive nature of cognition and emotion has been suggested by previous research which has 
identified that changes in emotional state can alter patterns and styles of thinking. A slight positive mood 
has been found to moderate a tendency towards flexibility in problem solving, as well as improved 
efficiency and thoroughness in decision making. Emotions, such as fear, anger, joy and sadness, have 
also been found to show up in the brain as different patterns of blood flow (Picard, Papert, Bender, 
Blumberg, Breazeal, Cavallo, Machover, Resnick, Roy & Strohecker, 2004). Evidence was provided by 
Adolphs et al., (2002) of dissociable neural systems involved in the knowledge and recognition of 
emotions which are both key factors in the Mayer and Salovey (1997) definition of emotional intelligence.  
 
Adolphs et al., (2002) explored the ability of a patient with brain lesions resulting in severe anterograde 
and retrograde amnesia. The patient was unable to acquire any new declarative knowledge. All language 
and basic functions however, that did not require declarative long term memory were found to be intact. 
The study reported that the patient could use visual information about movements or events relevant to 
the emotional concept to recognise emotion, but was unable to recognise or name emotions from static 
stimuli. This provides evidence that different types of knowledge about emotions draw from different 
neural systems. The study concluded that temporal and limbic-related structures may be the most 
fundamental for retrieving information about emotions signalled by static emotions, but the parietal and 
frontal lobes are primarily responsible for retrieving knowledge about emotions that unfold in real time. 
Studies such as these assist in clarifying the particular neural structures that are involved in reasoning 
about and with emotions. 
 
These findings imply that emotions and cognitions do represent different functions of the mind, however, 
the exact nature of the interaction and the biological nature of the neural pathways involved still need to 
be identified. Averill (2004) raises concerns about the assumption that emotions and cognitive are 
separate processes by pointing out that the same mental and neurological processes may enter into both 
emotional and cognitive behaviours.  
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A finding emanating from the research conducted by LeDoux (1996) is that the connectivity of the 
amygdala with the neo-cortex is not symmetrical. The ability of the amygdala to control the cortex is 
greater than the ability of the cortex to control the amygdale, which implies that emotional reactions can 
be elicited by the brain independently of conscious thought processes. Emotions are probably mostly 
processed at an unconscious level and thus we may have limited cognitive control over emotions, 
consequently, LeDoux maintains that emotions are computational functions of the nervous system rather 
than conscious feelings. These types of findings impact on the theoretical assumptions of emotional 
intelligence research especially with regard to assumptions that EI can be learned or consciously altered 
in situations of social bias.  
 
A point of some controversy is that LeDoux’s theories do not address emotions in general, but are 
focused on fear. This is acknowledged in LeDoux (1995, p.222) who anticipates that the understanding of 
the neural basis of fear will generalise to other emotions, or indicate how best to study them. At present 
there is limited understanding of the neural basis of other emotions such as happiness or contentment, as 
well as the nature of the conscious experience of emotions (Everitt, 1997). Although the findings of 
neuroscientific research into emotion will facilitate the exploration of emotion and similar factors such as 
self, personality, and social behaviour that have been previously neglected by cognitive science, there is 
still limited understanding of the relationship between conscious feelings and emotions as well as 
cognitive-emotional interactions.  
 
 
 
2.2.  EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
 
 
Theories of emotional intelligence overlap with Gardner's (1983) personal intelligences and expand on 
theories of social intelligence by recognizing emotions as an integral part of human experience and 
intelligence (Van Staaden, 2001). Emotional intelligence represents an ability to reason with emotions 
and to use emotions to enhance thought. El is considered to be a general framework that allows for the 
identification of specific skills needed for an individual to signal and respond to changes in relationships 
within the environment in which he or she functions, rather than a disorganized response. The 
assumption that El researchers make is that an enhanced awareness and understanding of emotional 
states and the reasons for emotional reactions, result in more effective problem solving. As a result, 
emotionally intelligent people may be more adaptable in complex social and interpersonal situations 
(Austin, Saklofske & Egan, 2005) and could therefore be better equipped to function optimally in 
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demanding environments. High levels of El have been credited with enhancing a person's likelihood of 
succeeding both occupationally and interpersonally (Caruso, 1999) in a number of environments. El could 
therefore be a large contributor to a person's ability to adapt their goals and thinking styles to the 
requirements of the environment, especially within a study or occupational environment.  
 
Emotional intelligence is a construct first formulated by Salovey and Mayer (1990) as an umbrella 
concept comprising of three distinct concepts namely, the appraisal and expression of emotions, 
regulation of emotions, and utilisation of emotional information in thinking and acting. This model of El 
was initially defined as a subset of social intelligence, but was subsequently altered (Mayer & Salovey, 
1997) to include thinking about feelings and give more emphasis on cognitive processes. The inclusion of 
a fourth branch resulted in a hierarchy of mental abilities that included firstly the perception, appraisal and 
expression of emotion, secondly the emotional facilitation of thinking, thirdly understanding, analysing and 
employing emotional knowledge, and finally the reflective regulation of emotions to promote further 
emotional and intellectual growth (Van der Zee, Thijs & Schakel, 2002).  
 
Daniel Goleman was responsible for the popularisation of El in 1995 with the publication of a best selling 
book “Emotional Intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ”, that made a number of extraordinary 
claims regarding the capacity of El to predict success over and above cognitive ability. Since then EI has 
been the focus of numerous articles and debates both within the popular and academic press. A number 
of commercial tests have been developed and sold on the basis of these theories, and the concept has 
been taken up in businesses and education with consultation services developed to teach and consult on 
El (Matthews, Roberts & Zeidner, 2004). The controversy that surrounds EI is centred on three core 
concerns: the nature and definition of the construct, whether the construct is sufficiently distinct from 
existing personality and ability theories, and the true importance and unique relevance of EI (Matthews et 
al., 2004). 
 
The first disagreement is centred on the definition of EI and what EI really means, which has resulted in 
controversies about how EI should be measured. El is perceived by some researchers to be an ability 
involving cognitive processing of emotional information, whereas other theorists view El as a dispositional 
tendency such as personality. There is not only a lack of consensus surrounding the true nature of EI, but 
theorists also disagree on how the differences between EI theories should be classified. Mayer et al., 
(2000a) drew a distinction between mixed models, which include a range of personality variables and 
ability models, which define El solely on a cognitive basis. Mixed models of El were described as defining 
the construct as a complex interaction of cognition, metacognition, mood, emotions and personality that is 
applied in both interpersonal and intrapersonal contexts (Matthews et al., 2003). For example, in mixed 
models, EI was described as an ability, but accompanying personality characteristics such as warmth, 
outgoingness and persistence (Mayer et al., 2000a), were often included in the definition of the construct. 
 
  
 27 
Petrides and Furnham (2000a, 2003) opposed the distinction between ability and mixed models and 
argued that the EI theory should distinguish between El models on a functional basis, as the theoretical 
perspectives of the two domains overlap. Petrides and Furnham differentiate between trait El which can 
be measured by a self-report questionnaire, and ability El which requires a performance test with correct 
and incorrect answers. They propose that it is the type of measurement that determines the nature of the 
model, rather than the underlying theory. 
 
Petrides and Furnham (2000a) view trait El as cross-situational consistencies in behaviour that are part of 
personality and assessed with self-report inventories that measure typical behaviour. Trait El, otherwise 
known as emotional self-efficacy, is defined as "a constellation of behavioural dispositions and self-
perceptions concerning one's ability to recognize, process, and utilise emotion-laden information" 
(Petrides, Frederickson & Furnham, 2004a, p. 278). Trait El is therefore seen as combining elements of 
personality theory such as empathy, impulsivity and assertiveness as well as combining elements of 
Thorndike's social intelligence and Gardner's personal intelligences (Petrides et al., 2004a). Self-report 
based measures are differentiated from performance measures as these scales simply ask test takers 
their self-reported beliefs about their own emotional intelligence, and thereby rely solely on an internal 
appraisal of performance that measures typical behaviour (Matthews et al., 2003; Petrides & Furnham, 
2001). These measures seem to be more related to well-established personality traits, largely due to the 
tendency for personality measures to be based on self-report techniques (Zeng & Miller, 2003).  
 
Ability El is seen as a cognitive-emotional ability (Petrides & Furnham, 2003), or a form of information-
processing El that is related more to traditional intelligence, and thereby measures maximal behaviour 
using performance tests (Petrides & Furnham, 2000a). Ability El is defined as "one's actual ability to 
recognize, process, and utilise emotion-laden information” (Petrides et al., 2004a, p. 278). The 
information-processing model views emotions as a source of information about the world, the self and 
others that the mind can process and utilise to construct adaptive emotional responses, thought and 
behaviour. This distinction has far-reaching implications for the operationalisation of the construct, for 
example asking a respondent whether they believe they are good at identifying emotions, is very different 
from observing their ability to correctly identify emotions.  
 
The second controversy is a result of bold claims about the importance and relevance of EI. Evidence is 
accumulating that El is a widely influential and valuable construct in modern day psychology in both 
individual and occupational realms. Concerns regarding the application of El centre mainly on the 
difficulty in accurately defining and assessing the measurement, largely because of the varying definitions 
of the construct and the difficulty inherent in attempting to measure subjective abilities (Petrides & 
Furnham, 2003).  
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A reason for these concerns is that many of the models and arguments employed, especially with regard 
to predictive validity, have ignored the conceptual differences between trait and ability El (Pérez et al., 
2005). Previous research has investigated trait El and ability El as if they were the same construct and 
researchers were previously evaluating a personality trait as if it were a cognitive ability which according 
to Petrides et al., (2004b) is erroneous. As a result researchers attempted to force trait El, measured 
through self-report instruments, into complying with the strict objective rules held by intelligence 
measurement. Trait El according to Petrides et al., (2004b) is by nature not a construct that can be 
measured objectively due to the interpersonal components. People's internal emotional states cannot be 
measured objectively as they are dependent on the individual's personal experiences and perceptions. 
Consequently, research has revealed very low correlations between measures of ability and trait El 
(O'Connor & Little, 2003; Warwick & Nettelbeck, 2004), and therefore, the two areas need to be seen as 
two different measurement trends that should be studied and assessed differently.  
 
Harsh criticism has been levelled against the construct of EI (Matthews et al., 2003). One potential 
reason for this is the attention that more popular mixed models have received from the media, and the 
corresponding exaggerated and unscientific claims concerning what El actually is, and the extent of its 
influence on everyday life. An example is the claim made by Goleman (1995, 1998), a chief proponent of 
the mixed model conception of El, who maintained that if IQ tests are known to predict 20% of the 
variance in performance, then El must account for the remaining 80%. A major critique of Goleman's 
model of El, however, is that it includes an extensive list of personality traits, such as ‘getting along with 
others’, self-motivation, persistence, controlling impulses, empathizing and mood regulation (Markin, 
2005). 
 
The third disagreement involves whether EI is simply a new name for existing constructs that are better 
defined and measured through well established theories. The question that remains to be answered is 
whether El is simply a theory about personality, a form of intelligence, or a combination of both. Research 
focussed on contributing towards defining the relationship between trait and ability El would therefore 
facilitate either the acceptance of the usefulness of the constructs in predicting important facets of 
everyday life, or possibly contribute to rising arguments on whether or not to redefine the construct or 
abandon it completely (Landy, 2005). 
 
2.2.1. Emotional intelligence as an ability 
 
 
Mayer and Salovey revised their ability model of EI in 1997, placing more emphasis on cognitive 
components and re-interpreting El in terms of potential for intellectual and emotional growth. This model 
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views El as a form of a cognitive ability, which is subjected to the same laws that govern traditional 
conceptions of intelligence (Matthews et al., 2003). El is treated as a new form of intelligence consisting 
of a group of underlying intelligence factors that are necessary to develop El skills such as the ability to 
understand and to reason with emotional information and to combine thought and emotion to effectively 
perform in specific situations (Wakeman, 2006; Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  
 
This view of El as an intelligence is unique to the ability model and focuses on measuring El through 
actual mental performance rather than self-reported personality traits, behaviour observed by others, or 
competency levels that a person may or may not actually possess. The model states that in the same 
way as traditional intelligence, mental problems have right or wrong answers, measured skills correlate 
with other measures of mental ability and ability level increases with age (Mayer et al., 2000a). Although 
Salovey and Mayer (1990) originally defined El as a trait, these theorists later argued that other ideas of 
El are misleading and that the use of the term implies an intelligence that processes and benefits from 
emotions (Mayer et al., 2000a). This model of El, on the other hand, views emotions as working together 
with thinking rather than as working in opposition to thinking. Emotions are recognized as containing data 
and information that can be used to optimize decisions (Markin, 2005). Mayer et al., (2000a) view El as 
an ability to recognise the meanings of emotional patterns in social interactions and to reason and solve 
problems on the basis of them.  
 
The model of ability El is hierarchical with the levels being seen as a series of conceptually related 
developmental stages, from the most basic psychological processes to the more psychologically complex 
and integrated processes that a person passes through successively, including (1) the ability to perceive 
emotions, (2) the ability to utilise emotion to facilitate reasoning, (3) the capacity to understand the 
meaning of emotions and the information they convey and (4) the ability to effectively regulate and 
manage emotion (Mayer et al., 2000a). The perception, appraisal and expression of emotions are viewed 
as the most basic processes consisting of core capacities that include identifying feelings and thoughts 
through proper and appropriate words in self and others. The reflective regulation of emotions is seen as 
the highest developmental stage that requires the most complex processing and involves a more 
integrated ability to consciously and reflectively regulate emotion to promote emotional and intellectual 
growth (Mayer et al., 2000a). Within each of the components, abilities build on each other through 
development (Mayer et al., 1999; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). 
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2.2.1.1. The four branches of emotional intelligence  
 
 
Branch 1: Perception and identification of emotions  
 
The first branch reflects the ability to accurately perceive or recognize emotions in the self and in the 
facial features or postural expressions of other people as well as in pictures, voices and cultural artefacts 
(Salovey & Grewal, 2005). This branch of emotional intelligence includes both verbal and non-verbal cues 
and involves recognition of emotion as it happens and an ability to label those emotions correctly (Jopie 
van Rooyen & Partners [JVR], 2007). This is the lowest level of emotional intelligence and supports the 
assumption that emotional intelligence improves with age, as evidence was reported in previous research 
that children from the age of four can accurately identify the emotions suggested by about half the faces 
they see, and from six years of age children are 75% correct (Profyt & Whissel, cited in Salovey, Hsee & 
Mayer, 1993).  
 
Emotional intelligence at this level has been inversely related with Alexithymia, which is a condition that 
prevents people from verbally expressing emotions supposedly because they have difficulty identifying 
those feelings (Salovey, Woolery, & Mayer, 2001). People who suffer from Alexithymia have difficulty 
distinguishing emotions and realising that some physical sensations are the manifestation of emotions. 
They thus have a deficit in emotional information processing and the conscious expression of emotion 
(Salovey et al., 2001), which lends credibility to the construct validity of the subscale in measuring 
emotion processing abilities.  
 
Accurate appraisal of emotions in others is important to adaptive social interaction and the ability to 
respond flexibly to social environments, and build supportive social networks (Salovey et al., 2001). It is 
at this level that an individual begins to understand how others might feel in a particular circumstance and 
appreciate different points of view. People with a low score on this branch are said to possibly 
overanalyse emotions in faces and struggle with attending to non-verbal cues. These people are 
therefore more likely to resist ascribing negative emotions to people (JVR, 2007). 
 
 
This branch involves the capacity of emotions to assist in intellectual processing and is reflected in the 
ability of emotions to direct positive action. Salovey and Mayer maintain that part of intelligence involves 
developing a knowledge base about experiences on which intelligences can draw. The utilisation of 
Branch 2: Using emotion to facilitate reasoning 
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emotion-based knowledge deals with the advantage that people who possess this ability have, in solving 
problems adaptively (Salovey & Mayer, 1990).  
 
This branch acknowledges that emotions generally influence problem-solving outcomes (Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990). Firstly, emotional fluctuations may influence the generation of future plans. Secondly, 
positive emotions may facilitate the organization of cognitive material so that diverse ideas are seen as 
more related and better integrated. Thirdly, emotion interrupts complex systems, labelling them and 
focussing them on needs of higher priority. Lastly, emotions and moods are seen as motivational sources 
in performing complex intellectual tasks (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). This ability also allows the shifting of 
emotion from optimistic to pessimistic, allowing the individual to consider multiple perspectives and the 
role emotions play in the encouragement of problem-solving (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  
 
At this level an individual begins to understand how others might feel in a particular circumstance and see 
different points of view. As a result people high in this branch are able to harness their own emotions in 
order to focus on problem solving and assist with planning (JVR, 2007). People with a low score on this 
branch struggle to feel empathy with other people as well as have low levels of creativity (JVR, 2007). 
 
 
Branch 3: Understanding emotion 
 
The third branch involves the capacity to analyse emotions, understand their probable trends over time as 
well as understand outcomes. The development of this branch is associated with the growth of language 
and prepositional thought. This branch firstly involves the ability to label emotions and to recognize the 
relationship between emotions and words, secondly it involves the ability to see the meaning that 
emotions convey about relationships of various intensity and similarity, thirdly the ability allows the 
understanding of complex feelings, and lastly it involves the understanding of transitions between 
emotions, such as from anger to shame (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; JVR, 2007). It is at this level that 
individuals recognise the variations of each emotion. People who have low scores on this ability may 
have problems with understanding another's point of view and may have little insight into people. 
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Table 1: Mayer & Salovey’s (1997) ability model of emotional intelligence 
 
 
Branch Name Brief description of abilities 
Perception & 
expression of 
emotion 
Involves the verbal and non-verbal perception of emotion in self and others: 
 Ability to identify emotion in oneself 
 Ability to identify emotion in other people and objects, art, stories, music and other 
stimuli 
 Ability to express emotions accurately, and to express needs related to those 
feelings 
 Ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate, or honest and dishonest 
expressions of feelings 
Assimilating 
emotions in 
thought 
 
Involves the capacity of emotions to assist thinking: 
 Ability to generate emotions to solve problems and facilitate creativity 
 Ability to prioritise thinking based on feelings  
 Ability to generate or emulate vivid emotions to facilitate judgements and memories 
concerning feelings 
 Ability to capitalize on mood swings to consider multiple points of view and integrate 
with reasoning 
Understanding of 
emotions 
 
Involves the capacity to analyse emotions, understand their trends and predict 
outcomes: 
 Ability to understand how different emotions are related with regard to intensity and 
similarity 
 Ability to perceive the causes and consequences of feelings 
 Ability to interpret complex feelings, such as emotional blends and contradictory 
feeling states 
 Ability to understand and predict likely transitions between emotions 
Regulation or 
management of 
emotions 
 
Involves the management of emotion in relation to individual goals, self-
knowledge and social awareness and therefore related to personality: 
 Ability to monitor and reflect on emotions 
 Ability to be open to pleasant and unpleasant feelings 
 Reflectively engage, prolong, or detach from an emotional state at appropriate 
times 
 Ability to understand emotions without exaggerating or minimising importance 
 Ability to manage emotion in oneself and others 
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2.2.2. Emotional intelligence as a trait 
Branch 4: Adaptive regulation of emotion in the self and others 
 
The fourth branch reflects the management of emotions which involves the rest of personality. Emotions 
are managed in the context of an individual's personal environment such as goals, self-knowledge and 
social awareness (JVR, 2007). This domain engages firstly the ability to regulate one's own emotions: 
that is, the ability to soothe oneself, to shake off rampant anxiety, gloom or irritability. People who excel in 
this domain bounce back quicker from life's setbacks and upsets, while those who fare poorly in this area 
are constantly battling feelings of distress (Goleman, 1995; Salovey et al., 1993). Secondly, it involves the 
ability to manage emotions in others.  
 
The highest level concerns the ability to recognize and appreciate both pleasant and unpleasant feelings 
in the self and in others. Judging emotion truthfully for what it is and using the information to grow 
intellectually expresses the essence of this level. High scores on this branch is firstly reflected in the 
ability to stay open to emotion and, secondly, in the ability to reflectively engage and detach from an 
emotion. Thirdly, it involves the ability to monitor one's own emotion in relation to oneself and others and, 
lastly, the ability to manage emotion in oneself and others by recognizing the information they convey and 
moderating negative emotion whilst enhancing pleasant ones (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Mayer et al., 
1999). People with a low ability to manage emotions are considered to be overly emotional, are controlled 
by their own emotions and become overwhelmed by situations (JVR, 2007).  
 
According to Salovey and Mayer (1990), the regulation of emotion was included in the construct of 
emotional intelligence because it is necessary to account for awareness and control over emotional 
processes. Positive, emotionally intelligent individuals are thus able to control their own and others' 
moods and even manage emotions to motivate others to productive ends (Salovey & Mayer, 1990). 
 
 
 
 
There is an overabundance of different theories and models of El as a trait which are too many to discuss 
in this review. A number of the models, such as the EI model developed by Schutte et al., (1998), are 
based on the same theoretical basis as the ability model developed by Mayer and Salovey (1997), with 
the main difference being that the abilities discussed are measured through self-report rather than 
objective measures. The psychometric properties of trait measurement instruments such as the Schutte 
Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test (SSREIT) are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Other 
measures such as those developed by Reuven Bar-On and Daniel Goleman include a variety of other 
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characteristics such as motivation, states of consciousness and social ability as a part of El (Mayer et al., 
2000a). The trait models of El are summarised in Table 2.  
 
Bar-On views El as "an array of non-cognitive capabilities, competencies and skills that influence one's 
ability to succeed in coping with environmental demands and pressures" (Bar-On cited in Matthews et al., 
2003, p. 15). This model includes clusters of well-established personality traits with a mental ability 
conception of El. Bar-On developed the Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i) that measures self-reported 
abilities and the potential for performance (Matthews et al., 2003). Critique of Bar-On's definition of El is 
that the construct is too broad and contains too many aspects of personality (Zeng & Miller, 2003). Mayer 
et al., (2000a) have criticised this theory for lacking internal consistency and being difficult to evaluate.  
 
Goleman (1995) defines El as including "abilities such as being able to motivate oneself and persist in the 
face of frustrations, to control impulse and delay gratification, to regulate one's moods and keep distress 
from swamping the ability to think, to empathise and to hope" (Goleman 1995, p. 34). This theory is 
described by Goleman as a theory of performance (Goleman 1998) and defined as being directly 
applicable to the domain of work and organisational effectiveness. The Emotional Competence Inventory 
(ECI) was developed in order to measure his version of El. Goleman has been criticised for being overly 
inclusive and incorporating many of the well-established aspects of personality such as empathy, 
motivation, warmth and social skills (Matthews et al., 2003). The definition and the categories have been 
criticised for not being related to each other, problematic and as "simply being a journalist distilling 
scientific information for the consumption of the populist rather than a legitimate scientific theory" 
(Matthews et al., 2003, p. 14).  
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Table 2: Core trait models and corresponding measures of emotional intelligence  
 
Salovey & Mayer (1990) Mayer & Salovey (1997) 
 
3 Levels
- Monitor emotions  
: 
- Discriminate between emotions 
- Use emotions to guide thinking and 
actions 
 
- Appraisal 
4 Hierarchical levels: 
- Understanding 
- Regulation 
- Utilisation 
Instrument: TMMS (Salovey et al., 1995), SSREIT (Schutte et al., 1998) 
Emotional Quotient, Bar-On (1997) 
 
- Intrapersonal intelligence (Emotional self-awareness, Assertiveness, Self-regard, Self-
actualisation, Independence)  
5 Broad areas of functioning and 15 factors: 
- Interpersonal intelligence (Empathy, Interpersonal relationships, Social responsibility) 
- Adaptability (Problem solving, Reality testing, Flexibility) 
- Stress management (Stress tolerance, Impulse control) 
- General mood (Happiness, Optimism)  
Instrument: EQ-i (Bar-On, 1997) 
 
Emotional Competence Inventory, Goleman (1995) 
 
- Self-Awareness 
5 Competencies: 
- Self-Control 
- Motivation 
- Empathy 
- Social Skills 
Instrument: ECI (Goleman, 1995) 
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2.3. EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND COGNITIVE THINKING STYLES 
 
 
 
Theories of cognitive thinking styles were developed as a component of personality trait theory to 
facilitate the understanding of the interaction between cognitive abilities and styles of thinking or thinking 
traits (Sternberg, 1994a, 1997). Theorists have established that personality is moderated by cognitive 
thinking styles in the effect on behaviour (Riding & Wigley, 1997) and as a result, styles can be defined as 
higher-order personality traits which assist in explaining trends displayed by people when dealing with 
and solving cognitive problems for example, consideration of cognitive style differences may give insight 
into why people in similar situations use different decision making processes as variation in strategic 
choices may reflect alternative style preferences. Thinking styles are distinguished from personality traits, 
as personality traits influence daily actions compared to cognitive styles, which influence the manner in 
which people approach and solve cognitive problems (Fjell & Walhovd, 2004) both academically and in 
other facets of everyday functioning.  
 
The potential relationship between thinking styles and emotional intelligence is an avenue through which 
the validity of the delineation between trait and ability El could be assessed. One of the only studies to 
date to assess the relations between El and thinking styles, examined the degree to which a measure of 
trait El overlaps with a measure of cognitive thinking styles, and evidence was reported for the predicted 
relations between these two constructs (Murphy, 2006). If both measures of EI are found to correlate in 
similar directions with a measure of thinking styles then these measures can be considered as measuring 
the same construct, however, if the pattern of relationships is different then it can be inferred that they are 
measuring different aspects of EI or different constructs altogether. The present study further examines 
the relationships of both ability and trait El with thinking styles, as well as the incremental validity of these 
measures over thinking styles in predicting job satisfaction. 
 
 
2.3.1. The foundation of thinking styles: The theory of mental self-government  
 
 
The theory of thinking styles was formed by Sternberg in 1988 and was based on the theory of mental 
self-government which attempts to explain how individuals use their patterns of thought to adapt to their 
environment and select the type of environment that best suits their abilities and needs. Sternberg's 
theory was motivated primarily by a need to develop the limited theories of thinking styles available 
(Zhang, 2001b) and to combine the different threads of research on styles into one comprehensive theory 
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(Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1995b). Thinking styles are defined as a personality attribute that guides the 
utilisation of abilities (Sternberg, 1994a). People vary in the ways that they prefer to use their abilities and 
are often more comfortable using a certain style or strategy across a variation of situations (Sternberg, 
1990), therefore, a style of thinking is a preference for a certain way of cognitive processing, or the 
process used to solve a problem (Sternberg, 1990).  
 
The theory of mental self-government maintains that cognitive styles are an interface between 
intelligence and personality, and that success in life does not just depend on how well we think, but also 
on how we think (Sternberg, 1997). Theories of cognitive thinking styles pair certain styles of thinking with 
certain methods of communicating information and the theory proposes thirteen thinking styles that fall 
along five dimensions. These are functions (including the legislative, executive and judicial thinking 
styles), forms (including the hierarchical, oligarchic, monarchic and anarchic styles), levels (including the 
local and global styles), scopes (including the internal and external styles) and leanings, (including the 
liberal and conservative styles). Table 3 outlines the thirteen thinking style categories and provides 
explanations of each style.  
 
Thinking styles are seen as largely flexible traits that can be learned and people can alternate styles of 
thinking to adapt to varying contexts or problems (Sternberg, 1994a, 1997). Similarly to El, styles are also 
seen as differing with age and experience. Contrary to El however, styles are not considered as 
hierarchical or right or wrong, rather the effectiveness of a style is determined by the match between the 
style and the situation to which it is being applied (Sternberg, 1997; Cilliers & Sternberg, 2001; Sternberg 
& Grigorenko, 1995a). 
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2.3.2. Explanation of the categories of thinking styles 
 
 
A brief overview of the categories of each of the thinking styles follows (Sternberg, 1997): 
 
 
2.3.2.1. Functions of thinking styles 
 
 
The legislative style characterises people who enjoy creating and formulating new ideas. Individuals who 
prefer the legislative style like to do things their own way and make their own rules. These people prefer 
problems that are not pre-structured for them, but rather that they can structure for themselves. 
Legislative people also prefer creative and constructive planning-based activities, such as writing papers, 
designing projects and creating new business or educational systems. In many environments legislative 
people are often viewed as not fitting in as they want to do things in their own way and therefore do not 
do very well in environments that have a fixed way of doing things. 
 
The executive style characterises people who are implementers. Executive people prefer to follow rules 
and prefer to be given guidance and structure. Executive people also like to enforce rules and laws and 
rely on existing methods to complete tasks or master a situation. Executive people will tend to be valued 
by organisations that want people to do things in a way that appeals to a set of rules or guidelines.  
 
The judicial style characterises people who like to evaluate rules and procedures and to judge things. 
Judicial people prefer problems in which they can analyse and evaluate existing rules, ways and ideas. 
Types of activities that judicial people prefer include delivering critiques, giving opinions, judging people 
and their work and evaluating programs. 
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Table 3: Thinking styles categories and explanations 
 
FUNCTIONS 
Legislative style The person prefers tasks requiring creative strategies. 
Executive style 
The person is more concerned with the implementation of tasks with set 
guidelines. 
Judicial style 
The person focuses attention on evaluating the products of other’s 
activities. 
FORMS 
Monarchic style 
The person prefers tasks that allow complete focus on one thing at a 
time. 
Hierarchical style 
The person prefers to distribute attention across several tasks that are 
prioritised. 
Oligarchic style 
The person prefers to work toward multiple objectives during the same 
period of time, but without setting clear priorities. 
Anarchic style The person prefers working on tasks that require no system at all. 
LEVELS 
Local style The person prefers tasks requiring working with details. 
Global style 
The person pays more attention to abstract ideas and the overall picture 
regarding an issue. 
SCOPE 
Internal style 
The person prefers being engaged in tasks that allow working 
independently. 
External style 
The person prefers being engaged in tasks that provide opportunities for 
developing interpersonal relationships. 
LEANINGS 
Liberal style The person prefers novelty and ambiguity. 
Conservative style 
The person adheres to existing rules and procedures in performing 
tasks. 
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2.3.2.2. Forms of thinking styles 
 
 
The monarchic style characterises people who tend to be motivated by a single goal or need at a time. 
Monarchic people focus single-mindedly on one task or aspect of a task until it is completed. People who 
prefer this style perform better in areas that match their interests but less well in areas that do not.  
 
The hierarchical style characterises people who tend to be motivated by a hierarchy of goals, with the 
recognition that not all of the goals can be fulfilled equally well and that some goals are more important 
than others. Hierarchical people tend to be priority setters who allocate resources carefully. They tend to 
be systematic and organised in their solutions to problems and in their decision making.  
 
The oligarchic style characterises people who tend to be motivated by several, often competitive goals of 
equally perceived importance. Oligarchic people have trouble deciding which goals to give priority to. The 
result is that they may have trouble allocating resources. When there is sufficient time to complete tasks 
this may not show through, however, if there is a lack of resources these people often need guidance or 
assistance to effectively complete tasks. Oligarchic people are often flexible and can adapt quickly to 
changing circumstances. 
 
The anarchic style characterises people who tend to be motivated by a wide assortment of needs and 
goals and do not like to be tied down to systems, rules, or particular approaches to problems. They tend 
to be not so much asystematic as antisystematic. Anarchic people often challenge systems, not on 
principle, but for the sake of challenging authority figures. People who prefer this style use a random 
approach to solving problems and have trouble setting priorities because they do not have firm sets of 
rules upon which to base these priorities. Anarchic people have a potential for creativity that is rare in 
others as they are not constrained by boundaries of thought and action that people usually succumb to. 
 
 
2.3.2.3. Levels of thinking styles 
 
 
The global style characterises people who prefer to deal with general problems and often abstract issues 
or the big picture. Global people tend to conceptualise and work in the world of ideas. People who prefer 
this style struggle to deal with tasks that involve fine detail.  
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The local style characterises people who prefer to deal with specific, concrete details that often require 
precision to complete.  
 
 
2.3.2.4. Scope of thinking styles 
 
 
The internal style characterises people who prefer tasks that allow them to work independently of others. 
People with an internal style tend to be introverted, task-oriented, sometimes aloof and socially less 
sensitive than other people. At times they also lack interpersonal awareness, if only because they do not 
focus on it. Internal people do not like group work.  
 
The external style characterises people who prefer tasks that allow them to work with people through 
interaction. External people tend to be more extroverted, people-oriented, outgoing, socially more 
sensitive and interpersonally more aware. 
 
 
2.3.2.5. Leanings of thinking styles 
 
 
The liberal style characterises individuals who like to go beyond existing rules and procedures and seek 
to maximise change. Liberal people seek or are comfortable with ambiguous situations and prefer some 
degree of unfamiliarity in life and work. They tend to be receptive to new ways of thinking. 
 
The conservative style characterises individuals who prefer to adhere to existing rules and procedures, 
minimise change, avoid ambiguous situations where possible and prefer familiarity in life and work. 
Conservative people follow traditions and although they may come up with their own ideas these ideas 
are grounded in existing and accepted customs. They tend to resist new ways of doing things. 
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2.3.3. The properties and application of thinking styles 
 
 
The basis of the theory of mental self-government is that people choose styles of managing themselves 
and their everyday interactions within which they are most comfortable. People are seen as flexible and 
will intrinsically attempt to adapt their styles of thinking to the demands of the situations in which they find 
themselves (Sternberg, 1988, 1990, 1994a, 1997). Similarly to El, styles are seen as a form of social 
conformity and can therefore be influenced or modified by the social or cultural environment (Zhang, 
2005a), often changing with time and life demands. Styles are defined as continuous rather than 
dichotomous and are not considered as good or bad, rather the effectiveness of the style depends on the 
task and the situation in which the task is being performed (Sternberg, 1994a).  
 
 
Figure 1: The grouping of thinking styles categories into the three classes 
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Research into thinking styles has indicated that they can be categorised into three classes (Zhang, 2000, 
2001a, 2002a, 2002b; Zhang & Sternberg, 2000). The first class (type I thinking styles) involves thinking 
styles that generate creativity and utilise higher levels of cognitive complexity. The styles in this group 
include the legislative, judicial, hierarchical, global and liberal styles. The second class (type II thinking 
styles) includes styles that are norm-favouring and simplistic. The styles in this group are the executive, 
local, monarchic and conservative styles. The third combination of styles (type III thinking styles) draws 
on characteristics of both of the previous two types depending on the situation wherein the styles are 
used. These styles include the anarchic, oligarchic, internal and external styles.  
 
Research into the applicability of thinking styles has mostly taken place in school or university settings 
and few studies have been conducted which examine thinking styles within occupational contexts. There 
have been several examples provided of the relationship between thinking styles and academic success. 
In spite of this, similar confirmation within occupational contexts is somewhat lacking. Sternberg 
emphasises that styles are as important as abilities and although abilities indicate whether a student has 
the potential to succeed in a career, his or her thinking style is indicative of whether the student will be 
able to adapt to the resulting career environment (Sternberg, 1990, 1997, 2003a).  
 
A number of studies have provided support for the validity of the theory of mental self-government in real 
life contexts. Evidence has been provided of the predictive validity of thinking styles in mediating school 
success amongst scholars (Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1995a). Park, Park and Choe (2005) in addition 
identified that students who were defined as gifted had a preference towards using legislative, global, 
judicial and liberal thinking styles (type I styles), whereas students that were not defined as gifted were 
more inclined to use executive, oligarchic and conservative thinking styles (type II styles). Thinking styles 
that were found to be positively associated with academic achievement included conservative, hierarchal 
and internal styles. Styles such as legislative, liberal and external styles on the other hand, were found to 
be negatively associated with academic achievement (Zhang & Sternberg, 1998).  
 
Zhang and Sternberg (2000) investigated the relationship between thinking styles and the theory of 
learning styles proposed by Biggs (1995) and realised that students who utilise mainly a deep approach 
to learning or attempt to employ a real understanding of study material, use type I thinking styles, and that 
students who use mainly a surface approach or the use of rote-learning approaches to learning use 
predominantly type II thinking styles. Zhang (2002a, 2002b) also found that there is a significant 
relationship between thinking styles that are more norm-conforming and simplistic, and analytical modes 
of thinking. They also identified that styles which are more creativity-generating and complex are related 
to holistic modes of thinking. The reliability and validity of thinking styles are discussed extensively in 
Chapter 3. 
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2.4. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the purpose of the study as well as a review of the origins of 
intelligence theory and the potential for intelligence in emotions. The distinction between trait and ability 
EI was discussed specifically regarding the nature of the differences in theoretical properties that result in 
the distinction between the two constructs and the practical implication of this distinction. The chapter 
further investigated the nature and properties of thinking styles, and the rationale for the potential 
relationship with ability and trait models of emotional intelligence was introduced. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY ISSUES OF THE INSTRUMENTS USED TO MEASURE EMOTIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND COGNITIVE THINKING STYLES 
 
 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the theoretical and methodological differences that underlie ability and trait EI 
have resulted in a number of difficulties in conclusively defining the nature of the EI construct as either an 
intelligence or a personality trait. The aim of this chapter is to review and discuss issues with reliability 
and validity that has been identified by previous research studies with the most prominent measures of 
trait and ability EI, particularly regarding the measurement instruments that are examined in the present 
study. The chapter will also focus on examining how the self-report instruments within the trait model and 
the objective performance instruments within the ability model of El have correlated with personality 
factors and cognitive abilities. Previous research that supports or refutes the hypothesis that self-report 
and ability El instruments measure EI constructs beyond that explained by existing measures of 
personality and intelligence, will be reviewed. This chapter will also examine the reliability and validity of 
the measure of cognitive thinking styles used in the research. The chapter concludes with the research 
questions and hypotheses to be tested.  
 
 
 
 
3.1. MEASURES OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
 
 
3.1.1. Performance based measures of emotional intelligence  
 
 
Ability models of El are concerned with the abilities to identify, express, label and manage emotions and 
are therefore based primarily on external appraisals of performance (Matthews et al., 2003; Petrides & 
Furnham, 2001). It has been argued that ability-based scales involving items, for which there are more or 
less correct answers, will provide the most valid assessment of El (Mayer et al., 2000a). The ability model 
maintains that for El to be justified as an intelligence, it must be measured based on an individual’s 
performance, rather than through self-reported questionnaires (Matthews et al., 2003).  
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This model contains the only measures available that claim to measure El in such an objective fashion. 
The Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS) is the original instrument created by Mayer and 
Salovey (1997) to measure how well people solve emotional problems on performance tasks rather than 
relying on people's subjective assessment of their emotional skills. The MEIS consisted of 402 items and 
12 ability measures divided into the four dimensions of El (Mayer et al., 2000a). The dimensions include 
identifying emotions, facilitating emotions, understanding emotions and managing emotions. Analysis of 
the data provided five scores, one for each branch and one for total El. Some of the subscales had low 
reliability scores and problems with scoring procedures (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).  
 
The test was later revised into the MSCEIT V1.0 (Mayer et al., 2002) and the MSCEIT V2.0 (Mayer, 
Salovey, Caruso & Sitarenios, 2003). These measures differ from the MEIS in that certain items and 
subtests have been revised and replaced and the subtests are comprised of fewer items. As the MSCEIT 
V2.0 is an improvement on the earlier MSCEIT V1.0 and MEIS rather than a different instrument, the 
validity and reliability of the MEIS measure will only be referred to briefly in this chapter to highlight the 
improvement from the original measure to the latest version.  
 
As the tests are considered to be tests of performance there are two key approaches to identify the 
correct answers: consensus scoring and expert scoring. Consensus scoring involves determining the 
correct answer by combining the answers of a large group of test-takers. The authors maintain that this 
method is the most acceptable, as emotions are a socially constructed concept and developed in relation 
with everyday social communication between people. A major drawback to this method is that the 
criterion is mostly based on North American samples and therefore representative of social scenarios 
unique to North American participants. Although studies have been done in countries such as Australia, 
the UK and South Africa, the number of studies in these and other non-Western countries are limited 
(Matthews et al., 2003; JVR, 2007).  
 
Expert scoring involves determining the correct answer by pooling the judgments of 21 so-called 
international emotion experts who were asked to provide answers to all the test items. Members of the 
expert sample were drawn from the International Society for Research in Emotions (ISRE) who attended 
a meeting in 2002. The expert sample consisted of 10 men and 11 women aged 20 to 52 years with a 
mean age of 39.4 (JVR, 2007). This type of scoring technique is most similar to that used in cognitive 
ability tests but is considered to be a highly controversial method. The expert scoring method utilised for 
the MEIS consisted of the judgement of the test authors as to which questions were right or wrong, 
therefore the expert panel of the MSCEIT was updated to lend greater credibility to the reliability of the 
instrument.  
 
The ability model and corresponding performance measures of El are considered by a large number of 
researchers to be the superior model in measuring and explaining El (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; Conte, 
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2005; Brackett & Mayer, 2003), largely due to the objective scoring of the instrument and low overlap with 
existing personality or other trait measurement instruments. These measures have been theoretically 
related to several important life criteria that ability measures may be expected to predict such as 
psychological well-being, life satisfaction, empathy, the quality of interpersonal relationships, success in 
occupations and positive workplace outcomes, as well as academic success (Palmer, 2003; Mayer et al., 
2000b; 2003; Mayer & Geher, 1996; Ciarrochi et al., 2000; Roberts et al., 2001; Lopes, Grewal, Kadis, 
Gall & Salovey, 2006). These findings have also in most cases been found to remain statistically 
significant after controlling for other predictors such as personality traits.  
 
 
3.1.1.1. Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT V2.0) 
 
 
Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) ability model of EI encompasses four conceptually related abilities that are 
arranged hierarchically from the most basic to the more psychologically complex (Palmer, 2003). The 
MSCEIT assesses this four-branch model of EI including the ability to perceive emotions, the ability to 
use emotions to facilitate reasoning, the capacity to understand the meaning of emotions and the ability 
to regulate and manage emotions.  
 
The MSCEIT also examines overall EI areas which represent experiential emotional intelligence and 
strategic emotional intelligence. The experiential emotional intelligence score is calculated using the first 
two branch scores: perceiving emotions and facilitating thought. Strategic emotional intelligence is a 
combination of the third and fourth branch scores: understanding emotions and managing emotions (JVR, 
2007). 
 
Each of the four branches consists of eight tasks with two tasks for each branch. Faces and pictures 
combine to form the perceiving emotions score; sensations and facilitation combine to form the facilitating 
thought score. Blends and changes combine to make the understanding emotions score, and emotional 
management and emotional relations combine to form the managing emotions score (JVR, 2007).  
 
The MSCEIT measures perceptions of emotions using the faces and pictures tasks by requiring 
respondents to rate how much of a particular emotion is expressed in photographs of people’s faces as 
well as in a picture of a design or a landscape. Emotional facilitation of thought is measured in the 
sensations task by tasking respondents with drawing emotional parallels with different sensations 
including colours, light, and temperature, and in the facilitation task by requiring respondents to 
demonstrate their understanding of emotions and identify the feelings that might facilitate or interfere with 
the successful performance of various cognitive and behavioural tasks. Understanding emotions is 
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measured in the blends task by asking respondents how emotions blend to form more complex emotions 
and requires the respondent to construct and deconstruct complex emotions that consist of more than 
one underlying emotion. This is also assessed using the changes task which examines the transition of 
emotions. This task assesses the respondents’ understanding of how emotional reactions change over 
time or how they follow upon one another. Emotional management is examined by having respondents 
rate the effectiveness of alternative actions in an emotional situation thereby examining how a person 
would regulate his or her own emotions. The emotional relations or social management task requires 
respondents to read a short story about another person, and then determine how effective several 
different courses of action would be in coping with emotions in the story (Mayer et al., 1999; 2003) to 
obtain an understanding of the respondent’s ability to manage the emotions of others. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT V2.0) scales and 
subtasks  
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3.1.1.2. Predominant criticisms of performance based measures of emotional intelligence 
 
 
Despite the advantages of using performance based measures of El, there appear to be a number of 
concerns about their psychometric properties which still need to be resolved (Matthews et al., 2004). 
Several researchers have expressed concerns about the absence of scientific standards for determining 
the accuracy of consensus and expert scores for the MEIS and the MSCEIT V2.0 (Conte, 2005; 
Matthews et al., 2003). Pérez et al., (2005) state that the greatest problem with ability tests is the difficulty 
in measuring the inherent subjectivity of emotional experience through objective scoring and at the same 
time addressing the uncertainty over how to achieve genuinely objective item scoring. Averill (2004) 
contends that the Mayer, Salovey viewpoint of EI is too simplistic as emotions are a complex pattern of 
responses and no single component such as a facial expression or image such as those utilised by the 
MSCEIT contain sufficient information for the attribution of emotion. Furthermore, these measures appear 
to be unable to do more than measure semantic knowledge about emotions, and a more relevant 
measure would need to place respondents in an environment where they can experience the emotions 
they are asked to respond to (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005). 
 
The second dominant criticism is that a performance test requires responses that can be evaluated 
against objective, predetermined scoring criteria. Consensus scoring techniques are therefore in direct 
contrast to traditional measures of intelligence where formal objective measures of correct or incorrect 
answers are used (Matthews et al., 2003). Items that were used in early IQ tests that depended on 
subjective judgment, such as deciding which of several faces was most attractive, have been largely 
removed from tests, due, in part, to the risk of cultural bias. The measurement of El as a cognitive ability 
is largely dependent on the assumption that answers to stimuli that supposedly presents various facets of 
emotion, can be categorised as correct or incorrect. If this is not possible, no scoring method would be 
capable of meeting the basic psychometric criterion for ability tests, namely that there exists a true and 
undisputable standard against which to judge responses (Roberts et al., 2001). 
 
A third major criticism of consensus scoring arises from the implication that standards of emotional 
success are relatively independent of individuals and culture, and therefore consensus scoring methods 
guarantee a uniformity of response (Averill, 2004). As emotional intelligence is considered by the authors 
of the model to be an intelligence (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso & Sitarenios, 2001) and is therefore expected 
to abide by the rules of traditional intelligence testing, the standards of success should apply across 
individuals and even cultures. This assumption hints at a biological conception of emotion that is 
perceived to be only moderately affected by socialisation and cultural norms (Averill, 2004). Although 
there is increasing indications of the biological basis of emotion (LeDoux, 1996), there is still much 
ambiguity regarding the nature of the neural relationship between cognition and emotion.  
  
 50 
The apparent grounding of Mayer, Salovey and Caruso’s (2004) assertion that emotions arise exclusively 
from a biological basis is in contrast to more traditional constructionist viewpoints such as those 
expressed by Averill (2004). Averill contends that social rules rather than genetic programming are the 
main principles by which emotional reactions are organised. A criticism levied often against all 
performance based measures and scoring methods is that these tests are easily influenced by the values 
and trends relative to certain cultures, genders, time periods or contexts. As a result of the multicultural 
nature of modern society, social norms do not only vary across countries but across settings as well, 
therefore the impact of context may be a significant confounding variable. The use of experts could also 
be detrimental to people from cultures and subgroups that the experts do not represent. It is therefore 
difficult to generalise the analysis of the results and corresponding implications across all settings (Van 
Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004) and the nature of the MSCEIT testing, therefore, does not sufficiently 
accommodate the effects of cultural, social or situational influences. 
 
A further criticism of consensus scoring is that, by definition, this scoring procedure evaluates 
convergence in emotional intelligence rather than superior abilities in emotional intelligence and, 
therefore, tends to devalue unusual and idiosyncratic emotional responses (Averill, 2004). The existence 
of correct answers to cognitive ability items imply that it is possible for a person who has unusually high 
cognitive abilities to provide correct answers, however, a person who has an unusually high El may not 
be recognised as they do not conform to the normative results (Matthews et al., 2003; Brody 2004).  
 
A criticism targeted specifically against expert scoring is the selection procedure for determining who is 
an 'expert' in emotions. Although the authors counteract that there is a high degree of agreement 
between consensus and expert scoring methods (Mayer, et al., 2001), no objective methods are used to 
positively identify a true 'expert' or genius in El (Roberts et al., 2001). Averill (2004) argues that expert 
scoring based on smaller diverse groups of judges further suggests that emotions can be identified by 
necessary and sufficient conditions and therefore hints again at a biological origin.  
 
Practical concerns that accompany the use of these measures include the time taken to administer them 
(between 45 and 60 minutes to complete), the high costs and the strict controls on the scoring methods 
and data of these tests by the test publishers (Goldenberg et al., 2006). The propriety nature of the 
databases also makes meta-analysis of results problematic (Conte, 2005).  
 
Conte (2005) maintains that much of the research conducted using the MEIS should be re-evaluated 
using the MSCEIT V2.0, due to the large difference between the measures and the lack of studies that 
have examined the correlations between them. Conte predicts that the MSCEIT V2.0 will demonstrate 
discriminant validity from personality measures, but that the measure will be lacking in incremental 
validity in predicting performance outcomes. In support of this argument, neither Barchard (2003) nor 
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Brackett and Mayer (2003) found that the MSCEIT demonstrated incremental validity for predicting 
academic success over and above cognitive ability and personality. 
 
 
3.1.2. Self-report measures of emotional intelligence  
 
 
Self-report measures are designed to assess beliefs and perceptions about an individual's competencies 
in specific domains of El (Salovey et al., 2001). These indexes generally ask a person to rate their 
abilities on a series of descriptive statements such as "I know why my emotions change," or "I expect 
good things to happen". A number of researchers have attempted to develop accurate self-report 
measures of El or El related constructs. There are numerous additional self-report measures available 
based on Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) model, the models developed by Goleman (1995) and Bar-On 
(1997) and a host of similar theories such as the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS, Lane, 
Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990), the TEIQue (Petrides & Furnham, 2003) and the SUEIT 
(Palmer & Stough, 2001). The Schutte Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test or SSREIT developed by 
Schutte et al., (1998) and the Trait-Meta-Mood Scale or TMMS developed by Salovey et al., (1995) are 
both based on Salovey and Mayer's (1990) original model of El.  
 
Due to the large number of instruments that claim to measure trait El, this review will focus predominantly 
on the SSREIT (Schutte et al., 1998) which is the instrument that has been used in the present study to 
measure the trait EI model developed by Salovey and Mayer (1990). Additional reference will be made to 
the Goleman's Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI; Goleman, 1995) and Bar-On's Emotional Quotient 
(EQ-i; Bar-On, 1997) where relevant, in order to provide a frame of reference against which the reliability 
and validity of the SSREIT can be evaluated. 
 
 
3.1.2.1. Brief overview of the Emotional Competence Inventory and Bar-On's Emotional 
Quotient  
 
 
The Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i) and the Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI) are measures 
that attempt to assess not only emotional abilities but also a number of non-ability characteristics that 
relate to personality, chronic mood and character and have therefore been previously referred to as 
mixed models (Mayer et al., 2000a). The EQ-i was developed by Bar-On and is a commercially sold 133-
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item inventory that yields an overall EQ score as well as scores for five composite scales: (1) 
intrapersonal, (2) interpersonal, (3) adaptability, (4) general mood and (5) stress management. The 
instrument also provides 15 clinical subscales and two validity subscales. The clinical subscales measure 
emotional self-awareness, assertiveness, self-regard, self-actualisation, independence, empathy, 
interpersonal relationships, social responsibility, problem solving, reality testing, flexibility, stress 
tolerance, impulse control, happiness and optimism. The scale is nevertheless criticised due to the lack of 
clarity regarding how each of these composites is related conceptually to El (Matthews et al., 2003), and 
the definition does not make an obvious distinction between the intelligence factors that provide the 
scope for developing emotional competencies and the skills and abilities that an emotionally competent 
person is expected to possess (Wakeman, 2006). The validity subscales are referred to as positive 
impression and negative impression (Schutte & Malouff, 1999), and measure the extent to which people 
respond randomly, or distort their responses in order to appear favourably or unfavourably. In spite of 
this, the response bias indexes are considered to be insufficient as these scales have been found to be 
unreliable in ascertaining whether a respondent is distorting his or her responses because of false 
perceptions regarding their own emotional abilities (Matthews et al., 2003).  
 
Goleman (1995) developed the ECI, to measure the components of his theory of El. The original ECI 
model (version 1) had 110 items on a seven point Likert scale measuring 25 competencies arranged in 5 
higher-order clusters: self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy and social skills. After further 
factor analysis, the scale was collapsed into 20 competencies and four domains: self-awareness, self-
management (a mix of self-regulation and motivation), social awareness (a combination of motivation and 
empathy) and social skills (a combination of motivation, empathy and social skills) (Matthews et al., 2003; 
Wolff, 2006). This version (version 2) consisted of 72 items measured on a six point Likert scale (Pérez et 
al., 2005). Matthews et al., (2003) criticise Goleman's updated version of the ECI for not measuring the 
same competence-based model described in his published theoretical framework. Pérez et al., (2005) 
express concerns that although the ECI has been promoted as a human resource tool, there is little 
information about the psychometric properties in scientific literature.  
 
 
3.1.2.2. The Schutte Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test (SSREIT) 
 
 
The SSREIT is a self-report measure of EI that was developed by Schutte, et al., (1998) in an attempt to 
measure the extent to which respondents are able to identify, understand, harness and regulate emotions 
in themselves and in others. The SSREIT is the measure that has been chosen to evaluate trait EI in the 
present study and will therefore be the primary focus for the discussion of the reliability and validity of trait 
EI.  
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The SSREIT, otherwise known by labels such as the EIS (Emotional Intelligence Scale), the SEI (Self-
Report Emotional Intelligence) and the Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale (SEIS), assesses EI based 
on self-report responses. The scale, which according to the authors was constructed to sample relatively 
evenly from the three primary content domains of the Salovey and Mayer (1990) model, has a single 
factor with 33 items that assesses the appraisal and expression of emotion in the self and others, 
regulation of emotion in the self and others and utilisation of emotion in solving problems (Chapman & 
Hayslip, 2005). These components, along with emotional knowledge, also form the core of Mayer and 
Salovey’s (1997) revised ability model and are central pieces in Goleman’s (1995) and Bar-On’s (1997) 
EI models. The SSREIT is therefore considered as tapping into a construct adopted by several 
conceptions of EI (Chapman & Hayslip, 2005). 
 
The SSREIT was developed by generating 62 items from Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) model of EI with 
each item selected for the pool reflecting an adaptive tendency towards emotional intelligence within the 
framework of the model. Using a principal component factor analysis followed by a varimax rotation on 
the 62 items, four components were extracted but only one strong factor was retained. On the basis of 
the 33 scale items, which were the items with the highest loading on the first factor, were selected. These 
items, according to the authors, represented all dimensions of the original Salovey and Mayer model 
(Schutte & Malouff, 1999). This method utilised by Schutte and colleagues has been criticised by 
researchers such as Petrides and Furnham (2000a) who maintain that as the components of the EI 
model are considered to be hierarchical and therefore conceptually related, an oblique rather than an 
orthogonal rotation should have been used to develop the items utilised in the instrument. These issues 
are discussed more extensively in the section pertaining to the validity of the SSREIT.  
 
The reason why the SSREIT was chosen instead of the better know ECI (Goleman, 1995) or EQ-i (Bar-
On, 1997) is because the SSREIT was based on Salovey and Mayer’s initial (1990) definition of 
emotional intelligence and would therefore allow meaningful comparison with the MSCEIT. As better 
known measures such as the ECI and EQ-i incorporate personality dimensions in the model, they are 
expected to show greater discriminant validity from the MSCEIT. The SSREIT has also emerged as the 
leading brief scale for assessing EI, not only because it is in the public domain (Chapman & Hayslip, 
2005) but also because it is considerably shorter than the major trait EI scales such as the EQ-i and the 
ECI.  
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3.1.2.3. Predominant criticisms of self-report measures of emotional intelligence 
 
 
A number of concerns have been expressed about the validity and reliability of many of the self-report 
measures of El (Ciarrochi et al., 2000) and a number of problems and serious omissions currently plague 
El research findings based on self-report methodologies. Critics state that self-report measures are not 
good indicators of actual ability, but rather present only an indication of a person's perception of their 
abilities and are therefore highly reliant on the test-taker's honesty and accurate self-knowledge 
(Ciarrochi et al., 2000). Critics question firstly whether people are sufficiently aware of their own 
emotional abilities to report upon them accurately. If the self-reports are inaccurate, these measures 
consequently yield information only about the person's self-perception, rather than his or her actual level 
of El. Self-perceptions may not even be available to conscious interpretation (Roberts et al., 2001).  
 
The second question asked by critics is whether people are answering the questions truthfully instead of 
reporting in a socially desirable manner (Salovey & Grewal, 2005; Roberts et al., 2001). Self-report tests 
are sensitive to response bias as very few of these instruments have measures built in to detect this. 
These measures have therefore been criticised as being filtered through a person's self-concept and 
impression management motives (Mayer et al., 2000a). The EQ-i (Bar-On, 1997) has scales called ‘fake 
good’ and ‘fake bad’ which are used to adjust the EQ-i content scales based on social desirability results, 
however, independent research by Hemmati, Mills and Kroner, (2004) has found a strong correlation of 
0.50 with the EQ-i total score and the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding. Research with the 
SSREIT has been less consistent with correlations found between social desirability measures and the 
SSREIT ranging from 0.12 (Saklofske et al., 2003) to 0.49 (Charbonneau & Nicol, 2002). 
 
In spite of the concerns regarding self-report measurement methods, modern technology and the 
prevalence of computer testing may have a neutralising effect on social response bias. Research 
conducted by Richman, Kiesler, Weisb and Drasgow (1999) revealed that social desirability was reduced 
using computer interviews compared to self-report tests conducted in face to face interviews, they also 
found that when respondents were assured of anonymity, they scored lower on social desirability 
measures. In addition, Kluemper (2008) argues that there may even be a complimentary theoretical link 
between social desirability and EI measured as a trait, as it could be argued that people who are able to 
manage their own emotions and the emotions of others may have a greater tendency to exhibit 
impression management or social adjustment behaviour as well as have a higher self esteem or 
enhanced core-self evaluation capabilities.  
 
Ciarrochi, Deane and Anderson (2002) found that self-reported emotional perception is unrelated to how 
people actually perform in recognising emotions. Dulewicz and Higgs (1999) have also stated that 
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measuring self-awareness is especially difficult as most people are unaware of how they are presented to 
other people. These problems are nevertheless common to all scales based on self-report, including 
personality assessment.  
 
Alternatively, self-report measures of intelligence are considered by some to be important because 
people often act on their beliefs about their abilities as opposed to their actual abilities (Bandura, 1977). 
The perception of emotional intelligence may, therefore, integrate motivation to achieve emotional 
competencies and certain preferences to act on these competencies. As a result, individuals may be 
more likely to modify their behaviours based on their beliefs about their abilities rather than their actual 
abilities (Thingujam, 2002). 
 
Critics further argue that these tests are only new forms of personality testing and do not in actual fact 
present something new. Research on tests of El that assess non-cognitive traits (e.g., assertiveness, 
optimism and impulse control) have found that these tests seem to be tapping dimensions of individual 
differences that are entirely unlike contemporary notions of what constitutes intelligence (Davies, 
Stankov, & Roberts, 1998). Scores on self-report tests of emotional intelligence have also been found to 
be highly correlated with standard personality constructs such as extroversion and neuroticism (Brackett 
& Mayer, 2003), and therefore contradict the conditions put forward by Mayer and Salovey (1997) that El 
represents a traditional form of intelligence. The similarity between El and Alexithymia has also been 
remarked on and some researchers have gone as far as to categorise El as the positive polar end of 
Alexithymia as it deals with negative emotions whereas El has a positive slant. Then again, Alexithymia is 
viewed as a construct of personality and hence a relationship to ability El is undesirable (Landy, 2005).  
 
Regardless of the criticism these tests have received, self-report measures are still the most popular 
method used to assess El in research, as these measures have significant advantages over ability tests. 
The tests are less complicated to administer and score than the ability measurements because the 
development principles for these measures follow the structured principles of psychometric test 
construction. The instruments are also freely available and are not controlled by external corporations 
which require large fees to use these instruments. Researchers therefore, have more access to these 
instruments and are not restricted by rigid procedures in the administering of the tests. In addition, the 
instruments are more straightforward than ability measures and can be administered without supervision 
(Austin, Saklofske, Huang, & McKenney, 2004). The self-report questionnaires are also less time-
consuming than the ability instruments which require a reasonable amount of time to administer. Ability 
measures however, have an advantage over self-report measures, as they represent an individual's 
performance level on a task (Mayer et al., 2000a) and are therefore more difficult to fake. Although 
perceived EI may not yet yield an actual emotional IQ, there is potential for the construct to provide 
important insight into how an individual perceives emotional competencies which may guide behaviour 
beyond that of actual ability levels (Thingujam, 2002). 
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3.2. A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF EMOTIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
 
Emotional intelligence is not a new concept and the theory has been reproved for its theoretical overlaps 
with both Thorndike's Social Intelligence and Gardner's Multiple Intelligences. On the other hand, the 
existence of social intelligence has been profoundly criticised largely due to difficulties in demonstrating 
the concept empirically and the consequent inability to develop a reliable psychometric instrument 
(Landy, 2005). Gardner’s inability to demonstrate the existence of interpersonal and intrapersonal 
intelligences psychometrically has also been commented on (Landy, 2005), and consequently there is 
concern as to whether or not the construct of El can succeed in developing a reliable and valid 
assessment of the theoretical model where similar constructs have failed. Contrary to these criticisms 
however, Ashkanasy and Daus (2005) emphasise that Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2000c) have gone to 
great lengths to distinguish emotional intelligence from social intelligence by arguing that emotional 
intelligence is about emotion and founded in a modern understanding of the neural basis of emotions in 
the brain.  
 
Although readily accepted and used in occupational fields such as talent management and personal 
development, the academic field has been less accepting of emotional intelligence. El is seen by a 
number of theorists as media hype and a fad (Matthews et al., 2003) and it is often forgotten that many of 
the El measures may be neither reliable nor valid (Ciarrochi et al., 2000). Some critics see El as a further 
means of controlling the actions of people and dictating a norm for how emotions should be managed 
(Landy, 2005). The primary difficulties encountered within the field arises from the lack of consensus in 
determining whether El should be considered as a cognitive ability, or as a personality trait, or whether it 
is distinct enough to be considered a construct at all.  
 
In general El measures have demonstrated adequate internal consistency and reliability (Matthews et al., 
2003). Self-report El measures have acceptable internal consistency as do the overall scales for ability-
based measures, but this data by itself gives no indication about whether El measures are simply 
assessing constructs already measured by other, more established constructs such as the Big Five 
personality dimensions (Conte, 2005). Furthermore, some of the subscales for the ability-based El 
measures have indicated less than acceptable internal consistency (Matthews et al., 2003).  
 
Validity evidence for El measures has been less forthcoming, especially with regard to content validity, 
which is largely due to the vague theoretical development and variety of definitions of El (Conte, 2005). 
Only once a firm taxonomy of El has been established with clear implications for the nature of the 
construct, can the content validity of El be reliably assessed. Evidence of construct validity in the form of 
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convergent and discriminant validity is also lacking, due to the lack of discrimination between trait and 
ability in El literature. As a result, research studies continuously fail to converge on a common construct. 
Criterion-related and incremental validity of El measures has also been found to be contradictory. Van 
Rooy and Viswesvaran (2004) found that the percentage of variance in performance explained by El was 
5 percent, which is much lower than the claims of theorists such as Goleman (1995), who has argued that 
El is more important than general mental ability (GMA). In addition neither trait nor ability El was found to 
indicate incremental validity above GMA in predicting performance outcomes. Further evidence for the 
need to separate trait and ability El into separate constructs is provided by the lack of convergence with 
regard to predictive validity. Self-report El measures appear to assess existing personality characteristics 
or perhaps emotional competencies, but they do not relate closely to existing measure of cognitive 
intelligence (Mayer et al., 1999; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004).  
 
The following section offers a review of the reliability of competing measures of El and focuses on the 
empirical findings regarding the construct, discriminant and predictive validity of the most well known 
instruments that claim to measure El. The focus of this section will be on the tools utilised in the present 
study and therefore research with other well known tools will only be referred to briefly.  
 
 
3.2.1. Reliability of competing measures of emotional intelligence 
 
 
Test of reliability examine the accuracy with which an instrument measures the construct it claims to 
measure. For a measure of EI to be considered as reliable, the instrument needs to measure a construct 
accurately and consistently in repeated administrations (Owen, 1996). Anastasi and Urbina (1997) state 
that desirable or satisfactory reliability coefficients should fall between 0.8 and 0.9 if important decisions 
have to be made about an individual. Cicchetti (cited in Schutte and Malouff, 1999) states that the 
minimum acceptable level of reliability is 0.7 for measures that are difficult to concretely define such as 
personality assessments.  
 
There are several options with which an instrument’s reliability can be retrieved, of which the Cronbach’s 
alpha is the most well-known. Cronbach’s alpha is a measurement of the degree of homogeneity of the 
items that comprise a scale. If each item in a test of emotional intelligence is actually measuring that 
construct, then responses to the items should correlate in a significant and meaningful manner with 
responses to all other items in the test (Stone, 2004). A second well know measurement is test-retest 
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reliability or temporal stability, which measures the consistency of test scores over time. These are the 
primary methods used to compare the reliability of the measurement instruments discussed.  
 
An additional measure which is utilised specifically in the assessment of the reliability of the MSCEIT at 
the subscale level is the split-half reliability coefficient. This form of analysis involves the dividing of a set 
of items from a single measure in two subsets, and the correlation between them is compared for 
consistency (Owen, 1996; Cools, 2007; Brackett & Geher, 2006). Low reliability on these scores indicates 
that the construct being measured is not an enduring disposition and therefore of questionable value 
(Stone, 2004). 
 
 
3.2.1.1. Reliability of ability EI measures: the MEIS and the MSCEIT  
 
 
The MSCEIT V1.0, V2.0 and MEIS were designed to provide one overall emotional intelligence score as 
well as four sub scores for each of the branches of emotional intelligence. The test-retest reliability of the 
overall MEIS over a 2-week period was 0.75 and the test-retest reliability of the MEIS branch scores 
ranged from 0.60 to 0.68. Conte (2005) maintains that in contrast to these results, reliability coefficients 
for cognitive ability tests typically range from 0.85 to 0.95. The reliability of the MEIS tasks were found by 
Ciarrochi et al., (2000) to be low, with only the emotion perception subscales reaching satisfactory levels 
of reliability.  
 
Mayer et al., (2003) reason that in view of the nonhomogeneous nature of the different item forms within 
each of the different tasks, the ideal measurement for the reliability of the measure is split-half reliability 
coefficients rather than coefficient alphas, as they involve the orderly allocation of different item types to 
the different sections of the test.  
 
Split-half reliability coefficients for the four branches are reported in the technical manual (Mayer et al., 
2002) as ranging from 0.80 to 0.91. Using a diverse sample consisting of respondents from a variety of 
countries, population groups and ages, Mayer et al., (2003) found good full-test split-half reliabilities for 
the total scale of 0.93 using general scoring and 0.91 using expert scoring. In spite of the high reliability 
scores of the total scale, the internal consistency estimates established for the subscales were found to 
range from a low 0.55 to 0.88 and approximately half of the subscales have reliability coefficient’s below 
the 0.7 criterion. The average internal consistency across all scales in the MSCEIT reported was 0.68 for 
consensus scoring and 0.71 for expert scoring which Conte (2005) asserts is far from optimal given that 
the instrument is intended to be a measure of cognitive ability.  
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Van Staaden (2001) reported Cronbach's alpha coefficients from a study conducted on a sample of South 
African university students that corresponded with the reliability coefficients provided by Mayer et al., 
(2003) for the overall MSCEIT and all subscales except for the emotional identification in faces, emotional 
identification in pictures and blends subtasks which were lower than those reported by Mayer et al (2003). 
The reliability coefficients may, however, be artificially low because Cronbach's alpha coefficients, rather 
than the recommended split-half method were used to evaluate reliability at the scale and subscale 
levels. The details of the reliability coefficients made available by Mayer et al (2003) and Van Staaden 
(2001) are presented in Table 4.  
 
 
Table 4: Reliability coefficients for the MSCEIT V2.0 using General and Expert scoring reported in 
previous studies 
 
 Area Score Branch scores &  Task scores 
Split-half reliability 
coefficients 
(Mayer et al., 2003) 
Cronbach's alpha 
coefficients 
(Van Staaden, 2001) 
 General Expert General Scoring 
Total MSCEIT V2.0 .93 .91 .90 
Experiential EI .90 .90 - 
Identification / Perception .91 .90 - 
Faces (Section A) .80 .82 .74 
Pictures (Section E) .88 .87 .78 
Facilitation .79 .76 - 
 Facilitation (Section B) .64 .63 .60 
 Sensations (Section F) .65 .55 .54 
Strategic EI .88 .86 - 
Understanding .80 .77 - 
Changes (Section C) .70 .68 .63 
Blends (Section G) .66 .62 .49 
Managing .83 .81 - 
Emotion management (Section D) .69 .64 .64 
Emotional relationships (Section H) .67 .64 .66 
 
 
Only one study conducted by Brackett and Mayer (2003) has examined test-retest reliability scores for 
the MSCEIT, which were described as good, with split-half reliability coefficients after three weeks 
reaching 0.86. Inter-rater reliabilities have also been established as sufficient by Mayer et al., (2003) who 
confirmed that task scores obtained using the general consensus method correlated highly with expert 
ratings (r = .93 to .97). In addition, correlations with external criteria have also been replicated across the 
  
 60 
two scoring methods (Brackett & Salovey, 2006). On the other hand, a recent study conducted by 
Palmer, Gignac, Manocha and Stough (2005) on a sample of Australian respondents revealed that 
expert-based scores were lower than the consensus-based scores, particularly for the facilitating and 
managing branch scores which were found to be below r = 0.7. This suggests that research conducted 
outside of the United States may not benefit from applying expert scoring procedures based on North 
American expert panels.  
 
An additional concern was raised regarding the reliability of the MSCEIT by MacCann, Matthews, Zeidner 
and Roberts (2003) who recognised that the inflated number of ‘no emotions present’ answer options in 
the measurement instrument resulted in an artificial inflation of reliability scores. The reliability of the 
measure is therefore dependent on the ability to correctly deduce that there is no emotion present in an 
item. These researchers found in separate studies that the more people selecting the no emotion option 
in an item, the more reliable the item was found to be. Furthermore, blindly choosing the ‘no emotions 
present’ option resulted in high percentile rankings for most of the tests, for example if a particular person 
selected the ‘no emotion present’ option for each question in the pictures test of the MSCEIT, that 
respondent would score in the ninety-fourth percentile in the pictures test.  
 
MacCann et al., (2003) argue that as the ‘no emotions present’ option is considered to be the most 
correct answer option in a number of the test items, the reliability of the test items relate to the ability to 
deduce a lack of emotion in an item rather than enhanced perceptual sensitivity. As a result, if a test taker 
answered that there was no emotion present on each of the items, they would still get a fairly high score, 
despite their inability to recognize emotion. This criticism would also have a negative impact on the 
reliability of the measure for assessment purposes, during which respondents would have additional 
incentive to look for the ‘correct emotions’ within the stimuli. Respondents would need to be informed that 
the ‘no emotions present’ answer option is a viable and correct response for many of the answers, which 
is not done in the test instructions. 
 
 
3.2.1.2. Reliability of trait EI measures: the EQ-I, ECI and the SSREIT  
 
 
The reliability of the EQ-i and the ECI have been reported in previous studies as being mostly satisfactory 
at the total scale level, yet low reliability coefficients have been identified on a number of the subscales. 
Bar-On (1997) reported that the internal consistency of the overall EQ-i, measured using Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient, was 0.76 and that test-retest reliability after 1 month was 0.85 and after 4 months was 
0.75. Although satisfactory, the reliability coefficient for the total scale is lower than would be expected 
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from a commercially sold measure of emotional intelligence on which people are evaluated and 
occupational decisions are made. 
 
Independent research with the EQ-i such as the research conducted by Austin et al., (2004) has also 
revealed a good reliability coefficient at the total scale level of 0.87. The positive impression scale has 
however been found to have a consistently low Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.61 (Austin et al., 2004) 
and the reliability coefficients of the remaining subscales range from 0.78 to 0.83. Problems have also 
been reported with the loading of the factors, as Petrides and Furnham (2001) found the questionnaire to 
be unifactoral and Palmer, Manocha, Gignac and Stough (2003) obtained six factors instead of 15. 
Significant overlap has also been identified between the EQ-i and the Big Five personality dimensions 
(Brackett & Mayer, 2003).  
 
Matthews et al., (2003) reported a good Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the total scale of the ECI of 0.82 
yet the reliability of the subscales was found to be marginal, with the weakest subscale reaching a 
coefficient of 0.59. Research with the ECI has also observed extensive overlap with the Big Five 
personality dimensions (Davies, 1998; Matthews et al., 2003; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). These 
researchers express concern about the reliability of the measure especially considering that the ECI is 
marketed as a tool for organisational high-stakes decision-making. The test manual (Wolff, 2006) 
provides reliability scores that range from 0.61 for the self-awareness subscale to 0.92 for the social 
awareness subscale, which is higher than those reported by Matthews et al., (2003). Nevertheless, 
Matthews and colleagues argue that only one dimension has sufficient reliability to justify commercial 
use.  
 
Previous comparisons between Goleman's ECI and Bar-On’s EQ-i models have demonstrated that the 
two models are largely similar and there is some repetition of components (Wakeman, 2006). Criticism 
aimed at both models includes the overlap with aspects of personality and social competence that are far 
beyond the bounds of the original definitions provided by Salovey and Mayer (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005). 
As a result the models are seen as too broad in scope and some researchers argue that they do not differ 
much from personality or traditional competency models. Ashkanasy and Daus (2005) go as far as to say 
that these measures should not even be confused with emotional intelligence. Goleman's model is 
however granted a degree of pardon due to his preference for the term ‘emotional competence’ when 
defining his model as opposed to ‘emotional intelligence’ (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005).  
 
The SSREIT which, as discussed previously, was developed to measure the original branches of the El 
model developed by Salovey and Mayer (1990), has demonstrated high internal consistency in a number 
of studies (Ciarrochi, et al., 2001; Petrides & Furnham, 2000a; Austin et al., 2004; Schutte et al., 2001). In 
a sample made up of community members, the scale was observed to have a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.90 
and for college students the Cronbach’s alpha was observed to be 0.87 (Schutte et al., 1998). In addition, 
  
 62 
independent research conducted by Palmer (2003) on an Australian community sample revealed a 
Cronbach’s alpha for the overall EI scale of 0.92, with a mean of 129.16 and a standard deviation of 
15.82. The scale has also been reported as having a good two-week test-retest reliability (r = .78) 
(Schutte et al., 1998) and group differences in scores and correlations with other measures have 
generally been reported as in accordance with theoretical expectations (Ciarrochi et al., 2001; Saklofske 
et al., 2003; Schutte et al., 2001). The SSREIT has also been identified as reliable for measuring both 
adolescents and adults (Ciarrochi et al., 2001; Matthews et al., 2003; Palmer, 2003).  
 
Previous studies with the SSREIT using South African populations have also revealed good reliability 
scores. Stone (2004) obtained a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.91 with an average score of 127 
amongst employees in a South African information technology and software development organisation. 
Murphy (2006) obtained a similar Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.90 with a mean of 128.22 and a 
standard deviation of 15.36 amongst a sample of South African university students. The Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients identified in these two studies as well as the original research conducted by Schutte et 
al., (1998) is documented in Table 5. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the SSREIT reported in previous studies 
 
Total EI Score Normative scores Results from South African studies 
 Schutte et al., (1998) n=346 Stone (2004) n=118 Murphy (2006) n=308 
Mean - 127.74 128.22 
Range - 74-160 - 
SD - 0.97 15.36 
α .87 - .90 .91 .91 
Test -retest .78 - - 
 
 
 
3.2.2. Validity concerns that relate to the measurement of emotional intelligence 
 
 
Validity is related to non-random measurement error and is considered to be the degree to which an 
instrument measures what it intends to measure. There are a number of different types of validity which 
are important to the development of the EI construct, and each type takes a different approach to assess 
the extent to which a scale measures what it claims to measure. The primary measures of validity that 
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should be displayed by a valid measure of EI are content validity, which implies that the measure should 
include items that reasonably tap the multiple conceptual facets of the construct, construct validity, which 
involves the relationship with measures of other constructs and criterion-related validity, which involves 
the ability of a measure to predict real life or behavioural outcomes that are conceptually related to EI 
(Owen, 1996; Anastasi & Urbina, 1997; Brackett & Geher, 2006). 
 
Content validity is related to item sampling adequacy, which is the extent to which a specific set of items 
reflects a content domain. A psychometrically valid test of emotional intelligence is required to cover a 
representative sample of the domain that it was designed to measure. It is not easy to assess the content 
validity of a scale because there are no well-defined, objective criteria to do so. Content validity or face 
validity consists of the consensual judgment of researchers and experts in the field regarding which 
qualities should be assessed as components of emotional intelligence and which qualities should be 
excluded from the definition of the construct (Stone, 2004; Cools, 2007). Within the model of EI on which 
both trait and ability measures of EI are based, four conceptually related and hierarchic clusters of 
abilities or competencies are identified: the appraisal and expression of emotions, utilisation in thought 
and behaviour, understanding, and management and regulation of emotion. Assessing the test’s content 
validity would involve identifying whether the test contained items that tapped each of these 
competencies (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). 
 
Construct validity concerns the extent to which the empirical relationships are observed with related 
constructs is consistent with theory, and specifically pertains to whether a concept of interest is 
empirically related to other concepts that are theoretically similar to it and is independent from those 
different to it. There is a distinction at this level between convergent validity which involves similarities 
between measures of theoretically related constructs believed to tap the same or similar constructs and 
discriminant validity which is demonstrated by being either uncorrelated or only modestly correlated with 
conceptually distinct measures (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). An EI test should correlate highly with other 
variables specified by the theoretical framework as relating to the underlying construct. For example the 
model on which the MSCEIT is based defines EI as a cognitive ability, therefore theoretically it is 
expected that this measure would be empirically related to other measures of cognitive ability and 
unrelated to measures that tap into trait elements of personality. Similarly if ability and trait EI are to be 
considered as measuring the same construct it is expected that the two instruments should be empirically 
related to each other, as well as to other measures of EI. Construct validity can also be established by 
examining a measure’s factor structure and the extent to which the measure is able to differentiate 
amongst groups in accordance with theoretical expectations (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). 
 
Criterion-related validity is divided into incremental validity which is established when variability in 
important outcomes is predicted after the predictive power of established tests has been accounted for 
and predictive validity which indicates the ability of the measure to predict a real life event or behaviour 
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(Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). To be of value, measures of EI should predict important practical outcomes of 
emotional life. This is perhaps the most important criterion because it reflects the importance of the 
measure’s ability to depict the relationship between the construct of EI and potential life outcomes (Stone, 
2004). For example one would expect that theoretically, a person’s self-reported ability to perceive 
emotion would be related to his or her performance in recognising facial expressions of emotion. 
Additional variables of interest to the present study are the ability of these constructs to predict 
performance criteria such as job satisfaction and fit between a person’s traits and their chosen career. As 
all these elements are important for identifying the strength of ability versus trait measures of EI, previous 
research that highlights relationships between these elements and each of the measures used in the 
study are reviewed in this section. Due to the extensive amount of research that has been conducted with 
the different instruments that claim to measure EI, only results pertaining to these specific instruments will 
be discussed and other tools will only be referred to briefly where relevant to the issues of validity under 
examination.  
 
 
3.2.2.1. The content validity of emotional intelligence measurement instruments: are these 
instruments sufficiently comprehensive to measure the EI domain  
 
 
In spite of the assurances by the authors, analysis by independent researchers has raised a number of 
concerns regarding the content validity of the MSCEIT. Van Staaden (2001) asserts that although the 
MSCEIT draws sufficient items from each of the four branches of the model, the measurement of 
perception and expression of emotion is incompletely expressed as it is technically expensive to do so, 
therefore the MSCEIT really only measures the perception of emotion. A recent review by McEnrue and 
Groves (2006) also finds that the ability of the measurement instrument to tap perception, expression, 
utilisation and management of a person’s own emotions as well as the ability to discriminate between 
accurate and inaccurate or honest and dishonest expressions of feelings is deficient. The authors have 
attempted to argue against these concerns by countering that other studies have shown that if people 
Content validity of the MSCEIT V2.0 
 
Content validity of the MSCEIT is difficult to measure through independent research because the 
questions used in the measurement instrument are the property of Multi-Health Systems Inc (MHS) and 
are not freely available for public review. The authors report the content validity as being good for the 
reason that there are two subtasks in the test that are used to measure each of the four branches of the 
model (Mayer et al., 2002).  
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can recognise the feelings of other people, they can generally recognise their own feelings as well (Mayer 
et al., 2000c).  
 
A further issue that has been raised regarding the content validity of the MSCEIT and specifically the first 
branch, perception of emotion, is highlighted by MacCann et al., (2003) who emphasise that the MSCEIT 
only identifies the visual identification of emotion in two dimensional pictures and consequently ignores 
aspects that are included in the definition of the ability such as expression, and differentiation in 
language, sound and behaviour. MacCann et al., (2003) stress that the predecessor of the MSCEIT, the 
MEIS, measured emotional perception with two additional tests that used language and sound and had 
higher internal consistency estimates than the MSCEIT which insinuates that the previous test may have 
had greater overall validity. These concerns suggest that there appears to be a gap between the ability EI 
model and what the MSCEIT actually measures. 
 
The face validity of the measure for use within occupational contexts is further criticised by McEnrue and 
Groves (2006) on a more conceptual level. They make an important suggestion that the items which 
required respondents to identify emotions within sensations such as cold, blue or sweet may not contain 
much relevance to the EI of managers or employees at work and, therefore, careful consideration is 
required to determine whether the MSCEIT would deliver appropriate conclusions within the specific 
context and interactive requirements of the occupational environment.  
 
 
In spite of their assumptions, the results of the study by Gignac et al., (2005) were unable to confirm the 
hypothesised six factor model, but a good fit for a nested factors model with a first order general factor, 
and four nested factors corresponding to ‘appraisal of emotions in the self’, ‘appraisal of emotions in 
others’, ‘emotional regulation of the self’, and ‘utilisation of emotions in problem solving’ were identified. 
These results suggest that although there appears to be some content validity in terms of the dimensions 
Content validity of the SSREIT 
 
Gignac, Palmer, Manocha and Stough (2005) are among the few researchers who have examined the 
content validity of the SSREIT by examining the extent to which the measure covers all the facets of the 
original Salovey and Mayer (1990) model on which the scale is based. As reported by Schutte et al. 
(1998), Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) original model included three categories: the appraisal and 
expression of emotions, regulation of emotions, and utilisation of emotions in solving problems. Gignac et 
al., (2005) however, maintain that within these three categories are six primary dimensions. They argue 
that the first category should be split into three sub categories namely: expression of emotions, appraisal 
of emotions in the self and appraisal of emotions in others. The regulation of emotions can similarly be 
separated into the regulation of emotions in the self and regulation of emotions in others.  
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of the Salovey and Mayer (1990) model, the scale does lack sufficient items for the measurement of the 
emotional regulation of others and requires items on the management of emotions in order to bring the 
scale in line with the revised four factor Mayer and Salovey (1997) model. Furthermore, only two items 
were qualitatively identified as potentially measuring the appraisal of emotions in the self and the two 
items identified by the researchers as measuring emotional expression did not demonstrate any unique 
covariance.  
 
Based on the findings of Gignac et al., (2005) the content validity of the SSREIT appears to be lacking 
and there is room for revising and extending the measure to cover the various components of EI more 
comprehensively. A concern at this point is, should the trait EI instrument in effect measure an alternative 
construct to the ability EI instrument, there is reason to question whether or not the measure should be 
based on the same underlying model as the ability EI measure. Further investigation into the actual 
nature of the trait EI construct is therefore required.  
 
 
3.2.2.2. The construct validity of emotional intelligence and the factor structure of the MSCEIT 
and the SSREIT  
 
 
Construct validity is the process of determining whether or not a test actually measures a theoretical 
construct or trait (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997) and is seen as a never-ending process. Matthews et al., 
(2003) allege that all studies should continue to provide evidence of construct validity and only when 
studies of a test consistently lead to negative outcomes should the test be rejected. Verification for the 
construct validity of EI measurement instruments has been sought in previous studies using several 
methods: by investigating the factor structure of the instrument in relation to the theoretical assumptions, 
by assessing convergent or discriminant validity specifically with regard to established measures of 
cognitive ability and personality traits, and by assessing the extent to which the measures are able to 
differentiate amongst groups.  
 
 
Factorial validity represents the extent to which a scale structure is empirically and theoretically justified. 
For a measure to demonstrate construct validity, its factor structure should comprise the theorised 
number and pattern of factors (Matthews et al., 2003). The factor structure of the MSCEIT consists of four 
first-order factors (the EI Branches), two second-order factors (the EI Areas) and one-third order factor 
(overall EI), which are all derived from the eight task scores (Brackett & Salovey, 2006). Research by the 
The factorial validity of the MSCEIT 
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authors as well as independent researchers provided support for the theoretical factor structure of the 
model, for example research by Mayer et al., (2003) confirmed a satisfactory four factor structure as well 
as an acceptable fit for a two factor solution and Day and Carroll (2004) have identified that the eight sub-
measures could be reliably interpreted as both a two and a four factor structure.  
 
In spite of these confirmations, certain studies, mostly using samples from countries outside of America, 
have reported contradictory findings with regard to the factor structure of the MSCEIT. Van Staaden 
(2001), using a sample of South African students, established that although a four factor structure was 
valid, the items of the MSCEIT did not fit under the four branches indicated by the model and revisions 
were required. Palmer et al., (2005) obtained similar results with a sample of Australian respondents 
using a nested model comparison confirmatory analysis technique and reported four first order factors: 
one overall emotional intelligence factor and three factors corresponding to three of the four emotional 
intelligence branches. In order to achieve mathematical identification however, Palmer et al., (2005) had 
to constrain the loading patterns of the nested models, therefore confounding their results with respect to 
the underlying structure of the data.  
 
Rossen, Kranzler and Algina (2008) replicated the study conducted by Palmer et al., (2005) with a North 
American sample and also observed that the one, two and four factor models did not provide a good fit 
for the data. Rode, Mooney, Arthaud-day, Near, Rubin, Baldwin, and Bommer, (2008) further examined 
the factor structure using multi-group confirmatory factor analysis and provided evidence of a single 
higher-order general emotional intelligence factor, but could not find support for the four branch, two area 
and one overall emotional intelligence factor model upon which the MSCEIT is based.  
 
 
The debate over the SSREIT’s factor structure arose from Schutte et al.’s (1998) conclusion that the 
SSREIT total score measured a general EI construct, as the items loading on the factors two to four were 
not conceptually distinct from the items that loaded on the first factor (Schutte et al., 1998), and because 
a high Cronbach’s alpha was obtained. As the EI factors on which the scale was based were defined by 
Salovey and Mayer (1990) as being conceptually related, the choice of a principal component analysis 
with a varimax rotation was not the most appropriate form of analysis from which to generate the items of 
The factorial validity of the SSREIT 
 
Whether the SSREIT is a multidimensional or one-dimensional instrument is an issue of construct validity 
that extends to the content validity of the measure as well. According to the authors (Schutte et al., 1998) 
the instrument provides one general measure of EI, however, research with the instrument has revealed 
the presence of more than one sub factor, which is to be expected as the model on which the measure 
was based consisted of three or four hierarchical and interrelated constructs.  
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the scale. Firstly, as the varimax technique is an orthogonal method it assumes that the underlying 
factors are uncorrelated and, therefore, an oblique rotation method would have been more suitable. 
Petrides and Furnham (2000a) have also argued that the use of a varimax rotation would distribute 
variance away from a common factor and across orthogonal factors, and therefore, the solution did not 
necessarily reflect a general factor. Gignac et al., (2005) further noted that the use of a factor analysis 
rather than a component analysis would have resulted in greater factor structure accuracy because in 
contrast to the principal component method, factor loadings are expected to be smaller, rather than 
larger. 
 
Petrides and Furnham (2000a) tested the assumption that SSREIT measured one general factor using a 
confirmatory factor analysis procedure. The 33 items in the questionnaire were the indicators of a single 
latent variable which represented the general EI factor. Model fit indices employed by the study were 
observed to be wide of the recommended values indices (χ2495 = 1662.36, GFI = .69, AGFI = .65, CFI = 
.51, RMSEA = .105, RMR = .093) and the χ2 test was found to be highly significant (p < .001) which 
indicated that the one factor model was unacceptable. They followed the confirmatory analysis with an 
exploratory factor analysis too seek a more appropriate solution and identified an alternative four factor 
solution which they identified as optimism or mood regulation, appraisal of emotions, emotional utilisation, 
and social skills.  
 
This revised four factor structure was again identified using an orthogonal varimax rotation rather than an 
oblique rotation, which they had initially conducted but all factor correlations were observed to be below 
0.3. This inability to find an interpretable solution with an oblique method implies that the four factors also 
do not appropriately measure the theoretically related EI domains identified in the Salovey and Mayer 
model. Furthermore, the four factor solution established by Petrides and Furnham (2000a) only explained 
40.4% of the total variance, leaving a substantial amount of error variance. The researchers therefore 
cautioned against the instability of the factor structure due to the small amount of items.  
 
Ciarrochi et al., (2002) replicated the factor analysis with varimax rotation method employed by Petrides 
and Furnham (2000a) and were able to confirm the four factor solution explaining 40% of the total 
variance. Two items (item 6 and item 33) in this study, however, loaded on alternative factors to those 
identified previously and the fourth factor was abandoned due to low reliability (α = .58). Contrary to the 
findings by Petrides and Furnham (2000a), Murphy (2006) was able to identify a four factor solution using 
an obliquely rotated direct oblimin solution. Most of the factor loadings were above 0.3, although a 
number of the items were not found to load on the same factors as those identified by both the Petrides 
and Furnham and the Ciarrochi et al studies.  
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Palmer (2003) examined the factor structure of the SSREIT using a sample representative of an 
Australian population. Using a confirmatory factor analysis, Palmer tested the fit of four models; a general 
factor, four orthogonal factors, four oblique factors and a hierarchical model, all based on the item 
structure identified by Petrides and Furnham (2000a). The study identified a satisfactory fit for all four 
models according to the CFI and RMSEA statistics, with the oblique four factor model representing best 
fitting model (CFI = .98, RMSEA = .068). In spite of these findings, the study did not report the 
significance of the models and as a result it is difficult to assess whether the models provided a 
satisfactory fit according to the χ2 test.  
 
Due to the different findings regarding the item structure of the MSCEIT using oblique versus orthogonal 
factor rotation methods, a more intensive examination of the exact nature of the item structures of the 
hypothesised four factors is required. Additionally, as all the research studies discussed which examined 
the factor structure of the SSREIT have involved university student populations, except for the study 
conducted by Palmer, there is a need for the hypothesised factor structure of the SSREIT to be replicated 
with larger and more diverse samples.  
 
 
3.2.2.3. The discriminate and convergent validity of emotional intelligence: the relationship 
between emotional intelligence, intelligence and personality 
 
 
1. The model of El must be defined and a reliable means of measuring it must be developed.  
Emotional intelligence as a mental ability 
 
Mayer et al., (1999) have argued that there are standard criteria which need to be met before any new 
form of intelligence can be considered as constituting a scientifically legitimate version of intelligence. The 
criteria which these authors have focused on have all previously been defined as components of 
psychometric studies of intelligence (Roberts et al., 2001). The five criteria are as follows (Mayer et al., 
1999): 
 
2. The intelligence must be operationalised as a set of mental abilities and therefore have clearly 
defined performance components rather than a preferred way of behaving or other non-intellectual 
attainments.  
3. The intelligence should meet certain prescribed correlational criteria, for example the abilities 
defined by the intelligence should be positively intercorrelated, or related to pre-existing 
psychometric intelligence tests, while at the same time providing evidence of some unique 
variance. Measures of El are therefore expected to reveal positive correlations amongst the 
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subscales designed to assess the four areas of El, as well as consistently reveal a factor structure 
that compromises a general factor of El and four correlated primary factors.  
4. The abilities of the intelligence should develop with age and experience. Abilities should build on 
each other through development, with individuals reflecting different levels of development at 
different ages.  
5. The intelligence must be shown to predict important practical outcomes of emotional life 
(Matthews, et al., 2004). 
 
If El is to be considered as a new type of intelligence according to the criteria established, then tests to 
measure El need to meet the aforementioned criteria, as well as have satisfactory reliability coefficients 
across all scores used to measure the construct. The instruments should also be distinct from existing 
measures of personality and should therefore show very little or no significant correlations with 
personality constructs. The El measure is required to overlap with measures of other intelligences 
especially verbal intelligence, yet the El measure should be able to predict some form of social behaviour 
after controlling for the effects of intelligence, personality and similar instruments that measure behaviour 
traits (Thingujam, 2004). Intelligence has traditionally been assessed through competence in 
mathematics, verbal reasoning and non-verbal reasoning (Wakeman, 2006); therefore these three 
components of intelligence are the regions which need to show comparability to El.  
 
Mayer et al., (1999) amongst other researchers (Mayer et al., 2001; 2003), have claimed that there is 
sufficient available evidence that El in this domain meets all the criteria and, therefore, the ability theories 
of El can be considered as a traditional form of intelligence. These arguments have been made on the 
basis of findings with the MEIS, MSCEIT and MSCEIT V2.0. As evidence, the researchers contend that 
El in this domain can be measured as an ability with correct and incorrect answers determined through 
consensus and expert scoring (Mayer et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2001). Mayer et al., (1999) also 
established that correlations between consensus and expert test scores ranged from r = -0.16 to r = 0.95, 
with half of the 12 correlations exceeding a correlation of 0.52. Studies with these measures have also 
been found to exhibit satisfactory levels of internal consistency and reliability (Palmer, 2003; Van 
Staaden, 2001; Ciarrochi et al., 2000), and earlier concerns regarding the reliability of the MEIS 
subscales have been reported as improved, with reported subscale reliabilities of the MSCEIT ranging 
from 0.79 to 0.91, using consensus scoring and 0.77 to 0.90 using expert scoring (Mayer et al., 2003).  
 
As mentioned previously, confirmation of the factor structure of the MSCEIT has been less conclusive. In 
an attempt to confirm the convergent validity of the MSCEIT, a confirmatory and exploratory factor 
analysis study was conducted on the MSCEIT as well as emotions and intelligence measures (Roberts, 
Schulze, O’Brien, MacCann, Reid, & Maul, 2006). Although the study was able to substantiate the 
relationship between strategic EI and intelligence, the study observed mixed results regarding the factor 
structure with some support for the distinction between strategic EI and experiential EI, but not for the 
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four-branch distinction at a lower level of a higher-order EI model. The findings from these research 
studies suggest that the branches of EI as measured by the MSCEIT may be difficult to distinguish 
empirically and as a result of these incongruous findings there is additional work required to validate the 
factor structure of both the branches and areas of the MSCEIT. 
 
Mayer and Salovey (1997) have conceptualised emotional intelligence as a set of mental abilities 
concerned with emotions and the processing of emotional information and as a result, the validity of the 
ability model rests on the expectations that these instruments will correlate with established measures of 
mental ability and be independent from established trait measures of personality components. Research 
has, however, uncovered contradictory findings with regard to the overlap between the MSCEIT and 
personality and intelligence measurements.  
 
A number of previous research findings with the MSCEIT have shown that the measure demonstrates 
statistically nonsignificant to moderate correlations with general cognitive ability (Ciarrochi et al., 2000; 
O'Connor & Little, 2003), and research studies have thus been unable to establish concrete support for 
the placement of emotional intelligence within the domain of cognitive ability. In a study using college 
students, Brackett and Mayer (2003) observed that the MSCEIT area and total scores were only modestly 
correlated with verbal SAT scores, which are a proxy for verbal intelligence and Lopes et al., (2003) 
reported that only the understanding emotions branch of the MSCEIT, which relies on knowledge of 
emotional vocabulary, correlated with verbal SAT scores but not the total score or any of the other 
branches. Lopes et al., (2003) further established that there was no significant relationship between 
overall EI and the WAIS-III vocabulary subtest and only a moderate correlation (r = .45) has been 
reported with the Wonderlic Personnel Test (Schulte, Ree, & Carretta, 2004). In spite of this, a potential 
confirmation of the overlap with cognitive ability was discovered by Livingston and Day (2005), who on 
further review of the validity of the MSCEIT versus the EQ-i revealed that the emotional understanding 
subscale was able to account for a statistically significant, although small amount of variance in cognitive 
ability.  
 
Initial research with the MSCEIT had revealed that the measure tends to have low to insignificant 
correlations with personality (O'Connor and Little, 2003) and research by Livingston and Day (2005) has 
shown that personality measures account for very little variance in the four branch scores of the MSCEIT. 
Conversely, Lopes et al., (2003) have reported moderate yet significant correlations with the Big 5 
dimensions of agreeableness, conscientiousness and intellectual curiosity, and Brackett and Mayer 
(2003) identified significant relationships with the openness to experience (r = .25) and agreeableness (r 
= .28) dimensions, but not with conscientiousness. Rode et al., (2008) found that although the MSCEIT 
did have discriminant validity from personality, the measure correlated more highly with social desirability 
than general mental ability which substantiates criticism that the MSCEIT is merely a measure of 
conformity rather than an actual intelligence.  
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Construct validity for the MSCEIT as a distinct measure of EI as a cognitive ability is supported by the 
lack of convergence with measures of trait EI because if two measures are assessing the same construct, 
scores on these measures should be highly correlated. When compared to self-report measures of 
emotional intelligence, previous research has indicated that the MSCEIT does correlate moderately with 
the Bar-On Emotion Quotient Inventory (the EQ-i, r = .21) and the Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test 
(the SSREIT, r = .18), however, these relationships disappear when personality is controlled, which 
reinforces the supposition that ability and trait measures are not measuring a common construct.  
 
Research results on the supposed hierarchical development of EI using the MSCEIT has been 
inconclusive; Mayer et al (1999) examined developmental trends between adolescent and college-age 
students and identified that college students scored higher than adolescent youth and Van Staaden 
(2001) identified that ‘academic year’ has a moderate influence on the management of emotion. On the 
other hand Palmer et al., (2005) established that there were no significant relationships between overall 
MSCEIT scores and age and Gohm and Clore (2002) observed no differences in MSCEIT scores across 
a cross-sectional sample of 400 students, although the age range of the sample was limited.  
 
Some evidence has been identified which indicates that trait El measures do meet some of the criteria 
stipulated for the validity of the ability model. Petrides et al., (2004a) observed that although trait El did 
not have any influence on mathematical or scientific performance, it did moderate the effect of IQ on a 
scholastic measure of English and overall performance. A relationship was indicated between students 
with low IQ's and high El who performed well, however, no effect was found for children with high IQ's. 
Petrides et al., (2004a) theorised that the reason for this effect was because high trait El provides a 
stabilising force before testing through aspects such as positive self-perceptions, in situations where the 
intellectual demands outweigh the resources of the student. This provided support for the ability of 
individuals who have high El to convert stress and anxiety into positive performance. There is however a 
lack of evidence of a relationship between trait EI as measured by the SSREIT and the age of 
participants (Murphy 2006; Goldenberg et al., 2006) as well as years of education completed, which is 
considered to be a proxy for intelligence (Goldenberg et al., 2006). 
 
Despite the growing evidence of the conceptual reliability and validity of emotional intelligence, there are 
a number of theorists and researchers who contest the conceptualisation of El as an intelligence on a 
number of theoretical and statistical grounds. The implication that IQ is fixed and difficult to change 
stands in direct conflict with the views of emotional intelligence as changing with age and experience, 
modifiable by social environments and upbringing and a skill that can be learned or taught (Roberts et al., 
2001). Mayer et al., (1999) defend this contention by maintaining that these criticisms are part of a 
simplistic view of intelligence and intelligence research. Brody (2004) asserts that ability tests of El 
measure knowledge of emotions but not necessarily the ability to perform tasks that are related to the 
knowledge that is assessed, and as a consequence a person who has expert knowledge of emotions 
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may or may not be expert in the actual ability that is allegedly measured by the test. Matthews et al., 
(2004) do contend that trait models of El would have potential value for acknowledging the importance of 
personality traits that may relate to emotion, however, they criticise these models harshly for not 
appearing to present any new conceptualisation of emotional functioning and accordingly, do not relate 
specifically to either emotion or intelligence.  
 
Petrides, Furnham and Mavroveli (2007a) present the strongest argument against the conceptualisation 
of El as an ability by arguing that the subjectivity of emotional experience undermines the development of 
items or tasks that can be scored according to truly objective criteria and that can entirely cover the 
domain of the construct. They maintain that the scoring procedures utilised by ability El tests in order to 
objectify emotional experience, produce scores that are psychologically meaningless and emphasise that 
the conceptualisation of El as a trait has greater value in bridging the gap between experimental and 
correlational accounts of emotion. For that reason, Petrides et al., (2007a) conclude that El is not distinct 
from personality constructs, but rather is a part of them and occupy factor space at the lower levels of 
personality hierarchies.  
 
 
Concern has been raised about the predictive validity of self-report measures of El, especially due to the 
perceived overlap with personality. It has been suggested that the correlations observed with theoretically 
related variables are a result of these instruments measuring personality traits known to predict these 
Emotional intelligence as a personality trait  
 
Personality, which is commonly seen as a person’s characteristic pattern of thinking, feeling and acting, 
has been explored using a variety of theories. Trait theory is one of the most predominant and well 
accepted personality theories, and attempts to explain personality in terms of the dynamics that underlie 
behaviour (Stys & Brown, 2004). Traits are characteristic patterns of behaviour or dispositions to feel and 
act in a certain way which distinguish one person from the next. These traits are hypothesized to be 
consistent and stable across a lifetime, acting as a type of template for an individual’s behaviour (Stys & 
Brown, 2004).  
 
The extent to which a trait measure of EI should correlate with personality is a topic requiring urgent 
discussion. El theories that are based on self-report measures have been criticised (Matthews et al., 
2003; Mayer et al., 2000a; Petrides & Furnham, 2000a) for not being sufficiently distinct from personality 
theory, to warrant being recognised as a separate construct and thereby lacking discriminant validity. This 
area of El research has been seen as being merely a mirror for the research on the Big five theory of 
personality which is an empirically derived model of personality based on the early work on traits by 
Gordon Allport, Raymond Cattell, and Hans and Sybil Eysenck (Stys & Brown, 2004).  
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criteria, rather than a distinct construct (Matthews et al., 2003; Mayer et al., 2000c; Newsome, Day & 
Catano, 2000). The SSREIT has been found to correlate moderately to strongly with a number of 
personality constructs, including Alexithymia, optimism, impulse control and openness to experience 
(Schutte et al., 1998), as well as the existing personality scales (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Petrides & 
Furnham, 2000a). As a result some researchers maintain that the instrument is simply a different type of 
personality inventory and not a measure of EI (Mayer et al., 2000c; Roberts et al., 2001).  
 
There have been studies conducted that have observed evidence of the validity of trait EI over 
personality, for example self-report El was found to be distinct from personality by Saklofske, et al., 
(2003) who examined the incremental validity of a trait El measure over personality measures in the 
prediction of variables such as life satisfaction, happiness, loneliness and depression. Studies conducted 
by leading researchers, Petrides and Furnham (2003) have provided evidence for the discriminant validity 
of trait El by finding that El is related to mood sensitivity after partialling out variance from the Big Five 
personality characteristics, thereby providing support for their hypothesis that trait El is a distinct 
personality trait. The study provided additional substantiation of the construct validity of trait El by linking 
two differing trait El measures to perceptions of emotions. Previous studies conducted by Petrides and 
Furnham (2001) have also provided support for the discriminant validity of self-report El in relation to 
personality, by locating a distinct El factor in the factor space of the Eysenckian measure of personality as 
well as in the Big Five Factor model of personality, in two separate studies using two different samples. 
 
Evidence of convergent validity has been provided by research which has observed significant 
correlations with theoretically similar constructs. Research with the SSREIT has revealed correlations 
with variables such as optimism, greater impulse control, lack of depressed affect, less Alexithymia 
(Schutte et al., 1998), empathic perspective taking, self-monitoring in social situations, closeness and 
warmth of relationship, marital satisfaction (Schutte et al., 2001), emotional well-being, positive mood 
states and self-esteem (Saklofske et al., 2003; Schutte, Schuettpelz, & Malouff, 2002). The SSREIT has 
additionally been found to measure expected elements of the emotional impact on thought. The SSREIT 
has been associated with cognitive task persistence (Schutte et al., 2002) and academic averages in 
university students (Schutte et al., 1998). Investigation into the predicative validity of the SSREIT using 
adolescents observed that the scores on the SSREIT were also meaningfully related to skill at identifying 
emotional expression, satisfaction with social support and mood management behaviour (Ciarrochi et al., 
2001). None of these studies, however, examined the incremental validity of SSREIT in measuring these 
variables beyond other relevant tests such as measures of cognitive ability or personality traits. In 
addition the MSCEIT, but not the SSREIT, was observed by Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner and 
Salovey (2006) as associating with perceived interpersonal strategies after personality, well-being and 
verbal intelligence were held constant.  
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Petrides et al., (2007b) maintain that the developing conceptualisation of EI as a personality trait at the 
lower levels of trait taxonomies is the only method truly consistent with existing theories of individual 
difference. Measures of trait EI are therefore expected to show near-zero correlations with measures of 
cognitive ability given the general independence of personality and cognitive ability. For that reason, trait 
EI is hypothesised to lie outside the realm of human cognitive ability, occupying factor space at the lower 
levels of personality hierarchies, and the shared variance between trait EI and personality is expected to 
range between 50% and 80% (Petrides et al., 2007b). 
 
 
3.2.2.4. Implications of group differences in emotional intelligence scores 
 
 
A core assumption on which the ability model of El rests is that the skills associated with El cannot exist 
outside of the social context in which they operate. A close relationship therefore exists between El and 
socially defined appropriate behaviour within the relative contexts such as cultural, social and 
occupational (Salovey & Grewal, 2005). Whether these skills as a whole operate similarly in every social 
context is a question requiring further research. For this reason, El testing based on conceptual scoring 
should consist of normative data constructed from a diverse sample of people within many different 
contexts or even the ability to select normative data against which to score from within a specific context, 
for example if a study was conducted within a Chinese business firm, the normative scores should consist 
of a sample taken from people working in the occupational environment in China.  
 
Cross cultural work outside of Western countries is lacking in the field of El and further research is 
required to assess the predicted outcomes of El in other cultures (Gohm, 2004), as well as the effect of 
cultural norms on emotional perception and expression in those cultures. Landy (2006) contends that 
even though normative data has been collected for EI tests from a number of countries such as Australia, 
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, countries of the European Union and South Africa, these 
countries share cultures that are more individualistic than collectivistic and more masculine than feminine. 
Studies that have been conducted on the possible ethnic differences in El have yielded inconclusive 
results and consequently there is an urgent need for studies exploring group differences in El (Roberts et 
al., 2001; Van Rooy, Alonso & Viswesvaran, 2005). According to Landy (2006), emotional intelligence 
research would benefit greatly from research done in countries that are very different from the western 
model such as China, Iran, Pakistan and Sweden.  
 
Few research studies have reported on theoretically expected group differences using the MSCEIT 
specifically for factors such as culture, gender, age and ethnicity, and no longitudinal studies have been 
conducted to determine whether ability EI improves with age, experience or EI training courses offered by 
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companies such as MHS. Van Staaden (2001) did find theoretically expected differences between a 
group of psychology and engineering students using the MSCEIT, with psychology students exhibiting 
higher scores on management, understanding and facilitation of emotions. These differences could, 
however, not be replicated between students in the fields of humanities, management, sciences and 
engineering, in a similar study by Murphy (2006) using the SSREIT. 
 
Analysis of gender differences has revealed mixed results, for example, Palmer et al., (2005) revealed 
that females scored significantly higher than males on the MSCEIT among student and adult samples, yet 
studies by both Bastian, Burns and Nettelbeck (2005) and Livingston and Day (2005) observed that 
gender was related to scores on only one task of the MSCEIT. Brackett and Mayer (2003) observed 
significant gender differences on the MSCEIT with women (M = 105.13, SD = 11.09) scoring higher than 
men (M = 95.17, SD = 13.43), however, in contrast to Schutte et al.'s (1998) findings, no significant 
gender differences were observed on the SSREIT. Both Murphy (2006) and Petrides and Furnham 
(2000b), on the other hand, found that women scored significantly higher on the social skills subscale 
identified on the SSREIT than men. 
 
Studies on gender differences are therefore inconclusive, Stys and Brown (2004) have speculated that 
this discrepancy could be due to measurement choice, as research with a number of self-report tools 
such as the EQ-i and the SSREIT have mostly identified no evidence of gender differences (Brackett & 
Mayer, 2003), yet research with the MSCEIT generally differentiates El between genders. They state 
therefore, that gender differences may exist only when El is defined in a purely cognitive manner, 
possibly because males are more likely to over-estimate their ability on self-report measures.  
 
 
3.2.2.5. The predictive validity of emotional intelligence: El in applied settings 
  
 
Petrides et al., (2007a) maintain that the most important criterion for establishing the validity of a measure 
of El is whether it ultimately predicts life success in various domains related to emotional functioning. To 
be of value an emotional intelligence measure should be predicative of important outcomes of emotional 
life such as the ability to deal with stress, manage interpersonal relationships and adjust negative life 
events into positive learning experiences. The predictive validity of a measure therefore indicates the 
measure’s ability to reflect the impact of EI on everyday life.  
 
In a meta-analysis of the El construct, Van Rooy and Viswesvaran (2004) observed that El does have 
predictive validity for relevant life space criteria. They reported that El has predicative validity in 
employment and life settings, but that the ability to predict academic performance was limited, a finding 
  
 77 
which was supported by Bastian et al., (2005). Although the level of performance prediction measured 
was not as high as often claimed, the levels were found to be higher than those of other selection 
methods used, such as letters of reference. It was also reported that 4% of the variance in performance 
and 5% of the variance in work performance can be explained by El (Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004).  
 
Although the relationship between the MSCEIT and intelligence has been observed to be slight, a 
number of studies have found evidence of relationships with measures of academic performance 
(Zeidner, Shani-Zinovich, Matthews, & Roberts, 2005; Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004; Lopes et al., 
2003; Lopes, Brackett, Nezlek, Schütz, Sellin, & Salovey, 2004; Lyons & Schneider, 2005). These 
findings may, however, be influenced by confounding variables, for example Brackett and Mayer (2003) 
discovered that the MSCEIT was unable to provide incremental validity in predicting academic 
performance above that of personality and intelligence. Lyons and Schneider (2005) reached similar 
conclusions by establishing that although a relationship was observed between math appraisals and EI in 
males, this relationship disappeared when controlling for general mental ability (GMA).  
 
As the MSCEIT is still new and was published only recently, there have been few studies conducted with 
regard to the ability of the MSCEIT to predict life outcomes at home, work or at school. As a result, limited 
research has been publicised with regard to the measurement of work performance and leadership 
(Brackett & Salovey, 2006; Rode et al., 2008) and initial studies that have examined the relationship with 
job performance have produced contrasting results. One of the earliest studies conducted by Janovics 
and Christiansen in 2001 (cited in Zeidner, Matthews & Roberts, 2004a) reported that only the perception 
and understanding branches of the MSCEIT moderately correlated with job performance as assessed by 
supervisor rankings. As the study consisted of a sample of 176 undergraduates, however, the results are 
not a realistic reflection of the dynamics within occupational environments.  
 
A recent study by Lopes et al., (2006) assessed the relationship between the MSCEIT and work 
outcomes using a performance test as well as company data, peer and supervisor assessment. The 
results identified that emotional intelligence was related to several indicators of work performance 
including company rank, and ratings of interpersonal facilitation, affect and attitude. A major limitation of 
this study, however, was that the sample consisted of only 44 respondents and was restricted to finance 
employees of a fortune 500 company and, therefore, did not provide an indication of the potential 
differences that may be expected due to different job expectations or complexity of job functions. 
 
Several studies have established that the MSCEIT is related to various aspects of everyday living. 
MSCEIT scores have been correlated with scales of psychological well-being (Brackett & Mayer, 2003) 
and Lopes et al., (2003) have reported a significant positive correlation between the managing emotions 
subscale of the MSCEIT and global self-perceived quality of interpersonal relationships. The managing 
emotions subscale was also found to be associated with the quality of social interaction with friends 
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(Lopes et al., 2004) after controlling for Big Five personality traits. Limited evidence has however been 
reported to corroborate the relationship with life satisfaction and job satisfaction. Livingston and Day 
(2005) found that none of the MSCEIT scales were related to life satisfaction and only the scores on the 
emotional perception scale gave slight evidence of a correlation with job satisfaction scores (r = .14).  
 
Research has produced evidence that El is predictive of adaptive behaviour. Both trait El (Martinez-Pons, 
1997) and performance-based EI (Ciarrochi et al., 2000) measures have been observed as contributing 
uniquely to facets such as life satisfaction even after controlling for IQ and personality. Trait El was also 
found by Schutte et al., (2001) to predict greater social skills and cooperative interpersonal interactions 
and Ciarrochi et al., (2002) identified that the SSREIT moderated the relationship between stress and 
mental health after controlling for personality. In addition, Goldenberg et al., (2006), reported that the 
SSREIT is able to predict psychosocial factors such as coping and depressive affect whereas relations 
between the MSCEIT and individuals’ coping and levels of depressive affect were observed to be largely 
insignificant. 
 
The criterion validity of the SSREIT has been brought into question in a number of studies primarily due 
to the moderate correlations identified with Big Five personality traits (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Saklofske 
et al., 2003; Chapman & Hayslip, 2005). As a result, there has been some uncertainty about whether the 
SSREIT provides any useful explanatory or predictive power beyond existing personality instruments. 
There is little consistency in findings regarding the relationship of the SSREIT to personality as some 
studies have reported high correlations of up to 0.4 and 0.5 with various Big Five personality factors 
(Brackett & Mayer, 2003), yet others have reported that the tool accounts for variance in measures not 
accounted for by personality (Saklofske et al., 2003; Ciarrochi et al., 2002). 
 
Chapman and Hayslip (2005) examined the incremental validity of the SSREIT across a comprehensive 
range of college adjustment criteria using a hierarchic regression model to control for the Big Five 
measures of personality. They identified that the SSREIT provides a very small amount of additional 
predictive power as Big Five measures entered earlier in the regression capture most of the variance in 
psychosocial criteria. They also discovered an insignificance zero-order correlation with GPA which is in 
contrast to the high correlations observed initially by Schutte et al., (1998; r = .32). In spite of this, the 
results of this study revealed that the SSREIT has incremental validity in influencing more psychosocial 
and interpersonal factors such as loneliness. The conclusions from the research throw doubt on the 
predictive power of the SSREIT as a trait measure over that of existing personality measurement tools 
and yet gives further support to the hypothesis that trait EI has value in determining relevant life criteria. 
 
Few studies have examined the predicative validity of the SSREIT within occupational environments. 
Carmeli (2003) has, however, reported that emotional intelligence was empirically related to positive work 
attitudes, altruistic behaviour, and contextual and task performance amongst senior managers of an 
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organisation. A direct relationship was also identified between trait EI and job satisfaction as well as 
withdrawal intentions from the organisation. 
 
The SSREIT has been found to display positive and negative characteristics, yet a number of studies 
have indicated that the SSREIT displays sufficient reliability and validity in measuring self-report EI and 
can therefore be used with a reasonable certainty of obtaining meaningful results. Measures of self-
reported EI will be strengthened to the extent that they can be empirically disentangled from other 
personality trait scales and the incremental relationships found with psychosocial criteria implies that 
there is room for continued investigation and refinement of the measurement instrument. The common 
self-report based methodology on the other hand, presents a complication due to the inflated correlations 
which occur as a result of common method variance (Chapman & Hayslip, 2005). 
  
If more than one factor is used, as discussed previously, Chapman and Hayslip (2005) caution that one 
or more factors may have more or less predictive validity for a criterion measure than other factors or the 
composite score, but that such relationships will be masked by only examining the composite score. They 
provided support for the benefit of using more than one factor by citing Ciarrochi et al. (2002), who 
established that the Social Skills factor moderated the relationship between daily hassles and suicide 
tendencies, and Ciarrochi et al., (2001) who observed that the four SSREIT factors predicted social 
support from various sources, even when variance due to self-esteem and trait anxiety was controlled for. 
Consequently, the question to be explored further is whether trait EI accounts for sufficient influence in 
moderating social and interpersonal interactions over that of existing personality trait measurements, in 
order to be considered as a tool that provides unique value.  
 
 
 
 
3.3. COMPARABILITY OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE MEASURES AND THE POTENTIAL 
FOR SEPARATING THE CONSTRUCTS 
 
 
 
Zeidner, Roberts and Matthews (2004b) lament the inability of both ability and trait models of El to 
adequately explain the nature of the El construct. The limited number of studies that could provide 
evidence of correlations between trait and ability models results in concerns regarding the convergent 
validity of the field, as there is no consensus on the qualities that define El or rules that label personal 
qualities as emotionally intelligent or not. Petrides and Furnham (2000a) maintain that due to these 
findings, the two models should be seen as measuring different facets of El and that trait El theories 
should not view the construct as an ability of any kind (Petrides et al., 2007b). Some researchers 
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maintain that ability El should be seen as the true measure of El as a form of intelligence, and trait 
measures of El should rather be viewed as measuring competence in using emotions (Ashkanasy, & 
Daus, 2005), and therefore seen as the ability to use and apply skills made available to the individual 
through his or her actual El. Ability El has the potential therefore, to test knowledge of emotions but not 
necessarily the ability to adequately apply that emotional knowledge in real life scenarios, whereas trait El 
may contribute towards understanding how well emotional abilities are applied. The two models should, 
therefore, be seen as complimentary rather than contradictory to each other.  
  
A few studies have examined the extent of the overlap between trait and ability-based El measures 
finding minimal to no significant relationships. As El tests claim to measure one underlying construct, 
different measures of El need to be highly correlated with each other otherwise they cannot be said to be 
measuring the same construct (Matthews et al., 2003). The MSCEIT has been found to show mostly 
insignificant correlations with the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (Lopes et al., 2003) and the Bar-On scale 
(Mayer et al., 2002). In a more recent study, Brackett and Mayer (2003) obtained moderate correlations 
between the MSCEIT and Bar-On scales as well as between the MSCEIT and the SSREIT, however, as 
soon as personality and well-being were controlled for the MSCEIT became mostly independent of both 
inventories. Nevertheless, the two self-report scales were observed to have strong associations with a 
personality measure, as well as moderate correlations with each other which suggest that these two 
measures could be measuring the same construct. The ECI (Goleman, 1995) and the EQ-i (Bar-On, 
1997) have also been found on previous occasions to be highly comparable (Matthews et al., 2003). A 
study by Warwick and Nettelbeck (2004) concurred that the lack of significant relationships between self-
report and ability measures of El (r = .19) provides support for two distinct forms of El. This has resulted 
in some theorists believing that the two measures should be seen as measuring different constructs 
altogether (Petrides & Furnham, 2000a).  
 
Petrides and Furnham (2001) maintain that by separating El into two constructs defined by the 
boundaries of the assessment measures, many of the concerns regarding the validity of El can be 
resolved. These theorists agree that self-report measures correlate highly with personality, but state that 
this is to be expected as personality is by definition a construct best measured through self-report means. 
Petrides and Furnham (2001, p. 442) further describe trait El is a "distinguishable, lower order, 
composite, personality construct". In spite of these arguments, Roberts et al., (2001) criticise the 
distinction based solely on measurement instruments as premature due to the lack of evidence 
supporting El as an intelligence.  
 
It is unfortunately difficult to adequately judge the validity of any of the trait models of El. Presently, the 
only way to measure El as defined by the trait models is via self-perceived reports of the respondent's 
own El, and therefore, the facet under scrutiny is self-reported El rather than actual EI (Conte, 2005). 
Furthermore, some theorists argue that it is too early to insist on one consistent definition (Gohm, 2004). 
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The lack of a consensual definition of El is of lesser importance than establishing the validity of the 
instruments, as there are many concepts in psychology for which there is no consensus on a definition 
such as consciousness, the mind and even personality and intelligence. Gohm (2004) contends that it is 
time to move beyond debates about whether El is a standard intelligence or a personality trait, as it is 
more productive to examine whether El is a set of skills that can be reliably and validly measured, 
whether the construct as defined by each model is useful for explaining psychological processes and 
whether the models are able to predict important outcomes. It is the hypothesis of this research study that 
these two models of El could be more valuable to research on emotion if the models were separated and 
seen as two unique constructs that measure different facets of emotional capabilities.  
 
It has been argued that trait or self-report measures would be more valid if they are to be considered as 
comprising a number of traits or attributes that are not seen as abilities (Goldenberg et al., 2006; Petrides 
et al., 2007a), contrary to broader trait measures that often combine attributes with emotional reasoning 
abilities (Brackett & Mayer, 2003). Petrides et al., (2004a) further maintain that trait El should be 
examined on the basis of what it explains rather than what it predicts, as El may have great value as an 
explanatory variable. The reason for this is that although El may not have a direct influence on variables 
such as occupational and academic success, it may be able to explain why certain people are able to 
manipulate certain situations to their advantage.  
 
The present study therefore proposes that trait models be revised to exclude references to ability and be 
re-named emotional competence which is in accordance with Goleman's (1995) label for his model, and 
that ability El should be solely referred to as emotional intelligence. Consequently, rather than discarding 
measures of trait El, these measures should be re-assessed for the benefit they can provide in facilitating 
understanding of the interaction between possessing emotional abilities and the actual application of 
these abilities, as well as self-perception regarding the person's own success in using these abilities. To 
validate this assumption, however, there is need for additional research in understanding the functioning 
of El as an intelligence and as a trait or competence, by examining the nature of potential relationships 
with existing well established trait and intelligence measures. Additional research beyond the scope of 
this study is, therefore, required to validate this model by examining actual El in real life situations by 
measuring and observing real-life emotional responses to scenarios or situations. For the purposes of this 
study, trait and ability El will continue to be referred to as such, however, trait El should be seen as 
synonymous with emotional competency and ability El as synonymous with emotional intelligence.  
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3.4. A REVIEW OF THE RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE THINKING STYLES 
INVENTORY 
 
 
 
The Thinking Styles Inventory (TSI) is based on Sternberg’s (1988) theory of mental self-government. 
Styles are thought to be distinct from abilities, and involve unconscious preferences for ways of 
processing information and the use of abilities (Sternberg, 1997). The assumption is that a person will 
have certain preferences for thinking styles and although the preference for these styles may be flexible 
and adaptive to varying situations, people will still succeed more effectively in an environment that 
matches their preferred thinking styles. 
 
The TSI is a self-report inventory consisting of 65 statements, with five items for each of the thirteen 
subscales. The measure originally consisted of 104 items, but was later shortened to 65 items (Zhang, 
1999). 
 
 
3.4.1. Reliability of the Thinking Styles Inventory 
 
 
The principal reason for choosing the TSI to measure styles is that the theoretical constructs as well as 
the inventory generated by the theory have been proven to be valid and reliable in accessing thinking 
styles in many studies across a number of cultural groupings. The scale has been used extensively in the 
United States (Grigorenko & Sternberg, 1997; Spicer, 2004), as well as in Hong Kong and China (Zhang 
& Sachs, 1997; Zhang & Sternberg, 1998, 2000). Studies have also been conducted successfully in 
South Africa (Cilliers & Sternberg, 2001; Fraser, van Ede, Hislop-Esterhuysen, & Owen, 2004; Murphy 
2006), the United Arab Emirates (Albaili, 1997) and a number of European countries (Balkis & Isiker, 
2005; Fjell & Walhovd, 2004). Furthermore, the scale has been found to be reliable for student as well as 
adult populations (Zhang, 2005b). 
 
The original college sample collected by Sternberg and Wagner (cited in Sternberg, 1997) obtained 
subscale reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) ranging from 0.42 (monarchic) to 0.88 (external) with a median 
reliability of 0.78, which suggested an overall reliable measure. The original 104 item version of the TSI 
measure has also been found to be a reliable gauge of thinking styles with a South African student 
population as a recent study obtained a high overall Cronbach’s alpha for the TSI of 0.90, with the 
subscales ranging from 0.66 (local) to 0.87 (liberal) (Murphy, 2006).  
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Table 6: Scale reliabilities obtained in previous studies for the thirteen subscales of the TSI 
 
Categories Scale Reliabilities 
 
Zhang & Sternberg (1998) 
n=622 
(65 items) 
Zhang (2005b) 
n=333 
(65 items) 
Fer (2005) 
n=402 
(104 items) 
Murphy (2006) 
n=208 
(104 items) 
Legislative .71 .78 .65 .79 
Executive .64 .60 .58 .79 
Judicial .71 .71 .58 .67 
Monarchic .46 .68 .50 .83 
Hierarchical .74 .77 .82 .82 
Oligarchic .63 .71 .67 .58 
Anarchic .43 .55 .71 .59 
Local .43 .69 .71 .56 
Global .58 .70 .77 .73 
Internal .78 .75 .81 .74 
External .73 .71 .82 .83 
Liberal .78 .82 .75 .87 
Conservative .68 .77 .89 .85 
 
 
The overall TSI can therefore be considered as a reliable measure for exploratory research and 
preliminary decision making, however, some problems have emerged in recent research. For example, 
low reliabilities have been obtained with the local, monarchic and anarchic scales (Zhang, 2004), and as 
a result, Sternberg, Wagner and Zhang (2003) revised the original TSI, changing it into the TSI-R, by 
modifying some of the items and established greatly improved reliability scores including 0.55 for the 
anarchic style, 0.80 for the monarchic style, 0.69 for the local style. The present study was conducted 
using the shortened 65 item questionnaire rather than TSI-R because reliability and validity data was only 
available for this version of the instrument when the study was designed.  
 
The reliability of the measure has been confirmed in independent studies with samples from different 
cultural backgrounds and Table 6 presents the Cronbach’s alpha for each of the thirteen subscales in 
different cultural settings (Zhang, 2005b; Zhang & Sternberg, 1998; Fer, 2005; Murphy, 2006). Studies 
with Asian respondents have resulted in Cronbach’s alpha scores ranging from 0.43 for the local 
subscale (Zhang & Sternberg, 1998) to 0.82 for the liberal subscale (Zhang, 2005b). Furthermore, a study 
with Turkish respondents revealed that the TSI is also reliable when translated into different languages 
(Fer, 2005). The study established an overall Cronbach’s alpha of 0.90 and subscales scores ranging 
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from 0.50 to 0.89 as well as a four week test-retest scores for the subscales ranging between 0.63 and 
0.78, which improved on the reliability values of the lower scoring subscales.  
 
 
3.4.2. Validity of the Thinking Styles Inventory 
 
 
The validity of the TSI has been verified by a number of studies across many domains. Although cognitive 
styles have primarily been examined within the field of education and learning, styles have been shown to 
be a fundamental factor in determining both individual and organisational behaviour. Styles have been 
used effectively in personal selection and career guidance (Hayes & Allinson, 1998) and have been 
observed to have predictive power for academic achievement beyond general abilities (Zhang, 2001a). 
 
 
3.4.2.1. Factor structure of the Thinking Styles Inventory and convergence with theoretically 
similar constructs 
 
 
Construct validity has been provided for the TSI through verification of its factor structure, as well as by 
assessing the measure’s convergence with similar measures of cognitive styles and personality traits and 
by examining theoretically expected differences between groups. Previous studies with the TSI have 
generally, though not completely supported the structure of the theory. In accordance with the theoretical 
structure of thinking styles within five broad dimensions and three types (see Chapter 2 for a discussion), 
factor analysis techniques should reveal a good fit for both three and five factors within the data. In 
previous studies satisfactory fit for the three factor model (Yeung, 2006) and the five factor model 
(Sternberg, 1994b; Zhang, 1999; Fjell & Walhovd, 2004) have been identified using principal-axis factor 
analysis with oblique or varimax rotation methods. In a recent study with Turkish respondents, Fer (2005) 
was able to provide concrete evidence of the factorial validity of the measure as the results produced a 
model consisting of five independent factors that accounted for 45% of the total variance in thinking 
styles. In addition, the TSI was translated into Turkish for the purpose of the study which presumes that 
the factorial structure of the measure can be confirmed in different languages as well as different cultures.  
 
There are studies that have, however, identified a four factor solution in the data (Zhang, 2001b; 2003), 
although in both sets the factor loadings made sense within the structure of the model as the first factor 
was dominated by type I styles, the second by type II styles, the third factor showed high loadings which 
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contrasted the internal and external styles and the fourth factor showed high loadings that contrasted the 
local and global styles.  
 
The author of the TSI (Sternberg, 1994b) has reported that there should be a number of expected 
relationships observed between the subscales of the TSI. The legislative and liberal styles are expected 
to be closely associated, as are the executive and conservative styles. An inverse relationship is however 
expected between the global and local styles as well as the liberal and conservative styles. These 
relationships have been confirmed by previous studies for example, Zhang and Sternberg (1998) 
reported correlations between the positive executive and conservative styles (r = .63, p < .001) and the 
legislative and liberal styles (r = .41, p < .001), as well as negative correlations between the conservative 
and liberal styles (r = -.14, p < .01) and the internal and external styles (r = -.30, p < .001). These results 
were replicated by Murphy (2006).  
 
Studies that have reviewed the domain of cognitive thinking styles (Jones, 2006; Zhang & Sternberg, 
2005) have identified a number of theoretically similar measures that are expected to be conceptually 
related to each other if these instruments are to be considered as measuring a common domain that is 
theoretically valid. A number of studies have obtained correlations to various degrees with the TSI and 
the other measures of styles named in these reviews, such as Gregorc’s measure of mind styles 
(Sternberg, 1994b) and Biggs’ study processes questionnaire (Zhang & Sternberg, 2000). Based on 
these overlaps, Zhang and Sternberg (2005) contend that the different style constructs are not entirely 
similar but share certain degrees of similarities with each possessing its own uniqueness.  
 
There is sufficient research to support the relationship between personality and cognitive styles. Previous 
research has obtained moderate to strong relationships between thinking styles and measures of 
personality such as the Myers-Briggs type Indicator (Sternberg, 1994b), a short version of Holland’s 
measure of personality types (Zhang, 2001b) and the NEO Five factor Inventory which measures the Big-
Five personality characteristics (Balkis & Isiker, 2005; Fjell & Walhovd, 2004; Zhang & Huang, 2001). He 
(2006) concludes that based on research findings, styles can be considered as acting at a cognitive 
control level to moderate personality and consequently, behaviour. These findings imply that thinking 
styles may partially be explained by the nature of the relationship between thinking styles and personality 
traits, however, the relationship is not strong enough to conclude that measures of thinking styles are 
made redundant by established measures of personality. The use of this measurement instrument for the 
purposes of the present study is based on He’s premise that thinking styles are a dimension of 
personality that influences attitudes, values and social interaction, and therefore, a degree of overlap with 
existing measures of personality traits is expected.  
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3.4.2.2. Theoretically expected differences between groups 
 
 
The theory of mental self-government describes thinking styles as variable throughout the lifespan and 
socialised by learning and environmental influences (Sternberg, 1997). It would therefore be expected 
that thinking styles would differ as a result of gender socialisation, cultural or language influences and 
age. Differences in thinking styles were identified between males and females in a number of studies. 
Male students were found to have higher scores on thinking styles such as the legislative, judicial, global, 
liberal (Zhang, 2002c; Zhang & Sternberg, 2000), executive (Zhang, 2002c; Zhang & Sternberg, 2002), 
monarchic (Zhang, 2002c) and internal styles (Zhang & Sternberg, 2000). Students who had additional 
life experience outside university such as travel and work experience (Zhang, 1999) were also found to 
be more inclined to use judicial, liberal and hierarchical styles than students who did not have similar 
experiences. A recent study conducted with a South African sample, however, did not find any gender or 
age related differences on the TSI (Murphy, 2006). On the other hand, these findings could be attributed 
to a lack of variation in age in a typically student based sample, as well as the impact of the socialisation 
effect of the teaching style of the university over that of gender stereotypes.  
 
A focus point of the construct validity of the TSI that is important to the present study concerns the 
relationship between the TSI subscales and careers or study fields that are assumed to rely on specific 
styles of thinking by the nature of the job requirements. Previous studies with student samples have 
found relationships between study fields and thinking styles, for example, Cilliers and Sternberg (2001) 
found that arts, education and sciences students had different preference profiles for thinking styles. Arts 
students were found to prefer legislative and internal styles, whereas education students and natural 
sciences students were found to exhibit stronger preferences for the executive, global and conservative 
styles. The results of the aforementioned study, however, are based on first year students and therefore 
the thinking styles displayed could reflect training received at secondary school level. A study conducted 
on students consisting mostly of final year and postgraduate students did not reveal a difference in 
thinking styles between different study fields (Murphy, 2006), however, this lack of a finding could be 
attributed to more complex and creative thinking styles that could be required from final year students 
rather than the supposed norm favouring styles possibly required by first and second year students.  
 
A study comparing thinking styles to vocational interests (Zhang, 2001b) observed that the external and 
judicial thinking styles were significantly related to people who were social and enterprising. A negative 
correlation was obtained between people who are artistic and the conservative, executive and local 
thinking styles. A study conducted on the thinking styles of creative writers in comparison to journalists 
(Kaufman, 2002) observed that creative writers had a significantly higher score on legislative style 
thinking, which supports construct validity because the legislative style characterises people who enjoy 
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creating and formulating new ideas and using creative thinking strategies. A limitation of this study, 
however, was that the sample consisted of students and not actual professionals. An additional study 
conducted with a sample of artists versus a sample of engineers (Gridley, 2007) revealed that artists also 
displayed a stronger preference towards legislative thinking styles as well as anarchic styles which 
indicate a creative, yet norm contesting thinking framework whereas engineers utilised the executive and 
hierarchic styles more prominently, indicating that they preferred to execute the plans of others.  
 
 
3.4.2.3. The predictive validity of the Thinking Styles Inventory 
 
 
The TSI has been assessed for its heuristic and predictive validity in educational settings and has been 
found to signal significant relationships between styles of thinking and factors such as academic 
performance, performance in varying subjects and demographic characteristics such as birth order and 
socio-economic status (Grigorenko & Sternberg, 1997; Sternberg, 1997; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1995a).  
 
As styles are not considered to be abilities, it is important to consider the fundamental differences 
between styles and abilities when assessing the predictive validity of the TSI with regard to achievement 
(He, 2006). A style focuses on the manner rather than level of performance and may as a result, only 
moderate the utilisation of ability, rather than generate abilities that were not present in the individual to 
begin with (He, 2006). Although styles do not determine levels of abilities, they have been found to have 
an impact on performance. Grigorenko and Sternberg (1997) identified that certain thinking styles 
significantly contribute to academic performance after scores on academic tests had been controlled for. 
The incremental validity of the TSI in predicting academic performance was supported by Zhang and 
Sternberg (1998) who replicated the findings in a Hong Kong setting, finding that thinking styles do serve 
as predictors of academic achievement over and above academic ability. Furthermore, results indicated 
that students with tendencies towards particular thinking styles performed better on some forms of 
assessments than others (Grigorenko & Sternberg, 1997).  
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3.5. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
The variability of approaches used to measure El have an impact on the validity of the construct, and the 
present confusion with regard to the true nature of El does not do much good for the reputation of the 
field. As noted earlier, however, the limited relationship between self-report and performance based 
measures of El may not be surprising, if a distinction is to be drawn between ability El as a form of 
intelligence and trait El as an emotional competence. Nevertheless, the convergent validity between 
these two measures should be similar, based on the extent to which these measures tap into common 
constructs.  
 
Ciarrochi et al., (2000) laid out a number of conditions that a measure needs to satisfy if it truly measures 
El as it claims to. These conditions are applicable to both the trait and ability measure of El. Firstly, the 
subscales as well as the overall scale should indicate reasonable levels of reliability, and all the 
subscales should load on a single factor as both the MSCEIT and the SSREIT tests claim to measure an 
overall score of El. The second condition is that women should score higher on El than men, as women 
have been shown to be slightly superior to men in perceiving emotions (Mayer & Geher, 1996; Mayer et 
al., 1999; Petrides & Furnham, 2000b). The third criterion is that the tests should correlate with a number 
of criterion variables such as age and experience, and there should be no discrimination of EI measures 
towards people of different ethnic groups or cultures if the measure is to be considered as a universally 
valid tool. Additional variables that should correlate with El are measures such as empathy, life and 
occupational satisfaction, self-esteem and quality of relationships, as people with high El should be better 
at perceiving others’ emotions, managing their own emotions and the emotions of others and adapting 
their emotions better to suit difficult situations. The constraint is that El should measure these criteria 
even after controlling for other well-establish tests that have shown to predict these variables more 
accurately (Ciarrochi et al., 2000).  
 
Zeidner et al., (2004b) called for the need to map out the construct of EI according to a more rigorous 
conceptual and definitional system, the application of alternative domains of knowledge to complement 
criterion validity studies and the investigation of whether it is practically useful in applied settings to 
measure EI for selection purposes. This study attempts to contribute to the first two requests, as well as 
partially contribute to the third, by examining the overlap between measures of ability and trait EI that are 
based on the same underlying theoretical principles (Salovey & Mayer 1990), to understand the 
relationship between these two constructs and a different measure of thinking described as a personality 
trait, and lastly to examine the applicability of EI within an occupational environment.  
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3.5.1. Construct validity of the trait emotional intelligence vs. ability emotional 
intelligence distinction 
 
 
The main aim of the present study is to critically evaluate the El construct as operationalised in the 
MSCEIT and the SSREIT. This study will examine the reliability and validity of a measure of trait El 
(SSREIT) and a measure of ability El (MSCEIT), specifically with regard to the factor structure and 
degree of overlap between the two instruments. The reliability of the instruments is expected to be the 
same as or improve on measures of reliability expressed in previous studies, as well as in the original test 
manuals. The factor structures of the instruments are also expected to be in accordance with the 
underlying models on which the measures are based. The relationship between the two models of EI and 
a trait measure of cognitive thinking styles will also be assessed, and the degree to which ability EI and 
trait El are able to predict job satisfaction after controlling for thinking styles will be examined. 
Furthermore, criterion differences such as gender, ethnicity, age, experience, leadership and 
occupational functions will be examined to determine if these El tests meet the criteria laid out by 
Ciarrochi et al., (2000).  
 
The first objective of this study is to examine the relationship between a performance-based measure of 
El (the MSCEIT) and a self-report measure of El that was derived from an ability model conceptual 
framework (SSREIT). If the two instruments are measuring the same construct they should correlate with 
each other, as the SSREIT and the MSCEIT are based on the same theoretical definition of El, however, 
if there is an underlying difference between the constructs which these two instruments are measuring, 
the two instruments should not yield any significant correlations.  
 
The study further aims at empirically assessing the degree of convergence, if any, between these two 
measurement tools and trait measure of cognitive thinking styles. Nomological validity is established 
when the correlations between El and theoretically related constructs are greater than zero as well as 
exceed the magnitude of the correlations used to establish discriminant validity (Rode et al., 2008). If El 
was to be considered purely as an ability model, measures of El should not correlate with existing well-
established instruments used to measure behavioural traits (Rode et al., 2008). The question posed by 
this research is, therefore, whether ability and trait tests measure the same or different constructs, as well 
as the manner in which these tests overlap with existing well established measures of behavioural traits 
and the potential contribution of this relationship in defining the distinction between these measures.  
 
Hypothesis 1.1: There will be no significant correlations between the total scales and subscales of the 
MSCEIT and the SSREIT.  
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Hypothesis 1.2: Significant correlations will be obtained between the SSREIT and the Thinking Styles 
Inventory but no significant correlations will be obtained between the Thinking Styles Inventory and the 
MSCEIT.  
 
 
With respect to the underlying factor structure, it is not known whether a single emotional ability or 
personality trait factor underlies these various measures or whether an alternative structure applies. In 
order to validate the distinction between trait El as an emotional competence and ability El as a true 
intelligence, it is expected that a two factor structure would be identified, based on the hypothesis that 
trait inventories measure similar processes that are separate from the implicit processes tapped by ability 
measurements. If the trait and ability constructs are therefore to be considered as tapping diverse areas 
of human competence and ability, the two self-report measures are expected to load together, separately 
from the ability measure.  
 
Hypothesis 1.3: Factor analysis using the subscales of the subscales of the EI and thinking styles 
measurement instruments will uncover an overlap between the trait EI and thinking styles measure, but 
the subscales of the ability EI measure are expected to load independently from both the trait EI and 
thinking styles subscales.  
 
Hypothesis 1.4: Certain expected group criterion relationships will be obtained with the EI scales and 
subscales including a positive relationship between emotional intelligence age and experience, a lack of 
ethnic differences in ability or trait emotional intelligence, and women will score higher on emotional 
intelligence scales and subscales than men. 
 
 
 
3.5.2. Predicative validity of trait emotional intelligence vs. ability emotional 
intelligence in the occupational environment  
 
 
Cognitive thinking styles are defined as individual preferences in information processing that are partially 
socialised (Sternberg, 1997), which suggests that work environments can influence people’s thinking 
styles. In Sternberg’s triarchic theory (1985) humans are described as adaptive creatures that when 
unhappy in an environment, will either try to change the environment or if unsuccessful, will leave that 
environment. Research into thinking styles has shown that individuals who have a preference for a 
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particular thinking style will function more optimally in a situation that matches that thinking style, than a 
person using a different thinking style (Sternberg, 1997, 2003b). In many educational as well as 
occupational settings certain ways of thinking are valued more than others and people who do not use 
those ways of thinking cannot thrive in those situations (Sternberg, 2003b). Cools and Van Den Broeck 
(2007) identified the importance of cognitive fit between one’s cognitive style and the demands of the job 
in predicting positive outcomes such as job satisfaction, whereas a mismatch is expected to lead to 
negative outcomes such as increased turnover and greater work-related stress or conflict.  
 
Zhang and Sternberg (2002) identified that people who are in a more favourable work environment are 
generally happier and thus more willing to take risks, to be innovative, and to be persistent in trying 
different ways of solving problems. They observed that teachers who perceived their teaching 
environment as being more positive, reported greater use of type I styles, whereas teachers perceiving 
themselves as working in a less favourable environment reported the use of type II thinking styles (Zhang 
& Sternberg, 2002). Similarly Zhang (2005b) identified that both actual and perceived work environment 
patterns were successfully predicted by thinking styles. Perceived favourable work environments and job 
satisfaction were observed to be predicted by type I thinking styles which tend to be more creativity-
generating and signify higher levels of cognitive complexity. Type II thinking styles which are styles that 
suggest a norm-favouring tendency and that signify lower levels of cognitive complexity, were 
predominantly predicted by ‘prospect for a salary increase’, and ‘rating of one’s salary’.  
 
Hypothesis 2.1: Perceived favourable work environments will positively contribute towards the prediction 
of type I thinking styles, yet will contribute negatively towards type II thinking styles.  
 
 
The role of thinking styles in mediating job satisfaction is expected to be confirmed based on both 
theoretical expectations as well as findings from previous studies. Due to the ambiguity in the EI field, 
however, the relationship between EI and job satisfaction is less certain. In order to have incremental 
validity, a measure of EI needs to be able to predict certain performance domains such as work and 
academic performance as well as leadership. Although measures of EI are already sold and used as 
recruitment and personal development tools in the world of work, little research has been done that 
conclusively links EI to performance at work.  
 
It is expected that EI will be related to job satisfaction as EI is related to the coping mechanisms used to 
deal with external pressures within occupational environments (Goldenberg et al., 2006). People with 
high levels of EI are therefore expected to cope better with work pressure by reframing difficult 
environments into positive experiences and redirecting negative emotions such as anxiety into productive 
activities (Rode et al., 2008). Low EI on the other hand is expected to correlate with more negative 
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appraisals of situations. Research has also revealed a relationship between high EI and life satisfaction 
(Palmer et al., 2002), which similarly to job satisfaction requires the ability to positively regulate emotions, 
and when people relate positively to one another they are expected to experience greater life satisfaction 
and lower stress (Salovey et al., 2001).  
 
Hypothesis 2.2: As EI defined as an ability is expected to mediate relationships with real life criteria 
independently from trait measurements, ability EI measured using the MSCEIT will explain unique 
variance in predicting job satisfaction after controlling for cognitive thinking styles.  
 
Hypothesis 2.3: It is expected that both trait and ability EI will explain unique variance in predicting self-
reported job satisfaction, however, ability EI will explain greater variance than trait EI given that ability EI 
is expected to have greater predictive power than trait EI in practical settings. 
 
 
Cools and Van Den Broeck (2007) examined the thinking styles of employees in three groups separated 
according to the cognitive climate of their occupations. A knowing-oriented cognitive climate was seen as 
specific to employees in finance, information technology (IT), and research and development (R&D) 
functions, a planning-oriented cognitive climate was observed to be specific to administrative and 
technical functions, and a creating-oriented cognitive climate was specific to sales and marketing 
functions and general management. The study reported that cognitive styles differed for various 
occupation types, resulting in particular cognitive climates within particular job types. The present study 
will explore whether cognitive thinking styles could similarly be a predictor of job functions within different 
occupational groups defined according to the cognitive climates identified by Cools and Van Den Broeck 
(2007).  
 
Hypothesis 2.4: Type I thinking styles (including the legislative, judicial, hierarchical, global and liberal 
styles), which are associated with creativity and higher cognitive complexity and external thinking styles 
(type III) contribute positively to the discrimination of respondents who work in knowing-oriented cognitive 
climates such as in finance, outsourced business processes, application management, information 
technology and research functions, and employees who work in creating-oriented cognitive climates such 
as consulting, sales and marketing functions.  
 
Hypothesis 2.5: Type II thinking styles which are associated with more norm favouring and planning 
styles (executive, local, monarchic and conservative styles) and internal thinking styles (type III) 
contribute positively to the discrimination of respondents who work in a planning-oriented cognitive 
climate such as administrative and technical or IT development staff who are responsible for applying 
technical skills and capabilities to build and maintain technology solutions. 
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Petrides et al., (2004a) maintain that trait EI is an advantage in subjects that require consideration of 
affect-related issues. These findings are important for the current study as a similar hypothesis could be 
concluded for career choice. It is possible that individuals higher in trait EI would be able to attain more 
benefit from these abilities in careers that deal continuously with affect-laden information and may involve 
ambiguous situations requiring emotional problem solving such as human resources or management for 
instance. Trait EI may, however, be less beneficial in careers that require primarily technical skills such as 
IT skills. EI comprises the ability to adaptively understand and regulate emotions. People who have high 
levels of EI should therefore be drawn to careers that require interaction with people on a more emotive 
level. It is hypothesised that people who work in occupations that require emotional skills such as human 
resources and management will have higher levels of EI than people who work in careers that require 
greater technical skills and less in depth interpersonal interaction.  
 
Hypothesis 2.6: Employees who work in occupations that deal primarily with affect laden information and 
require emotional problem solving such as human resources, consulting, sales and marketing will have 
higher levels of emotional intelligence than people who deal primarily with technical information required 
for building and maintain technology solutions.  
 
Hypothesis 2.7: Employees in management roles will display greater levels of ability and trait emotional 
intelligence than employees in non-management roles. 
 
 
 
 
3.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
 
 
As the primary objective of the present study is to examine how measurement formats affect the 
psychometric and theoretical properties of the El construct, this chapter focused specifically on the issues 
of validity and reliability that have arisen in previous research with measures of EI. The chapter provided 
a review of the validity and reliability of EI in general, although the majority of the chapter dealt with the 
specific trait and ability EI inventories as well as the thinking styles measurement instrument utilised in 
the present study. The chapter concluded with the research question and hypothesis to be tested. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
4.1. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 
The primary aim of the present study is to examine the possible relationship or lack of relationships 
between trait and ability measurements of EI by examining the underlying structure of these tools, as well 
as the potential interrelationships with a well established measurement of thinking styles. The study 
examines the validity of the proposition that there are two distinct forms of EI, namely trait and ability EI 
as postulated by Petrides and Furnham (2001). This was achieved by exploring the overlap of 
measurements instruments hypothesised to measure ability EI (the MSCEIT V2.0), and trait EI (the 
SSREIT), with the Thinking Styles Inventory (TSI) which has been shown in previous studies to be related 
to facets of personality (Zhang & Huang, 2001), as well as trait EI using the SSREIT (Murphy, 2006). The 
study argues that if trait and ability EI are to be seen as measuring the same construct, significant 
correlations should be obtained between the two instruments and similar relationships should be 
observable between both measures and the thinking styles scale.  
 
Critics of EI suggest that the best way to demonstrate the value of EI is to demonstrate its incremental 
validity beyond traditional predictors of performance (Landy, 2005). Research has been conducted which 
examines the relationship between thinking styles and job satisfaction as well as career fit, however, less 
is known about the influence EI has in predicting these constructs. A further argument explored by the 
study is that if both trait and ability EI are to be considered as contributing uniquely to the study of 
emotion and cognition, the instruments should be capable of predicting real life criteria after controlling for 
the effects of existing well established measures which have been shown to influence the same criteria in 
previous studies.  
 
The study was conducted within a large and diverse organisation in South Africa using an online 
quantitative survey research approach. The study used a non-experimental, correlational research design 
in order to analyse the strength of the relationship between the variables. The variables examined in the 
study include the components of trait EI and ability EI, the thirteen thinking styles categories, self-reported 
job satisfaction, primary job function, career level, actual resignation behaviour and the demographic 
characteristics of the participants such as age, ethnic group, gender and level of work experience. A 
limitation of correlational research is that errors of causality often arise. Inferences that one event causes 
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another event could often result in misleading conclusions as the impact could be the result of intervening 
variables. A further limitation of a correlational study is that the relationship between two variables could 
be the result of an artefact, such as a false positive relationship between two scales because the scales 
themselves contain similar items and not because their items are causally related (Babbie & Mouton, 
2004). Considering that only an experimental research design with random sampling, which has not been 
used in this study (as explained in section 4.2), can prove a definitive cause-and-effect relationship, this 
research will only attempt to measure the degree of relationships between the variables and point to 
possible causal factors that can be explored in subsequent research. 
 
 
 
 
4.2. SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
 
 
Employees of a large and diverse South African consulting firm that functions across a number of regions 
and industries formed the basis from which the sample was obtained. This particular organisation was 
utilised due to the large number of employees that work for the company and their diversity with regard to 
demographic characteristics as well as occupational roles. The sample consisted of employees from 
multiple disciplines within the company and from a number of dispersed regions across South Africa 
which reduces bias expected to appear within more heterogeneous companies.  
 
The sample was collected using non-probability purposive sampling methods in order to obtain the 
maximum number of participants for the study. Purposive sampling involves collecting any cases that 
contain the most representative attributes of the population (De Vos, Strydom, Fouche & Delport, 2002). 
A non-random sample of convenience was utilised by sending invitations to all employees of the 
company, but the sample size was dependent on the number of respondents who voluntarily completed 
the questionnaires. Online Surveys were administered to 1600 employees from junior assistant to senior 
manager level within the organisation. The data was supplemented with information obtained from 
personnel files such as demographic information, job function and whether or not the respondent had 
resigned in the lapsed 12 to 15 months between the administration of the survey and the analysis of the 
data and reasons given for resignation. 
 
The total size of the participating sample is 352 people which entails a response rate of 22% of the 
population. The response rate was lower than anticipated, but the sample size is acceptable for the 
purposes of the statistical analyses carried out in this research. Some of the methodological issues that 
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can arise from a low response rate in EI and cognitive styles research are discussed in Chapter 6 
(Section 6.3.1). As can be seen in Figure 3 below, the distribution of the respondents within the four 
different workforces from which the sample was obtained adequately reflects the proportion of employees 
within each workforce for the entire company. 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of sample within each of the workforces in comparison to the proportion of 
employees in each workforce for the entire company 
 
 
The organisation from which the sample was taken is part of a global network and functions across a 
range of industries and working environments that includes traditional office bound environments, virtual 
working and remote off-site employment. The organisation was therefore considered to be a prime 
example of a complex modern workplace. The diverse spread of job functions within the sample offered 
an added benefit of examining the impact of thinking styles and EI within different occupational roles. 
 
The organisation consists of four primary workforces that are largely distinct in terms of job functionality 
and expectations: 
 
a) The first workforce is a consultancy-oriented workforce that is employed on complex projects 
and design complex solutions for clients. These employees work remotely from a number of 
diverse client sites rather than from a permanent office location, and are expected to have 
knowledge of a wide range of industries and work on complicated problems requiring creative 
solutions. Consequently, this workforce is expected to display more complex and creative 
thinking styles due to the dynamic and interactive nature of the role.  
47%
9%
31%
13%
46%
12%
24%
17%
Sales / Consulting staff Office / Support staff Services / Outsourced staff Technical / IT Development staff
Company (n=1600)
Research sample (n=352)
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b) The second workforce is the services workforce, which is a workforce that is outsourced on long-
term contracted services such as business processes, application management and information 
technology to clients, and work within client office buildings rather than a permanent office 
location.  
 
c) The third workforce consists of technical or IT development personnel, who are responsible for 
applying technical skills and capabilities to build and maintain technology solutions at client 
locations. These employees are expected to display norm-favouring thinking styles that may be 
more associated with planning and execution of solutions and systems.  
 
d) The fourth workforce consists of office or support staff which are employees that are currently in 
a business practice such as facilities, administration, finance, human resources, marketing, 
creative services, operations and research. The roles employed by these workforces require 
significant interaction with employees in the rest of the company within South Africa as well as 
global locations, and require a range of thinking styles from the application of knowledge to 
complex and creative design or problem solving.  
 
 
 
 
4.3. RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
 
The ability model of emotional intelligence was measured using the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional 
Intelligence Test Version 2 (MSCEIT V2.0) (see Appendix C for the online instructions and Appendix D 
for examples of questionnaire items) and the trait model of EI was measured using the Schutte Self-
Report Emotional Intelligence Test (SSREIT, Schutte et al., 1998) (see Appendix A for the full 
questionnaire). The reason why the SSREIT was chosen was because firstly the measure has received 
sufficient research attention and there is empirical data and information available on more than one type 
of test validity in peer-reviewed research literature, and secondly because the measure is based on 
Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) definition of EI, and the results from the two instruments can therefore be 
meaningfully compared.  
 
The Thinking Styles Inventory (Sternberg & Wagner, 1992) was selected to measure thinking styles (see 
Appendix B for the full questionnaire). In addition to this, questions relating to job satisfaction and 
demographic details were requested in the survey. 
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4.3.1. Description and scoring of the MSCEIT  
 
 
The MSCEIT contains 141 items and provides seven scores: one for each of the four branches, two area 
scores and a total EI score. As discussed in Chapter 3, the two area scores represent experiential 
emotional intelligence, which is calculated using the first two branch scores, perceiving emotions and 
facilitating thought, and strategic emotional intelligence, which is a combination of the third and fourth 
branch scores; understanding emotions and managing emotions. In addition, each of the four branches 
consists of eight tasks with two tasks for each branch. Faces and pictures combine to form the perceiving 
emotions score, sensations and facilitation combine to form the facilitating thought score. Blends and 
changes combine to make the understanding emotions score, and emotional management and emotional 
relations combine to form the managing emotions score. The eight subscale scores are determined by 
adding the weights for each item as determined by either the consensus or expert scoring method. The 
four branch scores are determined by adding the two corresponding subscale scores that measure each 
branch (JVR, 2007). 
 
In addition to the total, area, branch and task scores, there are two supplemental scores. These 
measures provide additional information to help understand the respondent’s response style. The scatter 
score provides an indication of the amount of fluctuation between a respondent’s task scores. The 
positive-negative bias score provides a measure of an individual’s tendency to respond to pictorial stimuli 
with either positive or negative emotions (Mayer et al., 2002). 
 
For the purposes of this study, the MSCEIT was scored in a consensus fashion in which more or less 
correct answers to items are assigned according to normative averages. In this scoring method high 
scores on the MSCEIT are achieved by consistently choosing responses to items that have been 
endorsed by the majority of the normative sample which consists of the responses of more than 5000 
respondents in different countries. The majority of the normative sample consists of respondents from the 
United States, however, multi-national data from Europe, Asia, Africa, North America outside the U.S. 
and Australia are also included. Response scores are weighted by the proportion of the normative sample 
that also provided that answer. The assumption is made that large samples of individuals converge on 
correct answers. There are two additional scoring methods available that can be selected by the 
researcher or practitioner administering the test. In the expert scoring method, correct items of the test 
are set by a panel of experts in emotion and in the target scoring method, correct answers to test items 
are set by the person or target that wrote or developed the item (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of the 
expert and consensus scoring methods). 
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This research study used the general scoring method with scores adjusted for age, ethnicity and gender 
differences. The research data were provided both in terms of raw, unadjusted scores and standardised 
scores based on the adjusted scores which are expressed in terms of a standard intelligence with a mean 
score of 100 (average score obtained in the general population) and a standard deviation of 15. 
Additionally, the manual provides qualitative ratings that correspond to each numeric score. For example, 
an individual who receives an overall EI score of 69 or less would achieve a rating of 'considerable 
development required' whereas someone scoring 130 or more would achieve a rating of 'significant 
strength' (Mayer et al., 2002). The details of the scoring procedures are retained as proprietary 
information by Multi-Health Systems Inc. (MHS) of Toronto, Ontario, Canada who own the rights to the 
MSCEIT.  
 
 
4.3.2. Description and scoring of the SSREIT 
 
 
The SSREIT consists of a 5-point Likert scale on which a score of 1 represents strongly disagree and a 
score of 5 represents strongly agree which the respondent uses to indicate the extent to which each item 
describes him or her. On completion, items 3, 5 and 28 are reverse coded. The sum of all the items 
results in a total score which can range from 33 to 165. Higher scores on the scale indicate a greater 
overall level of emotional intelligence (Schutte et al., 1998). 
  
Schutte et al., (1998) collected the sample on which the questionnaire was standardised from a 
community sample of 328 respondents. Females obtained a mean score of 130.94 (SD = 15.09) and 
males had a mean score of 124.78 (SD = 20.25). Schutte and Malouff (1999) provided further group 
scores against which results can be compared. These included a group of psychotherapists with a mean 
of 134.92 (SD = 20.25), prisoners who had a mean score of 120.08 (SD = 17.71) and substance abuse 
clients with a mean of 122.23 (SD = 14.08).  
 
Other than the limited comparative scores supplied by the authors, and normative data established by 
Palmer (2003) on an Australian general population sample, there are little further normative data 
available on this scale. A number of studies have, however, found results comparable to those provided 
by the authors with studies conducted amongst South African and other African respondents. Stone 
(2004) obtained a mean score of 127.74 and an average score of 3.87 on the measure’s scale of 1 to 5 
with a sample of South African Information Technology (Software Development) employees and Murphy 
(2006) obtained a mean score 128.22 with a sample of South African University Students. The SSREIT 
has also been used successfully with Nigerian samples (Salami, 2007; Aremu, 2005).  
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4.3.3. Description and scoring of the TSI 
 
 
The Thinking Styles Inventory (TSI) developed by Sternberg and Wagner (1992) identifies 5 different 
dimensions of thinking styles which are further subdivided into thirteen categories of preference. For each 
item, the participants are asked to rate themselves on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (the statement does 
not describe the way they normally carry out tasks at all) to 7 (the statement characterises the way that 
they normally carry out tasks extremely well) (Sternberg, 1997). The present study uses a short version of 
the Thinking Styles Inventory as both versions have been used extensively in a number of settings and 
are considered to be comparable in terms of reliability, validity and factor structure. The main advantage 
of using the 65 item version is that it takes considerably less time to complete than the 104 item version 
(Sternberg et al., 2003; Zhang, 2004, 2005a, 2005b).  
 
  
4.3.4. Measures of job satisfaction  
 
 
Job satisfaction in the broad sense is considered to be a predisposition or an attitude, which is widely 
accepted as having three components: affect, cognition and behaviour (Saiyadain, 2003). This suggests 
that job satisfaction should be measured not only using self-reported assessments of feelings regarding 
occupational contentment, but also through the presence or absence of critical cognitive or behavioural 
responses.  
 
This study attempts to examine all three components by assessing self-reported feelings of satisfaction 
with specific aspects of the respondent’s job, cognitive intent that reflects the impact of satisfaction on 
potential behaviour such as willingness to recommend the organisation as a great place to work and 
intent to stay with the company for a certain number of years, as well as actual resignation behaviour and 
reported reasons for resignation. As the attitudinal and cognitive questions were included in an optional 
section at the end of the survey, not all the participants completed the questions. The questions were 
presented as optional due to the length of the questionnaire in order to prevent forced or randomized 
responses as a result of respondent exhaustion. 
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Figure 4: Questions used to measure self-reported job satisfaction 
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Attitudinal measures of job satisfaction 
 
Four items on a 5-point scale (1 = very dissatisfied, 5 = very satisfied) were used to measure employees 
self-reported degree of overall satisfaction with their company as an employer, their satisfaction with their 
occupation, satisfaction with the work force to which they belong and satisfaction with their present 
position. These questions were administered to assess overall satisfaction not only with the company for 
which the respondent works, but also perceived fit with their position, workforce and overall choice of 
occupation.  
 
Respondents were also requested to rate their daily working experience at their company to further 
measure emotional fit with the job. Respondents were asked to rate their experiences on four polar 
questions that ranged on a five point scale from fun (1) to boring (5), appreciated (1) to unappreciated (5), 
challenged (1) to overworked (5), and passionate (1) to uninspired (5). The relevant questions are 
provided in Figure 4. 
 
In a separate follow-up study one year from the data collection period of the original study, the question 
examining self-reported degree of overall satisfaction with the company as an employer was again posed 
to a number of respondents who participated in the original study. These additional results will be used to 
determine whether there is any potential for a relationship between thinking styles or EI and changes in 
self-reported job satisfaction over time.  
 
 
Cognitive measure of job satisfaction 
 
Two additional questions were included in an attempt to counteract potential concerns regarding the self-
report nature of the job satisfaction questions. Respondents’ intent to stay with the company was 
assessed by asking how long the respondent felt that they would still be working for the company. 
Respondents were also requested to assess their willingness to recommend the company as a great 
place to work for family and friends (see Figure 4 for the relevant questions). 
 
 
The actual resignation behaviour and reasons for resignation was obtained from employee records held 
by the human resources department of the organisation. Resignations consisted of two main categories, 
those which can be classified as voluntary resignation and managed resignation when the employee has 
in fact been involuntarily dismissed. The study will control for unavoidable compared to avoidable 
termination of employment factors for example resignation due to the end of a contract period, death, 
Behavioural measures of job satisfaction 
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other country transfers or the decision not to return to work after pregnancy. Avoidable resignations are 
considered to be reasons for resignation that could have been prevented by the company.  
 
 
4.3.5. Socio-demographic and occupational variables 
 
 
Previous studies have observed that EI (Palmer, 2003) and thinking styles (Cilliers & Sternberg, 2001; 
Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1995a; Zhang, 2002c, 2005b; Zhang & Sachs, 1997) can vary with one or more 
of the following demographic characteristics: age, experience, gender and culture. The theory of mental 
self-government describes thinking styles as variable throughout the lifespan and socialised by learning 
and environmental influences (Sternberg, 1997). It would therefore be expected that thinking styles would 
differ as a result of gender socialisation, cultural or language influences and age.  
 
These variables were incorporated in the analysis of the research as it was expected that similar results 
would be obtained for the present study. The following demographic or workforce information was 
collected either through the demographic information section of the survey questionnaire (see Figure 5 for 
the relevant questions) or through personnel information made available by the human resources 
department of the organisation.  
 
 
The thinking styles of respondents in different job functions will be further assessed according to 
differences in the cognitive climate of occupations based on a typology similar to that identified by Cools 
and Van Den Broeck (2007). This distinction between job functions was implemented specifically within 
the enterprise or office based workforce as this is the least homogenous workforce in the organisation, 
Job function and leadership 
 
The present study seeks to examine differences in emotional intelligence and thinking styles of people in 
different job functions: workforces and levels of management. As discussed in the sample specifications, 
the organisation from which the sample for the present study is drawn consists of four primary 
workforces; a consultancy-oriented workforce, a services workforce, a technical development or 
information technology (IT) based workforce and an office based workforce consisting of enterprise or 
support staff. Respondents were asked to indicate to which workforces they belong in the survey 
questionnaire but to further facilitate the distinction between job functions, additional information 
regarding the exact nature of the respondent’s job function was obtained from human resources.  
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consisting of a number of career functions including office services, research, human resources, finance 
and creative services or marketing. The three groups of the typology are conceptualised as follows:  
 
a) Job functions that require a knowing-oriented cognitive climate includes employees who belong 
to the services workforce, which is characterised by job functions such as outsourced business 
processes, application management and information technology, as well as employees who 
belong to the finance and research division of the enterprise workforce.  
b) Job functions that require a planning-oriented cognitive climate includes employees who belong 
to the solutions workforce which is characterised by job functions such as the application of 
technical skills in building and maintaining technology solutions as well as employees who belong 
to the office services or human resources divisions of the enterprise workforce and thereby are 
required to possess a number of administrative skills. 
c) Job functions that require a creating-oriented cognitive climate include employees in the 
consulting workforces as well as the creative services or marketing divisions of the enterprise 
workforce.  
 
The difference in emotional intelligence for different job functions was assessed by separating employees 
into two groups. Respondents who worked in the consulting workforce as well as the creative services or 
human resources divisions of the enterprise workforce were considered as working in occupations that 
deal primarily with affect laden information and require emotional problem solving. Employees who 
worked in the services, technical or IT development workforces on the other hand were considered as 
belonging to occupations that deal primarily with technical information required for building and 
maintaining technology solutions. 
 
Respondents were requested to specify their level within the company to assist in determining whether 
differences in EI or thinking styles could be identified for respondents who were in management positions 
compared to those who were not. Respondents were subdivided into two groups based on their level; 
those in either senior manager or manager positions and those who fell below the level of manager.  
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Figure 5: Questions used to measure socio-demographic and organisational variables  
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a) The baby boom generation is made up of 42 to 56 year-olds (born between 1946 and 1965), 
Age and experience of respondents 
 
EI is expected to improve with age and experience, therefore questions to assess these aspects were 
included as a measure of construct validity. Age was assessed as a continuous variable with a question 
that asked the respondent to provide his or her full age in years, as well as by a categorical assessment 
of the different generations to which the respondents in the sample belong. Recent theories of 
generational differences in society maintain that the economic, social, and political experiences that 
occurred in the formative childhood and teenage years define differences between generations and 
influence interactions within the workplace as well as society as a whole (Codrington & Grant Marshall, 
2004). The potential for differences in EI according to different generations is also assessed due to the 
increasing market related interest in generational differences in the workplace.  
 
The sample participants were divided into three age groupings based on the generational divisions 
outlined in a report from The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (PEW, 2007): 
b) Generation X is made up of 27 to 41 years olds (born between 1966 and 1980), and  
c) Generation Y is made up of 19 to 26 year-olds (born between 1981 and 1988). 
 
Experience was assessed by determining the length of time respondents had been with the company as 
well as whether respondents that had joined the company in the past 12 months, had joined the company 
as graduates or employees who were appointed with either one to two years of working experience, or 
more than two years of working experience. Thinking styles and EI are expected to differ with experience, 
therefore it is expected that new joiners with more than two years work experience and employees who 
have been with the company for longer periods of time will have different EI and thinking styles compared 
to graduates or new joiners with only one or two years of previous work experience. 
 
 
All three instruments claim to be reliable amongst different cultures, therefore differences between ethnic 
groups were assessed to determine whether these measures are indeed reliable across different cultural 
Gender, ethnicity and marital status of respondents 
 
The gender of the respondent was requested as a measure of construct validity because previous 
research has suggested that women are more emotionally intelligent than men (Schutte et al., 1998). 
Thinking styles are expected to be different for men and women due to the effects of socialisation and as 
a result separate norms were developed for males and females to classify the different levels of each of 
the thirteen thinking styles (Sternberg, 1997). 
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groupings. Due to the perceived sensitivity of this question, ethnic grouping was not asked in the 
questionnaire but was obtained separately from Human Resources for each of the respondents. 
 
Previous research has established a link between marital status and general measures of well-being 
(Ryan, Michael & James, 1998). Marital status of respondents was therefore assessed to determine if 
there is any impact on emotional intelligence or thinking styles and thereby determine if the marital status 
of respondents needs to be controlled.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.4. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE 
 
 
 
Permission was obtained from the Human Resources manager of the company and senior management 
within the company who both supported the research and encouraged participants to complete the 
survey. The SSREIT, the TSI and the relevant demographic and workforce questions were programmed 
in HTML format into an online survey tool using a program called Survey Monkey 
(www.surveymonkey.com) which was used to conduct the survey. The MSCEIT was administered using 
a separate online version of the survey hosted by MHS. I was required to attend an accreditation course 
to be permitted to administer the instrument and the course was attended in March 2007 (see Appendix E 
for accreditation). 
 
The online survey methodology was considered to be the best means for accessing the respondents as 
all employees have access to the internet but are not available in a single location at any one time. The 
online methodology therefore allows respondents to complete the survey in their own time at their 
convenience. The survey tool prevents respondents from missing or purposefully skipping questions. The 
tool also randomises the items, thereby decreasing the potential for response bias. An additional 
advantage of this data collection method is that it is cost effective and overrides the errors associated 
with manual data capturing which increases the reliability of the results.  
 
The respondents were sent the link to the two surveys (The MSCEIT and the SSREIT, TSI combination 
survey) in an email supported by one of the senior managers of the company. In order to maximise 
response to both surveys, the respondents were randomly divided into two groups using the SPSS 
random sampling tool with one group receiving the MSCEIT before the SSREIT and TSI link and the 
second group receiving the links in the reverse order. Participants were given a three month period in 
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which to complete the surveys to encourage a maximum response rate and regular reminders were sent 
out during this time. As an incentive to participate, respondents were offered access to the final report. An 
additional incentive of a random draw on completion of the study for a R500 cash prize was also offered 
to respondents. A number of research respondents did not complete both surveys in this time, however, 
there were sufficient participants who did complete both the surveys, and the sample was judged to be 
sufficient for the continuation of the research.  
 
The nature of the survey was explained to the respondents in the introductory email as well as the 
estimated time of completion. Participants were assured that their involvement was voluntary and that the 
results of their questionnaires would remain confidential and anonymous, and would not be made 
available to the company on an individual basis. The explanation of the surveys and instructions on how 
to complete the surveys were included in the actual online surveys and a contact email address and 
phone number of the researcher that was available for questions and guidance was included in the 
survey invitation. To prevent coercion, no Human Resources or management personnel were involved in 
the actual data collection procedure and all research invitations were sent from the researcher with 
permission from management and HR. The encouragement from management to take part in the survey 
took the form of a generic email sent to all personnel requesting voluntary participation in the study. 
 
On completion of the data collection period, a raw excel spreadsheet was downloaded from the 
surveymonkey.com website. MHS holds the rights to the scoring for the MSCEIT and provided a scored 
dataset on completion of the research. The surveymonkey.com questions were linked to the MSCEIT 
dataset using unique identifiers. Additional demographic and workforce information relevant to the 
research was made available by human resources.  
 
Twelve months after the data collection period, respondents were again requested to complete the 
SSREIT to determine if the measure had satisfactory test-retest reliability after one year, a figure which 
has as yet not been provided by research studies with the instrument. In addition, respondents were 
requested to respond to the question examining self-reported degree of overall satisfaction with their 
company as an employer, in order to determine if job satisfaction had changed over time. Only a portion 
of the original sample participated in the follow-up assessment as a number of the sample respondents 
had resigned in the twelve months after the original data collection period. A list of the respondents who 
had resigned in that time as well as reasons for resignation was provided by human resources.  
 
In order to protect respondents from improper use of their test results a unique identifier was used for 
each respondent and personal details such as email addresses and names were kept in an encrypted file 
separate from the survey results. All personal identification was deleted once the data was collected to 
prevent improper access in the future.  
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4.4.1. Controlling for response bias in the administration of the online measures  
 
 
In the literature review, criticisms of the vulnerability of self-report trait measures towards socially 
desirable responses were discussed. Consequently, a number of methods were employed in the present 
study in order to decrease the potential for socially desirable response bias. Schutte and Malouff (1999) 
affirm that if respondents believe that the questionnaires will be used to assess them on some level they 
may respond in ways to make themselves look better than they are, and that the best way to obtain 
honest responses is for respondents to remain totally anonymous. Respondents who participated in the 
study were assured anonymity and confidentiality to encourage them to answer truthfully. Access to the 
final report is also a method widely utilised in corporate research to ensure reliability of results as the 
opportunity to obtain insight applicable to participants on a professional level is considered as a sufficient 
incentive to encourage participants to answer truthfully. Hence, all participants in this research study will 
be given access to the final report when the study has been completed. 
 
 
 
 
4.5. DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
The following statistical techniques were applied in testing the hypotheses using the Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) computer program for Windows version 16.0 as well as AMOS 7.0. 
Before commencement of the analysis the data from the SSREIT and TSI scores were transformed to 
aggregate scores. In scoring the SSREIT, items 5, 28 and 33 for the SSREIT were reverse coded and the 
sum of the scales were added together to provide a total EI score. The aggregate scores for each of the 
subscales of the TSI were obtained by calculating the mean of the items in each of the subscales.  
 
It was decided not to control for non-normality in the results through data transformation or any other 
means as these types of procedures result in changes to the underlying construct being examined and 
therefore has negative implications for the interpretation of the results (Grayston cited in Field, 2005, p. 
79). As the sample sizes are large, the impact of non-normality in the data is reduced but alternative 
procedures to reduce the potential for type I errors in the data will be used where applicable. The 
implications of this decision will be discussed in the section on the conclusion and limitations of the 
research study.  
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4.5.1. Reliability and validity of the measurement instruments 
 
 
4.5.1.1. The factorial validity of the SSREIT 
 
 
To examine the validity of the factor structure of the SSREIT an exploratory factor analysis method 
followed by a confirmatory factor analysis was used on the total sample. Exploratory factor analysis is 
used to discover the nature of the constructs that influence a set of responses whereas confirmatory 
factor analysis is a complex factor analysis technique used to confirm or test certain hypotheses 
concerning the structure underlying a set of variables (Field, 2005, p. 629).  
 
In the overview of previous research regarding the factorial validity of the SSREIT it was discovered that 
a number of researchers have identified a clear four factor solution (Palmer, 2003; Petrides & Furnham 
2000a; Saklofske et al., 2003) as well as a satisfactory fit for the one factor model (Ciarrochi et al., 2001; 
Schutte et al., 1998) identified by Schutte et al., (1998). It is important to note, however, that these 
models were all derived through different techniques.  
 
The original version was developed using a principal component analysis of 66 items, after which the 
results were rotated orthogonally using a varimax rotation. Four components were identified but only one 
component was retained as a general factor which measured approximately 20% of the common 
variance. The study conducted by Petrides and Furnham (2000a) was aimed at reinterpreting the factor 
structure of the SSREIT, based on the premise that the original varimax rotation used would distribute 
variance away from a general factor. As discussed in Chapter 3, the findings from this study were unable 
to find an appropriate fit for the one factor model using confirmatory factor analysis, however, exploratory 
factor analysis revealed a clear four factor solution. Palmer (2003) used a confirmatory factor analysis to 
analyse a general factor, four oblique factors, four orthogonal factors and a higher order hierarchical 
model and confirmed previous findings that a four factor oblique model provided the best fit with the data.  
In accordance with previous research, a study conducted on a sample of South African student 
respondents also revealed a four factor model (Murphy, 2006) using an exploratory factor analysis with 
oblique rotation, however, differences were found in the item association with the different subscales in 
this study compared to the previous studies. As these findings result in uncertainty regarding both the 
existence and the item structure of a possible four factor structure, it was decided to firstly attempt to 
replicate the four factor model and corresponding item structure identified by Murphy (2006) using an 
exploratory factor analysis with an oblique rotation.  
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Item-level exploratory factor analysis of the SSREIT 
 
Although previous studies have utilised a principal component analysis, it was decided to use a principal 
axis factor analysis for the present study as this technique is designed to be less affected by unique and 
error variability due to the focus on shared variance, whereas the principal component analysis uses all 
the variance in the variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 608). An oblique rotation rather than an 
orthogonal rotation such as the varimax method used by the authors of the scale (Schutte et al., 1998) 
was determined to be the most suitable method for analysing the factor structure of the SSREIT because 
at a conceptual level, multiple domains of a single construct should be related and therefore the factors 
are expected to be correlated. In addition, highly correlated factors may suggest additional factor 
structures, however, according to Petrides and Furnham (2000a) an orthogonal solution would obscure 
this. A direct oblimin rotation technique was utilised to examine the factor structure of the SSREIT as it is 
an oblique rotation method that allows variables to be highly correlated yet aids in achieving a simple 
structure (Kaplan, 2000, p. 44). 
 
Catell’s scree test was used to study the slope of the plotted eigenvalues in order to determine the factor 
solution. The eigenvalue (Kaiser’s criterion) for a given factor measures the variance in all the variables 
explained by that factor. If a factor has a low eigenvalue then it is contributing little to the explanation of 
variance in the variables and may be considered as redundant. Kaiser’s criterion has been criticised for 
resulting in the retention of too many factors, therefore Catell’s scree test is used to clearly determine the 
number of factors to use. The scree test shows a sharp drop levelling off to a flat tail as each successive 
component's eigenvalue explains less and less of the variances. The Catell rule is to pick all factors prior 
to where the plot levels off, or changes (Pallant, 2001, p. 161).  
 
The groups of items that loaded highest on each factor were compared to findings from previous studies 
and all 33 items were allocated to one of the four factors based on factor scores of 0.3 and above on the 
present study as well as on at least one of the three previous studies discussed. Items that did not meet 
these criteria were allocated to items based on their highest loadings in the factor analysis or loadings on 
factors that were identified in at least two prior studies. After the factors were created, the correlations 
between them were compared using a Pearson’s product-moment correlation to determine whether the 
factors were related and could thereby confirm the oblique nature of the relationships between the 
factors.  
 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis was performed to statistically compare the extent to which different 
exploratory factor solutions of the SSREIT provided a fit with the present data. Seven models were tested 
Item-level confirmatory factor analysis of the proposed SSREIT models 
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via structural equation modelling using AMOS V7.0, four of these models were derived from the present 
study compared to three models obtained in previous studies.  
 
A number of reasons were given previously as support for the oblique nature of the relationship between 
the factors, nevertheless, to test this assumption it was decided to compare an oblique factor model 
against an orthogonal model. In order to determine whether the instrument was capable of measuring 
one general EI factor as well as sub factors, a hierarchical model of EI that consisted of a general factor 
and the four lower order factors was also tested. In addition, due to the low percentage of variance 
explained by the fourth factor and because previous research studies have excluded this factor due to 
low reliability (Ciarrochi et al., 2002), it was decided to compare the four factor model against a three 
factor model that excluded the utilisation subfactor and corresponding items.  
 
In the exploratory factor analysis it was determined that there were substantive differences between the 
present model and those obtained by Murphy (2006) which was based on an oblique rotation, and 
Palmer (2003) which was based on the orthogonally rotated model identified by Petrides and Furnham 
(2000a). Only the oblique version of this model will be examined as Palmer tested this model as an 
oblique and an orthogonal model and determined that although there was a satisfactory fit for both 
models, the oblique model provided the best fit for the data. The structure of these previous models was 
therefore re-examined in the analysis to further determine whether the item-structure of the revised model 
would provide a better fit for the present data than previously identified models.  
 
In order to allow fair comparison between the model and models identified in previous research, all 33 
items were used in each model, except for the three factor model which abandoned the last factor and 
corresponding items. No items were permitted to load on more than one factor in the assessment of any 
of the models. The seven hypothesised models to be compared are presented graphically in Chapter 5 
and Appendix F, Section 1 and are summarised as follows: 
 
a) A general factor using the original one factor model (Schutte et al., 1998).  
b) The factor solution interpreted by the present study in four formats: as an oblique four factor 
model, as an orthogonal four factor model, as a higher order hierarchical model and as an 
oblique three factor model. 
c) The orthogonal four factor model identified by Murphy (2006). 
d) The orthogonal four factor model identified by Palmer (2003). 
 
Maximum likelihood estimation was employed to estimate all models as maximum likelihood is typically 
used in latent variable modelling and its accuracy is less dependent on sample size (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007, p. 713). The fit indices used to assess the degree to which the variance implied by the specified 
models match the observed variances were the same as those reported by Palmer (2003). The primary fit 
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index is the chi-square statistic (χ2) (CMIN), followed by the normed chi-square adjustment (χ2/df). The 
chi-square statistic is expected to roughly equal the degrees of freedom (df) therefore a ratio of 2.0 for 
good fit or 3.0 for adequate fit is required, whereas larger values suggest a lack of fit (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007, p. 715; Palmer, 2003). A significant chi-square indicates lack of satisfactory model fit, 
however, as this statistic is highly susceptible to non-normality and sample size and therefore type II 
error, the decision to accept or reject model fit was supplemented by (1) the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), 
(2) the adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI), (3) the comparative fit index (CFI), (4) the Tucker-Lewis 
Index (TLI), (5) the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and (6) the standardised root 
mean square residual (SRMR). 
 
The GFI and the AGFI are indices that index the relative amount of the observed variances and 
covariances explained by the model and minimum values of 0.90 for the GFI and 0.85 for the AGFI are 
required. The AGFI adjusts the GFI for the number of parameters estimated and is therefore reported in 
addition to the GFI to ensure the development of a parsimonious model (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 
718). The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) which is also referred to as the 
Nonnormed Fit Index (NNFI) are incremental indices. The CFI indexes the relative lack of fit of a target 
model versus the independence baseline model and values between 0.90 and 0.95 on the CFI are 
considered to be a satisfactory fit, whereas values of more than 0.95 are considered to be a good fit of 
the data. The TLI was also reported as it is generally recommended when reporting incremental fit indices 
to report two of them and unlike the CFI, the TLI is moderately corrected for parsimony (Hoyle & Panter, 
1995). 
 
The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) was reported as it is a parsimony-adjusted index 
that utilises a maximum value of 0.08 for acceptable fit with values closer to or less than 0.05 indicating 
excellent fit. In addition, Hu and Bentler (cited in Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 720) suggest reporting the 
standardised root mean square residual (SRMR) which estimates the average differences between the 
sample variances and covariances and the estimated population variances and covariances. A maximum 
value of 0.08 is utilised for the SRMR and values closer to or less than 0.05 indicate excellent fit 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 720). 
 
As directed by Tabachnick and Fidell, (2007, p. 710), the path coefficients for all error variances as well 
as one regression coefficient to one of the measured variables from each of the latent factors, were set to 
one. For the hierarchical model, which required the four latent factors to load on a second order general 
EI factor, the variance of the general EI factor and the first order factors’ disturbances were also set to 
one.  
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4.5.1.2. The factorial validity of the MSCEIT  
 
 
To examine the validity of the factor structure of the MSCEIT, the one, two and four factor models which 
were obtained previously by Mayer et al., (2003) and on which the scales are based, were assessed for 
fit with the present data using confirmatory factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation in AMOS 
V7.0. The model was also assessed as a hierarchical model with four branch scores, two area scores 
and one general EI score, rather than a nested model as examined previously by Palmer et al., (2005) 
who obtained a less than satisfactory fit for all the expected models using this procedure.  
 
The analysis in this section was computed with both the unstandardised and unadjusted task scores as 
well as the standardised scores which were adjusted for age, gender and ethnicity by MHS. The same fit 
indices and corresponding cut-off points for satisfactory fit used previously to assess the SSREIT were 
applied to the assessment of the MSCEIT. Only two respondent cases were found to contain missing 
data which were consequently excluded from the analysis, resulting in a total sample of 223 respondents 
who successfully completed the instrument.  
 
MacCann et al., (2003) emphasise that caution should be used when conducting statistical analysis which 
assumes multivariate normality on results from the MSCEIT largely because the nature of the consensus 
scoring procedures causes the scored tests to have high levels of kurtosis and negative skew simply 
because if a test item is reliable, the majority of people will get the answer correct on each item. Although 
the sample size of the present study is larger and therefore not as susceptible to violations of normality 
experienced by smaller samples, efforts to control for non-normality will be applied where applicable. For 
the confirmatory factor analysis for example, the Bollen-Stine p-value which is more robust to multivariate 
non-normality (Hancock & Nevitt, 1999) will be reported to assess overall model fit, instead of the usual 
maximum likelihood-based p-value.  
 
 
4.5.1.3. Reliability of the measurement instruments 
 
 
To ascertain the reliability of the TSI and the SSREIT, estimates of internal consistency for the overall 
SSREIT scale and the four identified subscales, as well as the overall TSI scale and the thirteen category 
subscales were obtained using Cronbach’s alpha. An examination of the test-retest reliability of the 
SSREIT after 12 months was also obtained by examining scores from a subset of the sample population 
that completed the test originally and twelve months after the data collection period. A Pearson’s product-
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moment correlation coefficient was used to determine whether the original scores on the overall EI scale 
and four subscales were significantly correlated with the later data results. 
 
Mayer and colleagues stress that reliability coefficients for the MSCEIT should be calculated on scored 
rather than unscored data as the analysis of the reliability of the unscored data would only reflect the 
individual differences in the use of the scales rather than measured emotional intelligence. They further 
stress that split-half reliability coefficients are the most important reliability coefficients in the assessment 
of the internal consistency of the MSCEIT as the items are not homogenous. Instead, the branches and 
full-scale scores are based on items that vary between tasks. Based on this recommendation, split-half 
reliability coefficients were used to examine the reliability of the branch, area and overall MSCEIT scores 
using the scored items (with Spearman Brown correction to control for non-normality), and Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients are reported at the task level due to item homogeneity (Mayer et al., 2003). 
 
The relationships between the thirteen subscales of TSI were also investigated through the use of 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient. The relationships were examined by measuring the 
intercorrelations among the subscales of the TSI to determine whether the relations shown were similar 
to those predicted by the theory of mental self-government (Sternberg, 1997) and those reported in 
previous studies. 
 
 
4.5.1.4. The validity of the categorisation of the thinking styles subscales into five 
dimensions and three broad types 
  
 
To examine the validity of the assertion that the thirteen subscales of the TSI can be grouped into three 
broad categories and five dimensions, a three factor as well as a five factor oblique model was assessed 
using confirmatory factor analysis with maximum likelihood estimation to determine if it was possible to 
identify these superordinate structures in the data. Missing data accounted for approximately 14% of the 
results, therefore the Bollen-Stine p-value and the GFI, AGFI and SRMR fit indices could not be used. 
The model was examined on a scale level rather than an item level using the thirteen subscales as 
observed factors and the types and dimensions as latent factors. The procedure and fit indices used to 
test the two models were the same as those used in the examination of the SSREIT and MSCEIT. 
Specifically, the error variance was set to be uncorrelated and latent variables were correlated or oblique.  
 
Difficulties were found in the identification of the hypothesised three and five factor models which was 
attributed to insufficient sample size and problems caused by missing data in the sample. To attempt to 
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overcome these difficulties, a principal axis factor analysis was conducted at the subscale level to 
determine whether evidence could be obtained for the three and five factor models in this manner. A 
forced five factor model revealed appropriate size and directions of the factor loadings of the subscales 
on the expected five thinking styles dimensions. A forced three factor model revealed, however, that a 
number of the subscales in the third thinking styles type loaded more strongly with either type I or type II 
styles. This supports the claim by the authors of the scale that type III factors will associate more strongly 
with either type I or type II styles in certain situations. A confirmatory factor analysis procedure was again 
utilised to assess the model fit of the revised two factor model which was considered to be the most 
appropriate solution for the instruments based on the results of the combined analysis.  
 
 
 
4.5.2. Assessment of the emotional intelligence and thinking styles of the sample 
respondents  
 
 
4.5.2.1. Emotional intelligence and thinking styles profile of the sample and comparison 
to norms 
 
 
To determine the extent to which the test sample compares to normative scores available for the EI and 
thinking styles measures, means and standard deviations were obtained for each scale to examine 
distributions on the total and subscale scores. In addition, single-sample t-tests were used to compare the 
results from the present sample to normative data obtained in previous studies. The standardised scores 
for the overall, area, branch and task scores of the MSCEIT provided by MHS and adjusted for age, 
gender and ethnicity, were compared to the standardised North American mean score of 100 and 
standard deviation of 15 as well as the preliminary norm scores obtained for South African samples 
obtained from a MHS report prepared by Gallant (2005). These norms for South Africa have as yet not 
been integrated into the online scoring program utilised by MHS as the MSCEIT requires a minimum of 
35 respondents for each of the eight age by gender categories to compute suitable norms (Gallant, 
2005).  
 
The mean scores for the TSI were compared to the norms developed by Sternberg (1997) for non-
student adults. As the norms are different for men and women the midpoint between the two cut-off points 
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for each male versus female scale norm was taken to guide how the overall results on these scores 
compare to the norms.  
 
As no norms were generated by Schutte et al., (1998), the scores obtained for South African student 
respondents by Murphy (2006) for the total scale and subscales will be examined to begin establishing 
benchmarks for comparison within South African samples. It is important to note, however, that the 
subscales used in the present study are based on item structures which differ from those obtained in 
previous research. 
 
 
4.5.2.2. Exploring the correlations between the MSCEIT, SSREIT and the TSI 
 
 
The hypotheses that there would be no significant relationship between measures of trait and ability EI 
(Hypothesis 1.1) and that thinking styles which are defined as a lower order personality trait, will be 
related to trait EI but will be independent from ability EI (Hypothesis 1.2) were investigated through the 
use of a Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient. The correlations between the overall scale 
and subscales of the MSCEIT and the SSREIT were examined first, to determine if there was evidence of 
a significant relationship between the scales as well as the strength and direction of the relationship. 
Following this, the correlations with the subscales of the TSI were examined. 
  
 
4.5.2.3. Subscale level factor analysis of the three measurement instruments 
 
 
With respect to the underlying factor structure of trait versus ability EI, it is not known whether a single 
emotional ability factor underlies these measures or whether these instruments measure unique 
constructs. To determine whether evidence of the distinction between ability and trait EI could be 
identified at the factor level, a principal axis factor analysis technique with a direct oblimin oblique rotation 
was applied at the subscale level using the thirteen subscales of the TSI, four subscales of the SSREIT 
and the four branch scores of the MSCEIT. The subscales of the TSI are expected to load on the same 
factor as those of the SSREIT if these measures are both to be considered as tapping into similar 
components in the personality trait space, whereas the MSCEIT subscales are expected to load in an 
independent manner from both instruments (Hypothesis 1.3). Catell’s scree test was again used to 
determine the factor solution and a three factor model was identified. A Pearson’s product-moment 
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correlation was used to examine the direction and nature of the relationship between the three identified 
factors.  
 
 
4.5.2.4. Differentiation between demographic groups 
 
 
The construct validity of the scales was further assessed by examining differences between variations of 
the variables; gender, age, generational grouping, work experience, ethnic group and marital status. 
According to Hypothesis 1.4, certain group criterion relationships are expected on the EI scales and 
subscales including a positive relationship between emotional intelligence, age and experience, a lack of 
ethnic differences in ability or trait emotional intelligence, and higher scores for women on emotional 
intelligence scales and subscales than men. The following methods of analysis were used to assess the 
differences between groups on the total scale and subscales of the MSCEIT, SSREIT and the thirteen 
subscales of the TSI.  
 
Differences between groupings on the total scales of the MSCEIT and the SSREIT for the generation, 
work experience, ethnicity and marital status variables were assessed using a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). The post hoc Scheffe test was used to control the likelihood of a type I error and to 
indicate where the specific areas of difference lie. To prevent the incidence of type I error from conducting 
ANOVA on a number of related dependent variables, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
used to assess the differences between these groups on the branch, task and area scores of the MSCEIT 
and the four subscales of the SSREIT as well as the thirteen subscales of the TSI. 
 
To explore whether there were any significant differences for age as a continuous variable on the 
measurement instruments, the data was analysed using the Pearson’s product-moment coefficient 
(Pearson’s r). To explore whether there were any significant differences for gender on the measurement 
instruments an independent samples t-test was conducted.  
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4.5.3. Predictive validity of trait versus ability EI in the occupational environment 
 
 
4.5.3.1. The relationship between emotional intelligence, thinking styles and job 
satisfaction 
 
 
As the questions used to assess job satisfaction consisted of a combination of self-report attitudinal 
questions, questions designed to measure cognitive components such as intent to stay and willingness to 
recommend the company as a great place to work as well as actual resignation behaviour, the 
relationship between these various components was examined using a Pearson’s product moment 
correlation to determine if various components are sufficiently related. To ensure that the highest score 
on the item indicated the most positive response, the ‘intent to recommend’ and daily experience 
questions were reverse coded. Resignation behaviour was assessed as a dichotomous variable with 
respondents recorded as either active employees or employees who had resigned in the 12 months since 
the data had been collected.  
 
A series of hierarchical regression procedures was used to examine the hypothesis that perceived 
favourable work environments will positively contribute towards the prediction of type I thinking styles, yet 
will contribute negatively towards type II thinking styles, (Hypothesis 2.1). To eliminate the effects of age, 
ethnicity, length of work and experience of new joiners, these variables were entered into the regression 
analysis first using a standard enter method. The thirteen thinking styles were examined separately as 
dependent variables and the attitudinal and cognitive job satisfaction variables were entered into the 
regression model in the second step as predictor variables using a stepwise regression procedure to 
eliminate variables that did not contribute towards to prediction model. Listwise cases exclusion was used 
which resulted in a total sample size of 100 respondents which is a satisfactory sample size consisting of 
approximately 10 cases for every predictor in the model. The overall satisfaction after 12 months variable 
was excluded due to the low sample size of respondents who completed the measure and the thinking 
styles inventory (n=52).  
 
Hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3 deal with the expectation that EI measures will have incremental validity in 
predicting life outcome variables such as job satisfaction over that of existing trait measures and were 
examined in three steps. Firstly a partial correlation coefficient was computed to examine the strength 
and direction of the potential relationships, controlling for the demographic characteristics that were 
observed as displaying significant differences on the MSCEIT and the SSREIT, specifically, age, gender, 
ethnicity and new joiner experience. The second step involved a series of multiple regression analyses 
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which were used to examine the ability of the SSREIT and the MSCEIT to predict variance in job 
satisfaction. Each of the individual job satisfaction items were analysed as dependent variables and were 
regressed separately onto the unstandardised branch scores of the MSCEIT and the four subscales of 
the SSREIT. It was decided to examine the job satisfaction variables separately because although the 
items appeared in section 5.1.1.1 to be highly related, the correlations examined with the MSCEIT and 
SSREIT indicate variability in the relationships with these variables.  
 
The third step involved a series of hierarchical regression analyses with the job satisfaction variables that 
had been found to be significantly related to either the MSCEIT or SSREIT subscales. A hierarchical 
regression procedure was utilised in order to control for the potential effect of the demographic variables, 
as well as the thirteen subscales of the TSI. The MSCEIT and SSREIT scales were examined separately 
in the same manner as step 1. The four demographic variables were entered into the first step followed 
by the thirteen subscales of the TSI in the second step. In the final step the EI measures were entered 
separately into the same models. As the resignation status variable consisted of a dichotomous variable 
differentiating between active employees and employees who had resigned, a hierarchic logistic 
regression procedure was used to examine resignation behaviour as the outcome variable using the 
same procedure. 
 
 
4.5.3.2. Thinking styles and cognitive climate 
 
 
A discriminant analysis was performed to estimate the degree to which thinking styles could discriminate 
among respondents who work in knowing-oriented cognitive climates, creating-oriented climates or 
planning-oriented climates (Hypothesis 2.4 and 2.5). The total sample was split into the three cognitive 
climate groupings depending on the job function which they fulfilled. Respondents who work in finance, 
outsourced business processes, application management, information technology and research functions 
were grouped into the knowing-oriented cognitive climate, employees who work in consulting, sales and 
marketing functions were grouped into the creating-oriented cognitive climate, and respondents who work 
in administrative and technical or IT development functions were grouped in a planning-oriented cognitive 
climate. A sample of 284 respondents was available for this analysis. 
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4.5.3.3. Emotional intelligence and job functions 
 
 
The hypothesis that employees who work in occupations that deal primarily with affect laden information 
and require emotional problem solving such as human resources, consulting, sales and marketing will 
have higher levels of emotional intelligence than people who deal primarily with technical information 
required for building and maintain technology solutions (Hypothesis 2.6) was examined using an 
independent samples t-test. Differences in emotional intelligence between job functions with more 
affective requirements versus job functions with more technical requirements were assessed using an 
independent samples t-test.  
 
 
4.5.3.4. The potential relationship with levels of management 
 
 
The hypotheses that respondents in management positions are expected to display greater levels of 
ability and trait emotional intelligence (Hypothesis 2.7) than respondents in non-management positions, 
was examined using an independent samples t-test. 
 
 
 
 
4.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 provided a description of the methodology of the study as well as the history of the reliability 
and validity of the measurement instruments. The chapter began with an explanation of the selected 
design followed by the procedure used to select the sample. The description and scoring procedure for 
the test materials was explained, followed by an explanation of the data collection procedure. Lastly, the 
statistical techniques and assumptions used to analyse the data were presented in detail. The results of 
the data analysis are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the findings, an 
overview of the limitations of the study and recommendations for future studies. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 
 
 
The following chapter reports the results of the study arrived at through analysis of the data using the 
SPSS statistical package V16.0. The primary purpose of this study was to examine the validity of the 
conceptualisation of trait and ability EI as two distinct constructs by exploring the overlap between these 
constructs and a measure of thinking styles. In addition, the study examined the impact of trait and ability 
EI on criterion variables such as gender, ethnicity, age and experience and occupational variables such 
as job satisfaction and job function. The population of the study consisted of employees of a large South 
African corporate firm who completed a number of measurement instruments including the MSCEIT (an 
ability based measure of EI), the SSREIT (a trait measure of EI) and the TSI (a self-report measure of 
cognitive thinking styles). Respondents also completed questions designed to assess self-reported job 
satisfaction and socio-demographic characteristics. Details of actual resignations were obtained from the 
company for the 12 to 15 months after the data collection period. A further follow-up survey was released 
one year after the data collection period in order to obtain 12 month test-retest reliability figures for the 
SSREIT and re-assess overall job satisfaction to determine if any change had occurred after 12 months.  
 
The results of the study are presented in five different sections. Firstly an overview of the demographic 
characteristics of the sample is provided which specifies the number of respondents in each of the 
demographic and occupational categories under examination. The second section involves an analysis of 
the validity of the expected factor structures of the measurement instruments. This section begins with an 
examination of the item level factor structure of the SSREIT using both factor and confirmatory analysis 
procedures. Following this is a confirmatory analysis of the MSCEIT factors and subscales and an 
attempt to confirm the anticipated three type factor structure and the five dimension factor structure of the 
TSI. The second section concludes with a review of the reliability of the scales and subscales identified in 
each of the three measurement instruments.  
 
The third section entails an overview of the scores on the EI and thinking styles instruments for the total 
sample as well as a comparison of the results to norms for the measurement instruments and results 
from previous studies. The results from the assessment of the hypothesis that there will be sufficient 
differences between trait EI and ability EI as well as ability EI and cognitive thinking styles to support the 
hypothesised distinction between the two constructs is reported in the fourth section, including an 
examination of the expected demographic differences between groups on the measurements instruments 
specifically with regard to age, generation grouping, work experience, ethnicity, gender and marital 
status. The results of the analyses in this section are expected to contribute to the assessment of the 
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construct validity of the instruments under examination as well as determine whether any demographic 
characteristics need to be controlled when testing the remaining hypotheses of the study. The chapter 
concludes with the results of the analysis used to assess the predictive and incremental validity of 
emotional intelligence in the occupational environment.  
 
A total of 352 respondents participated in the survey, of these 308 respondents completed the TSI, 225 
completed the MSCEIT and 282 completed the SSREIT. There were 178 respondents who completed all 
three measures. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Number of respondents who completed each of the measurement instruments 
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 124 
5.1. DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE 
 
 
 
5.1.1. Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample 
 
 
The exact age which respondents provided ranged from 21 years to 56 years of age with a mean age of 
30 and a standard deviation of 6.89. The mode was 25 years which included 11% of the respondents. 
The age distribution is positively skewed with respondents clustering in the lower age groups. 
Respondents were grouped according to the generational categories outlined in Chapter 4, with the 
majority of the sample consisted of generation X (ages 27 to 41, 53%) and generation Y employees (ages 
19 to 26, 40%). Only a small proportion of the baby boomer generation were represented in the sample 
(ages 42 to 56, 7%). The gender composition of the sample is evenly split between men and women with 
men constituting a slight majority of the sample (53%). The distribution across the different ethnic groups 
is skewed towards White respondents who make up a large percentage of the sample (56%), however, 
Black (24%) and Indian (15%) respondents do constitute a sufficient portion of the sample. Most of the 
respondents are either single (49%) or married (40%), and divorced (5%) or co-habiting (6%) 
respondents make up a very small portion of the sample. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Age profile of the respondents  
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Figure 8: Socio-demographic characteristics of the sample 
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5.1.2. Occupational characteristics of the sample 
 
 
Nearly half of the sample (42%) consists of new joiners that have been with the company for less than a 
year. About one in three employees (36%) have been with the company between one and five years and 
20% of the sample have been with the company for more than six years. Within the sample of new 
joiners, 44 respondents joined the company as graduates, 17 joined with one to two years of work 
experience and 75 joined with more than two years work experience. The sample sizes are sufficient to 
determine if there are any differences in thinking styles or EI across the different experience groups. The 
sample consisted of 47 managers (14%) and 295 employees below manager level (86%). 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Tenure and experience of the sample 
 
 
  p
Tenure – When Joined
n
In the last 6 months 89
6-12 months 60
1-2 years 61
2-5 years 66
6-10 years 44
More than 10 years 23
Did not answer 9
Total 352
Experience:
New Joiners with the company 
for less than 12 months
n
Experienced hire with more 
than 2 years experience 75
Experienced hire with 1-2 
years experience 17
Graduate 44
Did not answer 13
Total New Joiners 149
1 to 2 years 
experience, 
13%
Graduate, 32%
2+ years 
experience, 
55%
New 
Joiners: 
42%
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Figure 10: Management profile of the sample 
 
87%
13%
Level
Management
Non-management
n
Assistant 26
Analyst 146
Senior Analyst or 
Specialist 123
Total Non-
management 295
n
Manager 31
Senior Manager 16
Total Management 47
 
 
Figure 11: Profile of the different workforces and cognitive climates to which the respondents 
belong 
 
 
 BPRI G
Workforce
n
Consulting workforce 160
Office / Enterprise workforce 43
Services workforce 83
Technical / IT Development workforce 59
Did not answer question 7
Total 352
Technical / IT 
Development, 17%
Services, 24%
Office / Enterprise workforce
Consulting, 46%
5%
26%
23%
16%
30%
Research
Office 
services
Human 
Resources
Finance
Creative 
services
n
Research 13
Human Resources 10
Finance 11
Office services 7
Creative services 2
Total 43
12%
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As discussed in Chapter 4, the company workforce consists of four divisions. Sales or consulting 
employees who form the majority of the sample (46%) deal with clients on a daily basis, architecting and 
designing solutions as well as consulting on management and performance issues. The services division 
(24%) consists of employees within the outsourcing section of the company who provide long-term 
contracted services such as business processes, application management and information technology. 
Technical or IT development employees (17%) are responsible for applying technical skills and 
capabilities to build and maintain technology solutions. Lastly, the enterprise or support division includes 
office based employees who are currently in a business practice such as facilities, administration, 
finance, human resources, marketing and communications, operations and research (12%).  
 
 
 
 
5.2. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE 
MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS 
 
 
 
In order to determine whether the ability and trait emotional intelligence measurement instruments utilised 
in the study measure EI as the theoretical models claim to, the reliability and validity of the MSCEIT and 
SSREIT were examined in accordance with the principles recommended by Ciarrochi et al., (2000) that 
were discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
According to Ciarrochi et al., (2000), both measures of EI should load on a single factor, however, the 
MSCEIT is also expected to demonstrate a factor structure that is in accordance with the branches and 
subtasks that are specified by the theory. To determine whether the factor structure of the MSCEIT is in 
accordance with the underlying models on which the instrument is based, as well as previous research 
findings, the factor structure was assessed using confirmatory factor analysis. With regard to the SSREIT, 
although the authors (Schutte et al., 1998) specify that the instrument measures a single general factor of 
EI, previous research has yielded additional three and four factor models with some inconsistencies 
involving the exact item structure of the identified factors and resulting subscales (Palmer, 2003; Petrides 
& Furnham, 2000a, Ciarrochi et al., 2000). For this reason an exploratory factor analysis was utilised to 
identify the item structure to be used in the present study. This revised item structure was compared to 
the structures identified by Palmer (2003) and Murphy (2006) using confirmatory factor analysis to 
determine which structure provided the best fit with the data.  
 
As the items vary between the different tasks (Mayer et al., 2003), split-half reliability coefficients rather 
than coefficient alphas were obtained to assess the internal consistency of the MSCEIT, with the 
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exception of each of the task scores which contain homogenous items. Estimates of internal consistency 
for the total scale and subscales (factors) of the SSREIT and the thirteen thinking-style scales were 
obtained using Cronbach’s alpha. The scales were found to be reliable and valid for the population used 
in the present study. A twelve month test-retest reliability score for the SSREIT was also obtained.  
 
To provide evidence of construct validity, the relationships between the subscales were also examined 
using a Pearson’s product-moment correlation to determine whether the results reflected the strength and 
direction of the relationships predicted by the theory of mental self-government, as well as those obtained 
by previous research studies with a South African sample of university students (Murphy, 2006). As 
previous research has resulted in contradictory findings regarding whether the three types and five 
dimensions of thinking styles can be identified in the results with the TSI, these factor structures were 
examined using confirmatory factor analysis as well as exploratory factor analysis procedures.  
 
 
5.2.1. Exploring the reliability and validity of the hierarchical four factor structure of 
the Schutte Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test  
 
 
Due to the uncertainty regarding the exact factor structure of the SSREIT, a principal axis factor analysis 
with a direct oblimin rotation was conducted to attempt to replicate the item structure and factor model 
identified by Murphy (2006). Following this procedure, a confirmatory factor analysis was performed to 
statistically compare the extent to which different exploratory factor solutions fit with the present data. The 
one factor model interpreted by Schutte et al., (1998) was compared to the item structure of the four 
factor models identified in the present study and the structures identified by Murphy (2006) and Palmer 
(2003).  
 
 
5.2.1.1. Item-level exploratory factor analysis of the SSREIT 
 
 
Prior to performing the factor analysis, the suitability of the data for factor analysis was assessed. The 
correlation matrix revealed a number of coefficients of 0.3 and above. The Kaiser-Mayer-Oklin value was 
0.86 which exceeded the recommended value of 0.6 (Field, 2005, p. 648). The Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity was statistically significant (p = .000). The sample size is greater than the recommended 150 
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respondents (n=282) and there were more than the recommended ratio of five cases for each of the 
variables or items (Field, 2005, p. 647). The data was therefore considered to be suitable for a factor 
analysis. 
 
The initial eigenvalues were inspected to determine the number of factors to use for the factor analysis. 
Initial eigenvalues with a total value higher than 1.0 indicates a strong extraction (Field, 2005), therefore, 
all factors with eigenvalues below 1.0 were not reported in the results and can be seen as insignificant. 
Nine factors were found to have eigenvalues (Kaiser Criterion) exceeding 1.0 (see Table 7) which is 
similar to the eight factors obtained by Murphy (2006), this nine factor model accounts for 44.76% of the 
total variance. Inspecting Catell’s scree test revealed that the graph levelled off at the fourth factor (see 
Figure 11), however, it is evident that the first factor does explain the majority of the variance (22.45%) 
which also supports an apparent one factor solution. In order to allow comparison with the factor structure 
found by Murphy (2006) it was decided to retain four factors for further investigation.  
 
 
Table 7: Total variance explained for the overall scale of the SSREIT before extraction 
(Excluding factors with eigenvalues lower than one) 
 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 7.930 24.029 24.029 7.408 22.450 22.450 
2 2.346 7.109 31.139 1.837 5.567 28.017 
3 1.921 5.821 36.960 1.355 4.105 32.122 
4 1.521 4.609 41.569 0.953 2.888 35.010 
5 1.404 4.255 45.824 0.875 2.652 37.662 
6 1.238 3.752 49.576 0.713 2.159 39.821 
7 1.134 3.437 53.014 0.605 1.832 41.653 
8 1.113 3.372 56.385 0.519 1.573 43.226 
9 1.012 3.067 59.452 0.507 1.537 44.764 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
 
 
To aid in the interpretation of the four factors that were extracted, an oblique direct oblimin rotation with 
Kaiser Normalisation was performed. The communalities after extraction are considered to be high as 
none are below 0.2, which indicates that the items seem to be well defined by the factors (see Table 9). 
The four factor solution explained a total of 33.84% of the variance (see Table 8), which is slightly lower 
than the 36.30% obtained by Murphy (2006). Examining the factor matrix (see Table 9) after the four 
factors were extracted did not reveal a simple structure, with items loading on more than one factor which 
is the same as the previous results (Murphy, 2006). The majority of the items loaded strongly on the first 
factor which supports Schutte et al’s (1998) claim that the SSREIT measures one general factor of EI. 
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Petrides and Furnham (2000a), however, maintain that the scale is predisposed to a strong general factor 
due to the varimax rotation used to develop the original scale.  
 
 
Figure 12: Scree plot for the overall scale of the SSREIT 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Total variance explained for the overall scale of the SSREIT after extraction 
(Excluding factors with eigenvalues lower than one) 
  
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings (a) 
  Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 7.930 24.029 24.029 7.307 22.142 22.142 5.464 
2 2.346 7.109 31.139 1.738 5.266 27.408 4.338 
3 1.921 5.821 36.960 1.242 3.764 31.172 4.443 
4 1.521 4.609 41.569 0.879 2.665 33.836 1.844 
5 1.404 4.255 45.824     
6 1.238 3.752 49.576     
7 1.134 3.437 53.014     
8 1.113 3.372 56.385     
9 1.012 3.067 59.452     
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
a When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Table 9: Factor matrix and communalities (h2) for the four factor solution of the SSREIT 
 
 
Item numbers Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 h
2  
(After extraction) 
1 .335 -.008 .137 .011 .131 
2 .510 -.108 .242 -.006 .330 
3 .338 -.087 .149 -.050 .147 
4 .422 .094 -.090 .134 .213 
5 .155 .513 .078 .124 .309 
6 .442 -.048 -.064 .017 .202 
7 .351 -.093 -.147 -.145 .175 
8 .457 -.120 -.257 .177 .321 
9 .479 .063 .326 .033 .341 
10 .479 -.237 .140 .057 .308 
11 .401 -.115 -.319 .317 .376 
12 .591 -.260 .136 .048 .437 
13 .413 -.138 -.265 .308 .354 
14 .458 -.294 -.043 .086 .306 
15 .475 .259 -.099 .049 .305 
16 .439 -.058 .092 .099 .214 
17 .518 -.196 .007 -.165 .334 
18 .534 .413 -.132 -.174 .503 
19 .516 .089 .218 .051 .324 
20 .570 -.278 -.104 -.247 .474 
21 .398 -.050 .390 -.145 .334 
22 .612 .190 .261 -.007 .479 
23 .651 -.220 .091 .002 .481 
24 .546 .032 .152 .229 .375 
25 .489 .503 -.117 -.069 .511 
26 .448 -.016 -.247 .041 .264 
27 .471 -.161 -.072 -.308 .348 
28 .128 .135 .387 .021 .185 
29 .491 .423 -.159 -.167 .474 
30 .649 .102 -.154 .221 .505 
31 .650 -.202 -.141 -.190 .520 
32 .387 .319 -.199 -.284 .372 
33 .102 .302 .186 .281 .215 
Extraction Method: Principal axis factoring, 4 factors extracted, 5 iterations required 
Factor loadings greater than 0.3 are shown in boldface. The items along with their numbers are 
shown in Appendix A 
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Table 10 displays the rotated pattern matrix which indicates a clearer distribution amongst the four 
factors. A comparison to the factor structures of the aforementioned studies (Murphy, 2006; Palmer, 
2003; Petrides & Furnham 2000a) revealed that items loading on the first two factors were largely 
comparable to previous studies, however, there were a number of items that did not load consistently 
across all studies. The comparison for factor three and four yielded no relationship with the factor 
structure obtained by Murphy (2006) although the structure was somewhat consistent with that obtained 
by Palmer (2003) and Petrides and Furnham (2000a). The item structure used in Palmer’s research was 
based on the findings of Petrides and Furnham (2000a), the only difference is that Palmer did not allow 
items to load on more than one factor due to restrictions imposed by the confirmatory factor analysis 
procedure utilised in the study. 
 
The differences in item loadings can be attributed to a number of reasons such as the different factor 
extraction and rotation methods used, as well as the different nature of the samples involved in each of 
the studies. The model obtained by Murphy (2006) for example, was obtained using a sample of students 
with a mean age of 22 years whereas the present sample is obtained with a sample of working adults 
with a mean age of 30 years. The degree of consistency in the majority of the items across these four 
studies does on the other hand, support the validity of the four factor structure of the instrument.  
 
After the factor analysis was performed, a score was calculated for each factor by obtaining the mean for 
all items comprising each factor. In order to enhance the validity of the subscales to be calculated from 
the factor scores in lieu of the different item structures found in the studies discussed previously, it was 
decided to allocate items to factors based on the following criteria: 
 
• Firstly, items were allocated to a specific factor only if the item had attained factor loading of 0.3 
and above on the present study and on at least one of the three previous studies discussed.  
• Secondly, items that did not meet the first criterion were allocated to factors based on their 
highest loadings in the factor analysis. 
• Thirdly, if an item had a factor loading which was found to load on a different factor to the present 
study in at least three prior studies, the item was placed within this factor (for example item 14).  
 
This allocation was done to ensure that the calculated sub scales would consist of item structures that are 
consistent across studies. The items comprising different factors of the aforementioned factor models can 
be observed in Table 11.  
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Table 10: Pattern matrix and item loadings for the four factor solution of the SSREIT 
 
 
 
Item numbers Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
21 .611 .023 .202 -.072 
9 .553 .079 .010 .103 
2 .537 -.003 -.065 -.056 
22 .528 .279 -.010 .101 
12 .517 -.090 -.246 -.141 
23 .497 .007 -.245 -.180 
19 .460 .146 -.079 .091 
10 .455 -.116 -.204 -.105 
24 .421 .042 -.298 .177 
28 .405 -.001 .206 .200 
3 .352 .014 -.014 -.086 
17 .345 .100 -.097 -.311 
16 .335 .019 -.207 .018 
1 .314 .052 -.052 .003 
29 -.001 .681 -.021 -.018 
25 .012 .680 -.058 .120 
18 .052 .680 -.017 -.026 
32 -.061 .632 .067 -.168 
15 .084 .400 -.208 .087 
5 .012 .394 .020 .390 
11 -.076 .002 -.646 .034 
13 -.010 -.029 -.616 .031 
8 .021 .067 -.510 -.069 
30 .160 .260 -.497 .098 
26 .003 .219 -.355 -.117 
14 .281 -.115 -.348 -.170 
4 .107 .193 -.301 .074 
6 .187 .131 -.230 -.094 
20 .291 .134 -.135 -.465 
33 .140 .073 -.087 .441 
27 .239 .218 .006 -.426 
31 .275 .212 -.215 -.400 
7 .077 .177 -.118 -.264 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalisation. Rotation converged in 21 iterations. 
Factor loadings greater than 0.3 are shown in boldface. The items along with their numbers are 
shown in Appendix A 
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Table 11: Items comprising different factors on the SSREIT between the present study and 
previous studies 
 
 
Item number 
Factor Present study Murphy (2006) Palmer (2003) Petrides & Furnham (2000a) 
  
Factor 1  
Optimism 
1 1      
2 2 2 2 
3 3 3 3 
  *4     
 6   
  7     
9       
10 *10 10 10 
12   12 12 
  14 14 14 
16 16   *16 
*17 17   *17 
19       
  20   *20 
21   21 21 
22     *22 
23 23 23 23 
24 24     
 *27     
28 28 28 28 
 31 31 *31 
  
Factor 2  
Social skills 
  *4     
5 5 5 5 
    9 9 
15 15 15 15 
18 18 18 18 
    19 19 
    22 *22 
25 25 25 25 
29 29 29 29 
32 32 32 32 
  *30     
  33     
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Item number 
Factor Present study Murphy (2006) Palmer (2003) Petrides & Furnham (2000a) 
  
Factor 3  
Appraisal 
   1 1 
4   4 4 
6   6 *6 
8  8 8 8 
 9     
 *10     
11   11 11 
 *12   *12 
13   13 13 
14     
   16 *16 
 19     
 22     
 21     
   24 24 
26   26 26 
30   30 30 
      *31 
    33 33 
  
Factor 4 
Utilisation 
     *6 
7   7 7 
 11     
 13     
*17   17 *17 
 26     
27 *27 27 27 
20   20 *20 
 *30     
31     *31 
33    
Note: Items highlighted in Blue are identified as belonging to these factors by the present study as well as more 
than one previous study 
* Items that are recorded as loading on more than one factor 
 
 
Of the original 33 items, 30 items loaded on factors that were previously associated with these items and 
only three items loaded on factors that were different to those identified by previous studies. Two items 
loaded with values less than 0.3 on any of the factors but as the factor location of these items was 
supported by previous studies, it was decided to retain these items for further analysis. The full items 
used in each of the factors can be observed in Appendix A. 
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a) The items retained for the first factor were 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 23, 24 and 28. Item 4 
had a stronger loading score on factor 3 but it was decided to move this item to factor one as the 
item also loaded on this factor in the present study as well as all three previous studies 
discussed. In accordance with previous studies, this factor was referred to as ‘optimism’ and 
included items that refer to self motivation and positive emotions such as ‘when I experience a 
positive emotion, I know how to make it last’. 
 
b) The items retained for the second factor were items 5, 15, 18, 25, 29 and 32. This factor was 
called ‘social skills’ and included items such as ‘I am aware of the non verbal messages I send to 
others’ which refer to dealing with emotions in social contexts.  
 
c) The third factor was composed of items 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 26 and 30 which refer predominantly to 
recognising, awareness and control over emotions such as ‘I help other people feel better when 
they are down’, and will be referred to as ‘appraisal’ of emotions.  
 
d) The fourth factor includes items 7, 17, 20, 27, 31 and 33, that refer to active use of emotions such 
as ‘when I am in a positive mood, I am able to come up with new ideas’ and will be referred to as 
‘utilisation’ of emotions. Although item 17 loaded on factor one and factor four it was decided to 
incorporate the item with factor four as the item statement ‘when I am in a positive mood, solving 
problems is easy for me’ appears to refer more to utilisation of emotions than optimism. It is 
important to note that this factor explains the least variance and consists of the fewest number of 
items. Furthermore, the subscale was removed from the SSREIT factor structure identified by 
Ciarrochi et al., (2002) due to low reliability (α = .58).  
 
On analysis of the correlations between the subscales using a Pearson’s product-moment correlation 
coefficient, it was identified that the subscales had positive and moderate to high correlations with one 
another (Cohen, 1988), as the correlations ranged from r = 0.37 to 0.86, which supports the use of an 
oblique rotation method. These results are presented in Table 12. 
 
Table 12: Pearson’s correlation matrix for the correlations between the four subscales and total 
score of the SSREIT 
 
Factor Total EI Optimism Social Skills Appraisal Utilisation 
1. Optimism .858** 1.000    
2. Social Skills .669** .383** 1.000   
3. Appraisal .782** .518** .408** 1.000  
4. Utilisation .729** .580** .367** .523** 1.000 
**p < .01 
Total sample n=282 
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5.2.1.2. Item-level confirmatory factor analysis of the SSREIT 
 
 
Eight models were assessed using AMOS V7.0 to determine which provided the best fit with the present 
data. In order to allow fair comparison between the model identified in the present research study and 
models identified in previous research, all 33 items were used in each model, except for the three factor 
model which abandoned the last factor and corresponding items. No items were permitted to load on 
more than one factor in the assessment of any of the models. The eight hypothesised models to be 
compared are summarised in Table 13. Path diagrams and parameter estimates of the hypothesised 
models are presented in Appendix F, Section 1. Latent variables in the path diagrams are presented as 
circles and rectangles are used to indicate observed variables.  
 
  
Table 13: Model specifications and item numbers for each of the SSREIT models under 
examination  
 
Model Source Model specification Factor Item numbers 
1 Schutte et al., (1998) General one factor model Factor 1 All 33 items 
2 
Present study 
Four Factor 
model 
Oblique Factor 1 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28 
3 
Orthogonal 
Factor 2 5, 15, 18, 25, 29, 32 
4 Factor 3 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 26, 30 
5 Hierarchical Factor 4 7, 17, 20, 27, 31, 33 
6 Three Factor model Oblique 
Factor 1 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28 
Factor 2 5, 15, 18, 25, 29, 32 
Factor 3 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 26, 30 
7 Murphy (2006) Four Factor model Oblique 
Factor 1 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 14, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 28, 31 
Factor 2 4, 5, 15, 18, 25, 29, 30, 32, 33 
Factor 3 8, 9, 12, 19, 22, 21 
Factor 4 11, 13, 26, 27 
8 Palmer (2003) Four Factor model Oblique 
Factor 1 2, 3, 10, 12, 14, 21, 23, 28, 31 
Factor 2 5, 9, 15, 18, 19, 22, 25, 29, 32 
Factor 3 1, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 16, 24, 26, 30, 33 
Factor 4 7, 17, 27, 20 
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The distribution of the SSREIT scores was found to display pronounced multivariate skewness and 
kurtosis. The Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate kurtosis had a critical ratio of 30.6 (see Appendix F, 
Table F1), which is higher than the critical ratio of 3 implying that the measured variables are not 
distributed normally. To control for the possible influence of non-normality on the data the Bollen-Stine p-
value which is more robust to multivariate non-normality (Hancock & Nevitt, 1999) will be reported to 
assess overall model fit, instead of the usual maximum likelihood-based p-value. Structural equation 
modelling analysis was performed with data from 282 respondents and no data was missing.  
 
Based on the majority of the item fit indicators, none of the models were found to be a good fit to the 
present data. As discussed previously, the chi-squared statistic is highly susceptible to type II errors and 
with sample sizes greater than 200 respondents, a good approximate fit may be accepted if indicated by 
other fit tests. The recommended criteria for GFI and AGFI figures were not met by any of the models 
examined, however, these indicators tend to bias results downwards when degrees of freedom are large 
relative to sample size (Garson, 2008, p. 5). The CFI and TLI figures were also below the recommended 
criteria for all models concerned. Possible reasons for the poor fit of these models is due to the observed 
lack of normality in the data and the high number of items to be estimated (33) in comparison to the 
sample size (n=282). 
 
With regard to the four factor models identified by Palmer (2003) (χ2489 = 1093.082, Bollen-stine p = .004, 
GFI = .80, AGFI = .77, CFI = .76, TLI = .75, RMSEA = .066, SRMR = .072) and Murphy (2006) (χ2489 = 
1157.568, Bollen-stine p = .004, GFI = .79, AGFI = .76, CFI = .74, TLI = .72, RMSEA = .070, SRMR = 
.076), both models presented less than satisfactory goodness of fit scores. Confirmatory factor analysis 
results obtained by Palmer (2003) who examined the structure originally proposed by Petrides and 
Furnham (2000a) indicated a satisfactory fit for the oblique (χ2489 = 1312.69, normed χ2 = 2.68, CFI = .98, 
RMSEA = .068), orthogonal (χ2495 = 1888.17, normed χ2 = 3.81, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .088) and 
hierarchical (χ2495 = 1312.69, normed χ2 = 3.48, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .082) four factor models as well as 
the general factor model by Schutte et al., (1998) (χ2489 = 1723.32, normed χ2 = 3.48, CFI = .97, RMSEA 
= .082) which he tested, however the oblique model yielded the best fit. Possible reasons for the 
discrepancy in the results may lie with the larger sample size of 367 participants used compared to 282 
used in the present study. Palmer (2003), furthermore, did not report the exact p values or parameter 
estimates for comparison.  
 
The general one factor model identified by Schutte et al., (1998) was the model that had the least 
acceptable fit to the data (χ2495 = 1397.376, Bollen-stine p = .004, GFI = .74, AGFI = .71, CFI = .65, TLI = 
.62, RMSEA = .081, SRMR = .080). This is consistent with the findings by Petrides and Furnham (2000a) 
who argued against Schutte and colleagues’ assumption that all the items load only on one general factor 
of EI.  
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The four orthogonal factor model (χ2495 = 1378.638, Bollen-stine p = .004, GFI = .76, AGFI = .73, CFI = 
.65, TLI = .63, RMSEA = .080, SRMR = .174) and the three oblique factor models identified in the present 
study, provided the worst fit to the data (χ2374 = 871.497, Bollen-stine p = .004, GFI = .82, AGFI = .79, CFI 
= .77, TLI = .75, RMSEA = .069, SRMR = .074). The lack of fit of the orthogonal model was evident in the 
high RMSEA and SRMR figures, which support the assumption that the underlying factors should not be 
considered as independent. The three factor oblique model was tested to examine the suggestion by 
Ciarrochi et al., (2002) that the SSREIT would be more reliable without the fourth factor and the 
corresponding items. As this model did not improve on the goodness of fit scores observed in the four 
factor models, the suggestion to remove these items from the instrument was not endorsed.  
 
The oblique four factor (χ2489 = 1053.086, Bollen-stine p = .004, GFI = .81, AGFI = .79, CFI = .78, TLI = 
.76, RMSEA = .064, SRMR = .070) and hierarchical four factor (χ2491 = 1059.164, Bollen-stine p = .005, 
GFI = .81, AGFI = .79, CFI = .78, TLI = .76, RMSEA = .064, SRMR = .071) models identified in the 
present study were found to be the best fitting models with the present data. The path diagram for the 
hierarchical four factor model is depicted in Figure 13. The normed chi-squared statistic for both models 
exceeded the recommended maximum value of 2.0 for good fit (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 715), but 
still met the 3.0 criteria for acceptable fit. The GFI, AGFI, CFI and TLI statistics, although less than 
satisfactory, indicated the highest scores of all the models and the standardised coefficients for the four 
subscales on the general EI factor ranged from 0.63 to 0.86. The RMSEA and SRMR figures, however, 
suggested and adequate model fit for both models. Both models were comparable and only differed by 
one point with regard to normed χ2 and SRMR scores. However, as the addition of a general EI factor 
would provide more information on EI than the four factor model on its own, it was decided to proceed 
with the hierarchic model of EI for further analysis.  
 
On closer examination of the parameter estimates of the model, which are presented in Table 15, it was 
evident that one item (item 33) has a negative, nonsignificant factor loading. This item was one of the few 
items that has previously loaded on different factors in previous research and may, therefore, not be 
differentiated clearly enough. Removal of this item from the model made little impact on the fit indices, 
however, future studies should consider whether this item is appropriate to the scale. The factor loadings 
of the four subfactors on the general EI factor were high, ranging from 0.63 to 0.86, yet there were no 
factor loadings which exceeded 1.0 and, therefore, no multicollinearity is evident in the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 141 
Table 14: Fit Indices for the comparative models of the SSREIT identified in the present study 
 
 
Model CMIN (χ2) 
Normed 
χ2 df 
Bollen-
stine p GFI AGFI CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Four oblique factor 
model 1053.086 2.15 489 .004 .81 .79 .78 .76 .064 .070 
Four orthogonal 
factor model 1387.638 2.08 495 .004 .76 .73 .65 .63 .080 .174 
Hierarchical four 
factor model 1059.164 2.16 491 .005 .81 .79 .78 .76 .064 .071 
Three oblique 
factor model 871.497 2.33 374 .004 .82 .79 .77 .75 .069 .074 
General factor 
identified by 
Schutte et al., 
(1998) 
1397.376 2.82 495 .004 .74 .71 .65 .62 .081 .080 
Four oblique factor 
model identified by 
Murphy (2006) 
1157.568 2.36 489 .004 .79 .76 .74 .72 .070 .076 
Four oblique factor 
model identified by 
Palmer (2003) 
1093.082 2.24 489 .004 .80 .77 .76 .75 .066 .072 
Limits  2.0-3.0  .90 .85 .90 .90 .05-.08 .05-.08 
 
 
The BPRI Group 69
Scores closer to 0 preferableScores closer to 1 preferable
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Figure 13: Four factor hierarchical model of emotional intelligence identified in the present study 
Standardised solution (n=282) 
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Table 15: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
four factor hierarchical model identified in the present study depicted in Figure 13 
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=282) 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
Optimism ← General EI 0.27 (0.05) 0.86 *** 
Social skills ← General EI 0.27 (0.05) 0.63 *** 
Appraisal ← General EI 0.32 (0.05) 0.86 *** 
Utilisation ← General EI 0.31 (0.05) 0.82 *** 
Item 1 ← Optimism 1.00  0.36 Na 
Item 2 ← Optimism 1.24 (0.24) 0.56 *** 
Item 3 ← Optimism 0.74 (0.17) 0.36 *** 
Item 9 ← Optimism 1.27 (0.25) 0.53 *** 
Item 10 ← Optimism 1.34 (0.26) 0.53 *** 
Item 12 ← Optimism 1.76 (0.33) 0.65 *** 
Item 14 ← Optimism 1.15 (0.24) 0.47 *** 
Item 16 ← Optimism 1.02 (0.21) 0.46 *** 
Item 19 ← Optimism 1.30 (0.25) 0.56 *** 
Item 21 ← Optimism 1.24 (0.26) 0.47 *** 
Item 22 ← Optimism 1.43 (0.27) 0.63 *** 
Item 23 ← Optimism 1.92 (0.35) 0.68 *** 
Item 24 ← Optimism 1.01 (0.19) 0.57 *** 
Item 28 ← Optimism 0.41 (0.16) 0.18 .010 
Item 5 ← Social skills 1.00  0.38 Na 
Item 15 ← Social skills 1.09 (0.21) 0.52 *** 
Item 18 ← Social skills 1.27 (0.22) 0.73 *** 
Item 25 ← Social skills 1.39 (0.25) 0.71 *** 
Item 29 ← Social skills 1.39 (0.25) 0.68 *** 
Item 32 ← Social skills 1.01 (0.19) 0.56 *** 
Item 4 ← Appraisal 1.00  0.46 Na 
Item 6 ← Appraisal 0.78 (0.15) 0.44 *** 
Item 8 ← Appraisal 1.47 (0.25) 0.52 *** 
Item 11 ← Appraisal 1.64 (0.28) 0.52 *** 
Item 13 ← Appraisal 1.36 (0.23) 0.52 *** 
Item 26 ← Appraisal 1.36 (0.24) 0.51 *** 
Item 30 ← Appraisal 1.38 (0.20) 0.71 *** 
Item 7 ← Utilisation 1.00  0.41 Na 
Item 17 ← Utilisation 1.26 (0.21) 0.65 *** 
Item 20 ← Utilisation 1.55 (0.25) 0.73 *** 
Item 27 ← Utilisation 1.20 (0.22) 0.55 *** 
Item 31 ← Utilisation 1.585 (0.26) 0.72 *** 
Item 33 ← Utilisation -0.046 (0.18) -0.02 .792 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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5.2.1.3. Reliability of the SSREIT 
 
 
As the hierarchical model was adopted as the primary model with which the remaining analysis will be 
conducted, the reliability of both a general factor of EI was assessed as well as the four identified factors, 
which will from now on be referred to as subscales. Previous findings with the SSREIT have reported 
good reliability for the overall EI scale, however, some of the reported scores for the subscales identified 
previously have been less than satisfactory. According to Schutte et al., (1998) the SSREIT has 
demonstrated a good internal consistency with Cronbach’s alphas reported of 0.90 for community 
members and 0.87 for college students. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients identified for the overall EI 
scale and the four subscales were surprisingly good considering that the confirmatory factor analysis 
yielded a less than optimal fit for the hierarchical four factor model. 
 
Previous research by Murphy (2006) yielded an overall Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.90 with a mean 
of 128.22 and a standard deviation of 15.36, which supported findings by Palmer (2003) who obtained a 
Cronbach’s alpha for the overall scale of 0.92, with a mean of 129.16 and a standard deviation of 15.82. 
The overall scale in the present study yielded a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.89 which is slightly 
lower than the scores reported previously. The mean of the total EI score was 135 with a standard 
deviation of 12.74, which is higher than the mean reported using the student sample.  
 
The optimism subscale yielded a high Cronbach’s alpha of 0.82 which is in line with the 0.83 reported by 
Murphy (2006). Item 28 was identified in both studies as presenting a low corrected item-total correlation 
(r = .21 compared to r = .29 in 2006), however, as the overall reliability is high this item will be retained. 
The social skills subscale yielded a lower Cronbach’s alpha of 0.75 compared to the 0.81 reported by 
Murphy, and the appraisal subscale had a good reliability of 0.72 (compared to 0.76). The utilisation scale 
initially had a moderate reliability of 0.61, however, on examination of the item-total correlations it was 
evident that item 33 was inappropriate to this scale (r = -.06). After removal of this item from the scale the 
total reliability increased to an appropriate level of 0.74.  
 
Previous studies have identified good short term test retest reliability for the SSREIT. However, no 
studies have previously examined the long-term test retest reliability of any of the EI scales. A sample of 
the research participants in the original research were requested to complete the SSREIT again 12 
months after the data collection period. A total of 89 respondents completed the measure once more, 
which is a response rate of 30% from the original 282 participants who completed the SSREIT. Test-
retest reliability is assessed by examining the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the scores from 
the original assessment compared to the scores from the latest assessment. In the ideal case both 
scores should coincide for each respondent and therefore the correlation coefficient should be 1.0, 
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however, coefficients of 0.7 and 0.8 are considered good (Field, 2005, p.669). The 12 month test-retest 
score was not expected to reach or exceed the 0.7 standard due to the long period after assessment and 
the assumption that EI does change with age and experience. The reliability score obtained in the 
present study for the total scale did, however, reach a reasonable Cronbach’s alpha of 0.63. 
 
To determine whether there was evidence of consistency for the four identified subfactors, the 
correlations between the latest and the original scores were also assessed. The utilisation (r = .69, p < 
.01) and optimism (r = .67, p < .01) subscales had good test-retest reliability exceeding that of the total 
scale. The appraisal (r = .58, p < .01) and social skills (r = .47, p < .01) subscales yielded weaker scores 
which suggest that items in these factors are less stable across time. Table 16 presents the Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients and test-retest reliability scores of the total scale of the SSREIT and the four subscales 
identified in the present study.  
 
 
Table 16: Scale reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha), means and standard deviations of the total scale 
and subscales of the SSREIT  
 
 
 Present study  
(n=282) 
Murphy  
(2006, n=308)  
12 Month 
Test-retest 
Scale No. of items Item numbers M SD α α r 
Total Scale 33  135 12.74 .89 .90 .64 
Optimism 14 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 28 4.31 0.41 .82 .83 .67 
Social Skills 6 5, 15, 18, 25, 29, 32 3.91 0.59 .75 .81 .47 
Appraisal 7 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 26, 30 3.96 0.57 .72 .76 .58 
Utilisation 5 7, 17, 20, 27, 31 3.95 0.52 .74 .72 .69 
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5.2.2. Establishing the reliability and nature of the factor structure of the Mayer-
Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test 
 
 
5.2.2.1. Confirmatory factor analysis of the MSCEIT  
 
 
Few studies have examined the factor structure of the MSCEIT V2.0 using confirmatory factor analysis. 
Mayer et al (2003) provided a review of the expected factor structure of the MSCEIT and a number of fit 
indices for a one, two and four factor model. Although, when the factor structure was reassessed by 
independent studies (Palmer, 2003, Gignac, 2005, Palmer et al., 2005) a number of valid concerns 
regarding the factor structure were raised. One of the main concerns is that if the MSCEIT V2.0 
measures emotional intelligence as an ability, all the subscales are expected to load on a single factor 
which could be referred to as ‘emotional g’ (Mayer et al., 1999). An additional concern is whether there is 
support for the two factor and four factor models of EI that were reported by Mayer et al., (2003).  
 
Research studies such as those conducted by Palmer et al., (2005) could not provide support for the 
experiential area level factor as well as the facilitating branch level factor which suggests that these 
models may not be satisfactory. Furthermore, the results obtained by Mayer et al., (2003) contained a 
number of interpretation errors (Gignac, 2005). Gignac demonstrated that the close fit indices reported by 
Mayer et al were inaccurate as the values reported for the NFI, TLI and RMSEA were overestimated for 
each model. Gignac further revealed that contrary to the results presented by Mayer et al., the one factor 
and two factor models did not provide a good fit and the four factor model yielded a nonpositive definite 
matrix could have resulted from collinearity between the perceiving and facilitating branch level factors. 
These discrepancies were attributed by Mayer and colleagues (Mayer, Panter, Salovey, Caruso & 
Sitarenios, 2005) in a follow-up article, to changes in the manner in which incremental fit indices were 
calculated caused by an upgrade from AMOS Version 4 to 4.02. According to Mayer et al., both the one 
and two factor models were assessed using AMOS V4.0 which compared the models to a baseline model 
that constrained means, intercepts, and covariances to zero. The four-factor model, however, was 
assessed using AMOS V4.02 which compares the model against a baseline comparison model that relied 
on modelling independence among covariances only. 
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Table 17: Fit Indices for the comparative models of the MSCEIT 
 
Model CMIN (χ2) 
Normed 
χ2 df 
Bollen-
stine p GFI AGFI CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR 
Unstandardised, unadjusted data 
One factor 
model  55.922 2.79 20 .005 .94 .89 .89 .84 .090 .060 
Two factor 
oblique model  52.280 2.75 19 .005 .94 .88 .90 .85 .089 .058 
Four factor 
oblique model  17.901 1.28 14 .363 .98 .95 .99 .98 .035 .035 
Hierarchical 
model 23.104 1.54 15 .082 .98 .94 .98 .95 .049 .040 
Data based on standardised scores 
One factor 
model  61.672 3.08 20 .005 .93 .87 .87 .82 .097 .066 
Two factor 
oblique model  45.359 2.39 19 .025 .95 .90 .92 .88 .079 .058 
Four factor 
oblique model  15.114 1.08 14 .473 .98 .96 1.00 .99 .019 .034 
Hierarchical 
model 20.471 1.37 15 .323 .98 .95 .98 .97 .041 .038 
 
Limits  2.0-3.0  .90 .85 .90 .90 .05-.08 .05-.08 
 
 
The BPRI Group 70
0
1
GFI AGFI CFI TLI
One factor model
2 factor oblique model
4 factor oblique model
Hierarchical model 
Acceptable Fit
Excellent Fit
Scores closer to 0 preferableScores closer to 1 preferable
Unstandardised MSCEIT data
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To examine the validity of the MSCEIT as a measure of ability EI with the present sample, a confirmatory 
factor analysis was performed to determine whether there would be a satisfactory fit for a one factor 
model measuring general EI, an oblique two factor model measuring the experiential and strategic areas 
and an oblique four factor model measuring the four branches of EI. The analysis is based on both 
standardised consensus data (which was adjusted for gender, age and ethnicity), as well as 
unstandardised unadjusted data to determine whether the EI structure was evident in data that had not 
been altered by the standardisation procedure.  
 
The Mardia’s coefficient of multivariate kurtosis had a critical ratio of 9.46 for the raw scores and 12.66 for 
the standardised scores (see Appendix F, Table F8), which is higher than the critical ratio of 3 which 
confirms that the measured task scores of the MSCEIT are not distributed normally, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. As a result, the Bollen-Stine p-value will be reported to assess overall model fit. Standardised 
parameter estimates for the comparative models of the MSCEIT are summarised in Table 18 and path 
diagrams as well as the full parameter estimates of the hypothesised models are presented in Appendix 
F, Section 2. The procedure used for the confirmatory analysis was the same as that employed 
previously by Mayer et al., (2003) in that error variance were set to be uncorrelated and latent variables 
were correlated or oblique.  
 
 
Table 18: Standardised parameter estimates for the comparative models of the MSCEIT 
 
  One factor model 
Two factor 
model 
Four factor 
model 
Four-branch / Hierarchical 
model 
Perception Branch  I I I I I I 
Faces 0.35 0.36 0.56 0.35 1.04 0.87 
Pictures 0.58 0.6 0.73 0.57   
Emotional Facilitation   II  II  
Facilitation 0.58 0.55 0.36 0.51 1.12  
Sensations  0.55 0.67 0.57 0.63   
Understanding Branch   II III II III II 
Changes 0.48 0.57 0.53 0.57 0.74 1.14 
Blends 0.65 0.50 0.61 0.72   
Managing Branch    IV III IV  
Emotional Management 0.54 0.60 0.68 0.68 0.70  
Emotional Relationships / 
Social management 0.57 0.58 0.73 0.73   
Note: Roman numerals indicate the factors specified in each model. Below each Roman numeral are the parameter 
estimates for each of the subtests associated with that factor. 
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Although implied by the underlying theoretical assumptions, no research conducted by the authors of the 
instrument and only one independent previous research study using a sample of university students 
(Rossen et al., 2008) has examined the factor structure of the MSCEIT as a hierarchical structure. The 
present study also attempts to determine whether a hierarchical factor structure would not be more 
appropriate to the data than the one, two and four factor structures examined previously by Mayer et al., 
(2003) as well as the nested structures examined by Palmer and colleagues. In order to limit 
multicollinearity for the hierarchical structure, factor loadings for the second level factors on the third level 
factors were set to be equal to each other and residual variances for the second order factors were set to 
be equal to each other in accordance with the procedure followed by Rossen et al., (2008).  
 
 
Figure 14: Hierarchical model of the MSCEIT based on the eight unstandardised observed task 
scores  
Standardised solution (n=223) 
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Tables 18 and 19 display the standardised parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit indices for the 
models examined with confirmatory factor analysis. The results for the standardised and the 
unstandardised models were nearly identical which indicates that the factor structure is largely 
uninfluenced by the standardisation and adjustment of the results. Due to the slightly better fit indices 
provided for the unstandardised models, the results discussed will be based on these figures. 
 
The one and two factor models based on the findings of Mayer et al., (2003) were found to display a poor 
fit to the data according to the χ2 criteria (Bollen-stine p > .05). The one factor model yielded a χ220 = 
55.922 with unsatisfactory levels of fit (Bollen-stine p = .005 GFI = .94, AGFI = .89, CFI = .89, TLI = .84, 
RMSEA = .090, SRMR = .060) as did the two factor model (χ219 = 52.280, Bollen-stine p = .005 GFI = .94, 
AGFI = .88, CFI = .90, TLI = .85, RMSEA = .089, SRMR = .040). When compared against the fit indices 
provided by Mayer et al., (2003) it is evident that the one and two factor models are not as well fitting as 
stated in the findings because although a TLI of 0.98 and 0.99 and an NFI of 0.99 and 0.99 are obtained 
respectively for the two models, in both cases the chi-square statistic was significant (p < .001) and 
RMSEA was much greater than 0.05 (0.124 and 0.093, respectively). All of the factor loadings on the 
general factor were statistically significant ranging from 0.35 to 0.58 which is comparable to the findings 
by Palmer et al., (2005) which supports a general factor of EI. The correlation between the experiencing 
and strategic area scores was 0.88 (p < .001) which is higher than the 0.74 reported by Palmer et al., 
(2005). 
 
On their examination of the four factor model, Mayer et al., (2003) attempted to overcome high 
covariance identified between the perceiving and emotional facilitation factors by constraining the 
covariances between the perceiving emotions and emotional facilitation factors, and between the 
understanding and managing emotions factors to be equal to each other. This procedure was criticised by 
Gignac (2005) who retested the four factor model without the equality constraints and found a nonpositive 
definite matrix solution which indicated that the four-factor model was unacceptable. He also found that 
the chi-squared statistic for the unconstrained model was substantially lower than the constrained model 
which suggests that the two factors are not equal in magnitude as the equality constraints implied. 
Furthermore, Gignac (2005) contends that the correlation of 0.97 identified between the perceiving 
emotions and emotional facilitation factors suggests that the two scales are essentially measuring the 
same construct.  
 
The examination of the four factor structure in the present study did not constrain the correlations 
between the area scores and contrary to Gignac (2005), found an excellent fit for the four factor structure 
with the present data (χ214 = 17.901, Bollen-stine p = .363 GFI = .98, AGFI = .95, CFI = .99, TLI = .98, 
RMSEA = .035, SRMR = .035). A factor loading of 1.17 was obtained, however, between the perception 
and emotional facilitation area scores resulting in a negative residual variance for that subtest, indicating 
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that the four factor model is an improper model. This supports Gignac’s (2005) concern that these two 
scores may be measuring the same construct.  
 
The examination of the model as a hierarchical structure, however, revealed a very good fit to the data 
(χ215 = 23.104, Bollen-stine p = .082 GFI = .98, AGFI = .94, CFI = .98, TLI = .95, RMSEA = .049, SRMR = 
.040) which provides support for the model as a hierarchic structure as specified by the underlying theory. 
The path diagram for the hierarchical four factor model is depicted in Figure 14 and the parameter 
estimates for the model are summarised in Table 18. Several factor loadings were, however, greater than 
1.0 (see Table 18) which indicates the presence of negative residual variance and as a result, this is also 
considered to be an improper model which is consistent with the findings of Rossen et al., (2008). The full 
parameter estimates and path diagrams of the comparative models are presented in Appendix F, Section 
2.  
 
Tables 19 and 20 display the intercorrelations among the eight MSCEIT task scores as well as the 
branch, area and overall EI scores. As can be seen in these tables, the correlations between the 
subscales range from 0.58 to 0.48 with many correlations in the mid 0.30 range. This is similar to the 
findings reported by Mayer et al., (2003). However, three of the correlations between the task scores are 
insignificant (see Table 18) and lower than the values which Mayer et al., reported as significant and 
ranging from 0.17 to 0.59. All three of these correlations are with the faces task.  
 
 
Table 19: Correlations among the eight MSCEIT task scores  
 
 MSCEIT Tas ks  Faces Pictures Sensations Facilitation Changes Blends Emotional Management 
Emotional 
Relationships 
Faces Task 1.000        
Pictures Task .197** 1.000       
Sensations Task .234** .433** 1.000      
Facilitation Task .219** .319** .327** 1.000     
Changes Task .171* .333** .409** .214** 1.000    
Blends Task .080 .274** .318** .186** .461** 1.000   
Emotion 
Management Task .058 .217** .350** .371** .296** .272** 1.000  
Emotional 
Relationships Task .094 .233** .279** .379** .294** .235** .476** 1.000 
****p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05, n=223 
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Table 20: Correlations among the MSCEIT branch, area, task and overall scores 
 
MSCEIT s ca les  
Branch scores Area scores Overall 
Emotional 
Intelligence 
Perception 
Branch  
Facilitating 
Emotions 
Understanding 
Branch  
Managing 
Branch  Experiential Strategic 
Ta
sk
 s
co
re
s 
Faces  .795** .277** .163* .086 .650** .146* .502** 
Pictures  .748** .473** .363** .268** .732** .381** .677** 
Sensations .419** .879** .426** .357** .719** .471** .705** 
Facilitation  .343** .738** .238** .430** .596** .404** .593** 
Changes  .305** .402** .833** .346** .390** .705** .590** 
Blends  .215** .325** .869** .298** .310** .698** .544** 
Emotion 
Management  .161* .436** .317** .783** .311** .669** .519** 
Emotional 
Relationships .207** .392** .308** .917** .334** .749** .589** 
B
ra
nc
h 
sc
or
es
 
Perception 1.000 .474** .321** .219** .892** .324** .756** 
Facilitation  1.000 .427** .473** .816** .543** .805** 
Understanding    1.000 .369** .423** .818** .673** 
Managing     1.000 .377** .836** .654** 
A
re
a 
sc
or
es
 
Experiential      1.000 .483** .906** 
Strategic      1.000 .802** 
Overall Emotional 
Intelligence       1.000 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05, n=223 
 
 
 
5.2.2.2. Reliability of the MSCEIT 
 
 
The split-half and Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for the MSCEIT overall and subscale scores are 
presented in Table 21. As recommended by Mayer et al., (2003), the means and standard deviations are 
presented as unstandardised scores. In addition, the reliability values reported at the task level are 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients due to item homogeneity, and split-half reliabilities are reported at the 
branch, area and overall test levels due to item heterogeneity.  
 
The split-half reliability coefficient for the overall MSCEIT scale (r = .73) was found to be a great deal 
lower than the results provided by Mayer et al., (2003). The strategic (r = .71) and experiential (r = .73) 
area scores as well as all four branch scores were also found to be lower than previously reported. An 
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unexpected result was that a number of the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of the task scores improved 
even though the reliability scores of the higher order scales declined, but Mayer et al. (2003, p.) 
suggested that due to the low reliabilities at the task level, caution should be exercised when reporting 
task scores, and therefore the remaining analysis will be reported at the branch and overall scale levels 
only.  
 
Table 21: Split-half and Cronbach’s alpha Reliability coefficients for the MSCEIT V2.0 
  
MSCEIT Subscales N of items 
Present study  
(n=282) 
General scoring  
(Mayer et al., 2003) 
Expert scoring  
(Mayer et al., 2003) 
  M SD Reliability M SD Reliability M SD Reliability 
Overall Emotional 
Intelligence 141 .47 .06 .73 .48 .70 .93 .50 .80 .91 
Experiential  
Area Score 80 .47 .08 .73 .49 .80 .90 .50 .90 .90 
Perception Branch  50 .47 .11 .57 .50 .10 .91 .54 .13 .90 
Faces Task 20 .48 .15 .80 .50 .12 .80 .57 .18 .82 
Pictures Task 30 .49 .13 .91 .50 .13 .88 .50 .13 .87 
Facilitation Branch  30 .47 .09 .53 .47 .90 .79 .45 .80 .76 
Facilitation Task 15 .46 .09 .68 .44 .90 .64 .41 .70 .63 
Sensations Task 15 .47 .13 .67 .50 .12 .65 .50 .12 .55 
Strategic  
Area Score 61 .46 .06 .71 .47 .80 .88 .51 .10 .86 
Understanding Branch  32 .52 .07 .62 .53 .10 .80 .60 .13 .77 
Changes Task 20 .52 .08 .52 .56 .10 .70 .63 .14 .68 
Blends Task 12 .48 .09 .47 .50 .12 .66 .57 .16 .62 
Managing Branch  29 .41 .08 .64 .42 .10 .83 .42 .90 .81 
Emotion Management 
Task 20 .41 .07 .57 .41 .90 .69 .40 .90 .64 
Emotional 
Relationships Task 9 .42 .11 .72 .43 .12 .67 .43 .12 .64 
 
The influence of cultural bias on psychometric scores is a topic that is of interest to most researchers who 
wish to apply any type of psychometric instrument to South African contexts. Van Staaden (2001) 
conducted one of the few reliability studies with the MSCEIT on a South African population and identified 
discrepancies in the factor structure of the MSCEIT between the South African data and the 
recommendations based on the North American context. To determine if the recommendations made by 
Van Staaden could be an indication of possible cultural differences between American and South African 
preferences for responding, the inter-item consistency of each task score was compared to the inter-item 
factor scores identified in Van Staaden’s research.  
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Table 22: Item statistics of the emotional identification in faces scale items 
 
Perceiving emotions: emotional identification in faces (Section A) and pictures (Section E) 
 
The faces task and the pictures task contributes towards the measurement of the identification or 
perception of emotions branch by asking respondents to identify the emotions expressed in four 
photographs of people’s faces and the feelings suggested by six artistic designs and landscapes. Below 
the image, respondents are provided with a list of five emotions and they need to indicate on a five point 
scale how much of each emotion is expressed in the image (Brackett & Salovey, 2006). As discussed 
previously, the answer option of ‘no emotions present’ is an answer option for every emotion in these two 
sections (MacCann et al., 2003).  
 
 
  Item grouping Section A Mean SD 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Factor loadings  
(Van Staaden, 
2001) 
A1 Face 1 Emotion 1 .34 .12 -.125 .810 .045 
A2 Face 1 Emotion 2 .30 .10 .348 .797 .404 
A3 Face 1 Emotion 3 .40 .26 .394 .791 .423 
A4 Face 1 Emotion 4 .26 .06 .132 .802 .197 
A5 Face 1 Emotion 5 .44 .24 .473 .786 .413 
A6 Face 2 Emotion 1 .42 .22 .429 .789 .362 
A7 Face 2 Emotion 2 .28 .09 -.218 .810 -.105 
A8 Face 2 Emotion 3 .28 .08 .345 .798 .441 
A9 Face 2 Emotion 4 .38 .24 .584 .779 .424 
A10 Face 2 Emotion 5 .57 .30 .592 .776 .578 
A11 Face 3 Emotion 1 .65 .36 .467 .788 .327 
A12 Face 3 Emotion 2 .30 .14 .069 .805 .041 
A13 Face 3 Emotion 3 .24 .05 -.039 .804 .248 
A14 Face 3 Emotion 4 .36 .25 .441 .788 .474 
A15 Face 3 Emotion 5 .66 .32 .556 .779 .573 
A16 Face 4 Emotion 1 .54 .19 -.122 .816 .012 
A17 Face 4 Emotion 2 .61 .29 .474 .786 .478 
A18 Face 4 Emotion 3 .54 .28 .553 .780 .618 
A19 Face 4 Emotion 4 .61 .28 .567 .779 .574 
A20 Face 4 Emotion 5 .62 .30 .583 .777 .533 
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Table 23: Item statistics of the emotional identification in pictures scale items 
 
  Item grouping Section E Mean SD 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Factor loadings  
(Van Staaden 
(2001) 
E1 Image 1 Emotion 1 .24 .08 -.045 .913 .024 
E2 Image 1 Emotion 2 .51 .27 .431 .910 .252 
E3 Image 1 Emotion 3 .44 .25 .496 .908 .410 
E4 Image 1 Emotion 4 .75 .31 .598 .907 .362 
E5 Image 1 Emotion 5 .81 .29 .575 .907 .333 
E6 Image 2 Emotion 1 .22 .06 .182 .912 .100 
E7 Image 2 Emotion 2 .42 .21 .656 .906 .475 
E8 Image 2 Emotion 3 .44 .28 .576 .907 .362 
E9 Image 2 Emotion 4 .41 .21 .583 .907 .396 
E10 Image 2 Emotion 5 .52 .31 .388 .911 .177 
E11 Image 3 Emotion 1 .23 .08 .409 .911 .023 
E12 Image 3 Emotion 2 .57 .24 .599 .907 .504 
E13 Image 3 Emotion 3 .63 .27 .706 .904 .469 
E14 Image 3 Emotion 4 .40 .25 .537 .908 .344 
E15 Image 3 Emotion 5 .68 .22 .726 .905 .476 
E16 Image 4 Emotion 1 .49 .24 .549 .907 .371 
E17 Image 4 Emotion 2 .27 .09 .542 .910 .348 
E18 Image 4 Emotion 3 .22 .04 .295 .912 -.155 
E19 Image 4 Emotion 4 .27 .08 .570 .910 .32 
E20 Image 4 Emotion 5 .43 .21 .606 .907 .376 
E21 Image 5 Emotion 1 .20 .09 -.242 .915 -.007 
E22 Image 5 Emotion 2 .71 .32 .638 .906 .474 
E23 Image 5 Emotion 3 .53 .27 .557 .907 .496 
E24 Image 5 Emotion 4 .52 .28 .573 .907 .489 
E25 Image 5 Emotion 5 .66 .33 .554 .908 .382 
E26 Image 6 Emotion 1 .39 .21 .377 .910 .136 
E27 Image 6 Emotion 2 .23 .04 .311 .912 -.222 
E28 Image 6 Emotion 3 .43 .18 .633 .907 .388 
E29 Image 6 Emotion 4 .47 .28 .482 .909 .349 
E30 Image 6 Emotion 5 .46 .21 .525 .908 .338 
 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for both the faces (α = .80) and the pictures tasks (α = .91) measured 
using all the items in the subscales are high and in line with the values provided by Mayer et al., (2003). 
The split-half reliability coefficient for the identification and perception branch score is, however, much 
lower (r = .57) than the values obtained by Mayer and colleagues (r = .91 to r = .90). Van Staaden (2001) 
did not calculate split-half reliability coefficients for the branch scores, however, the Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients he identified for both the faces task (α = .74) and the pictures task (α = .78) were also lower 
than reported in Mayer et al., (2003). This implies that there is some form of discrepancy between the 
emotional association made by the North American sample with certain items and the association made 
by the South African sample with the same items.  
  
 156 
If the item-total correlations found in the present study are compared with the factor loadings obtained by 
Van Staaden (2001), it is evident that the same six items (A1, A4, A7, A12, A13, A16) which loaded 
poorly on the faces factor in Van Staaden’s research also had low corrected item-total correlations (i.e. 
below the recommended level of r = 0.3 (Field, 2005, p. 672)) in the present study. One to two items in 
each item parcel (a single face task and corresponding emotions as answer options) were affected. In the 
pictures task, four of the items (E1, E6, E18, E21) which loaded poorly on Van Staaden’s pictures factor, 
also had low or negative item total correlations in the present study. Four of the items identified by Van 
Staaden as being problematic (E2, E10, E26, E27) did, however, display acceptable item total 
correlations.  
 
To examine whether the reliability of the subscales, and especially the split-half reliability of the branch 
scores, would improve if the identified items were removed, the task and branch scores were reassessed 
without items A1, A4, A7, A12, A13, A16, E1, E6, E18 and E21. The Cronbach’s alpha for the revised 
faces task increased from 0.80 to 0.85 and the pictures task increased marginally from 0.91 to 0.92. 
However, the split-half reliability of the identification or perception branch score increased dramatically 
from a low 0.57 to an acceptable 0.64. The revised branch score is still much lower than that of the North 
American sample which indicates that there is still some discrepancy with regard to the item structure of 
this specific branch for the South African population.  
 
 
Five of the items in the facilitation task (B4, B10, B11, B12, B13) and six of the items in the sensations 
task (F1, F2, F5, F7, F8, F10, F11) loaded poorly or negatively in the factors obtained in the Van Staaden 
(2001) study and displayed low or negative corrected item-total correlations in the present study. Similarly 
to the findings by Van Staaden, removal of these items from the facilitation task resulted in a decreased 
Cronbach’s alpha from 0.68 to 0.67, however, the sensations task improved from 0.67 to 0.72. The 
resulting revised branch also increased from a low 0.53 to a more acceptable 0.59. Together, the two 
branch scores, perception and facilitation of emotions, combine to form the experiential area scores. 
Facilitating emotions: facilitation (Section B) and sensations (Section F) 
 
The facilitation of emotions is measured by the sensations and facilitation subtasks. In the sensations test 
respondents are requested to imagine certain emotions and indicate the extent to which they match 
different situations and in the facilitation task, respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which 
certain emotions would assist cognitive tasks or behaviour. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for both 
these task scores were found to be higher than reported by Mayer et al., (2003). The split-half reliability 
coefficient for the facilitation branch score is, however, also much lower (r = .53) than the values obtained 
by Mayer et al., (r = .79 to r = .76).  
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When the split-half reliability score for the area score was recalculated without the identified problematic 
items it was discovered that the score improves from 0.73 to 0.78.  
 
 
Table 24: Item statistics of the facilitation scale items 
 
  Item grouping Section B Mean SD 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Factor loadings  
(Van Staaden 
(2001) 
B1 Situation 1 Item 1 .79 .24 .396 .649 .529 
B2 Situation 1 Item 2 .69 .27 .355 .656 .379 
B3 Situation 1 Item 3 .78 .24 .252 .672 .407 
B4 Situation 2 Item 1 .23 .08 .181 .677 -.080 
B5 Situation 2 Item 2 .36 .17 .173 .679 .319 
B6 Situation 2 Item 3 .44 .24 .478 .634 .422 
B7 Situation 3 Item 1 .39 .21 .333 .659 .286 
B8 Situation 3 Item 2 .74 .28 .450 .638 .389 
B9 Situation 3 Item 3 .30 .10 .150 .679 .334 
B10 Situation 4 Item 1 .24 .09 .010 .687 .050 
B11 Situation 4 Item 2 .22 .08 .234 .675 .088 
B12 Situation 4 Item 3 .26 .14 .258 .670 .257 
B13 Situation 5 Item 1 .27 .13 .242 .671 .087 
B14 Situation 5 Item 2 .38 .15 .271 .668 .379 
B15 Situation 5 Item 3 .60 .26 .408 .646 .289 
 
 
Table 25: Item statistics of the sensations scale items 
 
  Item grouping Section F Mean SD 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Factor loadings  
(Van Staaden 
(2001) 
F1 Feeling 1 Item 1 .24 .06 -.041 .681 .253 
F2 Feeling 1 Item 2 .23 .07 -.037 .682 .068 
F3 Feeling 1 Item 3 .76 .30 .489 .622 .373 
F4 Feeling 2 Item 1 .54 .25 .358 .648 .404 
F5 Feeling 2 Item 2 .24 .08 .155 .673 -.132 
F6 Feeling 2 Item 3 .52 .34 .412 .642 .389 
F7 Feeling 3 Item 1 .20 .04 .045 .678 .055 
F8 Feeling 3 Item 2 .24 .08 .100 .676 .163 
F9 Feeling 3 Item 3 .35 .20 .375 .646 .330 
F10 Feeling 4 Item 1 .30 .12 .005 .685 .183 
F11 Feeling 4 Item 2 .27 .11 .160 .672 -.021 
F12 Feeling 4 Item 3 .41 .21 .347 .650 .229 
F13 Feeling 5 Item 1 .49 .19 .414 .642 .348 
F14 Feeling 5 Item 2 .53 .30 .532 .612 .589 
F15 Feeling 5 Item 3 .35 .16 .418 .645 .452 
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Table 26: Item statistics of the changes scale items 
 
Understanding emotions: changes (Section C) and blends (Section G) 
 
The understanding of emotions is measured by the changes and blends subtasks which require 
respondents to identify emotions that result from the intensification of certain feelings or to identify 
emotions that combine to form more complex feelings. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for both these 
task scores are very low in the present study and the split-half reliability coefficient for the understanding 
emotions branch score is again much lower (r = .62) than the values obtained by Mayer et al., (2003) (r = 
.80 to r = .77).  
 
 
  Item grouping Section C Mean SD 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Factor loadings  
(Van Staaden 
(2001) 
C1 Changes Item 1 .60 .32 .089 .532 .238 
C2 Changes Item 2 .71 .33 .164 .516 .401 
C3 Changes Item 3 .35 .13 .150 .518 .131 
C4 Changes Item 4 .41 .24 .247 .499 .331 
C5 Changes Item 5 .47 .27 .176 .512 .300 
C6 Changes Item 6 .62 .30 .385 .464 .290 
C7 Changes Item 7 .43 .22 .251 .500 .229 
C8 Changes Item 8 .44 .13 .079 .524 .227 
C9 Changes Item 9 .47 .21 .087 .525 .165 
C10 Changes Item 10 .30 .11 .237 .512 .396 
C11 Changes Item 11 .72 .24 .080 .528 .351 
C12 Changes Item 12 .52 .24 -.074 .554 .250 
C13 Changes Item 13 .65 .31 .014 .548 .162 
C14 Changes Item 14 .34 .11 .406 .499 .449 
C15 Changes Item 15 .34 .18 .314 .495 .448 
C16 Changes Item 16 .51 .20 .165 .514 .256 
C17 Changes Item 17 .65 .26 .321 .483 .349 
C18 Changes Item 18 .76 .25 .264 .495 .354 
C19 Changes Item 19 .61 .27 .099 .526 .230 
C20 Changes Item 20 .79 .26 .188 .509 .260 
 
 
A larger percentage of items in both tasks, ten items of the twenty in the changes task (C1, C3, C7, C8, 
C9, C12, C13, C16, C19, C20) and four of the twelve items in the blends task (G3, G4, G8, G10), loaded 
poorly on the factors identified in the Van Staaden (2001) study and also had low or negative corrected 
item-total correlations in the present study. Removal of these items resulted in a small increase in the 
Cronbach’s alpha from 0.52 to 0.55 for the changes task and from 0.47 to 0.49 for the blends task. The 
resulting revised branch, however, decreased from 0.62 to 0.60.  
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Table 27: Item statistics of the blends scale items 
 
  Item grouping Section B Mean SD 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Factor loadings  
(Van Staaden 
(2001) 
G1 Blends Item 1 .50 .30 .222 .423 .433 
G2 Blends Item 2 .57 .31 .273 .401 .319 
G3 Blends Item 3 .46 .13 -.140 .494 .131 
G4 Blends Item 4 .29 .07 .228 .448 .049 
G5 Blends Item 5 .61 .31 -.002 .510 .329 
G6 Blends Item 6 .32 .15 .285 .422 .340 
G7 Blends Item 7 .72 .28 .254 .410 .393 
G8 Blends Item 8 .32 .12 .167 .447 .129 
G9 Blends Item 9 .70 .28 .196 .432 .377 
G10 Blends Item 10 .31 .08 -.047 .473 .029 
G11 Blends Item 11 .47 .24 .342 .384 .330 
G12 Blends Item 12 .41 .24 .287 .402 .375 
 
 
Managing emotions: Emotional management (Section D) and Emotional relationship (Section H) 
 
The managing of emotions area score is measured by a combination of the emotion management task, 
which requires respondents to indicate how effective certain actions might be in regulating certain moods 
and the emotional relationships task, which requires respondents to indicate how effective certain actions 
might be in regulating the emotions of another person. The low split-half reliability coefficient for the 
managing emotions area score (r = .64) results from the combination between the reasonable Cronbach’s 
alpha for the emotional relationships task score of 0.72 and the lower Cronbach’s alpha for the emotional 
management task score of 0.57.  
 
Ten items in the emotional management score (D4, D5, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10, D12, D15, D19, D20) are 
comparable to the problematic items identified by Van Staaden (2001), whereas only one item (H8) in the 
emotional relationships task was found to be problematic. However, removal of the items resulted in a 
decrease in the Cronbach’s alpha from 0.57 to 0.51 for the emotional management scale, but only in a 
small increase for the social relationships task from 0.72 to 0.74.  
 
The strategic area score, which is obtained from the combination of the understanding emotions and 
managing emotions branch scores, actually decreases by a large amount after removal of the identified 
items. It changes from a split-half reliability coefficient of 0.71 to a low 0.51 and the overall emotional 
intelligence scale reliability coefficient decreases from 0.73 to 0.72. These findings suggest that the 
problems with the reliability of the task, branch and area scores cannot be rectified simply by removing 
problematic items.  
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Table 28: Item statistics of the emotional management scale items 
 
  Item grouping Section D Mean SD 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Factor loadings  
(Van Staaden 
(2001) 
D1 Scenario 1 Item 1 .52 .30 .122 .572 .481 
D2 Scenario 1 Item 2 .52 .19 .272 .529 .575 
D3 Scenario 1 Item 3 .51 .23 .243 .534 .456 
D4 Scenario 1 Item 4 .26 .08 .035 .560 .140 
D5 Scenario 2 Item 1 .32 .15 .163 .548 .274 
D6 Scenario 2 Item 2 .24 .07 .089 .556 .165 
D7 Scenario 2 Item 3 .28 .13 .128 .552 .251 
D8 Scenario 2 Item 4 .38 .19 .226 .537 .271 
D9 Scenario 3 Item 1 .39 .13 .237 .539 .202 
D10 Scenario 3 Item 2 .33 .15 .146 .550 .222 
D11 Scenario 3 Item 3 .46 .17 .376 .513 .405 
D12 Scenario 3 Item 4 .29 .15 -.057 .578 .073 
D13 Scenario 4 Item 1 .44 .14 .108 .555 .308 
D14 Scenario 4 Item 2 .49 .16 .387 .514 .529 
D15 Scenario 4 Item 3 .25 .10 .081 .557 -.016 
D16 Scenario 4 Item 4 .27 .11 .163 .549 .304 
D17 Scenario 5 Item 1 .54 .26 .396 .495 .312 
D18 Scenario 5 Item 2 .31 .08 .304 .541 .285 
D19 Scenario 5 Item 3 .27 .06 .209 .549 .260 
D20 Scenario 5 Item 4 .54 .27 .141 .560 .201 
 
 
Table 29: Item statistics of the emotional relationship scale items 
 
  Item grouping Section H Mean SD 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Factor loadings  
(Van Staaden 
(2001) 
H1 Problem 1 Item 1 .57 .28 .549 .668 .582 
H2 Problem 1 Item 2 .41 .19 .537 .672 .478 
H3 Problem 1 Item 3 .57 .26 .527 .672 .510 
H4 Problem 2 Item 1 .40 .18 .338 .709 .652 
H5 Problem 2 Item 2 .42 .19 .496 .680 .442 
H6 Problem 2 Item 3 .37 .18 .409 .697 .335 
H7 Problem 3 Item 1 .31 .12 .258 .719 .424 
H8 Problem 3 Item 2 .23 .05 .008 .736 -.115 
H9 Problem 3 Item 3 .38 .17 .327 .710 .375 
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These findings suggest that although the MSCEIT appears to be a highly reliable measure in 
predominantly westernised countries such as Australia, America and Europe, there may be a discrepancy 
in the interpretation of certain images and scenarios by South African respondents. However, as the 
sample examined by Van Staaden’s study consisted only of 207 psychology students and 195 
engineering students from two separate South African universities, the findings from this analysis may not 
be reflective of the SA population as a whole. As a result further research with more diverse South 
African samples is required to validate these findings.  
 
 
5.2.3. The validity and reliability of the Thinking Styles Inventory and theoretical 
assumptions regarding the measurement structure 
 
 
5.2.3.1. Subscale reliabilities and correlations between scales 
 
 
The overall Cronbach’s alpha coefficient obtained for the 65 items version of the TSI (5 items in each 
scale) used in the present study was 0.92 which was higher than the 0.90 obtained by Murphy (2006) 
with the total 104 items (8 items in each scale). The alpha coefficients were mostly equivalent to, or 
improved on the subscale reliability coefficients obtained by Murphy (2006) on the 104 items as well as 
the findings of previous research with the 65 item scale (Zhang & Sternberg, 1998; Zhang, 2005b). The 
local scale which obtained a low Cronbach’s alpha with the 104 item scale improved from 0.56 to 0.68 in 
the shortened version. The monarchic and anarchic subscales, however, had lower alpha coefficients in 
the present study than reported by Murphy, although these coefficients were higher than reported 
previously by Zhang and Sternberg (1998).  
 
The anarchic and monarchic subscales have previously been found to display low alpha coefficients in a 
number of studies (Zhang, 2005b). Examination of the item total correlations for the subscales reveals 
that four of the five items in the anarchic subscale had item-total correlations below 0.30, but analysis 
showed that removal of these items do not improve the alpha coefficient of the overall scale. All items in 
the monarchic scale do show sufficient item total correlations and consequently removal of items will not 
improve the reliability of the scale either.  
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Table 30: Scale reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha), means and standard deviations of the TSI 
subscales  
 
 
  65 Item - Present study (n=308) 104 Item - Murphy (2006) sample (n=309) 
Subscale Item numbers M SD α M SD α 
Legislative 5, 10, 14, 32, 49 5.02 0.96 .76 5.30 0.82 .79 
Executive 8, 11, 12, 31, 39 4.71 1.01 .70 4.84 0.94 .79 
Judicial 20, 23, 42, 51, 57 4.66 1.31 .78 4.71 0.77 .67 
Global 7, 18, 38, 48, 61 3.87 1.14 .70 4.19 0.84 .73 
Local 1, 6, 24, 44, 62 4.35 1.14 .68 4.48 0.77 .56 
Liberal 45, 53, 58, 64, 65 5.00 1.06 .85 4.95 1.02 .87 
Conservative 13, 22, 26, 28, 36 4.12 1.17 .83 4.27 1.06 .85 
Internal 9, 15, 37, 55, 63 3.98 1.17 .70 4.76 0.91 .74 
External 3, 17, 34, 41, 46 5.31 1.14 .81 4.52 1.07 .83 
Hierarchic 4, 19, 33, 25, 56 5.35 1.15 .77 5.40 0.92 .82 
Monarchic 2, 43, 50, 54, 60 3.73 1.19 .64 3.96 1.00 .83 
Oligarchic 27, 29, 30, 52, 59 4.26 1.07 .77 4.28 0.79 .58 
Anarchic 16, 21, 35, 40, 47 4.59 1.04 .47 4.67 0.79 .59 
 
 
 
Table 31: Item statistics of the anarchic scale items 
 
 Scale Mean if Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
Item 16 19.42 11.545 .273 .092 .404 
Item 21 18.43 13.391 .201 .056 .451 
Item 35 18.89 13.141 .216 .068 .441 
Item 40 19.39 12.918 .178 .065 .470 
Item 47 19.19 10.887 .406 .169 .304 
 
 
Table 32: Item statistics of the monarchic scale items 
 
 Scale Mean if Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Squared Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
Item 20 15.64 16.182 .336 .135 .614 
Item 43 16.85 17.010 .314 .133 .622 
Item 50 15.40 16.333 .334 .126 .615 
Item 54 15.37 14.049 .499 .346 .532 
Item 60 15.74 13.344 .486 .331 .537 
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The validity of the TSI is supported by the magnitude and direction of the correlations between the 
thirteen subscales. The correlations between the thirteen subscales of the TSI, which are presented in 
Table 33, mostly exceed 0.30 and are significant at the p < 0.01 level which indicates that the styles are 
not orthogonal to each other and tend to correlate with one another to form profiles of thinking styles. The 
relationships between the scales were also in the direction predicted by the theory of mental self-
government (Sternberg, 1997). Scales defined as polar opposites were found to correlate negatively, for 
example global correlated negatively with local (r = -.204, p = .001), conservative with legislative (r = -
.090, p = .126), and liberal with conservative (r = -.297, p = .000). Subscales that are described as related 
were found to be positively associated such as the executive and conservative styles (r = .778, p = .000), 
and the legislative and liberal styles (r = .687, p = .000). The TSI scale was therefore considered to be a 
valid measure for this population.  
 
 
Table 33: Pearson’s correlation matrix for thirteen subscales of the TSI 
 
 Subscale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Legislative             
2 Executive .036            
3 Judicial .433** .257**           
4 Global .359** -.025 .222**          
5 Local .196** .524** .324** -.204**         
6 Liberal .687** -.113 .457** .365** .174**        
7 Conservative -.091 .778** .088 -.032 .457** -.297**       
8 Internal .458** .097 .153** .233** .322** .366** .128*      
9 External .292** .275** .524** .293** .126* .313** .077 -.157**     
10 Hierarchic .379** .262** .465** .116 .238** .349** .127* .154** .470**    
11 Monarchic .272** .462** .230** .193** .417** .168** .440** .399** .132* .161**   
12 Oligarchic .203** .440** .303** .269** .357** .158** .425** .199** .320** .251** .520**  
13 Anarchic .428** .223** .450** .311** .365** .489** .138* .324** .374** .353** .276** .407** 
Total sample n=308 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
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5.2.3.2. Confirmation of the categorisation of the thinking styles subscales into five 
dimensions and three broad types  
 
 
The validity of the claim that the thirteen subscales of the TSI can be grouped into three broad categories 
and five dimensions has previously been verified only through the use of exploratory factor analysis and 
as yet no published studies have used confirmatory factor analysis to test whether a good fit can be 
obtained for both the three and the five factor models. To verify this claim a three factor oblique model of 
the three types of thinking styles and a five factor oblique model of the five dimensions of thinking styles 
was evaluated using confirmatory factor analysis in AMOS V7.0.  
 
 
Figure 15: Five factor oblique model of the TSI  
Standardised solution (n=284) 
 
 
 
Functions
Legislative.72
Executive.54
Judicial
. 80
Forms
Monarchic.74
Hierarchic. 78
Oligarchic.73
Anarchic
. 81
Local
Global
Leanings
Liberal. 98
Conservative
.83
Scope
Internal. 47
External
. 56
Levels
. 41
. 39
1. 04
1. 72
2.36
1.28
1. 52
. 90
.95
1.42
1. 48
1. 71
  
  
 165 
A nonpositive definite matrix solution was obtained for the five factor oblique model which suggests that 
the model is not satisfactory. This occurred as a result of a negative variance estimate obtained for the 
latent variable, leanings. As the risk of negative variance estimates is highest in small samples when 
there are only two or three indicators per latent variable and when the communalities of the indicators are 
low (Brown, 2006, p. 189), model misspecification may have occurred as four of the five latent variables 
had only two or three indicators per variable. Attempts to correct this such as placing equality constraints 
on the model were ineffective, although fixing the error variance to a small positive value (0.1) corrected 
the negative variance obtained in the covariance matrix and allowed standardised coefficients to be 
calculated for the model parameters. The solution obtained as a result of this modification was also 
inadmissible, however, due a number of factor loadings greater than 1.00 between latent variables. 
Figure 15 presents the path diagram and Table 34 presents the standardised and unstandardised 
estimates for this model specification.  
 
 
Table 34: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
five factor model depicted in Figure 15 
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=284) 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
Legislative ← Functions 1.00  0.721 Na 
Executive ← Functions 0.79 (0.081) 0.543 *** 
Judicial ← Functions 1.51 (0.104) 0.801 *** 
Monarchic ← Forms 1.00  0.743 Na 
Hierarchic ← Forms 1.01 (0.071) 0.779 *** 
Oligarchic ← Forms 1.04 (0.080) 0.726 *** 
Anarchic ← Forms 0.96 (0.064) 0.813 *** 
Liberal ← Leanings 1.00  0.984 Na 
Conservative ← Leanings 0.27 (0.011) 0.829 *** 
Internal ← Scope 1.00  0.475 Na 
External ← Scope 1.15 (0.113) 0.558 *** 
Local ← Levels 1.00  0.412 Na 
Global ← Levels 0.96 (0.107) 0.391 *** 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
 
 
The fitting of the three factor oblique model also failed because the produced covariance matrix for the 
latent variables was not positive definite due to a number of negative eigenvalues. Figure 16 presents the 
path diagram and Table 35 presents the standardised and unstandardised estimates for this model 
specification. Before the conclusion can be drawn that the five and three factor models are inappropriate, 
the results would need to be confirmed with a larger sample size.  
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Figure 16: Three factor oblique model of the TSI  
Standardised solution (n=284) 
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Table 35: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
three factor model depicted in Figure 16 
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=308) 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
Legislative ← Type I 1.00  0.785 Na 
Judicial ← Type I 1.44 (0.089) 0.834 *** 
Global ← Type I 1.02 (0.082) 0.674 *** 
Liberal ← Type I 1.48 (0.092) 0.841 *** 
Hierarchic ← Type I 1.19 (0.080) 0.781 *** 
Local ← Type II 1.00  0.733 Na 
Conservative ← Type II 1.21 (0.082) 0.861 *** 
Monarchic ← Type II 0.98 (0.084) 0.685 *** 
Executive ← Type II 1.08 (0.071) 0.893 *** 
External ← Type III 1.00  0.771 Na 
Anarchic ← Type III 0.94 (0.061) 0.787 *** 
Oligarchic ← Type III 0.94 (0.075) 0.673 *** 
Internal ← Type III 0.84 (0.071) 0.635 *** 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Due to the difficulties identified in the estimation of the model fit using confirmatory factor analysis it was 
decided to attempt to confirm the factor structure using exploratory factor analysis. Principal axis factor 
analysis was employed at the subscale level with a direct oblimin rotation method to determine whether 
the rotated factor loadings of the thirteen subscales would provide evidence for the expected three and 
five factor models. Listwise deletion was used to control for missing values.  
 
The five factor model was found to explain a total of 63.78% of the variance and the loadings evident in 
the rotated pattern matrix did provide support for the hypothesised groupings of items within five domains. 
The legislative, executive and judicial factors loaded together on the functions factor with factor loadings 
of more than 0.2. As expected, according to the theoretical relations between subscales, the liberal and 
conservative, internal and external, and global and local factors loaded highly on the same factors but 
with inverse factor scores. The forms factor was less distinct with only the monarchic, oligarchic and 
anarchic factors loading highly, the hierarchic factor on the other hand had a higher loading on the 
functions factor.  
 
 
Table 36: Total variance explained for the five factor model of the TSI after extraction  
 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings (a) 
  Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 4.347 33.439 33.439 3.968 30.526 30.526 3.008 
2 2.459 18.917 52.356 2.197 16.901 47.427 2.280 
3 1.457 11.209 63.565 1.113 8.558 55.985 2.056 
4 1.109 8.530 72.095 .744 5.719 61.705 1.128 
5 .665 5.117 77.211 .270 2.078 63.783 2.927 
6 .571 4.393 81.604     
7 .531 4.081 85.686     
8 .438 3.368 89.053     
9 .379 2.912 91.966     
10 .327 2.519 94.485     
11 .300 2.308 96.793     
12 .243 1.872 98.665     
13 .174 1.335 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
a When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
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Table 37: Pattern matrix for the hypothesised five factor model of the TSI dimensions 
 
  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
 Subscales Functions Leanings Scope Levels Forms 
Legislative .476 -.102 .539 .126 .039 
Executive .259 .771 .006 -.093 -.076 
Judicial .652 -.015 .026 -.058 -.128 
Global .094 -.007 .174 .640 -.238 
Local .171 .115 .180 -.653 -.365 
Liberal .476 -.433 .390 .019 -.141 
Conservative -.014 .874 .066 -.012 -.088 
Internal -.094 .070 .787 .012 -.080 
External .772 .043 -.389 .154 -.160 
Hierarchic .645 .130 .069 -.026 .076 
Monarchic -.060 .277 .277 .013 -.445 
Oligarchic .012 .127 -.075 .056 -.733 
Anarchic .354 -.097 .161 -.029 -.377 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 14 iterations.  
 
 
Some of the subscales loaded highly on more than one factor, however, the nature of these relationships 
is in line with the relationship between the three thinking style types. The executive subscale had a higher 
loading on the leanings factor than on the functions factor indicating a strong relationship with the liberal 
and conservative subscales. The external and anarchic subscales also had a high loading on the 
functions factor, even though they theoretically belong to type III subscales rather than type I subscales. 
This is not surprising, however, as the type III subscales have been known to correlate more strongly with 
either type I or type II groupings depending on the situation or nature of the sample.  
 
The three factor model was found to explain a total of 54.77% of the variance in the thinking styles 
inventory. The rotated pattern matrix, however, revealed that although type I and type II thinking styles 
are clearly differentiated on different factors, all subscales, except for the internal subscale, loaded more 
strongly on either the type I or type II subscales. This supports the claim by the authors of the scale that 
type III factors can be associated more strongly with either type I or type II styles depending on the 
situation. As a result of this finding a two factor model was forced to determine which subscales 
associated more strongly with either type I or type II subscales and the revised structure was examined 
using confirmatory factor analysis to determine if a satisfactory fit for a two factor model could be 
obtained with the present data.  
 
 
  
 169 
Table 38: Total variance explained for the five factor model of the TSI after extraction  
 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings (a) 
  Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
1 4.347 33.439 33.439 3.892 29.939 29.939 3.391 
2 2.459 18.917 52.356 2.127 16.359 46.297 3.045 
3 1.457 11.209 63.565 1.101 8.471 54.768 1.194 
4 1.109 8.530 72.095     
5 .665 5.117 77.211     
6 .571 4.393 81.604     
7 .531 4.081 85.686     
8 .438 3.368 89.053     
9 .379 2.912 91.966     
10 .327 2.519 94.485     
11 .300 2.308 96.793     
12 .243 1.872 98.665     
13 .174 1.335 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
a When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
 
 
 
Table 39: Pattern matrix for the three factor model of the TSI types and a forced two factor type 
model 
 
  3 Factor Model   2 Factor Model 
  1 2 3   1 2 
Legislative .719 -.048 .273 Legislative .790 -.116 
Executive -.067 .872 -.159 Executive -.065 .880 
Judicial .643 .159 -.174 Judicial .603 .148 
Global .449 -.075 .059 Global .466 -.104 
Local .101 .600 .144 Local .169 .565 
Liberal .832 -.237 .227 Liberal .896 -.308 
Conservative -.290 .912 -.036 Conservative -.262 .924 
Internal .239 .230 .681 Internal .380 .120 
External .674 .086 -.608 External .457 .127 
Hierarchic .517 .163 -.173 Hierarchic .478 .158 
Monarchic .142 .581 .257 Monarchic .237 .520 
Oligarchic .256 .523 -.003 Oligarchic .285 .505 
Anarchic .576 .217 .069 Anarchic .616 .177 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 18 iterations. a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
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Figure 17: Two factor model of the TSI  
Standardised solution (n=284) 
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Table 40: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
two factor model depicted in Figure 17 
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=308) 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
Legislative ← Type I 1.00  0.770 Na 
Judicial ← Type I 1.51 (0.093) 0.854 *** 
Hierarchic ← Type I 1.25 (0.083) 0.767 *** 
Global ← Type I 1.00 (0.085) 0.803 *** 
Liberal ← Type I 1.44 (0.097) 0.836 *** 
Anarchic ← Type I 1.15 (0.075) 0.759 *** 
Internal ← Type I 0.97 (0.088) 0.796 *** 
External ← Type I 1.21 (0.082) 0.648 *** 
Local ← Type II 1.00  0.811 Na 
Executive ← Type II 0.97 (0.064) 0.704 *** 
Monarchic ← Type II 1.04 (0.077) 0.818 *** 
Conservative ← Type II 1.07 (0.075) 0.615 *** 
Oligarchic ← Type II 0.94 (0.077) 0.786 *** 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Confirmatory factor analysis with the revised two factor model revealed an admissible model, although 
the chi-squared statistic was significant (χ264 = 746.325, p = .000, χ2/df = 11.66, CFI = .76, TLI = .65), 
indicating a less than satisfactory model fit. Nevertheless, as this is the only model for which an 
admissible model structure could be confirmed, the two factor model will be used to investigate the 
remaining hypotheses of the study.  
 
 
 
 
5.3.  PROFILE OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND THINKING STYLES OF RESPONDENTS  
 
 
5.3.1. Employee scores on the total scale and subscales of the MSCEIT: Comparison 
with South African and North American MSCEIT norms 
 
 
The MSCEIT standardised scores are reported in a similar manner to intelligence scores with an average 
of 100 and a standard deviation of 15, with scores around 100 regarded as falling within the average 
range of emotional intelligence. In order to examine the extent to which the standardised scores obtained 
in the present sample differed from the MSCEIT North American norms, a one-sample t-test was 
conducted for each scale comparing the scale’s standard score to 100.  
 
The mean scores and significance levels for the standardised scores are presented in Table 41 and the 
mean differences from the North American norms are presented in Figure 18. All of the standardised 
scores excluding the faces task for the present sample were significantly below the mean score of 100 
which is considered to indicate an average emotional intelligence ability level, except for the facilitation 
task which was significantly higher than the mean score. None of the scores, however, were found to lie 
outside the standard deviation of 15, although the effect size for all measures was large with eta for the 
significant differences ranging from r = 0.15 (facilitation branch score) to r = 0.63 (strategic area score). 
These findings are comparable to those recorded by Gallant (2005) who reported that all of the 
preliminary South African norms developed for the MSCEIT were significantly below the American mean 
for each scale, with the exception of the facilitation branch score which was not significant.  
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Table 41: Comparison of results with the South African norms obtained by Gallant (2005) and the 
North American MSCEIT norms  
 
MSCEIT  
(Standardised 
consensus scores) 
Gallant  
(2005, n=310) 
 Present sample 
(n=225) 
Single-sample 
T-Test  
(Mean = 100) 
Effect 
size  
M SD  M SD (eta) 
Overall EI Score 88.77 14.45  89.95 13.35 t (221) = -11.219, p = .000*** .60 
Experiential Area  90.67 14.94  94.04 16.00 t (221) = -5.545, p = .000*** .35 
Strategic Area  91.96 13.45  90.58 11.51 t (223) = -12.244, p = .000*** .63 
Perception Branch  91.87 13.46  93.46 15.38 t (223) = -6.370, p = .000*** .39 
Facilitation Branch  94.73 18.48  97.52 16.12 t (221) = -2.294, p = .023* .15 
Understanding Branch  91.25 13.99  92.36 11.63 t (223) = -9.833, p = .000*** .55 
Managing Branch  96.94 14.72  92.17 11.90 t (223) = -9.848, p = .000*** .55 
Faces Task 93.77 12.80  99.65 23.13 t (223) = -0.225, p = .822 .02 
Pictures Task 93.51 15.36  93.71 12.63 t (224) = -7.471, p = .000*** .45 
Facilitation Task 98.74 16.19  103.52 15.77 t (221) = 3.329, p = .001** .22 
Sensations Task 94.48 18.14  93.63 14.37 t (223) = -6.639, p = .000*** .41 
Changes Task 94.02 14.67  92.21 11.29 t (223) = -10.332, p = .000*** .57 
Blends Task 92.31 13.56  91.79 11.16 t (224) = -11.031, p = .000*** .59 
Emotion Management 
Task 98.08 14.25 
 93.69 11.40 t (223) = -8.285, p = .000*** .49 
Emotional Relationships 
Task 96.99 14.76 
 93.25 12.57 t (224) = -8.053, p = .000*** .47 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
 
The positive negative bias subscale is a validity index used to establish the fake-good or fake-bad 
tendencies of individuals completing the measure. The scores on this scale were not significantly different 
from the norm [M = 101.99, SD = 17.28; t (224) = 1.73, p= .085] which supports the validity of the 
MSCEIT scores for use with this particular research population and that the interpretation of group 
performance on the scales is appropriate. The scatter score which provides an indication of the amount of 
fluctuation between a respondent’s task scores was also not significantly different from the norm [M = 
98.13, SD = 14.74; t (224) = -1.90, p= .059].  
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Figure 18: Mean scores and mean differences for the present study and South African norms in 
comparison to the North American MSCEIT norm of 100  
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5.3.2. Respondent scores on the total scale and subscales of the SSREIT  
 
 
The histogram depicted in Figure 19 suggests that the total EI scores for the respondents are more or 
less normally distributed with a slight positive skew and an even distribution of EI scores from a low of 95 
to a high of 165. The mean score for total EI was 135 with a standard deviation of 12.74 which is 
significantly higher than the mean score obtained with the student sample by Murphy (2006) [M = 128.22, 
SD = 15.36; t (281) = 9.04, p = .000]. The mean scores on the subscales for the four dimensions as 
presented in Figure 20 are comparable, but slightly higher than those recorded by Murphy (2006). 
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Significant differences were not calculated between the subscales as the item structures differ between 
the two studies. 
 
 
Figure 19: Respondent scores on the total scale of the SSREIT 
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Figure 20: Respondent scores on the subscales of the SSREIT 
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5.3.3. Profile of employees’ preferred thinking styles  
 
Figure 21: Raw scores on the subscales of the TSI for the present sample compared to the raw 
scores obtained for a South African student sample (Murphy, 2006) 
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TSI Raw scores 
Murphy  
(2006, n=309) 
Present sample 
(n=308) T-Test 
Effect 
size  
(eta) M SD M SD 
Legislative 5.30 0.82 5.02 0.96 t (307) = -5.121, p = .000*** .28 
Executive 4.84 0.94 4.71 1.01 t (307) = -2.227, p = .027* .13 
Judicial 4.71 0.77 4.66 1.31 t (307) = -0.674, p = .501 .04 
Global 4.19 0.84 3.87 1.14 t (307) = -4.944, p = .000*** .27 
Local 4.48 0.77 4.35 1.14 t (307) = -2.029, p = .043* .12 
Liberal 4.95 1.02 5.00 1.06 t (283) = 0.825, p = .410 .05 
Conservative 4.27 1.06 4.12 1.17 t (307) = -2.296, p = .022* .13 
Internal 4.76 0.91 3.98 1.17 t (307) = -11.771, p = .000*** .56 
External 4.52 1.07 5.31 1.14 t (307) = 12.170, p = .000*** .57 
Hierarchic 5.40 0.92 5.35 1.15 t (307) = -0.703, p = .482 .04 
Monarchic 3.96 1.00 3.73 1.19 t (307) = -3.450, p = .001** .19 
Oligarchic 4.28 0.79 4.26 1.07 t (291) = -0.359, p = .720 .02 
Anarchic 4.67 0.79 4.59 1.04 t (307) = -1.343, p = .180 .08 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
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The bar graph depicted in Figure 21 summarises the means scores of respondents on the 13 TSI sub 
scales in comparison to the subscale scores obtained by Murphy (2006) with a South African student 
sample. Eight of the thirteen subscale scores were found to be significantly different from than those 
obtained by Murphy (2006) using a single-sample t-test. Of these eight subscales, all the sores were 
lower with the exception of the external subscale which was significantly higher. Only the differences on 
the scope subscales though, achieved high effect sizes of r = 0.56 for the internal subscale and r = 0.57 
for the external subscale. The effect sizes for the remaining results ranged from a low r = 0.12 (local) to a 
moderate r = 0.28 (legislative).  
 
On assessing the total sample scores for the functions styles (see Figure 22) against the North American 
non-student adult norms developed by Sternberg (1997), it appears as though the employees in this 
company have a high middle executive score, a low middle judicial score and a low middle legislative 
score. This may indicate that these employees have most of the characteristics of the executive thinking 
style and few of the characteristics of the judicial and legislative styles. 
 
 
Figure 22: A comparison of respondent scores on the functions subscales of the TSI to North 
American norms developed by Sternberg (1997) 
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The comparison of the scores for the forms styles (see Figure 23) reveals that in comparison to North 
American norms, these employees have very high monarchic scores and high oligarchic scores but low 
middle anarchic scores and very low hierarchic scores. This implies that employees in this company 
mostly prefer to focus on one project at a time and to a lesser extent, prefer working on multiple 
objectives during the same period of time without clear set priorities.  
 
 
Figure 23: A comparison of respondent scores on the forms subscales of the TSI to the North 
American norms developed by Sternberg (1997) 
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The comparison of the scores for the leanings, scope and levels styles (see Figure 24) reveals that in 
comparison to the North American norms, these employees have high conservative scores and high 
middle local and liberal scores, but low middle external, internal and global scores. This implies that 
compared to North American adult samples, the South African employee sample may be more inclined to 
prefer working with details and prefer novelty and ambiguity rather than strict rules and procedures.  
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Figure 24: A comparison of respondent scores on the leanings, scope and levels subscales of the 
TSI to the North American norms developed by Sternberg (1997) 
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5.4. CONSTRUCT VALIDITY OF TRAIT VS. ABILITY EI: EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
THE EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE CONSTRUCT IN RELATION TO THINKING STYLES 
 
 
5.4.1. Correlations between emotional intelligence and thinking styles measures  
 
 
Table 42 presents the correlations between the MSCEIT standardised total score and branch scores with 
the total score and subscale scores of the SSREIT. As expected, the overall MSCEIT scale and the 
overall SSREIT scale do not correlate significantly with each other (r = -.075, p = .322). The utilisation 
subscale of the SSREIT does, however, show a small significant negative correlation with the overall 
MSCEIT scale (r = -.149, p = .048). The MSCEIT understanding branch score in turn shows small 
significant negative correlations with the overall SSREIT score (r = -.157, p = .038) and the optimism 
subscale scores (r = -.186, p = .013). As the strength of these results in both instances is weak, the 
relationship between these two scales does suggest that they are measuring independent constructs, 
thereby confirming Hypothesis 1.1.  
 
 
Table 42: Pearson’s correlations between the total score and branch scores of the MSCEIT and 
the total score and sub scores of the SSREIT  
 
Measurement  
scales 
MSCEIT 
Overall EI 
Score 
Perception 
Branch score 
Facilitation 
Branch score 
Understanding 
Branch score 
Managing 
Branch score 
SS
R
EI
T 
Overall EI Score -.075 -.073 -.107 -.157* .020 
Optimism -.132 -.106 -.142 -.186* -.021 
Appraisal .025 -.001 -.010 -.057 .096 
Utilisation -.149* -.146 -.132 -.139 -.089 
Social Skills .059 .115 -.106 .031 .060 
Total sample n=178 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
 
The results of the examination of Hypothesis 1.2, which states that significant correlations will be 
obtained between the SSREIT and the Thinking Styles Inventory, but no significant correlations will be 
obtained between the Thinking Styles Inventory and the MSCEIT, are presented in Table 43. The results 
of the Pearson’s correlations between these two measures are mostly as expected, because firstly all of 
the thinking styles subscales except for the conservative and internal subscales correlate significantly in a 
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positive direction with the overall score of the SSREIT. In addition, most of the TSI subscales also 
correlate significantly with the subscales of the SSREIT. The strength of the significant relationships 
observed ranges from a low r = 0.121 (p = .042) between the executive subscale and the overall SSREIT 
score to a moderate r = 0.505 (p = .000) between the hierarchic and optimism subscales. As most of the 
correlations imply low to moderate relationships below r = 0.5 between the SSREIT and the TSI, these 
scales cannot be said to overlap to such an extent that the instruments are measuring exactly the same 
construct.  
 
 
Table 43: Pearson’s correlations between the total score and branch scores of the MSCEIT and 
the total score and sub scores of the SSREIT with the subscales of the TSI 
 
Measurement  
scales 
MSCEIT SSREIT 
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Legislative .049 .030 .075 .056 .094 .361** .289** .215** .307** .309** 
Executive .011 -.083 .037 .108 -.024 .121* .138* .105 .116 .040 
Judicial -.045 -.084 -.053 .075 .055 .432** .402** .290** .344** .302** 
Global .008 .004 -.020 .074 -.018 .219** .140* .218** .236** .109 
Local -.154* -.186* -.068 -.020 -.052 .208** .194** .146* .201** .135* 
Liberal -.121 -.123 -.093 -.060 .071 .426** .335** .312** .421** .276** 
Conservative -.003 .000 .042 .041 -.132 -.069 -.039 -.039 -.073 -.035 
Internal -.079 -.065 -.022 -.026 -.125 .105 .036 .104 .141* .102 
External .041 -.013 .063 .083 .086 .432** .410** .353** .273** .246** 
Hierarchic -.040 -.159* .028 .042 .069 .463** .505** .264** .270** .304** 
Monarchic -.133 -.144 -.047 -.046 -.078 .150* .101 .130* .254** .078 
Oligarchic -.005 -.050 .001 .133 -.023 .205** .169** .218** .255** .051 
Anarchic -.138 -.099 -.055 -.040 -.085 .382** .267** .321** .361** .265** 
Total sample n=178 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
 
Three significant but weak negative relationships were observed between the MSCEIT and the TSI with 
the local subscale of the TSI subscales demonstrating a small significant but negative relationship with 
the overall scale of the TSI (local; r = -.154, p = .039), and the perception branch score demonstrating a 
small significant negative relationship with the local (r = -.186, p = .013) and hierarchic subscales (r = -
.159, p = .033) of the TSI. Although not significant, most of the TSI subscales have small inverse 
relationships with the MSCEIT except for the legislative, executive, external and global subscales which 
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are generally perceived to be thinking styles that require more cognitive complexity and it could therefore 
be argued that these styles require a greater component of the ability to integrate emotion with thought. It 
could similarly be argued that a lower emotional intelligence may result in a greater preference for styles 
that are more simplistic. Repeat studies with larger samples would be required to confirm these 
hypotheses. 
 
In order to determine whether the relationships observed between the MSCEIT and the SSREIT could be 
attributed to the small relationship observed with the TSI, a partial correlation was computed controlling 
for the thirteen subscales of the TSI. This resulted in the disappearance of all the observed relationships 
between the SSREIT and the MSCEIT. These results are presented in Table 44.  
 
 
Table 44: Partial correlations between the total score and branch scores of the MSCEIT and the 
total score and sub scores of the SSREIT controlling for the thirteen subscales of the TSI 
 
Measurement  
scales 
MSCEIT 
Overall EI 
Score 
Perception 
Branch score 
Facilitation 
Branch score 
Understanding 
Branch score 
Managing 
Branch score 
SS
R
EI
T 
Overall EI Score -.068 -.066 .052 -.245 -.036 
Optimism -.086 -.027 .005 -.252 .023 
Appraisal -.098 -.105 .008 -.182 -.164 
Utilisation -.118 -.118 -.012 -.184 -.024 
Social Skills .032 .013 .112 -.128 -.019 
Total sample n=178 
 
 
5.4.2. Factorial relationships between emotional intelligence and thinking styles 
measures  
 
 
To determine whether any evidence of an overlap is evident between ability and trait EI, a principal axis 
factor analysis with an oblique rotation was conducted on the unadjusted, unstandardised subscales of 
the MSCEIT and the subscales of the SSREIT. The thirteen subscales of the TSI were included in this 
analysis to further examine the hypothesis of the study that the SSREIT is measuring EI as a lower order 
personality trait whereas the MSCEIT is measuring EI as an independent construct which will be 
unrelated to any alternative trait measures at the factor level.  
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The factor analysis performed on all the subscales from the MSCEIT, SSREIT and TSI inventories 
resulted in six factors with eigenvalues (Kaiser Criterion) exceeding 1.0 (see Table 45). A three factor 
solution was retained for further analysis based on visual inspection of Catell’s scree test. After rotation 
using an oblique direct oblimin method with Kaiser normalisation, the three factor solution explained a 
total of 40.94% of the variance (see Table 46).  
 
 
Table 45: Total variance explained for the MSCEIT, SSREIT and TSI subscales before extraction 
(Excluding factors with eigenvalues lower than one) 
 
 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5.179 24.661 24.661 4.741 22.576 22.576 
2 2.670 12.713 37.375 2.363 11.252 33.828 
3 2.298 10.944 48.318 1.830 8.715 42.543 
4 1.672 7.961 56.279 1.278 6.085 48.628 
5 1.308 6.230 62.509 .888 4.230 52.858 
6 1.125 5.357 67.866 .630 2.999 55.858 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
 
 
Figure 25: Scree plot for the joint loading of the subscales of the MSCEIT, SSREIT and TSI 
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Table 46: Total variance explained for the MSCEIT, SSREIT and TSI subscales after extraction 
(Excluding factors with eigenvalues lower than one) 
   
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of 
Squared Loadings (a) 
  Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % Total 
1 5.179 24.661 24.661 4.589 21.851 21.851 4.460 
2 2.670 12.713 37.375 2.276 10.836 32.687 2.666 
3 2.298 10.944 48.318 1.733 8.252 40.939 1.789 
4 1.672 7.961 56.279         
5 1.308 6.230 62.509         
6 1.125 5.357 67.866         
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
a When factors are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
 
 
Table 47: Pattern matrix and factor loadings jointly for the subscales of the MSCEIT, SSREIT and 
TSI 
 
 
Subscales  Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
TSI - Liberal .821 -.207 -.097 
TSI - Legislative .756 -.078 .093 
TSI - Judicial .627 .160 .072 
TSI - Anarchic .611 .150 -.065 
SSREIT - Utilisation .587 .005 -.148 
SSREIT - Optimism .545 -.023 -.055 
SSREIT - Appraisal .535 -.035 -.112 
SSREIT - Social Skills .531 -.048 -.007 
TSI - External .508 .027 .220 
TSI - Hierarchic .495 .184 .091 
TSI - Global .449 -.090 .121 
TSI - Internal .322 .114 -.106 
TSI - Conservative -.298 .894 .058 
TSI - Executive -.085 .867 .100 
TSI - Local .108 .576 -.158 
TSI - Monarchic .293 .504 -.111 
TSI - Oligarchic .312 .415 .038 
MSCEIT - Understanding Branch score -.036 .087 .739 
MSCEIT - Facilitation Branch score -.022 .041 .695 
MSCEIT - Perception Branch score -.077 -.102 .539 
MSCEIT - Managing Branch score .118 -.015 .491 
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
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The results from the analysis provided support for the distinctiveness of ability EI from trait EI and 
confirmed Hypothesis 1.3 that factor analysis using the subscales of the subscales of the EI and thinking 
styles measurement instruments will uncover an overlap between the trait EI and thinking styles measure 
and the subscales of the ability EI measure will load independently from both the trait EI and thinking 
styles subscales. On examination of the pattern matrix presented in Table 47, it is evident that all the 
subscales from the SSREIT and eight of the thirteen TSI subscales loaded uniquely on the first factor. 
These TSI subscales are the same combination of complex and creative type I and type III subscales that 
were identified as loading independently on the two factor model for the TSI identified in section 5.2.3.2. 
The combination of norm-favouring type II and type III thinking styles identified in section 5.2.3.2 loaded 
independently on the second factor. On the other hand, the four subscales of the MSCEIT loaded 
independently on the third factor and no cross loadings were observed on any of the three identified 
factors.  
 
Analysis of the direction of the correlations between the three factors as presented in Table 48 supports 
these findings, as the ability EI factor correlates negatively with both factor 1 and factor 2 on which the 
thinking styles and SSREIT subscales load. Factor 1 and 2 are, however, positively correlated to a 
moderate degree. These results support the hypothesis that EI defined as an ability is conceptually and 
empirically distinct from EI defined as a trait. The lack of a relationship between the MSCEIT and the TSI 
is also significant, specifically because the TSI is defined as a lower order personality trait but is related to 
cognitive processes. The MSCEIT therefore appears to measure an emotional intelligence construct that 
is relatively independent from any form of personality.  
 
Table 48: Factor correlation matrix for the correlations between the three identified factors 
 
Factor 
Factor 1 
(SSREIT & Type I 
TSI subscales) 
Factor 2 
(Type II TSI 
subscales) 
Factor 3 
(MSCEIT subscales) 
Factor 1  
(SSREIT & Type I TSI subscales) 1.000   
Factor 2  
(Type II TSI subscales) .198 1.000  
Factor 3  
(MSCEIT subscales) -.052 -.080 1.000 
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5.4.3. Differences in emotional intelligence and thinking styles for groups with 
differing demographic characteristics  
 
 
To contribute towards examining the construct validity of the trait versus ability EI distinction, the 
differences between groups were examined to assess whether theoretically expected differences could 
be observed on the three measures. Demographic variables that will be examined in this section include 
age and work experience, ethnic differences, gender and marital status. Only significant differences found 
will be presented in table form in this chapter, the detailed results are presented in Appendix F, Section 3.  
 
 
5.4.3.1. Age, generational differences and work experience: Does emotional intelligence 
change over the life span? 
 
 
The relationships between age as a continuous variable (which ranged from a minimum of 21 to a 
maximum of 56), and the total score and subscales of the MSCEIT, SSREIT and the subscales of the TSI 
were examined using Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient. No significant relationships were 
observed between age and the total scale or subscales of either the SSREIT or the thirteen subscales of 
the TSI. These results are presented in Appendix F, Table F14. 
 
For the MSCEIT, as presented in Table 49, there were no differences evident on the perception branch 
score, though significant inverse relationships were observed on the remaining branch scores which is 
contrary to expectations. The magnitude of the relationships, however, suggests that there is little 
increase in EI associated with age in the present sample. Repeating the analysis with the unstandardised 
and unadjusted overall and branch scores results in a disappearance of the significant relationship with 
age, although the direction of the Pearson’s correlation coefficients are still negative for the overall, 
perception, facilitation and understanding scores. Figure 26 presents a scatterplot depicting a weak 
inverse relationship between age and overall EI with the majority of the results clustering below the North 
American mean of 100. These findings are therefore influenced by the tendency for South African 
respondents to score below the North American mean (Gallant, 2005) as well as the positive skew 
evident in the age distribution with the majority of respondents clustering in the lower age groups. 
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Table 49: Pearson’s correlation matrix for age on the total scale and subscales of the MSCEIT  
 
Sca les   N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) 
MSCEIT (MHS standardised scores)       
Overall EI Score 222 -.230** .001 
Perception Branch  224 -.076 .258 
Facilitation Branch  222 -.190** .005 
Understanding Branch  224 -.372** .000 
Managing Branch  224 -.180** .007 
MSCEIT (Unstandardised scores) 
   Overall EI Score 222 -.091 .177 
Perception Branch  224 -.054 .420 
Facilitation Branch  222 -.090 .184 
Understanding Branch  224 -.152* .022 
Managing Branch  224 .046 .495 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
 
Figure 26: Scatterplot depicting the inverse relationship between age and overall ability EI  
 
 
 
 
The three generational groupings, generation X (ages 27 to 41), generation Y (ages 19 to 26) and the 
baby boomer generation (ages 42 to 56), were assessed for differences in trait versus ability EI at the 
total scale level using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). EI at the subscale level as well as 
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thinking styles were examined for differences using a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). The 
sample size of the baby boomers sample is small (n=26) in comparison to generation X (n=187) and 
generation Y (n=139), therefore, caution should be taken when drawing inferences from the results. 
 
Significant differences between generational groups were identified on the standardised total [F (2, 219) = 
5.31, p = .006] and branch scores of the MSCEIT [F (2, 219) = 4.09, p = .000, Wilks’ Lambda = .86, eta = 
.26]. The analysis, however, yielded a significant Box’s test of equality of covariance matrices (p = .010) 
on the MSCEIT branch scores which indicates that the homogeneity assumptions of the test have been 
violated. Repeating the analysis on the unstandardised and unadjusted scores revealed a non-significant 
Box’s test (p = .246) as well as no significant differences on the total [F (2, 219) = 1.44, p = .239] or 
branch scores [F (2, 219) = 1.12, p = .347, Wilks’ Lambda = .96, eta = .14], which suggests that the 
procedure used to standardise the results significantly affects the covariance evident in the data. For this 
reason it was decided to continue the analysis with the MSCEIT total scale and subscales using both the 
standardised and the unstandardised data in order to compare the differences in the results.  
 
 
Table 50: Generational differences on the standardised versus the unstandardised total scales 
and subscales of the MSCEIT 
 
Scale 
Generation Y Generation X Baby Boomers ANOVA 
Effect 
size 
(eta) M SD M SD M SD 
MSCEIT  
(Standardised scores) n=91 n=112 n=19   
Overall EI Score 92.77 14.37 88.87 11.81 82.81 13.89 F (2,219) = 5.311, p = .006** .22 
Perception Branch  94.73 17.32 93.05 13.08 89.96 18.01 F (2,219) = 1.517, p = .222 .12 
Facilitation Branch  100.03 16.12 96.67 15.67 90.45 17.02 F (2,219) = 3.148, p = .045* .17 
Understanding Branch  97.10 11.68 89.98 10.54 84.26 8.61 F (2,219) = 16.357, p = .000*** .36 
Managing Branch  94.45 13.85 90.87 10.15 89.19 9.99 F (2,219) = 3.470, p = .033* .18 
MSCEIT (Unstandardised scores)   
Overall EI Score .46 .06 .47 .06 .44 .08 F (2,219) = 1.440, p = .239 .11 
Perception Branch  .49 .11 .49 .10 .46 .14 F (2, 219) = 1.133, p = .324 .10 
Facilitation Branch  .46 .09 .46 .08 .43 .11 F (2, 219) = 1.033, p = .358 .10 
Understanding Branch  .51 .06 .51 .07 .48 .07 F (2, 219) = 2.321, p = .101 .14 
Managing Branch  .39 .08 .41 .07 .41 .07 F (2, 219) = 0.780, p = .459 .08 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
 
Results of the post hoc Scheffe test revealed that generation Y respondents scored higher on the overall 
EI score as well as the facilitation, understanding and managing branch than respondents who belonged 
to the baby boomer category. The effect size was low to moderate with eta ranging from r = 0.17 to r = 
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0.36. The means and standard deviations for the standardised and unstandardised branch and total 
MSCEIT scores are presented in Table 50.  
 
No significant differences were observed on the total scale [F (2, 279) = 0.04, p = .959] or subscales of 
the SSREIT [F (2, 279) = 0.67, p = .717, Wilks’ Lambda = .98, eta = .10] between the three groups, nor 
were any differences observed on the thirteen subscales of the TSI [F (2, 281) = 1.15, p = .282, Wilks’ 
Lambda = .90, eta = .23]. The means and standard deviations of the generation groups on the subscales 
of the SSREIT and TSI are presented in Appendix F, Table F15.  
 
Work experience was assessed by examining whether EI and thinking styles differed for respondents 
depending on the length of time respondents had been with the company as well as whether respondents 
who had joined the company in the past 12 months, joined as graduates, or employees who were 
appointed with either one to two years of working experience, or more than two years of working 
experience.  
 
No significant differences were observed for the length of time respondents had been with the company 
on both the standardised total [F (5, 207) = 0.84, p = .522] and branch scores [F (5, 207) = 0.80, p = .717, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .93, eta = .14] as well as the unstandardised total [F (5, 207) = 0.67, p = .648] or branch 
scores [F (5, 276) = 0.59, p = .921, Wilks’ Lambda = .94, eta = .12]. No significant differences were 
observed on the total scale [F (5, 276) = 2.11, p = .064] or subscales of the SSREIT [F (5, 207) = 1.76, p 
= .051, Wilks’ Lambda = .88, eta = .18] between the three groups, nor were any differences observed on 
the thirteen subscales of the TSI [F (5, 278) = 1.13, p = .223, Wilks’ Lambda = .77, eta = .23]. These 
results are presented in Appendix F, Table F16. 
 
Significant differences were evident for the experience of the new joiner on the standardised total [F (2, 
181) = 3.07, p = .049] and branch scores [F (2, 181) = 3.51, p = .001, Wilks’ Lambda = .86, eta = .27] but 
not on the unstandardised total [F (2, 181) = 0.08, p = .925] or branch scores [F (2, 181) = 0.88, p = .532, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .96, eta = .14]. Post hoc tests revealed that graduates had higher scores on overall EI 
as well as the facilitation, understanding and managing branches of the standardised MSCEIT scores 
than experienced hires with more than 2 years work experience. See Table 51 for further details. These 
results are therefore most likely the result of the age adjustment to North American norms undertaken for 
the standardised scores than actual differences in the sample.  
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Table 51: Experience of the new joiner - differences on the standardised versus the 
unstandardised total scales and subscales of the MSCEIT 
 
Scale 
Graduate 
Experienced 
hire with 1-2 
years 
experience 
Experienced 
hire with 
more than 2 
years 
experience 
ANOVA 
Effect 
size 
(eta) 
M SD M SD M SD 
MSCEIT  
(Standardised scores) n=55 n=26 n=103   
Overall EI Score 94.67 14.99 90.60 11.87 89.23 12.49 F (2,181) = 3.065, p = .049* .18 
Perception Branch  94.96 19.81 91.59 14.69 94.54 13.96 F (2,181) = 0.409, p = .665 .06 
Facilitation Branch  102.59 15.08 97.72 14.82 96.12 15.49 F (2,181) = 3.233, p = .042* .18 
Understanding Branch  97.61 12.41 94.39 11.43 89.60 10.50 F (2,181) = 9.293, p = .000*** .30 
Managing Branch  97.45 13.75 94.75 10.88 90.30 10.34 F (2,181) = 7.655, p = .001** .28 
MSCEIT (Unstandardised scores)   
Overall EI Score .47 .06 .47 .06 .47 .06 F (2,181) = 0.077, p = .925 .04 
Perception Branch  .48 .12 .48 .12 .50 .10 F (2,181) = 0.825, p = .440 .09 
Facilitation Branch  .48 .07 .46 .09 .46 .08 F (2,181) = 0.524, p = .593 .08 
Understanding Branch  .52 .06 .51 .06 .51 .07 F (2,181) = 0.606, p = .547 .08 
Managing Branch  .41 .07 .42 .06 .41 .07 F (2,181) = 0.229, p = .796 .05 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
 
No significant differences were found on the total scale [F (2, 279) = 0.55, p = .579] or subscales of the 
SSREIT [F (2, 279) = 0.92, p = .498, Wilks’ Lambda = .97, eta = .11] between the three groups, nor were 
any differences found on the thirteen subscales of the TSI [F (2, 281) = 1.17, p = .261, Wilks’ Lambda = 
.90, eta = .23]. These results are presented in Appendix F, Table F17. 
 
 
5.4.3.2. Gender differences: Examining the stereotype of the emotionally superior female 
 
 
Gender differences in both EI and thinking styles are components that assist in providing construct 
validity. Women are considered to be better equipped to recognise facial emotions and distinguish 
amongst emotions and women are perceived to provide better emotional support in social settings (Day 
and Carroll, 2004). With regard to thinking styles, women have been found to score differently on the 
thinking styles subscales and therefore different norms were developed for males and females 
(Sternberg, 1997). An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the differences in the mean 
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scores on the total scale and sub scales of the MSCEIT, SSREIT and the subscales of the TSI for males 
and females.  
 
Men were found to score higher than women on the standardised MSCEIT total score and branch scores. 
The findings were considered to be unusual, however, as the unstandardised scores that had not been 
adjusted for age, gender or ethnicity revealed significant differences between men and women on only 
the managing emotions branch score which is more consistent with the underlying theory of the MSCEIT, 
and again brings into question the accuracy of the North American norms scores used for the adjustment 
of the standardised results. These comparisons are presented in Table 52. 
 
 
Table 52: Gender differences on the standardised versus the unstandardised total scales and 
subscales of the MSCEIT 
 
Scale 
Female Male 
T-Test 
Effect 
size 
 (eta) M SD M SD 
MSCEIT  
(MHS standardised scores) n=103 n=122   
Overall EI Score 87.88 12.96 91.71 13.47 t (220)= -2.149 , p = .033* .14 
Perception Branch  91.14 13.61 95.43 16.53 t (222)= -2.098 , p = .037* .14 
Facilitation Branch  94.84 15.05 99.80 16.71 t (220)= -2.308 , p = .022* .15 
Understanding Branch  89.81 11.30 94.54 11.50 t (222)= -3.092 , p = .002** .20 
Managing Branch  89.53 10.53 94.43 12.55 t (222)= -3.131 , p = .002** .21 
MSCEIT  
(Unstandardised scores)  
Overall EI Score .47 .06 .46 .06 t (220) = 1.510, p = .132 .10 
Perception Branch  .49 .11 .48 .11 t (222) = 0.608, p = .544 .04 
Facilitation Branch  .47 .08 .45 .09 t (220) = 1.090, p = .277 .07 
Understanding Branch  .51 .07 .51 .06 t (222) = 0.400, p = .690 .03 
Managing Branch  .42 .07 .39 .08 t (222) = 2.437, p = .016* .16 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
 
Differences between men and women on the SSREIT, which are presented in Table 53, were found to be 
more consistent with expectations as women performed better than men on the overall scale of the 
SSREIT as well as the appraisal subscale. However, the magnitude of the effect sizes were small, with 
eta ranging from r = 0.13 to r = 0.22. With regard to thinking styles, only two significant differences were 
observed on the legislative and liberal subscales, with men scoring higher on both these subscales than 
women. The effect size for these results were also small (r = .18 and r = .20 respectively). The results 
provided by Murphy (2006) also only revealed one significant difference between genders on the 
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oligarchic subscale which suggests that there may not be much difference in the thinking styles between 
genders for South African samples.  
  
 
Table 53: Gender differences on the total scales and subscales of the SSREIT and TSI 
 
Scale 
Female Male 
T-Test Effect size  (eta) M SD M SD 
SSREIT  n=142 n=140   
Overall EI Score 136.73 12.52 133.40 12.78 t (280) = 2.207, p = .028* .13 
Optimism 4.35 .39 4.27 .43 t (280) = 1.703, p = .090 .10 
Appraisal 4.08 .51 3.83 .59 t (280) = 3.801, p = .000*** .22 
Utilisation 4.00 .57 3.94 .61 t (280) = 0.857, p = .392 .05 
Social Skills 3.92 .60 3.90 .58 t (280) = 0.254, p = .800 .02 
TSI n=155 n=153   
Legislative 4.84 .90 5.20 1.00 t (306) = -3.257, p = .001** .18 
Executive 4.74 1.00 4.68 1.01 t (306) = 0.542, p = .588 .03 
Judicial 4.59 1.26 4.73 1.36 t (306) = -0.980, p = .328 .06 
Global 3.78 1.08 3.96 1.20 t (306) = -1.335, p = .183 .08 
Local 4.42 1.07 4.28 1.19 t (306) = 1.100, p = .272 .06 
Liberal 4.80 1.07 5.21 1.02 t (282) = -3.350, p = .001** .20 
Conservative 4.15 1.16 4.09 1.18 t (306) = 0.455, p = .649 .03 
Internal 4.01 1.15 3.95 1.18 t (306) = 0.422, p = .673 .02 
External 5.23 1.11 5.39 1.17 t (306) = -1.254, p = .211 .07 
Hierarchic 5.39 1.09 5.32 1.21 t (306) = 0.589, p = .557 .03 
Monarchic 3.69 1.19 3.76 1.20 t (306) = -0.498, p = .619 .03 
Oligarchic 4.20 1.01 4.32 1.13 t (290) = -0.931, p = .352 .05 
Anarchic 4.59 1.03 4.59 1.06 t (306) = 0.034, p = .973 .00 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
 
5.4.3.3. Ethnic differences in emotional intelligence and thinking styles 
 
 
Significant differences between ethnic groups were observed on both the unstandardised total [F (3, 218) 
= 9.14, p = .000 ] and branch scores [F (3, 218) = 3.61, p = .000, Wilks’ Lambda = .82, eta = .25] as well 
as the standardised total [F (3, 218) = 4.41, p= .005] and branch scores of the MSCEIT [F (3, 218) = 3.36, 
p = .000, Wilks’ Lambda = .83, eta = .24]. The standardised scores again yielded a significant Box’s test 
of equality of covariance matrices (p = .025) on the MSCEIT branch scores, yet the unstandardised 
scores revealed a non-significant Box’s test (p = .144). Coloured respondents were excluded from the 
  
 192 
analysis with the MSCEIT due to a low base size (n=2). The means and standard deviations for the 
standardised and unstandardised branch and total MSCEIT scores are presented in Table 54.  
 
 
Table 54: Ethnic differences on the standardised versus the unstandardised total scales and 
subscales of the MSCEIT 
 
Scale 
Black Indian White 
ANOVA 
Effect 
size 
(eta) M SD M SD M SD 
MSCEIT  
(Standardised scores) n=44 n=40 n=136   
Overall EI Score 84.49 12.79 94.12 14.68 90.63 12.54 F (2,219) = 4.406. p = .005** .24 
Perception Branch  87.25 13.33 91.35 16.76 96.18 15.00 F (2,219) = 4.28. p = .006** .24 
Facilitation Branch  96.43 15.51 99.73 18.43 97.40 15.69 F (2,219) = 0.696. p = .556 .10 
Understanding Branch  89.59 11.74 97.77 12.53 91.68 10.70 F (2,219) = 3.985. p = .009** .23 
Managing Branch  93.41 13.19 96.84 13.00 90.56 10.77 F (2,219) = 3.874. p = .010* .22 
MSCEIT (Unstandardised scores)   
Overall EI Score .43 .07 .45 .06 .48 .06 F (2,219) = 9.143. p = .000*** .33 
Perception Branch  .43 .11 .45 .10 .51 .10 F (2,219) = 9.096. p = .000*** .33 
Facilitation Branch  .44 .09 .46 .10 .47 .08 F (2,219) = 1.691. p = .170 .15 
Understanding Branch  .47 .08 .50 .06 .52 .06 F (2,219) = 7.789. p = .000*** .31 
Managing Branch  .38 .09 .39 .07 .41 .07 F (2,219) = 3.499. p = .016* .22 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
 
Significant differences between ethnic groups were also observed on the total scale [F (3, 278) = 3.70, p 
= .012] and branch scores [F (3, 278) = 1.87, p = .035, Wilks’ Lambda = .92, eta = .16] of the SSREIT as 
well as the subscales of the TSI [F (3, 280) = 2.78, p = .000, Wilks’ Lambda = .68, eta = .34]. These 
findings which are presented in Table 55 are contrary to the findings by Murphy (2006) who observed no 
differences between ethnic groups on either the SSREIT or the TSI. 
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Table 55: Ethnic differences on the total scales and subscales of the SSREIT and TSI 
 
 
Scale 
Black Coloured Indian White 
ANOVA 
Effect 
size 
(eta) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
SSREIT n=63 n=11 n=45 n=163   
Overall EI 139.60 12.04 131.18 16.77 133.47 13.65 134.03 12.13 F (3,278) = 3.703, p = .012* .20 
Optimism 4.49 0.38 4.14 0.57 4.26 0.47 4.27 0.38 F (3,278) = 5.357, p = .001** .23 
Appraisal 4.05 0.52 3.90 0.83 3.93 0.57 3.93 0.56 F (3,278) = 0.803, p = .493 .09 
Utilisation 4.22 0.53 3.84 0.64 3.92 0.57 3.90 0.59 F (3,278) = 5.001, p = .002** .23 
Social Skills 3.97 0.59 3.89 0.56 3.87 0.61 3.91 0.58 F (3,278) = 0.307, p = .821 .06 
TSI n=73 n=14 n=49 n=172   
Legislative 5.18 1.00 4.80 0.92 4.92 0.95 5.00 0.95 F (3,280) = 2.813, p = .040* .17 
Executive 4.81 0.96 4.67 1.11 4.90 1.02 4.62 1.01 F (3,280) = 3.215, p = .023* .18 
Judicial 4.95 1.46 4.33 1.65 4.82 1.42 4.52 1.15 F (3,280) = 11.21, p = .000*** .33 
Global 3.84 1.27 3.73 1.41 3.71 1.05 3.94 1.09 F (3,280) = 0.761, p = .517 .09 
Local 4.55 1.12 4.31 1.19 4.42 1.07 4.25 1.15 F (3,280) = 4.208, p = .006** .21 
Liberal 5.25 .97 5.18 1.00 5.10 1.00 4.87 1.11 F (3,280) = 2.338, p = .074 .16 
Conservative 3.96 1.32 3.94 1.39 4.23 1.15 4.16 1.09 F (3,280) = 0.997, p = .394 .10 
Internal 3.68 1.32 3.71 1.35 4.00 1.09 4.12 1.08 F (3,280) = 0.646, p = .586 .08 
External 5.48 1.22 5.04 1.38 5.30 1.24 5.26 1.05 F (3,280) = 4.593, p = .004** .22 
Hierarchic 5.38 1.24 4.96 1.34 5.58 1.23 5.31 1.07 F (3,280) = 4.118, p = .007** .21 
Monarchic 3.72 1.33 3.67 1.76 3.80 1.19 3.71 1.09 F (3,280) = 2.531, p = .057 .16 
Oligarchic 4.04 1.13 4.70 .93 4.61 1.01 4.22 1.04 F (3,280) = 2.68, p = .047 .17 
Anarchic 4.61 1.05 4.71 1.31 4.61 1.10 4.57 1.01 F (3,280) = 1.861, p = .136 .14 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
 
5.4.3.4. The potential influence of marital status  
 
 
No significant differences were observed for the length of time respondents had been with the company 
on both the standardised total [F (3, 176) = 0.77, p = .515] and branch scores [F (3, 176) = 1.42, p = .152, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .91, eta = .18] as well as the unstandardised total [F (3, 176) = 0.53, p = .665] or branch 
scores [F (3, 176) = 0.96, p = .488, Wilks’ Lambda = .94, eta = .15]. No significant differences were 
observed on the total scale [F (3, 278) = 0.82, p = .485] or subscales of the SSREIT [F (3, 278) = 1.67, p 
= .301, Wilks’ Lambda = .95, eta = .13] between the three groups, nor were any differences observed on 
the 13 subscales of the TSI [F (3, 280) = 1.02, p = .435, Wilks’ Lambda = .87, eta = .22]. These results 
are presented in Appendix F, Table F18. 
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5.5. THE ABILITY OF TRAIT EI VERSUS ABILITY EI TO PREDICT LIFE OUTCOMES IN THE 
OCCUPATIONAL ENVIRONMENT  
 
 
 
 
The question of relevance and suitability for predicating outcomes in the occupational environment is a 
prominent question to be considered when selecting either a trait or an ability model of EI for occupational 
testing. The extent to which both constructs have incremental validity beyond what can be measured by 
personality or intelligence measures is a critical determinant of the effectiveness of the instruments. This 
section reports the extent to which trait EI in comparison to ability EI is capable of predicting job 
satisfaction, career function and leadership status.  
 
 
 
5.5.1. Criterion-related validity of emotional intelligence in predicting job satisfaction 
 
 
5.5.1.1. Relationship between self-reported measures of job satisfaction 
 
 
Table 56 presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix used to analyse the relationship between the various 
items that measure job satisfaction. Overall satisfaction was found to display a significant positive 
relationship to all the measures except for resignation status, and overall satisfaction measured again 
after one year remained positively related to most of the variables. Intent to stay and willingness to 
recommend the company were furthermore related to all the measures, except for willingness to 
recommend, which was unrelated to resignation behaviour. The daily experience attitudinal measures 
which appeared to have the least relationships with the other satisfaction variables are the scales ranging 
from unappreciated to appreciated, and overworked to challenged. Resignation status on the other hand 
displayed the strongest significant relationships with the satisfaction with workforce and satisfaction with 
present position items. Smaller significant relationships were observed between the satisfaction with 
chosen occupation item and the boring versus fun daily experience item. 
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Table 56: Pearson’s correlation matrix depicting the relationships between the variables used to 
measure job satisfaction  
 
Subscale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Attitudinal measure - Satisfaction 
1 Overall satisfaction            
2 Overall - After a year .517**           
3 Workforce .167* .323*          
4 Present position .193* .177 .532**         
5 Occupation .245** .251* .423** .424**        
Attitudinal measure - Daily experience 
6 Boring - Fun  .551** .291* .172 .300** .365**       
7 Unappreciated - Appreciated .394** .146 .011 .225* .246* .662**      
8 Overworked - Challenged .405** .149 .151 .170 .246* .603** .574**     
9 Uninspired - Passionate .520** .352** .076 .191 .344** .732** .644** .602**    
Cognitive measure 
10 Intent to stay .497** .284* .292** .342** .297** .476** .376** .372** .526**   
11 Recommend .470** .392** .123 .267** .316** .434** .441** .451** .512** .359**  
Behavioural Measure 
12 Resignation status -.024 .032 .245** .261** .150* .188* .037 .087 .124 .180* .138 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
 
5.5.1.2. Thinking styles and job satisfaction 
 
 
Hypothesis 2.1 was based on the expectation that respondents who reported higher levels of job 
satisfaction would score significantly higher on type I thinking styles, whereas those reporting lower levels 
of satisfaction were expected to score significantly higher on type II thinking styles. Table 57 presents the 
results from the hierarchical regression analysis including the variance accounted for by the controlled 
variables and the final model, the F value and degree of freedom in the analysis of variance for each final 
model and the standardised beta coefficients for each of the significant variables that contribute to the 
final model.  
 
Results indicated that three of the type I thinking styles, specifically the hierarchic, external and anarchic 
styles, and two of the type II thinking styles, local and oligarchic, were statistically predicted by 
participant’s reported work environment variables over and above their age, ethnicity, length of work and 
experience of new joiners. The thinking styles groupings used were based on the factors identified in 
section 5.2.3.2.  
 
. 
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Table 57: Predicting thinking styles from job satisfaction 
 
Subscale R
2
adj 
(Control) R
2
adj ANOVA Standardised Beta coefficients 
Type I styles (Factor 1, Section 5.2.3.2) 
Judicial .081 - F (4,95) = 3.183, p = .017 β Ethnicity β Join experience 
 
-.270, p = .006 
.285, p = .022 
 
Liberal .075 - F (4,95) = 3.005, p = .022 β Ethnicity β Join experience 
 
-.254, p = .010 
.266, p = .033 
 
Hierarchic .034 .075 F (5,94) = 2.596, p = .030 
β Ethnicity  
β Age 
β Satisfaction - present position 
-.199, p = .048 
-.359, p = .013 
.236, p = .025 
 
Global -.018 - F (4,95) = 0.573, p = .683 - - 
Legislative .022 - F (4,45) = 1.552, p = .193 - - 
External .016 .108 F (5,94) = 3.409, p = .007 β Join experience  β DE: Boring - Fun 
.253, p = .040 
.317, p = .001 
 
Anarchic .047 .076 F (5,94) = 2.626, p = .029 
β Ethnicity 
β Join experience 
β Satisfaction - occupation 
β DE: Overworked - Challenged 
-.213, p = .031 
.294, p = .019 
.196, p = .050 
.372, p = .000 
 
Internal .031 - F (4,45) = 1.790, p = .137 - - 
Type II styles (Factor 2, Section 5.2.3.2) 
Local .058 .174 F (6,93) = 4.483, p = .000 
β Ethnicity  
β Satisfaction - present position 
β DE: Overworked - Challenged 
-.204, p = .036 
-.209, p = .041 
.372, p = .000 
 
Oligarchic -.003 .098 F (6,93) = 2.791, p = .015 
β DE: Unappreciated - 
Appreciated 
β DE: Overworked - Challenged 
-.240, p = .050 
 
.415, 
 
p = .001 
 
Executive -.014 .035 F (5,95) = 1.711, p = .140 β DE: Overworked - Challenged -.317, p = .001 
 
Conservative -.016 - F (4,95) = 0.606, p = .659 - - 
Monarchic .028 - F (4,95) = 1.721, p = .152 - - 
Total sample n=100 
 
 
The nature of the results were able to provide partial support for the hypothesis, as satisfaction with 
present position was found to positively predict 4% of the variance in the hierarchic thinking style, the 
boring versus fun daily experience item was found to predict 9% of the variance in the external thinking 
style and the satisfaction with occupation as well as overworked versus challenged daily experience 
variables were found to positively predict 3% of the variance in the anarchic thinking style. In addition, 
satisfaction with present position contributed negatively to the type II local style and the appreciated 
versus unappreciated daily experience variable contributed negatively to the type II oligarchic style. The 
overworked versus challenged daily experience item, on the other hand, contributed positively to both the 
local and oligarchic styles. Demographic variables that had a strong predictive impact on a number of 
thinking styles were ethnicity and experience of the new joiner.  
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5.5.1.3. The influence of emotional intelligence on job satisfaction 
 
 
To examine the relationship between trait and ability EI and the job satisfaction variables partial 
correlations were computed controlling for the demographic characteristics, age, gender, ethnicity and 
new joiner experience. These findings are presented in Table 58. It was expected that both trait and 
ability EI would be associated with higher levels of self-reported job satisfaction, but that ability EI would 
account for a larger component in the prediction of job satisfaction than trait EI. Contrary to expectations, 
none of the MSCEIT scales was related to the job satisfaction variables, with the exception of a moderate 
relationship observed between occupational satisfaction and the managing emotions branch (r = .458, p 
= .011).  
 
The total SSREIT scale and all the subscales were positively correlated with a number of the job 
satisfaction variables excluding overall satisfaction, the boring versus fun daily experience variable, intent 
to stay, willingness to recommend and actual resignation status. As these last three variables can be 
considered as measuring intent or actual behaviour, the observed relationship between the self-reported 
job satisfaction variables and the SSREIT scales may be a function of common method variance.  
 
 
Table 58: Partial correlation matrix for the total scale and subscales of the MSCEIT and SSREIT 
with self-reported job satisfaction variables 
 
 MSCEIT SSREIT 
Subscale EI PB FB UB MB EI O A U SS 
Overall satisfaction -.295 -.299 -.336 .029 -.029 .100 .194 .070 .093 -.120 
Overall - After a year -.137 -.054 -.280 .070 -.041 .368* .316 .392* .126 .294 
Workforce .109 .086 -.056 .071 .198 .134 .229 .150 -.121 .065 
Present position -.227 -.217 -.174 -.246 .116 .465* .562** .340 .318 .082 
Occupation -.090 -.166 -.261 -.140 .458* .254 .345 .197 .087 -.031 
Boring - Fun  -.035 -.131 -.145 .121 .161 .177 .299 .086 .103 -.037 
Unappreciated - Appreciated .031 -.106 .168 -.025 .067 .240 .390* .136 .211 -.076 
Overworked - Challenged .174 .094 .133 .137 .072 .349 .314 .428* .097 .181 
Uninspired - Passionate -.004 -.121 -.008 .042 .144 .382* .381* .278 .395* .081 
Intent to stay -.105 .048 -.300 -.050 .044 .229 .280 .157 .139 .056 
Recommend -.120 .004 -.328 .147 -.095 .080 .053 .122 -.029 .115 
Resignation status .018 -.007 .126 -.083 -.005 -.052 -.068 .031 -.015 -.036 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
MSCEIT: EI = Overall EI score, PB = Perceiving branch score, FB = Facilitation branch score, UB = Understanding branch 
score, MB = Managing branch score  
SSREIT: EI = Overall EI score, O = Optimism, A = Appraisal, U = Utilisation, S = Social Skills 
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To examine the incremental validity of the EI scales in predicting job satisfaction, a series of multiple 
regression analyses were conducted using the various self-report job satisfaction variables as well as 
intent to stay, willingness to recommend and resignation status as outcome variables. A logistic 
regression procedure was used to examine the prediction of resignation status which is a dichotomous 
variable. The summary for the series of multiple regression analyses is presented in Appendix F, Table 
F19.  
 
Both the MSCEIT and the SSREIT predicted less than 10 percent of variance in the job satisfaction 
variables, yet the SSREIT was able to account for significant variance in only three of the job satisfaction 
variables namely, satisfaction with workforce, occupation and present position whereas the MSCEIT was 
able to account for significant variance in these three variables as well as intent to stay. These results are 
presented in Table 59. The lack of predictive ability could be due to the nature of the job satisfaction 
variables as the items used were not based on existing established instruments, however, Burns, Bastian 
and Nettlebeck (2007) also reported that the MSCEIT was unable to predict more than 10 percent 
variance in established life outcome variables and Livingston and Day (2005) identified no relationship 
between the MSCEIT and life satisfaction and only a small relationship between the emotional perception 
branch score and job satisfaction (r = .14). An additional reason for the lack of relationships identified 
could be attributed to the low base sizes of these measures.  
 
To determine whether these EI measures are able to predict job satisfaction over thinking style traits, 
hierarchical regression analyses were carried out on the four job satisfaction variables on which 
significant differences were identified to control for the TSI as well as the demographic characteristics, 
gender, ethnicity, join status and age. Table 60 shows that the significant relationship found between the 
MSCEIT and SSREIT subscales and the satisfaction with workforce variable disappeared when the 
demographic and thinking styles variables were entered into the model. The MSCEIT was able to account 
for an additional 8% in the prediction of satisfaction with present position, 11% for satisfaction with 
occupation and 6% for intent to stay after thinking styles and demographic variables were controlled for, 
compared to the SSREIT which was able to predict 5%, 6% and 1% more respectively. Although the 
amount of variance explained in the job satisfaction variables is small, these findings do partially support 
the hypothesis that EI defined as an ability has a stronger relationship with job satisfaction variables than 
trait EI variables even after personality traits such as thinking styles have been controlled for.  
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Table 59: Multiple regression of job satisfaction variables onto emotional intelligence measures  
 
 
 
SSREIT MSCEIT 
Satisfaction with workforce 
R2adj (n=258) .031 Sig. R2adj (n=165) .045 Sig. 
F (4, 264) 3.158 .015 F (4, 164) 2.983 .021 
β Optimism .257 .001  β Perception Branch  .075 .410 
β Appraisal -.007 .931  β Facilitation Branch  -.156 .093 
β Utilisation -.059 .444 β Understanding Branch  -.111 .216 
β Social Skills -.044 .515  β Managing Branch  .259 .002 
Satisfaction with present position 
R2adj (n=264) .042 Sig. R2adj (n=170) .075 Sig. 
F (4, 269) 4.026 .003 F (4, 169) 4.516 .002 
β Optimism .169 .030  β Perception Branch  -.036 .690 
β Appraisal .091 .228  β Facilitation Branch  -.034 .710 
β Utilisation .032 .669 β Understanding Branch  -.181 .040 
β Social Skills -.035 .605  β Managing Branch  .303 .000 
 Satisfaction with occupation 
R2adj (n=262) .072 Sig. R2adj (n=168) .083 Sig. 
F (4, 268) 6.314 .000 F (4, 167) 4.879 .001 
β Optimism .305 .000  β Perception Branch  .150 .093 
β Appraisal -.001 .986  β Facilitation Branch  -.119 .189 
β Utilisation -.034 .643 β Understanding Branch  -.199 .024 
β Social Skills .017 .792  β Managing Branch  .314 .000 
 Intent to stay 
R2adj (n=157) -.005 Sig. R2adj (n=124) .068 Sig. 
F (4,156) .815 .517 F (4, 119) 3.238 .015 
β Optimism .054 .639  β Perception Branch  .030 .774 
β Appraisal -.043 .693  β Facilitation Branch  -.275 .010 
β Utilisation .102 .347 β Understanding Branch  -.063 .530 
β Social Skills .045 .631  β Managing Branch  -.047 .622 
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Table 60: Hierarchical regression analysis using emotional intelligence, thinking styles and 
demographic measures as predictors of job satisfaction variables 
 
 
 
SSREIT subscales 
(O, A, U, S) 
MSCEIT subscales 
(PB, FB, UB, MB) 
Model Predictors R R2adj ∆R2 Sig. R R2 ∆R2 Sig. 
Satisfaction with workforce n=258 n=163 
1a Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status .095 -.007  .678 .072 -.020  .935 
1b 
Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status,  
LS, JS, GS, LIS, HS, IS, ES, AS, 
EXS, LOS, CS, MS, OS 
.241 -.008 .049 .605 .268 -.037 .067 .838 
1c 
Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status,  
LS, JS, GS, LIS, HS, IS, ES, AS, 
EXS, LOS, CS, MS, OS, 
SSREIT or MSCEIT subscales 
.314 .019 .041 .225 .380 .017 .073 .321 
Satisfaction with present position n=264 n=168 
2a Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status .226 .036  .009 .213 .022  .107 
2b 
Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status,  
LS, JS, GS, LIS, HS, IS, ES, AS, 
EXS, LOS, CS, MS, OS 
.363 .072 .081 .005 .337 .013 .068 .331 
2c 
Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status,  
LS, JS, GS, LIS, HS, IS, ES, AS, 
EXS, LOS, CS, MS, OS, 
SSREIT or MSCEIT subscales 
.429 .114 .052 .000 .439 .077 .079 .043 
Satisfaction with occupation n=262 n=166 
3a Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status .020 .005 .020 .267 .143 -.004 .020 .501 
3b 
Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status,  
LS, JS, GS, LIS, HS, IS, ES, AS, 
EXS, LOS, CS, MS, OS 
.101 .038 .081 .062 .392 .057 .133 .076 
3c 
Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status,  
LS, JS, GS, LIS, HS, IS, ES, AS, 
EXS, LOS, CS, MS, OS, 
SSREIT or MSCEIT subscales 
.164 .091 .063 .002 .517 .160 .113 .001 
Intent to stay n=157 n=110 
4a Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status .214 .020  .129 .246 .025  .159 
4b 
Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status,  
LS, JS, GS, LIS, HS, IS, ES, AS, 
EXS, LOS, CS, MS, OS 
.448 .103 .155 .012 .505 .117 .194 .033 
4c 
Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Join status,  
LS, JS, GS, LIS, HS, IS, ES, AS, 
EXS, LOS, CS, MS, OS, 
SSREIT or MSCEIT subscales 
.455 .083 .006 .042 .556 .145 .055 .022 
TSI: LS = Legislative style, JS = Judicial style, GS = Global style, LIS = Liberal style, HS = Hierarchical style, IS = Internal 
style, ES = External style, AS = Anarchic style, EXS = Executive style, LOS = Local style, CS = Conservative style, MS = 
Monarchic style, OS = Oligarchic style 
MSCEIT: EI = Overall EI score, PB = Perceiving branch score, FB = Facilitation branch score, UB = Understanding 
branch score, MB = Managing branch score  
SSREIT: EI = Overall EI score, O = Optimism, A = Appraisal, U = Utilisation, S = Social Skills 
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5.5.2. Predicting cognitive climate from thinking styles 
 
 
Discriminant analysis was used to examine the possibility that thinking styles are able to distinguish 
between employees working in different cognitive climates. The three types of cognitive climates utilised 
in the research include a knowing-oriented cognitive climate, a planning-oriented cognitive climate and a 
creating-oriented cognitive climate. The means for the three groups on the thirteen thinking styles are 
shown in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27: Mean scores for the different cognitive climates on the thirteen subscales of the TSI  
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The assumptions of a discriminant analysis require, inter alia, an initial MANOVA test to confirm whether 
there are real differences between the three groups. The overall multivariate test was statistically 
significant at the p < .05 level [F (2, 281) = 2.21, p = .001, Wilks’ Lambda = .82, eta = .31] which supports 
an attempt to classify individuals into different cognitive climate groupings. On examination of the results 
from the discriminant analysis it was apparent that the group differences shown by the MANOVA can be 
explained in terms of two underlying dimensions. The first function (χ226 = 55.587, p = .001) explains 60% 
of the variance and according to the functions at group centroids, appears to discriminate the creating-
oriented cognitive climate from the planning and knowing-oriented climates. The second function (χ212 = 
22.210, p = .035) explains 40% of the variance and appears to discriminate the planning-oriented 
cognitive climate.  
 
 
Table 61: Classification Function Coefficients and Structure matrix for the thirteen thinking styles  
 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function 
Coefficients 
 Structure Matrix 
  
Function    Function 
1 
(Planning climate) 
2 
(Creating climate) 
 1 
(Planning climate) 
2 
(Creating climate) 
Local .525 .197  Local .627* .292 
Anarchic .622 -.305  Anarchic .447* -.180 
Global -.401 -.129  Global -.383* -.187 
Internal .306 -.693  Internal .300* -.122 
External .003 -.335  External -.159* -.141 
Liberal .370 .402  Liberal .149* .114 
Monarchic -.237 .864  Monarchic .022 .529* 
Executive .055 .048  Executive .159 .215* 
Hierarchic -.338 -.327  Hierarchic -.139 -.203* 
Conservative .023 .189  Conservative .146 .180* 
Legislative -.432 .334  Legislative -.091 .157* 
Judicial -.179 .244  Judicial -.013 .124* 
Oligarchic -.123 -.434  Oligarchic .017 -.083* 
Total sample n=284 
Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical discriminant functions  
 Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within function. 
*. Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any discriminant function 
 
On examination of the standardised discriminant variate coefficients presented in Table 61 it was 
revealed that the dominant predictor variables of the first function were the local style with a coefficient of 
0.525 and the anarchic style with a coefficient of 0.622. The dominant prediction variables of the second 
function were the monarchic style with a coefficient of 0.864 and the internal style with a coefficient of  
-0.693. However, the variables which contribute most to group separation in function 2 are the monarchic 
and executive styles. According to the structure matrix, the only type I thinking styles which significantly 
  
 203 
contributes towards the discrimination of the creating-oriented climate in a positive direction is the liberal 
style. On the other hand, three of the type II styles contribute positively towards the planning-oriented 
climate, specifically the monarchic, executive and conservative styles, and the type I hierarchic style 
contributes in a negative direction to this climate. This provides partial support for the research 
hypothesis which expected type I thinking styles to contribute more towards the prediction of the knowing 
and creating climates and type II thinking styles to contribute more towards the prediction of the planning-
oriented climate. 
 
 
5.5.3. Differences in emotional intelligence depending on job function 
 
 
Results from an independent samples t-test on the total scale and subscales of the MSCEIT confirmed 
the hypothesis that job functions which require more affect laden information and emotional problem 
solving will have higher levels of emotional intelligence than job functions which require more technical 
information.  
 
Table 62: Differences on the standardised versus the unstandardised total scales and subscales 
of the MSCEIT for job functions that have more affective requirements compared to functions 
which have more technical requirements 
 
Scale 
Affective 
Requirements 
Technical 
Requirements T-Test 
Effect 
size 
 (eta) M SD M SD 
MSCEIT  
(MHS standardised scores) n=109 n=90   
Overall EI Score 93.74 12.34 87.24 13.35 t (195)= 3.364 , p = .002** .22 
Perception Branch  94.70 14.08 93.13 16.89 t (173)= 4.372 , p = .482 .05 
Facilitation Branch  101.05 14.15 95.37 16.84 t (195)= 3.384 , p = .011* .18 
Understanding Branch  96.55 11.68 88.96 10.09 t (197)= 2.126 , p = .000*** .33 
Managing Branch  95.00 12.36 90.10 11.24 t (197)= 0.101 , p = .004** .20 
MSCEIT  
(Unstandardised scores)  
Overall EI Score .50 .10 .48 .11 t (195) = 1.343, p = .000*** .25 
Perception Branch  .48 .07 .45 .09 t (197) = 2.980, p = .173 .10 
Facilitation Branch  .53 .06 .49 .07 t (155) = 10.436, p = .018* .19 
Understanding Branch  .41 .07 .39 .08 t (197) = 0.301, p = .000*** .25 
Managing Branch  .50 .10 .48 .11 t (197) = 0.536, p = .065 .13 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
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Respondents who worked in job functions with greater affective requirements scored higher on overall EI 
as well as all the branch scores except for the perception branch compared to respondents who worked 
in job functions with greater technical requirements. These results were observable on both the 
standardised and the unstandardised scales of the MSCEIT. The results of these comparisons are 
presented in Table 62. No significant differences were evident for the mean scores, however, on the total 
scale or subscales of the SSREIT. The means and standard deviations for the different job functions on 
the SSREIT are presented in Appendix F, Table F20. 
 
 
5.5.4. Thinking styles, emotional intelligence and levels of management 
 
 
An independent samples t-test was used to determine whether differences in EI could be identified for 
respondents who were in management positions compared to those who were not. The results of the 
analysis could not confirm the hypothesis as no differences in EI could be found for managers versus 
non-managers on either the MSCEIT or SSREIT subscales. As management performance was not 
measured, these results do not make any inferences about the relationship between EI and 
management, only that within the present sample managers and non-managers do not differ significantly 
in terms of EI.  
 
One difference was observed on the subscales of the TSI between managers and non-managers, 
however, Managers (M = 4.41, SD = 1.12) were observed to score higher on the local thinking style than 
non-managers [M = 4.02, SD = 1.19; t (306) = -2.666, p = .008]. In addition, non-managers (M = 4.28, SD 
= 1.24) were observed to score higher on the global thinking style than managers [M = 3.80, SD = 1.11; t 
(306) = 2.158, p = .032]. The magnitude of the effect size for these differences was small (r = .15 and r = 
.12 respectively). The detailed results are presented in Appendix F, Table F21.  
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
As an emerging field, the concept of EI has been enthusiastically examined yet few boundaries have 
been developed that guide the growth of empirical knowledge in a coherent and concise direction. The 
aim of this study was to contribute towards clarifying the nature of EI specifically with regard to the trait 
versus ability EI distinction. A further aim of the study was to examine the incremental validity of trait EI 
compared to ability EI in predicting real life outcomes, such as job satisfaction.  
 
 
 
 
6.1.  SUMMARY OF THE STUDY  
 
 
 
The primary focus of the study was to critically evaluate the EI construct operationalised as either an 
ability or a trait by examining the relationship with a conceptually related measure of trait cognitive 
thinking styles, to determine whether a clear distinction can be made between the constructs and thereby 
provide support for the hypothesis that they should be seen as independent and unique concepts. The 
study utilised the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test Version 2 (MSCEIT V2.0) as a 
measure of ability EI and the Schutte Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test (SSREIT) as a measure of 
trait EI. In addition the two instruments were compared to a measure of cognitive thinking styles, which 
have been defined as a lower order personality trait, to determine whether they can be sufficiently 
distinguished from alternative personality constructs to be considered as measuring a component of 
cognitive abilities.  
 
The study used an exploratory correlational design and was conducted on a sample of 352 employees 
from a large and diverse South African consulting firm, obtained using a non-probability purposive 
sampling method. The MSCEIT V2.0 measures one general level of EI as well as two area scores, four 
branch scores, and eight task scores. The overall EI score and the four branch scores formed the basis of 
the analysis of the study. The SSREIT measures one general level of EI, however, four subscales that 
were identified during the factor analysis procedure were used in the analysis to add depth to the results. 
The Thinking Styles Inventory (TSI) (Sternberg & Wagner, 1992), which was the instrument used to 
measure cognitive thinking styles, measures thirteen categories of thinking styles. 
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The research was reported in two successive stages. The first stage of the research study presented a 
critical review of the validity and reliability of the MSCEIT and the SSREIT and focused on four aspects. 
Firstly the factorial validity of the instruments was assessed to determine whether the theoretical structure 
on which these instruments are based can be empirically replicated. Secondly, the reliability of the 
instruments was examined to determine whether the instruments demonstrate adequate internal 
consistency at the total scale and subscale levels. Thirdly, the degree of overlap of the measure of ability 
EI and trait EI was examined in relation to the measure of thinking styles, to determine whether a single 
emotional ability factor underlies these two measures, or whether these instruments measure unique 
constructs. In the fourth component, the construct validity of the instruments was examined by assessing 
whether theoretically expected differences between groups on variables such as gender, age and level of 
experience could be observed. The second stage entailed a review of the ability of EI measures to 
moderate practical outcomes in the occupational environment such as job related satisfaction, resignation 
behaviour, variations in job functions and levels of management over that of cognitive thinking styles.  
 
This chapter will discuss the research findings for each of the hypotheses of the study in the context of 
the EI literature and previous studies that have critically examined the validity and reliability of the 
aforementioned instruments such as Ciarrochi et al., (2000), Petrides and Furnham (2000a) and Palmer 
et al., (2005). Thereafter the broader implications of the results will be explored. Finally, limitations of the 
present study and directions for future research will be outlined. 
 
 
 
 
6.2. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
 
 
 
6.2.1. Reliability and validity of the TSI 
 
 
It is fitting to discuss the findings regarding the reliability and validity of the TSI first. The TSI was adopted 
as a benchmark against which to assess the distinctiveness of the trait versus the ability measures. The 
theoretical domain of cognitive thinking styles probes practical intelligence and therefore addresses a 
component of the same general domain that EI instruments explore. An interesting question to explore 
would be whether the criticism of the validity and reliability of existing EI measurement instruments have 
been overly harsh due to the overwhelming popular interest in the concept, in comparison to the 
discrepancies overlooked in less controversial measurement instruments.  
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The study utilised the shortened 65 item version of the TSI which has been found in previous research 
studies to present estimates of internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha that are similar to those 
obtained with the longer 104 item version (Murphy, 2006; Zhang & Sternberg, 1998; Zhang, 2005b). Two 
of the subscales presented Cronbach’s alpha coefficients that were lower than 0.70, specifically the 
anarchic subscale which obtained a low Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.47 and the monarchic subscale 
which was still acceptable for research purposes at 0.64. The low internal consistency of these two scales 
has apparently been improved in the revised TSI-R (Sternberg et al., 2003) which was not utilised in the 
study. Conclusions drawn from the study regarding the validity and reliability of the TSI would accordingly 
require reassessment with the revised TSI-R. 
 
The validity of the TSI was supported by the intercorrelations between the thirteen thinking styles which 
were in the expected direction according to the theory of mental self-government. Scales defined as polar 
opposites for example, were found to correlate in inverse directions with each other such as the global 
and local styles and the liberal and conservative styles. Subscales that were described as related were 
found to be positively associated such as the executive and conservative, and legislative and liberal 
styles.  
 
The present study is the first research study that has attempted to verify the validity of the claim that the 
thirteen subscales of the TSI can be grouped into three broad categories and five dimensions, using 
confirmatory rather than exploratory factor analysis. The results obtained, however, did not provide 
support for either the five or the three factor models due to negative variance estimates evident in the 
latent variables. The failure in obtaining a fit for the five factor model probably occurred for two reasons:  
 
• There were only two indicator variables per thinking styles dimension for the levels, scope and 
leanings latent factors  
• Missing data account for approximately 14% of the sample which resulted in a lower than desired 
sample of 284 respondents for the analysis 
 
The missing data in the TSI occurred as a result of respondents who dropped out of the survey before 
completing it. As the order of the items was randomised by the online survey tool to prevent bias, the 
reliability or validity of a single item or scale would not have been affected. Measures were put in place to 
attempt to prevent respondent drop-out such as eligibility for incentives only on completion of all the 
questionnaires. Suggestions for reducing drop-out of online surveys in future studies would include 
conducting the surveys with groups of participants in a single venue either on computers or using 
traditional paper and pencil methods. Repeat studies with larger samples may also be able to increase 
the probability of a good fit as the risk of negative variance estimates is highest in small samples when 
there are only two or three indicators per latent variable (Brown, 2006). 
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The inadmissibility of the three factor model, on the other hand, was also due to the lack of a positive 
definite covariance matrix although each of the three latent variables had more than two indicators. This 
may signal that two of the variables in the model are perfectly correlated with each other, implying that 
two of the variables may be measuring the same thing (Brown, 2006). A non positive definite covariance 
matrix may also occur as a result of missing data or when sample sizes are small as a result of sampling 
fluctuation (Brown, 2006). 
 
In an attempt to explore the reasons for the lack of fit, an exploratory factor analysis method was used to 
confirm both the three and five factor structures. With regard to the five factor structure, although thinking 
styles were found to load in the expected directions on the hypothesised five dimensions and the model 
accounted for approximately 64% of the variance, a number of the subscales were found to cross-load 
strongly on alternative dimensions. Examination of the three factor model revealed that only 55% of the 
variance could be explained by the model, leaving 45% of the variance unaccounted for. In addition, a 
number of the hypothesised type III thinking styles, loaded strongly with either the type I or type II thinking 
styles.  
 
Confirmatory analysis did reveal an admissible model for the revised two factor model, however, the chi-
squared statistic was found to be significant and the CFI and TLI figures were lower than the 0.80 cut-off 
for an acceptable fit. Similar difficulties have been identified by other researchers who tried to confirm the 
five or three factor models using exploratory analysis. Thus Zhang (2001b; 2003) suggest that the five 
dimension and three or even two type models hypothesised by the theory of mental self-government may 
not be suitable structures for categorising the thirteen styles identified by the theory. It is unfortunate that 
the present study was unable to utilise the revised TSI-R which has apparently greatly improved the 
reliability of the subscales (Sternberg et al., 2003), and may as a consequence, reveal a more robust 
factor structure. The consistency in reliability estimates and the nature of the relationships between the 
subscales for studies conducted in different regions globally (for example Yeung, 2006; Fer, 2005) seem 
to confirm that the instrument is able to measure a coherent construct across different social and cultural 
groups.  
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6.2.2. Factorial validity of the MSCEIT in comparison to the SSREIT  
 
 
Contradictory results regarding the nature of the factor structure of both the MSCEIT and the SSREIT 
identified in previous studies have formed the basis for a number of the concerns about the validity of the 
constructs on which these measures are based. The emotional intelligence model developed by Salovey 
and Mayer (1990) and Mayer and Salovey (1997) outlined first three then four interrelated yet hierarchical 
subcomponents of emotional intelligence that culminate in an overall measure of EI. As both measures 
are based on this same underlying model, both measures should be able to present evidence of these 
four components as well as a general factor of EI and hierarchical relationship between them. In this 
study the structure of these two instruments were tested using both exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analysis approaches. 
 
The present study could not confirm the one-dimensional factor structure of the SSREIT as claimed by 
the authors (Schutte et al., 1998) using exploratory factor analysis, finding instead evidence of a four 
factor structure in the data which supports findings made by researchers such as Palmer (2003), Petrides 
and Furnham (2000a), Ciarrochi et al., (2000) and Murphy (2006). The item structure of this four factor 
model does not, however, present a consistent item structure across the aforementioned studies and the 
reliability of some of the individual items raises questions regarding the suitability of these items in 
measuring self-reported EI in accordance with the theoretical assumptions on which the model is based. 
Results from confirmatory analysis furthermore could not reveal a satisfactory fit to the data for either a 
one factor, three factor, four factor or four factor hierarchical model based on the item structures identified 
in the present sample as well as in previous studies (Palmer, 2003; Petrides & Furnham, 2000a, Murphy, 
2006) using the chi-squared statistic. In addition the results showed evidence of high levels of positive 
skew and kurtosis which most likely occurred as a result of the lack of negatively worded items in the 
questionnaire and self response bias which may particularly occur in self-report instruments if 
respondents perceptions of their own abilities are inaccurate or if they wish to present a favourable image 
of themselves (Roberts et al., 2001).  
 
Results of recent confirmatory analysis studies (Gignac, 2005; Palmer et al., 2005; Rossen et al., 2008) 
have raised concerns regarding the structure of the MSCEIT. In addition there has only been one study, 
conducted by Rossen et al., (2008) with a sample of university students that has examined the MSCEIT 
as a hierarchic model, which is the structure suggested by the underlying theory. This prompted a review 
to determine whether satisfactory fit could be identified using the MSCEIT for a one, two and four factor 
model as professed by Mayer et al., (2003) and whether evidence of a hierarchical structure could be 
identified in the data.  
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The results of the study identified that a one factor model reflecting a general score of EI did not provide a 
good fit to the data using either standardised or unstandardised data. Although the GFI, AGFI, CFI, TLI 
and SRMR fit indices did attain acceptable levels, the chi-squared statistic was significant (Bollen-stine p 
< .05) and the normed chi-squared statistic was high at 2.79 for the unstandardised results and 3.08 for 
the standardised results. On the other hand, all the loadings of the subscales were found to be positive 
and significant which does suggest the presence of a general factor of EI, a finding that correspondents 
with the results of Rossen et al., (2008). The findings from the oblique two factor model were similar to 
the one factor model and did not improve the overall fit to the data which suggests that neither the 
general EI score nor the distinction between two areas of EI are valid for assessment of EI with the 
present sample.  
 
The fit provided by both the oblique four factor model which reflected the four branches of the ability 
model and the hierarchic four factor model which reflected the four branches and two areas of the model 
did result in a satisfactory fit to the data according to the chi-squared statistic (Bollen-stine p > .05). In 
both cases, however, factor loadings greater than 1.0 were evident with both the standardised and 
unstandardised data which suggests negative residual variance in the models and implies that the 
branches may be difficult to distinguish from one another. As these findings are similar to the conclusions 
reached by previous researchers (Gignac, 2005; Palmer et al., 2005; Rossen et al., 2008), it appears that 
the MSCEIT does lack structural fidelity.  
 
As mentioned by both Rossen et al., (2008) and Palmer et al., (2005) the non-positive definite matrices 
identified in the four factor and hierarchic models may be a result of only two indicators contributing 
towards each factor and as a result, three to four indicators should ideally be used to account for each 
latent factor (Bollen, cited in Palmer et al., 2005). As the MEIS consisted of a greater number of items 
and scenarios designed to measure each branch of EI, it may be worthwhile to reassess the structure of 
the MEIS to determine whether some of these components could not be reintegrated into the MSCEIT to 
strengthen the structure.  
 
A larger issue that needs to be raised at this point is the assumption of multivariate normality which is 
required by the maximum likelihood estimation method used for the confirmatory analysis procedure by 
the present research study as well as the previous studies. A dilemma arises as a result of conclusions 
reached in a study by MacCann et al., (2003) which identified that consensually scored tests have very 
high levels of kurtosis and negative skew and therefore, statistical analysis assuming multivariate 
normality cannot be validly used. MacCann et al demonstrated that scores could be normal only if scale 
reliability is low so that different people obtain high scores on different items and therefore, tests based 
on consensus scoring cannot be both reliable and normally distributed. As a result, even though 
maximum likelihood estimation has been reported to be fairly robust against violations of normality 
(McDonald & Ho, 2002), the research results from not only confirmatory analysis studies but all research 
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with the MSCEIT which uses data analysis measures that assume multivariate normality are suspect. 
This is an issue that cannot be resolved within the context of the present research study and requires 
debate regarding whether the techniques used to assess the construct validity of the MSCEIT at present 
are sufficiently robust to allow for a fair assessment.  
 
In summary, the assessment of the SSREIT, within the limitations of the present study, has not shown 
sufficient evidence of robust, theoretically defensible factor structure. In order to enhance the potential for 
obtaining an appropriate factor structure, the SSREIT appears to require a thorough review of the 
theoretical basis of the measure and the content of the items used to assess the four identified 
components of EI. In addition, there are several methodological differences that may contribute to 
differences in the observed item structures of the measurement instrument. As the branches of EI are 
theoretically interrelated, for example, assessment of the factor structure of the instrument should be 
based on oblique rather than orthogonal techniques. In a number of studies however (Ciarrochi et al., 
2000; Petrides & Furnham, 2000a), this has not been the case, including the original study used to 
design the measurement instrument (Schutte et al., 1998). A recommendation for future research would 
be to reassess the original 62 items on which the SSREIT was based using an oblique rotation to 
determine if a more cohesive set of items can be identified for the four hypothesised subscales and the 
instrument overall. The measure would also benefit from the inclusion of items that would enhance the 
robustness of the measure and reduce bias such as a larger number of negatively worded items and 
items developed to assess self-response bias.  
 
On the other hand, it is uncertain whether the identification problems with the MSCEIT arise from the 
items or actual item structure or whether the problems lie with the scoring procedure used to score the 
results. Re-assessment of the impact of analysis methods that have been used to examine the validity of 
the MSCEIT in the present research study as well as previous research results that are based on 
assumptions of normality in the data may be required. Reviews of alternative scoring methods to reduce 
the bias in the data and improve reliability, such as the recent study by MacCann, Roberts, Matthews, 
and Zeidner (2004) who examined the influence of the Method of Reciprocal Averages (MRA) scaling as 
an alternative scoring technique for the MSCEIT, may also succeed in improving the interpretability and 
overall validity of the measurement tool.  
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6.2.3. Reliability and internal consistency of the SSREIT in comparison to the MSCEIT 
 
 
The reliability of the measurement instruments is the domain in which self-report measures have a clear 
advantage over ability measures. The present study identified that the SSREIT displayed a high 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.89, which is consistent with previous findings that have continuously placed the 
reliability of the SSREIT around the 0.90 level. The reliability of the MSCEIT on the other hand, measured 
using split-half reliability measures, only reached a satisfactory level of 0.73 which is much lower than the 
scores provided by the authors (Mayer et al., 2003). Although reliability scores above 0.6 are sufficient for 
research, scores that meet or exceed 0.90 are preferable for use in applied settings (Matthews, Zeidner, 
& Roberts, 2007). The overall scale of the MSCEIT does not therefore appear to be appropriate for use in 
contexts such as personnel selection.  
 
The subscales of the SSREIT identified in the present study also indicated reasonable internal 
consistencies ranging from 0.72 for the appraisal subscale to 0.82 for the optimism subscale. Test re-test 
reliability examined after 12 months also supported the reliability of the instrument as scores were found 
to range from 0.58 for the appraisal subscale to 0.67 for the optimism subscale and 0.64 for the overall EI 
score. Although the subscales of the SSREIT that were identified appear to be reliable according to 
Cronbach’s alpha, the lack of consistency with regard to item structure between studies brings into 
question the ability of the SSREIT to accurately measure the EI construct according to the underlying 
theoretical structure.  
 
The split-half reliability scores for the MSCEIT were lower than required with the branch scores ranging 
from 0.53 for the facilitation branch to 0.64 for the managing branch and the task scores ranging from 
0.47 for the blends task to 0.91 for the pictures task. A comparison of the reliability findings of the 
MSCEIT to an assessment conducted on a South African student sample by Van Staaden (2001) 
revealed that a number of the items which presented low corrected item-total correlations in the present 
study displayed low factor scores in the study conducted by Van Staaden, which suggests that either the 
items are being misinterpreted within the South African cultural context, or that the items themselves may 
be faulty. As only these two studies have examined these issues with South African samples, the findings 
may not be reflective of the South African population as a whole. Additional research with more 
representative South African samples and cultural groupings from which the MSCEIT norms were 
developed is required to further explore the reasons for these findings and determine whether one or both 
of these inferences can be confirmed. Either way, the reliability of the MSCEIT may be improved by 
increasing the number of items within the subscales as well as more rigorous item development or review 
(Matthews et al., 2007).  
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The tendency for South African respondents to score significantly below the North American mean 
(Gallant, 2005) which was confirmed by the results of the present study for all the subscales excluding 
the faces and facilitation tasks, also results in concerns regarding the reliability of the MSCEIT items as 
well as the scoring procedure across cultural boundaries. The effect size for these differences was large 
with eta exceeding 0.40 for ten of the fifteen scores. These findings bring into question all the results of 
the MSCEIT obtained specifically using the standardised scores and the tool is unlikely to be beneficial 
for use within practical contexts in South Africa until the problems with the normative scoring procedure is 
resolved.  
 
 
6.2.4. Discriminant validity of the trait versus ability EI distinction in relation to 
cognitive thinking styles 
 
 
The key component of the study was to assess the degree of convergence between EI conceptualised as 
a trait and EI conceptualised as an ability, to establish whether they can be seen as tapping into one 
concept or whether there is support for drawing a distinction between them. Three research hypotheses 
were examined in this regard: 
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The results of the analyses provided substantial support for the distinctiveness between trait EI, 
measured with the SSREIT, and ability EI, measured using the MSCEIT, as not only where there no 
correlations obtained between the MSCEIT and the SSREIT after thinking styles had been controlled for, 
but a scale level exploratory factor analysis using an oblique rotation revealed that the branch scores of 
the MSCEIT loaded separately from both the SSREIT subscales and the thirteen subscales of the TSI.  
 
Trait EI has been identified in research as a distinct, compound construct that lies at the lower levels of 
personality hierarchies (Petrides et al., 2007b), which is similar to the definition of thinking styles which 
have also been identified as a lower order personality trait (Zhang, 2002c). The results from the study 
supported this categorisation of both measures as the SSREIT was found to correlate strongly with the 
TSI subscales, however, none of the correlations exceeded a correlation of 0.5 which suggests that the 
measures are not so strongly correlated that they are measuring the same construct. A surprising finding 
was that the subscales of the SSREIT loaded on the same factor as the type I subscales of the TSI 
identified in the factor analysis of the model, and the type II subscales loaded independently on their own 
factor. These findings support the distinction made between the two thinking styles factors identified in 
the study and also suggests that the relationship between these measures is not merely a result of 
common method variance.  
 
Previous research that examined the relationship between the SSREIT and the TSI (Murphy, 2006) has 
identified a series of positive correlations between high EI and the legislative, judicial, liberal, hierarchical, 
anarchic and internal styles as well as a negative correlation with the conservative style. When examined 
in light of the present findings, it appears as though high levels of EI are strongly associated with type I 
styles but low EI is not particularly related to type II styles. This supports the assumption of the theory of 
mental self-government that styles are continuous rather than dichotomous and neither good nor bad, but 
rather that the effectiveness of the style depends on the task that is being performed and the situation in 
which that task is being performed (Sternberg, 1994a). This study provides an interesting observation of 
the nature of the relationship between trait constructs as well as the characteristics that may be 
associated with people who prefer type I thinking styles and it would be worthwhile to see if the 
relationship can be established with other measures of trait EI, possibly even measures that have been 
based on different theoretical structures such as the ECI or the EQ-i. 
 
The three weak, inverse relationships observed between the MSCEIT overall scale and the local TSI 
subscale as well as the perception branch scale and the local and hierarchic TSI subscales are also 
unexpected. The local style refers to people who prefer to work with details and may therefore suggest 
that overemphasis on details may lessen the ability to perceive emotions in the self or others. This 
explanation, however, seems to be counterintuitive. The inverse relationship with the hierarchic subscale 
could make sense as this refers to people that distribute attention across several prioritised tasks. People 
who prefer the hierarchic style may therefore simply be too occupied with cognitive activities to pay 
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attention to emotional cues. These correlations may also result from the potential relationship between 
thinking styles and cognitive abilities implied by the definition, as thinking styles are defined as traits that 
are able to moderate the use of cognitive abilities. As the magnitude of the observed correlations 
between the MSCEIT and the TSI are low and the factors on which the TSI and SSREIT subscales load 
and the factor on which the MSCEIT subscales load are inversely correlated, it appears that the MSCEIT 
does seem to measure a construct that is relatively independent from any form of personality.  
 
 
6.2.5. Effectiveness of trait versus ability EI in differentiating demographic 
characteristics 
  
 
Additional criteria that were assessed in order to demonstrate whether the MSCEIT or SSREIT presented 
construct validity was the examination of theoretically expected differences between groups. Three 
criteria formed the basis of the research hypothesis, EI should increase with age and experience, women 
should score higher on El than men and there should be no discrimination of EI measures towards people 
of different ethnic groups or cultures if the measure is to be considered as a universally valid tool. 
 
• χ MSCEIT: An inverse relationship was found between the 
MSCEIT and age, generation and experience with graduates and 
respondents in lower age groups scoring higher than respondents 
in higher age groups or experienced hires with more than 2 years 
experience
• χ MSCEIT: Men were found to have higher scores on the 
standardised scores than women
• χ SSREIT: No significant differences for age, generation or 
experience
• √ SSREIT: Women found to score higher than men on the 
overall scale and appraisal subscale 
• χ MSCEIT & SSREIT: Significant ethnic differences found on 
overall scales and subscales
Hypothesis 1.4
Certain expected group criterion 
relationships will be found with 
the EI scales and subscales 
including a positive relationship 
between emotional intelligence 
age and experience, a lack of 
ethnic differences in ability or 
trait emotional intelligence, and 
women will score higher on 
emotional intelligence scales and 
subscales than men
 
 
The results of the analysis could not substantiate the construct validity of either measure because in 
addition to being unrelated to the SSREIT, the MSCEIT was found to present a different pattern of 
association to both the SSREIT and the expectations of the study. An inverse significant relationship was 
uncovered between the standardised scales of the MSCEIT and the age of the respondents. In addition, 
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respondents in the younger generation Y age group scored significantly higher on the MSCEIT scales 
than respondents in the older baby boomers category and respondents who had recently graduated 
presented a higher level of EI according to the MSCEIT than respondents who had two or more years of 
work experience. The relationship with gender further confounded the results as men were found to have 
higher scores on most of the subscales than women, which is a finding that is contrary to most studies 
with the MSCEIT (Goldenberg et al., 2006; Brackett & Mayer, 2003). On the other hand, when the 
analyses were repeated with the unstandardised scores these differences mostly disappeared. These 
findings again bring into question the validity of the scoring procedure for use outside North American 
samples.  
 
The SSREIT on the other hand did present significant differences between men and women, with women 
scoring higher than men on the overall scale and appraisal subscales. This is contrary to the findings of 
Murphy (2006) who observed no differences on the total scale with a South African student sample, 
however, women were observed to score higher on the social skills subscales than men. The different 
findings on the subscales may be more related to the instability of the factor structure rather than 
interpretable differences between men and women. In addition, no evidence was observed for the 
expected relationship with either age or experience, which is consistent with findings with the SSREIT 
(Goldenberg et al., 2006; Palmer, 2003; Murphy, 2006).  
 
It is uncertain whether the differences in results of the findings of the MSCEIT and the SSREIT with 
regard to gender is due to a lack of validity on the part of the measurement instrument or whether gender 
differences may not be as consistent in the differentiation of individuals with high EI from those with low 
EI as previously thought. In addition, as EI abilities are expected to develop with age and experience the 
unusual pattern identified with the MSCEIT and the lack of findings with the SSREIT bring into question 
the validity of both measures in adequately assessing EI within the present sample. If the MSCEIT is to 
be considered as a more valid tool in measuring EI than the SSREIT, it could be argued that the results 
stem from the greater emotional awareness that younger generations have regarding the importance of 
emotions in the workplace, however, this is an assumption that will require additional research to validate.  
 
The findings with regard to ethnic differences also results in a level of concern because both the SSREIT 
and the MSCEIT standardised and unstandardised subscales showed evidence of discrimination towards 
different ethnic groups. The pattern of group differences on the SSREIT favoured Black respondents 
which is a finding supported by Van Rooy et al., (2005) who reported similar results with the SSREIT. The 
findings with the MSCEIT, on the other hand, favoured White and Indian respondents. These findings are 
a clear indication that both scales do not measure a construct that is consistent across cultural 
boundaries.  
 
  
 217 
Although the construct validity of the TSI was not under review in the hypothesis of the study, the theory 
of mental self-government describes thinking styles as variable throughout the lifespan and socialised by 
learning and environmental influences (Sternberg, 1997). Thinking styles are therefore expected to differ 
as a result of age, experience and gender socialisation. Analysis of the TSI subscales identified only two 
significant gender differences on the legislative and liberal subscales with men scoring higher than 
women on both. This is supported by previous research that has identified male students as having 
higher scores on the legislative, judicial, global, liberal (Zhang, 2002c; Zhang & Sternberg, 2000), 
executive (Zhang, 2002c; Zhang & Sternberg, 2002), monarchic (Zhang, 2002c) and internal styles 
(Zhang & Sternberg, 2000). As only two subscales provided evidence of thinking styles differences, 
however, thinking styles may be less variable within occupational environments than those in the typically 
researched student environments.  
 
Results of the study did not show any relationship with age or experience for the subscales of the TSI 
which is a finding supported by both Murphy (2006) and Zhang (2001) who also reported no relationships 
between thinking styles and age. As the lack of differences cannot be attributed to a lack of variation in 
age or experience across this particular sample, thinking styles may be less dependent on age and 
experience than previously thought.  
 
Significant ethnic differences were also discovered on six of the thirteen TSI subscales with Black and 
Indian respondents scoring higher on these scales than White respondents. This is a finding contrary to 
that of Murphy (2006) who reported no variation in the thinking styles of students as a result of ethnicity or 
language. As the pattern of differences with regard to these demographic findings are similar for the 
SSREIT and TSI, who both seem to demonstrate alternative findings to the MSCEIT, it could be argued 
that these differences are a function of the self-report methodology that the TSI and SSREIT have in 
common. Regardless of the reason, if either the EI or the thinking styles instruments are to be used 
reliably outside of the social and cultural groups that were used to develop the instruments, accurate 
normative scores would need to be developed for those regions.  
 
 
6.2.6. Evaluating the effectiveness of trait versus ability EI in predicting occupational 
characteristics and outcomes 
 
 
Emotional Intelligence has to affect a wide array of work behaviours such as job performance, teamwork, 
satisfaction and so forth to be considered as a valuable construct, however, research into these claims 
has had mixed results (Zeidner et al., 2004a). As relationships between cognitive abilities, personality and 
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success have been consistently supported, alternative constructs that claim to fill the gaps left by these 
measures must demonstrate sufficient predictive power beyond that already demonstrated by existing, 
well established measures (Zeidner et al., 2004a). Although the present study did not utilise measures of 
intelligence or personality such as the Big Five, which have already been explored in existing literature 
(for example Petrides et al., 2007b), the study did seek to identify the extent to which either the MSCEIT 
or the SSREIT were able to display incremental validity in predicting occupational outcomes beyond the 
variance accounted for by demographic characteristics as well as an established measures of trait 
thinking styles.  
 
 
6.2.6.1. Job satisfaction, thinking styles and emotional intelligence 
 
 
An array of self-report job satisfaction variables, self-reported perceptions of daily working experience, as 
well as two cognitive outcome variables, intent to stay with the organisation for a period of time and 
willingness to recommend the company as a great place to work, were used to assess the job satisfaction 
of employees. In addition, actual resignation behaviour was assessed, controlling for unavoidable 
compared to avoidable termination of employment factors. As these variables do not constitute a 
validated measurement instrument, it was decided not to attempt to develop a composite score, but 
rather to examine the impact of the individual variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
A hierarchical regression analysis procedure was utilised to determine whether job satisfaction was 
indicative of preferences for certain thinking styles in the organisational environment over demographic 
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characteristics. Perceived favourable work environments were expected to contribute positively to the 
prediction of type I thinking styles, yet contribute negatively towards type II thinking styles.  The two factor 
model that was identified in the factor analysis of the subscales of the TSI was used as the basis for the 
assessment of the findings. For this reason the type III external, internal and anarchic subscales were 
categorised as type I styles and the oligarchic subscale was categorised as a type II style.  
 
The results of the research partially supported the hypothesis as two of the self-reported satisfaction 
variables, satisfaction with present position and satisfaction with occupation, as well as two of the self-
reported daily experience variables, boring versus fun and overworked versus challenged, predicted 
between 3% and 9% of the variance in the hierarchic, internal or anarchic type I thinking styles. The 
impact of the boring versus fun variable on the external style made conceptual sense as a fun work 
environment would appear to be the ideal environment to encourage styles that result in the building of 
interpersonal relationships. The influence of satisfaction with occupation and being challenged at work in 
promoting an anarchic style on the other hand was interesting as it suggests that employees in 
occupations in which they are satisfied and challenged are more likely to use styles that defy normative 
and rule bound guidelines, preferring to deal with problems in creative and unique ways. This is a style 
that would be highly valued in a consulting environment in which creative thinking is required.  
 
Satisfaction with present position was also found to contribute negatively to the local style and the 
appreciated versus unappreciated daily experience variable contributed negatively to the oligarchic style. 
A finding that was contrary to expectations, however, was that the overworked versus challenged daily 
experience items contributed positively to both the local and the oligarchic styles. These findings 
therefore support the assumption that perceived workplace satisfaction may result in different styles of 
thinking within the workplace, which is a finding that may interest organisations who wish to stimulate 
creative thinking in order to promote good performance. 
 
The measure of cognitive thinking styles was utilised both as a benchmark against which to compare the 
influence of EI, measured using either the trait or the ability model, on practical occupational outcomes. 
Although thinking styles are not a personality assessment tool, but rather a measure of lower order 
personality traits, it was decided to examine the dynamics of these constructs rather than personality as 
the overlap with standard measures of personality and EI as well as occupational performance has been 
previously explored (for example, Bastian et al., 2005; Burns et al., 2007).  
 
As EI defined as an ability is considered to be independent from all aspects of personality, the MSCEIT 
should be capable of predicting practical outcomes over that of any form of personality measurement.  In 
addition, if trait EI is to be considered as a conceptually valid construct it should also be able to predict 
practical outcomes independently from other trait measures. The validity of the assumption that ability EI 
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is a superior predictor of life outcomes than trait EI will be supported if the MSCEIT is able to predict 
greater amounts of unique variance in occupational outcomes than the SSREIT after controlling for 
thinking styles and demographic characteristics. These hypotheses were examined using three steps, a 
partial correlation to determine the nature and direction of the relationship with the occupational 
characteristics discussed previously, a multiple regression analysis to determine which of the 
characteristics could potentially be predicted by either measure and a hierarchical regression analysis 
with these items to determine whether the instruments could predict unique variance after thinking styles 
and demographic characteristics had been controlled for.  
 
 
 
 
 
The lack of correlations between the MSCEIT and all of the job satisfaction variables, except for 
satisfaction with occupation and the managing emotions branch, suggests that the MSCEIT is not 
strongly related in any way to either perceptions of satisfaction experienced by respondents or slightly 
more discernable outcomes such as intentions to stay, willingness to recommend and actual resignation. 
The SSREIT on the other hand, correlated to a moderate degree with a number of the actual self-report 
variables. As none of the cognitive or behaviour aspects showed evidence of a correlation, these findings 
may be the result of common method variance.   
 
The multiple regression analysis, with either the MSCEIT or the SSREIT as predictors of the job 
satisfaction variables, revealed possible causal relationships with three of the self-report variables, 
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satisfaction with workforce, satisfaction with present position and satisfaction with occupation, as well as 
one of the cognitive variables, intent to stay. No evidence was found of a causal relationship with actual 
resignation status using a logistical regression procedure, which suggests that neither trait nor ability EI 
may be a mediator of job satisfaction to the extent that the construct will influence drastic employee 
behaviour such as resignation. As the number of respondents who had resigned was not large, it was 
decided not to proceed with an assessment of actual reasons given for resignation, although there may 
be some relationship with resignation as a result of low job satisfaction or forced resignation, which may 
be discernable in larger samples. 
 
Evidence for the incremental validity of both the SSREIT and the MSCEIT was apparent on three of the 
four items that were further examined with the hierarchical regression analysis. The MSCEIT was found 
to account for an additional 8% in the prediction of satisfaction with present position, 11% for satisfaction 
with occupation and 6% for intent to stay after thinking styles and demographic variables were controlled 
for, compared to the SSREIT which was able to predict 5%, 6% and 1% more respectively. 
 
These findings support both the hypotheses that trait and ability EI will predict unique variance in job 
satisfaction as well as that the MSCEIT will have superior predictive power over the SSREIT. As the 
percentage of unique variance explained is small, leaving more than 90% of the variance unaccounted 
for in both instances, the practical value of these measures in predicting self-reported job satisfaction is 
negligible.  
 
 
6.2.6.2. Job function, cognitive climate and levels of management 
 
Previous research studies have provided preliminary evidence of differences in thinking styles for 
different career or study fields (Cilliers & Sternberg, 2001; Sternberg, 2003b), therefore the present 
research study attempted to determine whether thinking styles could discriminate between the cognitive 
climates required by certain types of organisations according to the model developed by Cools (2007; 
Cools & Van den Broek, 2007).  
  
Partial support was identified for the hypothesis that type I thinking styles, and the type III thinking styles 
that were found to associate strongly with type I styles, would discriminate the creating-oriented and 
knowing-oriented cognitive climates from planning-oriented climates which would display higher scores 
on the type II thinking styles. Evidence for only two cognitive climates could be identified using 
discriminant analysis, a planning-oriented climate and a creating-oriented climate, as no distinctive 
pattern of thinking styles was evident for the knowing-oriented job functions. The creating-oriented 
  
 222 
climate was predicted by two type I styles, the legislative and judicial styles, however, the profile for this 
cognitive climate included the monarchic, executive and conservative type II styles. The planning-oriented 
climate on the other hand was significantly predicted by two type II styles, the local and internal style, but 
also by the liberal and anarchic styles which were associated with type I styles. These findings suggest 
that respondents who work in the consulting, marketing and sales job functions may employ a different 
combination of styles in their line of work than respondents who work in technical or IT development 
positions. As the factor structure of the thinking styles measure was not found to be consistent in the 
present study these findings would need to be replicated before valid interpretations can be made from 
the results. 
 
 
• Partial confirmation
•χ Dominant predictors of a creating 
occupational climate are monarchic, 
executive and conservative (type II) 
styles
•√ Type I styles that do contribute are 
the legislative and judicial styles
•χ No knowing oriented cognitive 
climate was discernable with regard to 
different thinking styles
Hypothesis 2.4
Type I thinking styles (including the legislative, judicial, 
hierarchical, global and liberal styles), which are associated with 
creativity and higher cognitive complexity and external thinking 
styles (type III) contribute positively to the discrimination of 
respondents who work in knowing-oriented cognitive climates 
such as in finance, outsourced business processes, application 
management, information technology and research functions, 
and employees who work in creating-oriented cognitive 
climates such as consulting, sales and marketing functions
•Partial confirmation
•√ Dominant predictors of a planning 
occupational climate are local (type II) 
and internal (type III) styles
•χ Additional strong predictors 
included the liberal (type I) style and 
anarchic (type III) style
Hypothesis 2.5
Type II thinking styles which are associated with more norm 
favouring and planning styles (executive, local, monarchic and 
conservative styles) and internal thinking styles (type III) 
contribute positively to the discrimination of respondents who 
work in a planning-oriented cognitive climate such as 
administrative and technical or IT development staff who are 
responsible for applying technical skills and capabilities to build 
and maintain technology solutions
 
 
 
As the three hypothesised cognitive climates were not clearly discernable in the research sample, it was 
decided not to test whether the EI scales could account for differences between the groups of job 
functions used to define the three cognitive climates. Instead, job functions were separated into two 
groups based on the assumptions of whether the job functions consisted of primarily technical 
components or affective components. It was hypothesised that people who worked in job functions that 
required a greater amount of emotional problem solving and deal primarily with affect laden information 
would have higher EI than people who work in job functions that may require more technical skills. In 
addition, it was hypothesised that employees in management roles would display greater levels of 
emotional intelligence than people in non-management roles.  
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• √ Confirmed for the MSCEIT which was 
able to differentiate between affective 
and technical occupations on the overall 
scale and subscales using both 
standardised and unstandardised scores
•χ No differences found on the SSREIT
Hypothesis 2.6
Employees who work in occupations that deal primarily with 
affect laden information and require emotional problem 
solving such as human resources, consulting, sales and 
marketing will have higher levels of emotional intelligence 
than people who deal primarily with technical information 
required for building and maintaining technology solutions 
•No confirmation
• χ No differences found on either the MSCEIT or 
SSREIT for management versus non-management 
staff
Hypothesis 2.7
Employees in management roles will display greater 
levels of ability and trait emotional intelligence than 
employees in non-management roles
 
 
 
The hypothesis was confirmed using the total scale and subscales of the MSCEIT as respondents in the 
primarily affective job functions scored higher on the EI scales than respondents in the technical job 
functions. As no differences were discernable on the SSREIT, this may be additional evidence for the 
superiority of ability tools over self-report tools in discriminating between variables that are independent of 
self-response bias. An intriguing finding, however, was the lack of a relationship between management 
and non-management on both the MSCEIT and the SSREIT. Some level of relationship between these 
two groupings was expected, specifically because of popular notions of EI and their influence on the 
business world. On the other hand, leadership style or performance was never examined, therefore these 
results cannot make any inferences regarding the relationship between emotional intelligence and the 
effectiveness of management. 
 
 
 
 
6.3. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
On the basis of the above discussion it is clear that stronger evidence is needed if EI is to be considered 
as measuring the three basic characteristics of an intelligence as suggested by Mayer et al., (2001). 
Furthermore, if one considers the framework specified by Ciarrochi et al., (2000) for the assessment of 
the suitability of an EI measure, both the MSCEIT and the SSREIT seem to demonstrate a number of 
psychometric concerns that require thorough assessment before either of these measures can be 
considered as suitable for use within applied contexts such as occupational environments. These criteria 
and the corresponding results from the study are presented graphically in Figure 28. 
  
 224 
Figure 28: Analysis of the results of the research study according to the reliability and validity 
criteria specified by Ciarrochi et al., (2000) 
 
Structural Fidelity & 
should load on one 
general factor of EI 
Reliability and 
Validity Criteria MSCEIT 
SSREIT 
Unsupported at the one, two, 
four and hierarchical factor level 
 
Unsupported at the one, 
two, four and hierarchical 
factor level 
 
Reasonable levels 
of reliability 
(Greater than 0.7 = 
acceptable,  
0.9 = ideal) 
Total scale: 0.73 
Branches: 0.53 to 0.64 
Tasks: 0.47 to 0.91 
 
 
Total scale: 0.89 
Subscales: 0.72 to 0.82 
Moderate significant 
correlations with 
personality trait thinking 
styles ranging from r = 
0.121 to r = 0.463 
Tendency for South African 
respondents to score significantly 
lower than the North-American 
mean. 
 
Unrelated to trait EI 
Weak significant correlations with 
personality trait thinking styles 
ranging from r = -0.154 to r = -0.186 
Loaded independently from thinking 
styles on factor analysis 
Loaded together with type 
1 thinking styles on factor 
analysis 
Discriminant 
validity from 
established 
measures of 
personality or 
intelligence 
Differentiating 
between groups 
1. Increase with 
age and experience 
2. Gender 
1. Inversely related to age 
2. Significantly higher for 
Generation Y than Baby Boomers 
3. Significantly higher for 
graduates than experienced hires 
with more than 2 years 
4. Men score higher on EI scales 
than women 
  
No differentiation for age, 
generation or experience 
Consistency across 
cultures and social 
groups 
Incremental 
validity in 
predicting 
occupational 
outcomes 
Significant ethnic differences 
Women score higher than 
men on overall EI score 
and appraisal sub score 
Significant ethnic 
differences 
1. Predicted 8% unique variance 
in self-reported satisfaction with 
present position, 11% of 
satisfaction with occupation and 
6% for intent to stay 
2. Unable to predict actual 
resignation behaviour 
3. Able to discriminate between 
occupations with more affective 
requirements and occupations 
with more technical 
requirements. 
4. No differences in EI between 
levels of management 
1. Predicted 5% unique 
variance in self-reported 
satisfaction with present 
position, 6% of satisfaction 
with occupation and 1% for 
intent to stay 
2. Unable to predict actual 
resignation behaviour 
3. Unable to discriminate 
between job functions  
4. No differences in EI 
between levels of 
management. 
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The first criteria specified was that the overall scale should indicate reasonable levels of reliability, and all 
the subscales should load on a single factor as both the MSCEIT and the SSREIT tests claim to measure 
an overall score of El. Although the overall SSREIT scale has consistently reached high levels of 
reliability assessed using Cronbach’s alpha, the problems with the factor structure raises concerns about 
the usefulness of the tool. Even though the SSREIT is inherently biased towards a unifactoral 
interpretation, as pointed out by Petrides and Furnham (2000a), the inability to confirm an acceptable fit 
for a general factor using confirmatory analysis brings into question the ability of the measure to reliability 
assess even a general EI score. In addition, the difficulties experienced in identifying consistent item 
structures to measure the four components of EI outlined in the theoretical model point to an insufficient 
number of items to effectively cover the content domain of the four EI areas as well as problems with the 
actual items themselves, for example, the lack of negatively worded items results in bias towards a 
positive skew in the results. 
 
The present study is the first research study to explore the structure of the MSCEIT as a hierarchical 
structure organised into three levels, which is the structure implied by the definition of EI as an ability, 
with a sample of non-university respondents. This was an improvement on the only other research study 
which examined the MSCEIT as a hierarchical model conducted by Rossen et al., (2008), who used a 
sample of university respondents. Although the MSCEIT has been promoted as a superior measure of EI 
to self-report measures, the evidence for the construct validity of the tool was lacking. Taken as a whole, 
the lack of structural fidelity, low internal consistency at the task level and lack of consistency in item 
structure across cultures suggests that the MSCEIT lacks construct validity and therefore may not 
adequately measure ability EI as it was intended to.  
 
The primary contribution of this study results from the partial confirmation of the criteria which insists that 
measures of EI should present evidence of discriminant validity from established measures of personality 
and intelligence (Ciarrochi et al., 2000). The SSREIT and the MSCEIT were found to be unrelated and 
the MSCEIT presented evidence of independence from alternative personality traits, beyond the Big Five 
or the Giant Three. Although a variety of other studies have explored the nature of the relationship 
between EI and personality or intelligence, there are few studies that have examined the implications of 
these relationships for the trait versus ability EI distinction. The present research was aimed at obtaining 
sufficient evidence for the divergence between the two constructs to support the hypothesis that two 
unique constructs, rather than two faces of the same construct, are being measured. A theoretical 
concern that requires further investigation, however, is whether a trait is actually a measurable 
characteristic that can always be distinguished from ability within a common domain.  
 
Although these findings appear to be a positive step for research in the field of EI as greater legitimacy is 
provided for the establishment of a distinction between trait and ability EI, the results also bring into 
question the nature of EI and what these so called trait or ability instruments actually measure. If trait and 
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ability EI are not related to each other on any level, then the place of trait EI measures in the EI field need 
to be reconsidered as well. Based on the research findings, future recommendations for the 
conceptualisation of these two constructs is that EI measured using ability measures should be defined 
as emotional intelligence, whereas due to the significant overlap with personality and other trait measures 
such as cognitive thinking styles, trait EI should be defined as measuring emotional competence. In this 
way confusion regarding the actual nature of these two theories and the extent of the overlap between 
them can be avoided. Ability EI has, however, not been confirmed as a distinct general factor and is yet to 
be adequately located within the factor space of intelligence (MacCann et al., 2004). The status of ability 
EI as a form of intelligence is therefore still uncertain.  
 
Contradictory evidence was obtained for the conditions that women should score higher on El than men, 
the tests should correlate with age and experience, and there should be no discrimination of EI measures 
towards people of different ethnic groups or cultures if the measure is to be considered as a universally 
valid tool. The lack of findings with the SSREIT and the contradictory findings with the MSCEIT regarding 
age and experience suggests that the measures are not able to accurately measure EI as a construct that 
develops as a function of age and cognitive maturation. Furthermore, only the SSREIT was able to 
display theoretically expected differences with regard to gender.  
 
The bias towards South African respondents present in this research study with both measurement 
instruments as well as those reported by previous researchers such as Gallant (2005) and Van Staaden 
(2001) using the MSCEIT, further indicates that the interpretations drawn from these tools within South 
African contexts may not be valid. This study was the first study to assess the interaction between an 
ability and a trait measure of EI outside of the geographical contexts in which the instruments were 
developed and standardised. The research results were therefore able to identify inconsistencies in the 
coherency of the items, structural fidelity of the tools and scoring procedure of the MSCEIT which may 
have previously been masked by socialisation processes in western cultures. 
 
Findings with regard to the final criteria that EI should have incremental validity in measuring practical life 
outcomes after controlling for other well-establish tests that have shown to predict these variables more 
accurately (Ciarrochi et al., 2000), did reveal a degree of support for the incremental validity of both the 
SSREIT and the MSCEIT tools. Although EI measured using both trait and ability EI appear to contribute 
significantly to the prediction of occupational outcomes specifically self-reported perceptions of job 
satisfaction and daily experience, above that of trait thinking styles and demographic characteristics, the 
percentage of variance explained is less than 10% and is therefore far lower than expected and raises 
doubts regarding the value of EI as a tool in organisational development. In addition, no measures were 
used to control for the influence of either mental ability of personality factors other than thinking styles, 
therefore the extent to which these constructs influence the findings is unknown.  
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The results of these findings regarding the independence of the ability from the trait model suggest, 
however, that although only a small percentage of additional variance in occupational outcomes may be 
explained by trait or ability EI, these components may be cumulative rather than complimentary as the 
two measures clearly examine different components of emotional intelligence, or emotional competence 
as a preferred domain for trait EI. The potential worth of these measures may therefore be justified, 
although, the psychometric problems with both measurement instruments need to be addressed before 
valid inferences can be made regarding the nature and direction of potential relationships with life 
outcomes.  
 
The superiority of the predictive validity over that of the SSREIT does suggest that the MSCEIT has 
practical value in application to real life outcomes that is lacking in the SSREIT. These conclusions 
suggests that further review, not only of the items used to assess EI in the MSCEIT, is required, but the 
accuracy of the normative scores used to determine correctness of answers to items, require review 
within samples that do not conform to the characteristics of the norm sample. The conclusions of this 
study are therefore in agreement with conclusions made by Keele and Bell (2008) on completion of their 
factor analysis of the SSREIT and the MSCEIT, that little progress can be made in predicting real life 
criteria unless the tools of measurement actually measure the scales and factors they propose to 
measure. On the other hand, according to Burns et al., (2007) even modest incremental validity will serve 
a useful purpose and it is reasonable to expect that, given improved reliability of scoring methods, 
incremental validity will also improve. 
 
 
6.3.1. Limitations and directions for future research  
 
 
There are several limitations to this study that may decrease the ability to draw conclusions about the 
validity and reliability of the instruments under examination as well as general conclusions about the 
population of business professionals utilised for the purposes of the research. Firstly, the generalisation 
of the conclusions to broader contexts is limited because only people who are employed in a large 
corporate institution were involved and the findings may therefore be confounded by the organisational 
climate inherent to the specific institution. In addition, Coloured respondents are underrepresented in the 
sample (specifically on the MSCEIT) which suggests that the distribution of ethnic groups incorporated in 
the sample is not sufficiently reflective of the South African population. As the sample is, therefore, not 
sufficiently representative of the broader South African community, these results cannot be generalised to 
the population as a whole. Furthermore, as the sample constituted only 22% of the organisational 
population, the effects of nonparticipation bias may result in a significant influence on the results 
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specifically if those respondents who do not participate are very different from those who do (Lin & 
Schaeffer, 1995).   
 
The missing data that resulted from respondents dropping out of the survey impacted the TSI more so 
than the other measures due to the length of the questionnaire. Although the version used was shorter 
than the original 104 items, the 65 items may still have appeared to be too lengthy for the respondents to 
complete. Future studies could consider reducing the number of items in the TSI or alternatively structure 
the research process to allow respondents to complete the questionnaire in a central venue or a 
dedicated time.  
 
The greatest limitation of the study refers to the lack of normality evident in the research sample with both 
the MSCEIT and the SSREIT. The SSREIT appears to be biased towards a positive skew due to the lack 
of negatively coded questions in the questionnaire as well as the potential influence of self-response bias. 
The MSCEIT on the other hand, appears to be inherently biased towards high levels of kurtosis and 
negative skew (MacCann et al., 2003) as a result of the consensus scoring procedures used to 
standardise the results. It was decided not to attempt to statistically alter the data to prevent potential 
changes to the underlying nature of the construct, but to rely on the potential robustness of traditional 
parametric test statistics. These tests statistics may, however, not be robust under all non-normal data 
conditions and the results may therefore be vulnerable to type I and type II error rates (Cribbie & 
Keselman, 2003). These limitations apply not only to the present study but to all research studies that 
have evaluated these instruments with data analysis methodologies based on assumptions of multivariate 
normality. The implication of this firstly is that alternative analysis methods need to be identified such as 
non-parametric statistical tools, in order to reassess the influence of the assumptions that were violated in 
the course of the analysis. Secondly, research on more appropriate scoring methods and possible 
revision of the items of the tests is required such as the research conducted by MacCann et al., (2004).  
 
A further limitation is that the items used to investigate employee perceptions of job performance were 
not based on a standardised measure of job satisfaction. In addition, the items are susceptible to 
reporting bias as they were based on perceptions of satisfaction. It was attempted to counteract this 
concern by measuring actual resignation behaviour and cognitive responses such as intention to stay and 
willingness to recommend. As the reason for resignations were not examined it is not certain whether EI 
would be related to resignation because of low job satisfaction or terminated employment contracts. The 
results of the study would need to be confirmed with standardised tools, actual objective measures of 
performance and more representative samples before any conclusions can be drawn that would be 
valuable for practical implementation in organisations. In addition, any findings regarding the relationship 
between the SSREIT subscales and occupational variables are dependent on whether the item structures 
of the subscales can be replicated and confirmed. The subscales therefore need to be standardised if 
additional research is to be conducted with the SSREIT. 
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Future research with these measures need to pay attention to the definitions of trait measures as an 
emotional competency and ability measures as an emotional intelligence in order to begin differentiating 
between the two constructs and mapping the contributions of each in explaining the interaction between 
cognition and emotion. Additional research is also required to validate the relationship of these two 
theories with actual performance, specifically if ability EI is to be considered as measuring an objective 
form of intelligence. Finally, given the gender differences identified on the subscales of the MSCEIT, 
specifically the standardised subscales, future research with subjects outside the normative populations 
should consider examining whether gender differences impact on the factor structure of the MSCEIT. 
 
To summarise, the results of the research study leave considerable doubts about the construct validity of 
both the trait and ability measures of EI that were utilised, however, reconceptualisation of the field may 
improve the inconsistencies that accompany the existing definitions. The lack of support at most levels of 
the validation process for the SSREIT results in uncertainty regarding the suitability of the SSREIT for use 
either in research or as an applied tool for measuring EI, or emotional competence as proposed by the 
study. Although this research cannot fully discount the usefulness of the tool, the consolidated findings of 
this research study are in agreement with the conclusions made by Petrides and Furnham (2000a) that 
due to the psychometric problems experienced with the instrument specifically regarding the instability of 
the factor structure of the SSREIT, future research should reconsider the use of the instrument as a 
measure of EI. As the SSREIT is no longer the only trait EI tool available in the public domain, but has 
been joined by counterparts such as the TEIQue (Petrides & Furnham, 2003) and the SUEIT (Palmer & 
Stough, 2001), it may be of greater contribution to the field to begin exploring the limitations of these 
tools. With regard to the MSCEIT, although the structural fidelity of the instrument appears to be lacking, 
the incremental validity of the instrument over trait measures does suggest that improvement of the 
scoring procedures may result in improved reliability and validity of the tool. Future research attention 
should therefore be focused on rectifying the psychometric problems with the instrument before the 
practical application is discussed.   
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APPENDIX A: Schutte Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test (SSREIT) 
Schutte et al., (1998) 
 
 
 
Directions:  
 
 
Each of the following items asks you about your emotions or reactions associated with emotions. After 
deciding whether a statement is generally true for you, use the 5-point scale to respond to the statement. 
Please circle the ‘1’ if you strongly disagree that this is like you, the ‘2’ if you somewhat disagree that this 
is like you, ‘3’ if you neither agree nor disagree that this is like you, the ‘4’ if you somewhat agree that this 
is like you and the ‘5’ if you strongly agree that this is like you. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Please give the response that best describes you. 
 
 
 
 
1 
Strongly 
disagree 
2 
Somewhat 
disagree 
3 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
4 
Somewhat 
agree 
5 
Strongly 
agree 
 
 
 
1. I know when to speak about my personal problems to others. 
2. When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times I faced similar obstacles and overcame them. 
3. I expect that I will do well on most things I try. 
4. Other people find it easy to confide in me. 
5. I find it hard to understand the non verbal messages of other people. 
6. Some of the major events of my life have led me to re evaluate what is important and not important. 
7. When my mood changes, I see new possibilities. 
8. Emotions are one of the things that make my life worth living. 
9. I am aware of my emotions as I experience them. 
10. I expect good things to happen. 
11. I like to share my emotions with others. 
12. When I experience a positive emotion, I know how to make it last. 
13. I arrange events others enjoy. 
14. I seek out activities that make me happy. 
15. I am aware of the non verbal messages I send to others. 
16. I present myself in a way that makes a good impression on others. 
17. When I am in a positive mood, solving problems is easy for me. 
18. By looking at their facial expressions, I recognise the emotions people are experiencing. 
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19. I know why my emotions change. 
20. When I am in a positive mood, I am able to come up with new ideas. 
21. I have control over my emotions. 
22. I easily recognise my emotions as I experience them. 
23. I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome to tasks I take on. 
24. I compliment others when they have done something well. 
25. I am aware of the non verbal messages other people send. 
26. When another person tells me about an important event in his or her life, I almost feel as though I 
experienced this event myself. 
27. When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to come up with new ideas. 
28. When I am faced with a challenge, I give up because I believe I will fail. 
29. I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them. 
30. I help other people feel better when they are down. 
31. I use good moods to help myself keep trying in the face of obstacles. 
32. I can tell how people are feeling by listening to the tone of their voice. 
33. It is difficult for me to understand why people feel the way they do. 
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APPENDIX B: Thinking Styles Inventory (TSI)  
(Sternberg & Wagner, 1992) 
 
 
Directions  
 
Read each statement carefully and decide how well it describes you. Use the scale provided to indicate 
how well the statement fits the way you typically do things at university, at home, or on a job. Circle 1 if 
the statement does not fit you at all, that is, you almost never do things this way. Circle 7 if the statement 
fits you extremely well, that is, you almost always do things this way. Use the values in between to 
indicate that the statement fits you in varying degrees. 
 
 
 
1 
Not At All 
Well 
2 
Not Very Well 
3 
Slightly 
Well  
4 
Somewhat 
Well 
5 
Well 
6 
Very Well 
7  
Extremely 
Well 
 
 
 
There are no right or wrong answers. Please read each statement and circle the number on the scale 
next to the statement that best indicates how well the statement describes you. Please proceed at your 
own pace, but do not spend too much time on any one statement. If you have any questions, feel free to 
ask them now. 
 
 
1. I prefer to deal with specific problems rather than with general question. 
2. When talking or writing about ideas, I stick to one main idea. 
3. When starting a task, I like to brainstorm ideas with friends or peers. 
4. I like to set priorities for the things I need to do before I start doing them. 
5. When faced with a problem, I use my own ideas and strategies to solve it. 
6. In discussing or writing on a topic, I think the details and facts are more important than the overall 
picture. 
7. I tend to pay little attention to details. 
8. I like to figure out how to solve a problem following certain rules. 
9. I like to control all phases of a project, without having to consult with others. 
10. I like to play with my ideas and see how far they go. 
11. I am careful to use the proper method to solve any problem. 
12. I enjoy working on things that I can do by following directions. 
13. I stick to standard rules or ways of doing things. 
14. I like problems where I can try my own way of solving them. 
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15. When trying to make a decision, I rely on my own judgment of the situation. 
16. I can switch from one task to another easily, because all tasks seem to me to be equally important. 
17. In a discussion or report, I like to combine my own ideas with those of others. 
18. I care more about the general effect than about the details of a task I have to do. 
19. When working on a task, I can see how the parts relate to the overall goal of the task. 
20. I like situations where I can compare and rate different ways of doing things. 
21. When there are many important things to do, I try to do as many as I can in whatever time I have. 
22. When I'm in charge of something, I like to follow methods and ideas used in the past. 
23. I like to check and rate opposing points of view or conflicting ideas. 
24. I like to collect detailed or specific information for projects on which I work. 
25. In dealing with difficulties, I have a good sense of how important each of them is and in what order 
to tackle them. 
26. I like situations where I can follow a set routine. 
27. When discussing or writing about a topic, I stick to points of view accepted by my colleagues. 
28. I like tasks and problems that have fixed rules to follow in order to complete them. 
29. I prefer to work on a project or task that is acceptable to and approved by my peers. 
30. When there are several important things to do, I do those most important to me and my colleagues. 
31. I like projects that have a clear structure and a set plan and goal. 
32. When working on a task, I like to start with my own ideas. 
33. When there are many things to do, I have a clear sense of the order in which to do them. 
34. I like to participate in activities where I can interact with others as a part of a team. 
35. I like to tackle all kinds of problems, even seemingly trivial ones. 
36. When faced with a problem, I like to solve it in a traditional way. 
37. I like to work alone on a task or a problem. 
38. I tend to emphasise the general aspect of issues or the overall effect of a project 
39. I like to follow definite rules or directions when solving a problem or doing a task. 
40. When discussing or writing down ideas, I use whatever comes to mind. 
41. When working on a project, I like to share ideas and get input from other people. 
42. I like projects where I can study and rate different views of ideas. 
43. When trying to make a decision, I tend to see only one major factor. 
44. I like problems where I need to pay attention to details. 
45. I like to challenge old ideas or ways of doing things and to seek better ones. 
46. I like situations where I interact with others and everyone works together. 
47. I find that solving one problem usually leads to many other ones that are just as important. 
48. I like working on projects that deal with general issues and not with nitty-gritty details. 
49. I like situations where I can use my own ideas and ways of doing things. 
50. If there are several important things to do, I do the ones most important to me. 
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51. I prefer tasks or problems where I can grade the designs or methods of others. 
52. When there are several important things to do, I pick the ones most important to my friends and 
colleagues. 
53. When faced with a problem, I prefer to try new strategies or methods to solve it. 
54. I like to concentrate on one task at a time. 
55. I like projects that I can complete independently. 
56. When starting something, I like to make a list of things to do and to order things by importance. 
57. I enjoy work that involves analysing, grading, or comparing things. 
58. I like to do things in new ways not used by others in the past. 
59. When I start a task or project, I focus on the parts most relevant to my peer group. 
60. I have to finish one project before starting another one. 
61. In talking or writing down ideas, I like to show the scope and context of my ideas, that is, the 
general picture. 
62. I pay more attention to parts of a task than to its overall effect or significance. 
63. I prefer situations where I can carry out my own ideas, without relying on others. 
64. I like to change routines in order to improve the way tasks are done. 
65. I like to take old problems and find new methods to solve them. 
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APPENDIX C: Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) online instructions 
(Mayer et al., 2003) 
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APPENDIX D: Example items for the MSCEIT  
 
These examples are obtained from http://www.emotionaliq.org/MSCEIT-Sample.htm and are meant to 
illustrate the type of items that MSCEIT consists of.  
 
 
1. Identifying Emotions  
  
Indicate how much of each emotion is expressed by this face: 
  
None    1      2      3      4      5   Very Much 
  
Happiness       
Anger 
Fear 
Excitement 
Surprise 
 
 
2. Using/ Facilitation  
 
What mood(s) might be helpful to feel when meeting in-laws for the very first time?  
 
                Not Useful                            Useful  
a) Slight Tension      1      2      3      4      5  
b) Surprise               1      2      3      4      5  
c) Joy                      1      2      3      4      5  
 
 
3. Understanding Emotions  
 
Tom felt anxious, and became a bit stressed when he thought about all the work he needed to do. 
When his supervisor brought him an additional project, he felt ____.  (Select the best choice.) 
  
a) Overwhelmed  
b) Depressed  
c) Ashamed  
d) Self Conscious 
e) Jittery  
   
 
4. Managing Emotions  
 
Debbie just came back from vacation. She was feeling peaceful and content.  How well would 
each action preserve her mood?  
 
Action 1: She started to make a list of things at home that she needed to do.  
Very Ineffective..1.....2.....3.....4.....5..Very Effective  
Action 2: She began thinking about where and when she would go on her next vacation.  
Very Ineffective..1.....2.....3.....4.....5..Very Effective  
Action 3: She decided it was best to ignore the feeling since it wouldn't last anyway.  
Very Ineffective..1.....2.....3.....4.....5..Very Effective  
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APPENDIX E: MSCEIT Certification 
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APPENDIX F: TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Appendix F - Section 1: Path diagrams and parameter estimates for the hypothesized models of 
the SSREIT (Section 5.2.1.2) 
 
Table F1: Assessment of normality of SSREIT items used in confirmatory factor analysis 
 
Variable min max skew c.r. kurtosis c.r. 
Item 31 1.00 5.00 -0.78 -5.38 0.49 1.69 
Item 2 1.00 5.00 -0.88 -6.06 1.27 4.34 
Item 28 1.00 5.00 -2.59 -17.73 7.34 25.17 
Item 12 1.00 5.00 -0.78 -5.37 0.78 2.67 
Item 21 2.00 5.00 -0.70 -4.81 0.11 0.36 
Item 14 1.00 5.00 -1.21 -8.31 1.96 6.72 
Item 23 1.00 5.00 -0.97 -6.68 0.69 2.37 
Item 3 2.00 5.00 -1.12 -7.70 0.93 3.19 
Item 10 1.00 5.00 -1.16 -7.98 1.57 5.37 
Item 18 1.00 5.00 -0.76 -5.24 1.02 3.51 
Item 25 1.00 5.00 -0.83 -5.66 0.76 2.59 
Item 29 1.00 5.00 -0.39 -2.66 -0.18 -0.62 
Item 19 2.00 5.00 -0.79 -5.38 0.86 2.95 
Item 5 1.00 5.00 -0.66 -4.52 -0.38 -1.31 
Item 32 1.00 5.00 -0.87 -5.93 1.17 4.02 
Item 22 2.00 5.00 -0.87 -5.93 1.11 3.82 
Item 15 1.00 5.00 -0.68 -4.64 0.14 0.47 
Item 9 2.00 5.00 -1.22 -8.38 1.55 5.32 
Item 33 1.00 5.00 -0.59 -4.07 -0.21 -0.71 
Item 8 1.00 5.00 -0.72 -4.91 -0.13 -0.46 
Item 1 1.00 5.00 -1.17 -7.99 1.21 4.15 
Item 16 1.00 5.00 -1.04 -7.15 1.84 6.30 
Item 24 2.00 5.00 -1.31 -9.01 1.47 5.03 
Item 6 2.00 5.00 -1.37 -9.36 1.88 6.44 
Item 26 1.00 5.00 -0.43 -2.97 -0.26 -0.89 
Item 30 1.00 5.00 -0.94 -6.42 1.46 5.00 
Item 13 1.00 5.00 -0.63 -4.33 0.18 0.61 
Item 4 1.00 5.00 -1.36 -9.31 2.72 9.33 
Item 11 1.00 5.00 -0.37 -2.56 -0.67 -2.29 
Item 20 2.00 5.00 -0.58 -3.98 -0.56 -1.90 
Item 7 1.00 5.00 -0.39 -2.64 -0.11 -0.36 
Item 27 1.00 5.00 -0.26 -1.80 0.13 0.43 
Item 17 2.00 5.00 -0.95 -6.52 0.02 0.05 
Multivariate      175.18 30.60 
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Figure F1: General one factor model of emotional intelligence identified by Schutte et al., (1998)  
Standardised solution (n=282) 
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General EI Factor
 
 
Model fit = (χ2495 = 1397.376, Bollen-stine p = .004, GFI = .74, AGFI = .71, CFI = .65, TLI = .62, RMSEA = 
.081, SRMR = .080)  
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Table F2: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
one factor model depicted in Figure F1 
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=282) 
 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
Item 1 ← General EI Factor 1.00  0.34 Na 
Item 2 ← General EI Factor 1.20 (0.25) 0.51 *** 
Item 3 ← General EI Factor 0.74 (0.18) 0.34 *** 
Item 4 ← General EI Factor 1.15 (0.26) 0.42 *** 
Item 5 ← General EI Factor 0.54 (0.26) 0.14 .037 
Item 6 ← General EI Factor 1.00 (0.22) 0.45 *** 
Item 7 ← General EI Factor 1.11 (0.27) 0.35 *** 
Item 8 ← General EI Factor 1.62 (0.35) 0.45 *** 
Item 9 ← General EI Factor 1.21 (0.26) 0.48 *** 
Item 10 ← General EI Factor 1.30 (0.27) 0.48 *** 
Item 11 ← General EI Factor 1.56 (0.36) 0.39 *** 
Item 12 ← General EI Factor 1.72 (0.33) 0.59 *** 
Item 13 ← General EI Factor 1.36 (0.30) 0.41 *** 
Item 14 ← General EI Factor 1.21 (0.26) 0.47 *** 
Item 15 ← General EI Factor 1.42 (0.30) 0.47 *** 
Item 16 ← General EI Factor 1.05 (0.23) 0.44 *** 
Item 17 ← General EI Factor 1.32 (0.27) 0.52 *** 
Item 18 ← General EI Factor 1.30 (0.27) 0.51 *** 
Item 19 ← General EI Factor 1.28 (0.26) 0.52 *** 
Item 20 ← General EI Factor 1.59 (0.31) 0.57 *** 
Item 21 ← General EI Factor 1.12 (0.26) 0.40 *** 
Item 22 ← General EI Factor 1.45 (0.28) 0.60 *** 
Item 23 ← General EI Factor 1.97 (0.37) 0.66 *** 
Item 24 ← General EI Factor 1.03 (0.21) 0.55 *** 
Item 25 ← General EI Factor 1.34 (0.28) 0.47 *** 
Item 26 ← General EI Factor 1.53 (0.33) 0.45 *** 
Item 27 ← General EI Factor 1.35 (0.29) 0.47 *** 
Item 28 ← General EI Factor 0.29 (0.16) 0.12 .066 
Item 29 ← General EI Factor 1.41 (0.30) 0.47 *** 
Item 30 ← General EI Factor 1.56 (0.30) 0.64 *** 
Item 31 ← General EI Factor 1.90 (0.36) 0.65 *** 
Item 32 ← General EI Factor 0.98 (0.23) 0.37 *** 
Item 33 ← General EI Factor 0.33 (0.23) 0.09 .145 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Figure F2: Four factor oblique model of emotional intelligence identified by Palmer (2003)  
Standardised solution (n=282) 
 
 
Model fit = (χ2489 = 1093.082, Bollen-stine p = .004, GFI = .80, AGFI = .77, CFI = .76, TLI = .75, RMSEA = 
.066, SRMR = .072)  
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Table F3: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
four factor model identified by Palmer (2003) depicted in Figure F2  
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=282) 
 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
Item 17 ← Utilisation 1.00  0.69 Na 
Item 27 ← Utilisation 0.89 (0.12) 0.54 *** 
Item 7 ← Utilisation 0.78 (0.13) 0.42 *** 
Item 20 ← Utilisation 1.24 (0.13) 0.77 *** 
Item 11 ← Appraisal 1.00  0.46 Na 
Item 4 ← Appraisal 0.72 (0.13) 0.48 *** 
Item 13 ← Appraisal 0.87 (0.15) 0.49 *** 
Item 30 ← Appraisal 0.98 (0.14) 0.74 *** 
Item 26 ← Appraisal 0.92 (0.16) 0.50 *** 
Item 6 ← Appraisal 0.53 (0.10) 0.44 *** 
Item 24 ← Appraisal 0.62 (0.09) 0.60 *** 
Item 16 ← Appraisal 0.61 (0.11) 0.48 *** 
Item 1 ← Appraisal 0.51 (0.12) 0.32 *** 
Item 8 ← Appraisal 0.90 (0.16) 0.46 *** 
Item 33 ← Appraisal 0.26 (0.13) 0.14 .04 
Item 9 ← Social skills 1.00  0.47 Na 
Item 15 ← Social skills 1.38 (0.22) 0.54 *** 
Item 22 ← Social skills 1.31 (0.19) 0.65 *** 
Item 32 ← Social skills 1.10 (0.18) 0.50 *** 
Item 5 ← Social skills 1.11 (0.24) 0.34 *** 
Item 19 ← Social skills 1.07 (0.18) 0.52 *** 
Item 29 ← Social skills 1.57 (0.23) 0.63 *** 
Item 25 ← Social skills 1.59 (0.23) 0.67 *** 
Item 18 ← Social skills 1.40 (0.20) 0.66 *** 
Item 10 ← Optimism 1.00  0.54 Na 
Item 3 ← Optimism 0.57 (0.11) 0.38 *** 
Item 23 ← Optimism 1.47 (0.18) 0.72 *** 
Item 14 ← Optimism 0.96 (0.14) 0.54 *** 
Item 21 ← Optimism 0.81 (0.14) 0.42 *** 
Item 12 ← Optimism 1.30 (0.16) 0.66 *** 
Item 28 ← Optimism 0.21 (0.11) 0.13 .05 
Item 2 ← Optimism 0.86 (0.12) 0.53 *** 
Item 31 ← Optimism 1.39 (0.17) 0.70 *** 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Figure F3: Four factor oblique model of emotional intelligence identified by Murphy (2006)  
Standardised solution (n=282) 
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Model fit = (χ2489 = 1157.568, Bollen-stine p = .004, GFI = .79, AGFI = .76, CFI = .74, TLI = .72, RMSEA = 
.070, SRMR = .076)  
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Table F4: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
four factor model identified by Murphy (2006) depicted in Figure F3 
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=282) 
 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
Item 27 ← Utilisation 0.78 (0.14) 0.50 *** 
Item 3 ← Optimism 0.77 (0.19) 0.36 *** 
Item 23 ← Optimism 2.09 (0.40) 0.70 *** 
Item 14 ← Optimism 1.35 (0.28) 0.52 *** 
Item 2 ← Optimism 1.23 (0.25) 0.53 *** 
Item 7 ← Optimism 1.13 (0.28) 0.35 *** 
Item 10 ← Optimism 1.37 (0.28) 0.51 *** 
Item 13 ← Utilisation 0.85 (0.16) 0.47 *** 
Item 26 ← Utilisation 1.01 (0.18) 0.54 *** 
Item 11 ← Utilisation 1.00  0.46 Na 
Item 20 ← Optimism 1.76 (0.34) 0.63 *** 
Item 17 ← Optimism 1.44 (0.29) 0.57 *** 
Item 24 ← Optimism 0.97 (0.20) 0.52 *** 
Item 31 ← Optimism 1.97 (0.38) 0.68 *** 
Item 28 ← Optimism 0.30 (0.16) 0.13 .061 
Item 16 ← Optimism 1.02 (0.23) 0.43 *** 
Item 1 ← Optimism 1.00  0.34 Na 
Item 12 ← Appraisal 1.16 (0.14) 0.62 *** 
Item 19 ← Appraisal 0.96 (0.12) 0.61 *** 
Item 9 ← Appraisal 1.00  0.61 Na 
Item 33 ← Social skills 0.50 (0.20) 0.17 .014 
Item 32 ← Social skills 1.19 (0.21) 0.54 *** 
Item 29 ← Social skills 1.67 (0.26) 0.66 *** 
Item 6 ← Optimism 1.01 (0.22) 0.45 *** 
Item 4 ← Social skills 1.00  0.43 Na 
Item 15 ← Social skills 1.42 (0.24) 0.55 *** 
Item 5 ← Social skills 1.14 (0.26) 0.35 *** 
Item 18 ← Social skills 1.51 (0.23) 0.70 *** 
Item 25 ← Social skills 1.62 (0.26) 0.67 *** 
Item 30 ← Social skills 1.26 (0.21) 0.61 *** 
Item 8 ← Appraisal 0.88 (0.16) 0.39 *** 
Item 22 ← Appraisal 1.16 (0.12) 0.75 *** 
Item 21 ← Appraisal 0.80 (0.13) 0.44 *** 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Figure F4: Four factor oblique model of emotional intelligence identified in the present study  
Standardised solution (n=282) 
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Model fit = (χ2489 = 1053.086, Bollen-stine p = .004, GFI = .81, AGFI = .79, CFI = .78, TLI = .76, RMSEA = 
.064, SRMR = .070)  
  
 265 
Table F5: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
four factor oblique model identified in the present study depicted in Figure F4 
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=282) 
 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
Item 33 ← Utilisation -0.05 (0.18) -0.02 .775 
Item 3 ← Optimism 0.74 (0.17) 0.36 *** 
Item 22 ← Optimism 1.42 (0.27) 0.62 *** 
Item 14 ← Optimism 1.17 (0.24) 0.47 *** 
Item 2 ← Optimism 1.24 (0.24) 0.56 *** 
Item 10 ← Optimism 1.35 (0.27) 0.53 *** 
Item 12 ← Optimism 1.78 (0.33) 0.65 *** 
Item 27 ← Utilisation 1.21 (0.22) 0.55 *** 
Item 31 ← Utilisation 1.60 (0.26) 0.71 *** 
Item 20 ← Utilisation 1.57 (0.26) 0.73 *** 
Item 21 ← Optimism 1.25 (0.26) 0.47 *** 
Item 19 ← Optimism 1.29 (0.25) 0.55 *** 
Item 23 ← Optimism 1.94 (0.35) 0.69 *** 
Item 28 ← Optimism 0.41 (0.16) 0.18 .01 
Item 24 ← Optimism 1.01 (0.19) 0.57 *** 
Item 16 ← Optimism 1.02 (0.21) 0.46 *** 
Item 1 ← Optimism 1.00  0.36 Na 
Item 26 ← Appraisal 1.35 (0.23) 0.51 *** 
Item 30 ← Appraisal 1.37 (0.20) 0.72 *** 
Item 13 ← Appraisal 1.32 (0.22) 0.51 *** 
Item 9 ← Optimism 1.27 (0.25) 0.53 *** 
Item 5 ← Social skills 1.00  0.38 Na 
Item 18 ← Social skills 1.27 (0.22) 0.73 *** 
Item 15 ← Social skills 1.10 (0.22) 0.53 *** 
Item 25 ← Social skills 1.38 (0.25) 0.71 *** 
Item 29 ← Social skills 1.39 (0.25) 0.68 *** 
Item 11 ← Appraisal 1.59 (0.27) 0.51 *** 
Item 8 ← Appraisal 1.43 (0.24) 0.51 *** 
Item 6 ← Appraisal 0.77 (0.14) 0.44 *** 
Item 32 ← Social skills 1.01 (0.19) 0.56 *** 
Item 4 ← Appraisal 1.00  0.47 Na 
Item 17 ← Utilisation 1.28 (0.22) 0.65 *** 
Item 7 ← Utilisation 1.00  0.41 Na 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Figure F5: Four factor orthogonal model of emotional intelligence identified in the present study  
Standardised solution (n=282) 
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Model fit = (χ2495 = 1378.638, Bollen-stine p = .004, GFI = .76, AGFI = .73, CFI = .65, TLI = .63, RMSEA = 
.080, SRMR = .174)  
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Table F6: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
four factor orthogonal model identified in the present study depicted in Figure F5 
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=282) 
 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
Item 33 ← Utilisation -0.22 (0.18) -0.08 .224 
Item 3 ← Optimism 0.72 (0.17) 0.36 *** 
Item 22 ← Optimism 1.42 (0.27) 0.63 *** 
Item 14 ← Optimism 1.06 (0.23) 0.44 *** 
Item 2 ← Optimism 1.24 (0.24) 0.57 *** 
Item 10 ← Optimism 1.32 (0.26) 0.53 *** 
Item 12 ← Optimism 1.74 (0.32) 0.65 *** 
Item 27 ← Utilisation 1.16 (0.22) 0.53 *** 
Item 31 ← Utilisation 1.44 (0.25) 0.64 *** 
Item 20 ← Utilisation 1.69 (0.28) 0.78 *** 
Item 21 ← Optimism 1.31 (0.27) 0.50 *** 
Item 19 ← Optimism 1.32 (0.25) 0.57 *** 
Item 23 ← Optimism 1.82 (0.34) 0.65 *** 
Item 28 ← Optimism 0.50 (0.17) 0.22 .003 
Item 24 ← Optimism 0.98 (0.19) 0.56 *** 
Item 16 ← Optimism 0.98 (0.21) 0.45 *** 
Item 1 ← Optimism 1.00  0.36 Na 
Item 26 ← Appraisal 1.44 (0.27) 0.51 *** 
Item 30 ← Appraisal 1.34 (0.23) 0.66 *** 
Item 13 ← Appraisal 1.56 (0.28) 0.57 *** 
Item 9 ← Optimism 1.31 (0.26) 0.55 *** 
Item 5 ← Social skills 1.00  0.42  
Item 18 ← Social skills 1.15 (0.19) 0.72 *** 
Item 15 ← Social skills 0.95 (0.18) 0.50 *** 
Item 25 ← Social skills 1.29 (0.21) 0.72 *** 
Item 29 ← Social skills 1.26 (0.21) 0.67 *** 
Item 11 ← Appraisal 1.98 (0.35) 0.60 *** 
Item 8 ← Appraisal 1.61 (0.30) 0.54 *** 
Item 6 ← Appraisal 0.70 (0.16) 0.38 *** 
Item 32 ← Social skills 0.92 (0.17) 0.57 *** 
Item 4 ← Appraisal 1.00  0.44 Na 
Item 17 ← Utilisation 1.34 (0.23) 0.69 *** 
Item 7 ← Utilisation 1.00  0.41 Na 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Figure F6: Three factor oblique model of emotional intelligence identified in the present study 
(2006)  
Standardised solution (n=282) 
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Model fit = (χ2374 = 871.497, Bollen-stine p = .004 GFI = .82, AGFI = .79, CFI = .77, TLI = .75, RMSEA = 
.069, SRMR = .074)  
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Table F7: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
three factor oblique model identified in the present study in Figure F6  
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=282) 
 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
Item 3 ← Optimism 0.78 (0.19) 0.36 *** 
Item 23 ← Optimism 2.04 (0.39) 0.69 *** 
Item 14 ← Optimism 1.34 (0.28) 0.52 *** 
Item 2 ← Optimism 1.26 (0.26) 0.54 *** 
Item 7 ← Optimism 1.07 (0.27) 0.34 *** 
Item 10 ← Optimism 1.35 (0.28) 0.51 *** 
Item 16 ← Optimism 1.04 (0.23) 0.44 *** 
Item 1 ← Optimism 1.00  0.34 Na 
Item 12 ← Appraisal 1.15 (0.14) 0.62 *** 
Item 19 ← Appraisal 0.96 (0.12) 0.61 *** 
Item 9 ← Appraisal 1.00  0.62 Na 
Item 33 ← Social Skills 0.51 (0.21) 0.17 .013 
Item 32 ← Social Skills 1.20 (0.21) 0.54 *** 
Item 29 ← Social Skills 1.68 (0.27) 0.66 *** 
Item 6 ← Optimism 1.00 (0.22) 0.45 *** 
Item 4 ← Social Skills 1.00  0.43 Na 
Item 15 ← Social Skills 1.44 (0.25) 0.55 *** 
Item 5 ← Social Skills 1.20 (0.26) 0.36 *** 
Item 18 ← Social Skills 1.54 (0.24) 0.71 *** 
Item 25 ← Social Skills 1.67 (0.26) 0.68 *** 
Item 30 ← Social Skills 1.25 (0.21) 0.60 *** 
Item 8 ← Appraisal 0.87 (0.16) 0.38 *** 
Item 22 ← Appraisal 1.15 (0.12) 0.75 *** 
Item 21 ← Appraisal 0.80 (0.13) 0.44 *** 
Item 20 ← Optimism 1.74 (0.34) 0.63 *** 
Item 31 ← Optimism 1.94 (0.37) 0.67 *** 
Item 24 ← Optimism 0.96 (0.20) 0.52 *** 
Item 28 ← Optimism 0.36 (0.16) 0.15 .029 
Item 17 ← Optimism 1.44 (0.29) 0.58 *** 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Appendix F - Section 2: Path diagrams and parameter estimates for the hypothesized models of 
the MSCEIT (Section 5.2.2.1) 
 
Table F8: Assessment of normality of MSCEIT task scores used in confirmatory factor analysis 
 
Unstandardised MSCEIT data Min max skew c.r. kurtosis c.r. 
RawScore_H (Emotional relationships) .117 .541 -0.976 -5.950 .214 .653 
RawScore_D (Emotional management) .149 .507 -1.084 -6.611 1.476 4.499 
RawScore_G (Blends) .184 .611 -0.843 -5.140 .627 1.910 
RawScore_C (Changes) .308 .680 -0.671 -4.089 -.079 -.240 
RawScore_F (Sensations) .100 .617 -1.318 -8.032 1.166 3.555 
RawScore_B (Facilitation) .127 .584 -1.063 -6.482 1.178 3.591 
RawScore_E (Pictures) .034 .635 -1.411 -8.602 1.496 4.559 
RawScore_A (Faces) .123 .666 -0.636 -3.877 -.522 -1.592 
Multivariate      16.025 9.459 
Standardised MSCEIT scores Min max skew c.r. kurtosis c.r. 
Standardised Score_H  
(Emotional relationships) 55.078 134.32 -0.06 -0.363 0.8 2.438 
Standardised Score_D  
(Emotional management) 69.126 157.579 0.935 5.698 4.028 12.278 
Standardised Score_G (Blends) 64.4 128.62 0.039 0.237 0.057 0.175 
Standardised Score_C (Changes) 64.327 140.201 0.901 5.491 1.59 4.847 
Standardised Score_F (Sensations) 58.235 132.275 -0.063 -0.387 -0.329 -1.004 
Standardised Score_B (Facilitation) 62.523 133.36 -0.259 -1.577 -0.14 -0.425 
Standardised Score_E (Pictures) 23.529 120.229 -1.043 -6.359 3.485 10.624 
Standardised Score_A (Faces) 47.997 143.255 0.594 3.622 -0.146 -0.445 
Multivariate         21.444 12.658 
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Figure F7: One general factor of the MSCEIT based on the eight unstandardised observed task 
scores  
Standardised solution (n=223) 
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Model fit = (χ220 = 55.922, Bollen-stine p = .005 GFI = .94, AGFI = .89, CFI = .89, TLI = .84, RMSEA = 
.090, SRMR = .060)  
 
Table F9: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
unstandardised one general factor model identified in Figure F7 
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=223) 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
RawScore_A (Faces) ← General EI 1.00  0.35 Na 
RawScore_E (Pictures) ← General EI 1.55 (0.37) 0.58 *** 
RawScore_D  
(Emotional management) ← General EI 0.78 (0.18) 0.58 *** 
RawScore_H  
(Emotional relationships) ← General EI 1.16 (0.28) 0.55 *** 
RawScore_G (Blends) ← General EI 0.81 (0.21) 0.48 *** 
RawScore_F (Sensations) ← General EI 1.58 (0.36) 0.65 *** 
RawScore_B (Facilitation) ← General EI 0.95 (0.23) 0.54 *** 
RawScore_C (Changes) ← General EI 0.85 (0.20) 0.57 *** 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Table F8: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
standardised one general factor model  
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=223) 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
StdScore_A (Faces) ← General EI 1.00  0.31 Na 
StdScore_E (Pictures) ← General EI 0.95 (0.25) 0.54 *** 
StdScore_D 
(Emotional management) ← General EI 0.82 (0.22) 0.52 *** 
StdScore_H 
(Emotional relationships) ← General EI 1.00 (0.26) 0.57 *** 
StdScore_G (Blends) ← General EI 0.82 (0.22) 0.53 *** 
StdScore_F (Sensations) ← General EI 1.19 (0.31) 0.60 *** 
StdScore_B (Facilitation) ← General EI 1.05 (0.29) 0.48 *** 
StdScore_C (Changes) ← General EI 1.03 (0.26) 0.65 *** 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
 
 
Figure F8: Two factor model of the MSCEIT based on the eight unstandardised observed task 
scores  
Standardised solution (n=223) 
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Model fit = (χ219 = 55.922, Bollen-stine p = .005 GFI = .94, AGFI = .89, CFI = .89, TLI = .84, RMSEA = 
.090, SRMR = .060)  
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Table F9: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
unstandardised two factor model identified in Figure F8 
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=223) 
  
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
RawScore_A (Faces) ← Experiencing EI 1.00  0.36 Na 
RawScore_E (Pictures) ← Experiencing EI 1.56 (0.36) 0.60 *** 
RawScore_B (Facilitation) ← Experiencing EI 0.93 (0.22) 0.55 *** 
RawScore_F (Sensations) ← Experiencing EI 1.59 (0.36) 0.67 *** 
RawScore_C (Changes) ← Strategic EI 1.00  0.57 Na 
RawScore_G (Blends) ← Strategic EI 0.99 (0.18) 0.50 *** 
RawScore_D (Emotional 
management) ← Strategic EI 0.95 (0.16) 0.60 *** 
RawScore_H (Emotional 
relationships) ← Strategic EI 1.43 (0.24) 0.58 *** 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
 
 
 
Table F10: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
standardised two factor model  
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=223) 
 
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
StdScore_A (Faces) ← Experiencing EI 1.00  0.38 Na 
StdScore_E (Pictures) ← Experiencing EI 0.89 (0.20) 0.62 *** 
StdScore_B (Facilitation) ← Experiencing EI 0.89 (0.22) 0.50 *** 
StdScore_F (Sensations) ← Experiencing EI 1.07 (0.24) 0.66 *** 
StdScore_C (Changes) ← Strategic EI 1.00  0.70 Na 
StdScore_G (Blends) ← Strategic EI 0.79 (0.12) 0.56 *** 
StdScore_D (Emotional management) ← Strategic EI 0.78 (0.12) 0.54 *** 
StdScore_H (Emotional relationships) ← Strategic EI 0.94 (0.14) 0.59 *** 
***p < .001 
Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Figure F9: Four factor model of the MSCEIT based on the eight unstandardised observed task 
scores Standardised solution (n=223) 
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Model fit = (χ214 = 17.901, Bollen-stine p = .363 GFI = .98, AGFI = .95, CFI = .99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = 
.035, SRMR = .035)  
 
Table F11: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
unstandardised four factor model identified in Figure F9 
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=223) 
  
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
RawScore_G (Blends) ← Emotional Understanding 0.87 (0.16) 0.56 *** 
RawScore_C (Changes) ← Emotional Understanding 1.00  0.73 Na 
RawScore_A (Faces) ← Perception 1.00  0.36 Na 
RawScore_E (Pictures) ← Perception 1.48 (0.33) 0.57 *** 
RawScore_B (Facilitation) ← Emotional Facilitation 1.00  0.53 Na 
RawScore_F (Sensations) ← Emotional Facilitation 1.62 (0.25) 0.61 *** 
RawScore_H (Emotional 
relationships) ← 
Emotional 
Management 1.45 (0.23) 0.68 *** 
RawScore_D (Emotional 
management) ← 
Emotional 
Management 1.00  0.73 Na 
***p < .001, Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Table F12: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
standardised four factor model  
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=223) 
  
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
StdScore_G (Blends) ← Emotional Understanding 0.74 (0.12) 0.60 *** 
StdScore_C (Changes) ← Emotional Understanding 1.00  0.80 Na 
StdScore_A (Faces) ← Perception 1.00  0.43 Na 
StdScore_E (Pictures) ← Perception 0.91 (0.21) 0.70 *** 
StdScore_B (Facilitation) ← Emotional Facilitation 1.00  0.50 Na 
StdScore_F (Sensations) ← Emotional Facilitation 1.06 (0.18) 0.59 *** 
StdScore_H (Emotional 
relationships) ← 
Emotional 
Management 1.20 (0.19) 0.71 *** 
StdScore_D (Emotional 
management) ← 
Emotional 
Management 1.00  0.66 Na 
***p < .001, Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
+ 
 
Table F13: Unstandardised and standardised parameter estimates, and significance levels for the 
hierarchic standardised model  
(Standard errors in parentheses, n=223) 
  
Measurement Model Estimates Unstandardised Standardised p 
Experiencing EI  General EI 6.75 (0.97) 0.87 *** 
Strategic EI  General EI 6.75 (0.97) 0.94 *** 
Perception  Experiencing EI 1.00  0.81 Na 
Emotional Facilitation  Experiencing EI 1.11 (0.31) 1.14 *** 
Emotional Understanding  Strategic EI 1.00  0.81 Na 
Emotional Management  Strategic EI 0.80 (0.16) 0.78 *** 
StdScore_G (Blends) ← Emotional Understanding 0.76 (0.13) 0.61 *** 
StdScore_C (Changes) ← Emotional Understanding 1.00  0.79 Na 
StdScore_A (Faces) ← Perception 1.00  0.42 Na 
StdScore_E (Pictures) ← Perception 0.93 (0.22) 0.71 *** 
StdScore_B (Facilitation) ← Emotional Facilitation 1.00  0.48 Na 
StdScore_F (Sensations) ← Emotional Facilitation 1.16 (0.21) 0.61 *** 
StdScore_H (Emotional 
relationships) ← Emotional Management 1.24 (0.20) 0.72 *** 
StdScore_D (Emotional 
management) ← Emotional Management 1.00  0.65 Na 
***p < .001, Na: No p-values listed for these variables as they were constrained to one 
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Appendix F - Section 3: Detailed results for differences in emotional intelligence and thinking 
styles for groups with differing demographic characteristics (Section 5.4.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table F14: Pearson’s correlation matrix for age on the total scale and subscales of the SSREIT 
and the subscales of the TSI 
 
 
Sca les   N Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) 
SSREIT       
Overall EI Score 282 .008 .898 
Optimism 282 .024 .684 
Appraisal 282 .020 .739 
Utilisation 282 .032 .596 
Social Skills 282 -.046 .446 
TSI       
Legislative 308 -.073 .199 
Executive 308 -.047 .407 
Judicial 308 -.057 .317 
Global 308 .019 .734 
Local 308 .036 .529 
Liberal 284 .020 .735 
Conservative 308 -.024 .677 
Internal 308 .047 .409 
External 308 -.026 .646 
Hierarchic 308 -.016 .783 
Monarchic 308 -.017 .770 
Oligarchic 292 -.084 .151 
Anarchic 308 -.010 .858 
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Table F15: Generational differences on the total scale and subscales of the SSREIT and the 
subscales of the TSI 
 
 
Scale Generation Y Generation X 
Baby 
Boomers ANOVA 
Effect 
size 
(eta)  M SD M  M SD 
SSREIT  n=106 n=156 n=19   
Overall EI Score 134.99 13.31 135.03 12.66 135.89 10.48 F (2,279) = 0.042, p = .959 .04 
Optimism 4.32 0.42 4.30 0.42 4.40 0.32 F (2,279) = 0.517, p = .597 .06 
Appraisal 3.92 0.58 3.98 0.57 3.96 0.48 F (2,279) = 0.383, p = .682 .05 
Utilisation 3.95 0.65 3.97 0.55 4.06 0.55 F (2,279) = 0.307, p = .736 .05 
Social Skills 3.96 0.56 3.90 0.62 3.82 0.45 F (2,279) = 0.563, p = .570 .06 
TSI n=139 n=186 n=26   
Legislative 5.01 1.02 5.07 0.94 4.70 0.80 F (2,281) = 1.669, p = .190 .11 
Executive 4.77 0.97 4.69 1.06 4.57 0.78 F (2,281) = 1.226, p = .295 .09 
Judicial 4.63 1.39 4.74 1.27 4.18 1.10 F (2,281) = 2.861, p = .059 .14 
Global 3.73 1.16 4.00 1.13 3.68 1.05 F (2,281) = 1.590, p = .206 .11 
Local 4.33 1.14 4.37 1.16 4.34 1.00 F (2,281) = 0.124, p = .883 .03 
Liberal 4.92 1.13 5.05 1.04 5.03 0.89 F (2,281) = 0.498, p = .608 .06 
Conservative 4.11 1.14 4.16 1.23 3.84 0.82 F (2,281) = 1.201, p = .302 .09 
Internal 3.84 1.25 4.09 1.10 3.89 1.09 F (2,281) = 0.508, p = .602 .06 
External 5.31 1.19 5.32 1.13 5.23 0.91 F (2,281) = 0.561, p = .571 .06 
Hierarchic 5.34 1.16 5.39 1.17 5.21 1.02 F (2,281) = 0.488, p = .614 .06 
Monarchic 3.68 1.25 3.79 1.14 3.49 1.32 F (2,281) = 0.802, p = .450 .08 
Oligarchic 4.35 1.04 4.23 1.13 4.00 0.71 F (2,281) = 1.347, p = .262 .10 
Anarchic 4.56 1.01 4.63 1.07 4.43 1.03 F (2,281) = 0.315, p = .730 .05 
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Table F16: Length of time with the company - differences on the total scale and subscales of the 
MSCEIT, SSREIT and the subscales of the TSI 
 
Scale 
In the last 6 
months 6-12 months 1-2 years 2-5 years 5-10 years 
More than 10 
years 
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
MSCEIT  
(Standardised scores) n=57 n=39 n=41 n=37 n=27 n=12 
Overall EI Score 91.07 14.55 92.67 10.15 89.04 11.53 89.99 14.92 86.29 14.97 90.42 13.51 
Perception Branch 93.13 14.45 94.66 11.43 93.00 15.16 95.37 20.26 89.10 14.55 99.78 17.37 
Facilitation Branch 97.58 16.00 100.53 17.65 97.72 13.73 97.57 14.37 93.24 19.47 98.28 14.73 
Understanding Branch 93.94 12.50 94.56 9.89 92.31 10.24 92.27 13.61 88.80 12.02 87.24 10.36 
Managing Branch 93.53 13.17 94.99 11.06 89.73 10.50 92.84 14.13 89.56 9.94 91.73 9.89 
MSCEIT (Unstandardised scores) 
Overall EI Score .46 .07 .48 .05 .46 .06 .46 .06 .45 .07 .48 .07 
Perception Branch .48 .11 .50 .09 .48 .12 .48 .10 .46 .12 .53 .12 
Facilitation Branch .46 .09 .47 .09 .46 .07 .46 .07 .44 .11 .48 .08 
Understanding Branch .51 .07 .52 .06 .51 .06 .50 .07 .50 .08 .49 .09 
Managing Branch .40 .08 .42 .06 .39 .08 .40 .09 .40 .07 .42 .06 
SSREIT n=75 n=19 n=51 n=51 n=54 n=32 
Overall EI Score 137.9 11.5 135.5 13.1 132.6 13.8 131.8 11.9 135.5 13.2 138.0 13.4 
Optimism 4.37 0.35 4.38 0.37 4.18 0.51 4.29 0.40 4.27 0.42 4.41 0.42 
Appraisal 4.04 0.55 3.92 0.56 3.96 0.57 3.77 0.58 4.07 0.49 4.03 0.63 
Utilisation 4.06 0.58 3.94 0.63 3.96 0.59 3.79 0.58 4.02 0.57 4.13 0.46 
Social Skills 4.06 0.51 3.85 0.64 3.87 0.64 3.78 0.50 3.91 0.62 4.01 0.70 
TSI n=57 n=52 n=61 n=20 n=39 n=79 
Legislative 5.08 0.91 5.09 1.07 5.24 0.83 4.81 1.00 4.81 1.08 5.06 0.73 
Executive 4.76 1.08 4.66 1.02 4.83 0.93 4.52 0.98 4.65 1.11 5.06 0.67 
Judicial 4.81 1.14 4.60 1.44 4.98 1.22 4.50 1.40 4.37 1.48 4.44 0.99 
Global 3.80 1.14 3.96 1.23 4.14 0.98 3.69 1.14 3.78 1.17 3.90 1.21 
Local 4.49 1.12 4.27 1.20 4.54 1.13 4.11 1.05 4.17 1.25 4.62 0.93 
Liberal 5.05 1.08 5.04 1.11 5.16 1.03 4.86 1.05 4.84 1.10 4.94 1.02 
Conservative 4.00 1.13 4.10 1.26 4.28 1.07 4.00 1.11 4.17 1.42 4.46 0.93 
Internal 3.95 1.14 3.75 1.19 4.23 0.97 3.99 1.27 3.90 1.31 4.24 0.95 
External 5.39 1.00 5.44 1.25 5.53 0.95 4.98 1.25 5.09 1.31 5.44 0.87 
Hierarchic 5.44 1.08 5.26 1.26 5.53 1.02 5.13 1.21 5.28 1.26 5.65 0.97 
Monarchic 3.70 1.12 3.55 1.21 4.01 1.13 3.69 1.19 3.74 1.44 3.64 1.13 
Oligarchic 4.19 1.09 4.40 0.99 4.42 1.09 4.14 1.01 4.18 1.21 4.20 1.10 
Anarchic 4.74 0.86 4.55 1.18 4.82 0.93 4.30 1.08 4.46 1.21 4.65 0.94 
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Scale ANOVA Effect size (eta) 
MSCEIT (Standardised scores) 
Overall EI Score F (5,207) = 0.841, p = .522 .14 
Perception Branch  F (5,207) = 0.833, p = .528 .14 
Facilitation Branch  F (5,207) = 0.661, p = .654 .13 
Understanding Branch  F (5,207) = 1.390, p = .230 .18 
Managing Branch  F (5,207) = 1.266, p = .280 .17 
MSCEIT (Unstandardised scores) 
Overall EI Score F (5,207) = 0.668, p = .648 .12 
Perception Branch  F (5,207) = 0.693, p = .629 .13 
Facilitation Branch  F (5,207) = 0.372, p = .867 .09 
Understanding Branch  F (5,207) = 0.660, p = .654 .13 
Managing Branch  F (5,207) = 0.722, p = .607 .13 
SSREIT  
 
  
Overall EI Score F (5,276) = 2.112, p = .064 .19 
Optimism F (5,276) = 2.047, p = .072 .19 
Appraisal F (5,276) = 1.934, p = .089 .18 
Utilisation F (5,276) = 1.736, p = .126 .17 
Social Skills F (5,276) = 1.804, p = .112 .18 
TSI 
 
  
Legislative F (5,278) = 0.948, p = .450 .13 
Executive F (5,278) = 0.747, p = .589 .11 
Judicial F (5,278) = 1.244, p = .289 .15 
Global F (5,278) = 1.247, p = .287 .15 
Local F (5,278) = 0.568, p = .724 .10 
Liberal F (5,278) = 0.642, p = .668 .10 
Conservative F (5,278) = 1.071, p = .377 .14 
Internal F (5,278) = 0.806, p = .546 .12 
External F (5,278) = 2.116, p = .064 .19 
Hierarchic F (5,278) = 0.423, p = .833 .09 
Monarchic F (5,278) = 1.532, p = .180 .16 
Oligarchic F (5,278) = 0.498, p = .778 .09 
Anarchic F (5,278) = 1.129, p = .345 .14 
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Table F17: Experience of the new joiner - differences on the total scale and subscales of the 
SSREIT and the subscales of the TSI 
 
 
Scale 
Graduate 
Experienced 
hire with 1-2 
years 
experience 
Experienced 
hire with more 
than 2 years 
experience 
ANOVA 
Effect 
size 
(eta) 
M SD M SD M SD 
SSREIT  n=93 n=39 n=150   
Overall EI Score 134.20 13.87 134.28 12.57 135.82 12.07 F (2,279) = 0.547, p = .579 .06 
Optimism 4.29 0.43 4.28 0.41 4.34 0.40 F (2,279) = 0.469, p = .626 .05 
Appraisal 3.90 0.62 3.86 0.53 4.02 0.54 F (2,279) = 1.940, p = .146 .12 
Utilisation 3.93 0.64 4.02 0.53 3.98 0.57 F (2,279) = 0.373, p = .689 .05 
Social Skills 3.91 0.60 3.94 0.60 3.91 0.58 F (2,279) = 0.067, p = .935 .00 
TSI n=104 n=43 n=161   
Legislative 4.94 .99 5.02 1.12 5.07 .90 F (2,281) = 0.170, p = .844 .03 
Executive 4.75 1.03 4.67 1.00 4.70 1.00 F (2,281) = 0.506, p = .604 .06 
Judicial 4.57 1.39 4.59 1.36 4.74 1.24 F (2,281) = 0.000, p = 1.000 .00 
Global 3.80 1.21 3.76 1.22 3.94 1.08 F (2,281) = 0.076, p = .927 .03 
Local 4.21 1.15 4.34 1.16 4.44 1.11 F (2,281) = 0.556, p = .574 .06 
Liberal 4.90 1.11 4.82 1.07 5.11 1.03 F (2,281) = 1.863, p = .157 .11 
Conservative 4.14 1.26 3.97 1.06 4.14 1.14 F (2,281) = 0.392, p = .676 .05 
Internal 3.69 1.17 4.17 1.24 4.11 1.11 F (2,281) = 4.182, p = .016 .17 
External 5.24 1.23 5.20 1.19 5.38 1.06 F (2,281) = 0.150, p = .860 .03 
Hierarchic 5.33 1.19 5.15 1.26 5.42 1.09 F (2,281) = 0.473, p = .623 .05 
Monarchic 3.64 1.30 3.74 1.19 3.77 1.13 F (2,281) = 0.137, p = .872 .03 
Oligarchic 4.29 1.12 4.17 0.94 4.26 1.07 F (2,281) = 0.314, p = .730 .04 
Anarchic 4.45 1.04 4.45 1.08 4.72 1.02 F (2,281) = 1.640, p = .196 .11 
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Table F18: Marital status - differences on the total scale and subscales of the MSCEIT, SSREIT 
and the subscales of the TSI 
 
Scale 
Single Married Co-habiting Divorced 
ANOVA 
Effect 
size 
(eta) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
MSCEIT  
(Standardised 
scores) 
n=86 n=78 n=10 n=6   
Overall EI Score 92.36 14.33 89.79 12.15 94.84 12.05 92.07 11.82 F (3,176) = 0.765, p = .515 .11 
Perception 
Branch  95.10 17.71 94.06 13.40 96.03 14.09 95.15 19.91 F (3,176) = 0.152, p = .929 .05 
Facilitation 
Branch  99.43 15.27 96.69 15.51 101.31 9.77 99.30 21.76 F (3,176) = 0.575, p = .632 .10 
Understanding 
Branch  94.75 12.58 89.62 10.47 100.13 10.06 91.08 6.77 F (3,176) = 4.145, p = .007 .26 
Managing 
Branch  94.80 13.35 91.56 10.48 90.86 10.58 97.46 5.89 F (3,176) = 1.555, p = .202 .16 
MSCEIT (Unstandardised scores)   
Overall EI Score .47 .06 .47 .06 .49 .06 .49 .04 F (3,176) = 0.527, p = .665 .10 
Perception 
Branch  .49 .11 .50 .10 .51 .12 .49 .12 F (3,176) = 0.158, p = .925 .05 
Facilitation 
Branch  .47 .08 .47 .08 .49 .05 .47 .11 F (3,176) = 0.279, p = .840 .07 
Understanding 
Branch  .51 .07 .51 .07 .55 .05 .53 .03 F (3,176) = 1.671, p = .175 .17 
Managing 
Branch  .41 .07 .42 .07 .40 .07 .46 .03 F (3,176) = 1.382, p = .250 .15 
SSREIT  n=136 n=118 n=15 n=13   
Overall EI Score 135.78 13.23 134.08 12.28 133.33 11.39 138.69 13.28 F (3,278) = 0.817, p = .485 .09 
Optimism 4.32 0.42 4.30 0.42 4.35 0.29 4.35 0.39 F (3,278) = 0.097, p = .962 .03 
Appraisal 3.97 0.57 3.95 0.56 3.71 0.58 4.15 0.49 F (3,278) = 1.488, p = .218 .13 
Utilisation 4.00 0.61 3.91 0.56 3.91 0.64 4.25 0.50 F (3,278) = 1.539, p = .205 .13 
Social Skills 3.98 0.59 3.84 0.58 3.84 0.51 3.96 0.69 F (3,278) = 1.254, p = .291 .11 
TSI n=152 n=125 n=17 n=14   
Legislative 5.08 1.01 4.93 0.92 5.02 0.93 5.07 0.87 F (3,280) = 2.505, p = .059 .16 
Executive 4.74 1.02 4.73 0.99 4.52 1.24 4.51 0.81 F (3,280) = 0.502, p = .681 .07 
Judicial 4.74 1.39 4.57 1.19 4.67 1.29 4.54 1.55 F (3,280) = 3.502, p = .016 .19 
Global 3.84 1.23 3.90 1.04 3.80 1.29 3.94 1.00 F (3,280) = 0.225, p = .879 .04 
Local 4.41 1.15 4.32 1.10 3.80 1.23 4.59 1.07 F (3,280) = 2.702, p = .046 .17 
Liberal 5.11 1.00 4.87 1.10 5.11 1.45 5.06 0.86 F (3,280) = 1.159, p = .326 .11 
Conservative 4.08 1.19 4.19 1.17 4.01 1.22 4.04 0.91 F (3,280) = 0.135, p = .939 .03 
Internal 3.89 1.21 4.03 1.09 4.06 1.37 4.40 1.13 F (3,280) = 1.314, p = .270 .12 
External 5.32 1.23 5.32 1.02 5.34 1.03 5.07 1.33 F (3,280) = 1.030, p = .380 .10 
Hierarchic 5.32 1.23 5.41 1.01 5.55 1.31 5.06 1.31 F (3,280) = 1.299, p = .275 .12 
Monarchic 3.69 1.27 3.80 1.10 3.45 1.21 3.80 1.24 F (3,280) = 0.426, p = .734 .07 
Oligarchic 4.29 1.04 4.22 1.12 4.13 1.00 4.37 1.13 F (3,280) = 0.278, p = .841 .05 
Anarchic 4.58 1.04 4.59 1.01 4.54 1.07 4.71 1.41 F (3,280) = 0.778, p = .507 .09 
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Table F19: Multiple regression of job satisfaction variables onto EI measures  
 
SSREIT MSCEIT 
Overall Job satisfaction 
R2adj (n=150) -.008 Sig. R2adj (n=117) -.006 Sig. 
F (4, 150) 0.684 .604 F (4, 113) 0.831 .508 
β Optimism .153 .195  β Perception Branch  -.155 .167 
β Appraisal .040 .708  β Facilitation Branch  -.018 .869 
β Utilisation -.068 .542 β Understanding Branch  .076 .477 
β Social Skills -.026 .783  β Managing Branch  -.060 .551 
Overall satisfaction after a year 
R2adj (n=66) .030 Sig. R2adj (n=47) -.016 Sig. 
F (4, 62) 1.506 .211 F (4, 42) 0.819 .521 
β Optimism .081 .646  β Perception Branch  .029 .880 
β Appraisal .244 .123  β Facilitation Branch  -.284 .103 
β Utilisation .007 .968 β Understanding Branch  .014 .938 
β Social Skills -.019 .886  β Managing Branch  -.007 .964 
Satisfaction with workforce 
R2adj (n=258) .031 Sig. R2adj (n=165) .045 Sig. 
F (4, 264) 3.158 .015 F (4, 164) 2.983 .021 
β Optimism .257 .001  β Perception Branch  .075 .410 
β Appraisal -.007 .931  β Facilitation Branch  -.156 .093 
β Utilisation -.059 .444 β Understanding Branch  -.111 .216 
β Social Skills -.044 .515  β Managing Branch  .259 .002 
Satisfaction with present position 
R2adj (n=264) .042 Sig. R2adj (n=170) .075 Sig. 
F (4, 269) 4.026 .003 F (4, 169) 4.516 .002 
β Optimism .169 .030  β Perception Branch  -.036 .690 
β Appraisal .091 .228  β Facilitation Branch  -.034 .710 
β Utilisation .032 .669 β Understanding Branch  -.181 .040 
β Social Skills -.035 .605  β Managing Branch  .303 .000 
 Satisfaction with occupation 
R2adj (n=262) .072 Sig. R2adj (n=168) .083 Sig. 
F (4, 268) 6.314 .000 F (4, 167) 4.879 .001 
β Optimism .305 .000  β Perception Branch  .150 .093 
β Appraisal -.001 .986  β Facilitation Branch  -.119 .189 
β Utilisation -.034 .643 β Understanding Branch  -.199 .024 
β Social Skills .017 .792  β Managing Branch  .314 .000 
 Daily experience: Boring - Fun 
R2adj (n=104) .026 Sig. R2adj (n=75) -.033 Sig. 
F (4,102) 1.709 .154 F (4, 72) 0.400 .808 
β Optimism .086 .559  β Perception Branch  .026 .863 
β Appraisal .170 .216  β Facilitation Branch  -.033 .817 
β Utilisation .008 .950 β Understanding Branch  -.146 .279 
β Social Skills .019 .866  β Managing Branch  .019 .877 
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Daily experience: Unappreciated - Appreciated 
R2adj (n=104) .000 Sig. R2adj (n=75) .007 Sig. 
F (4,102) 1.003 .410 F (4, 72) 1.126 .351 
β Optimism .174 .241  β Perception Branch  -.079 .586 
β Appraisal -.003 .982  β Facilitation Branch  .061 .666 
β Utilisation -.027 .839 β Understanding Branch  -.187 .160 
β Social Skills -.186 .098  β Managing Branch  -.092 .453 
 Daily experience: Overworked - Challenged 
R2adj (n=104) .005 Sig. R2adj (n=75) -.049 Sig. 
F (4,102) 1.131 .346 F (4, 72) 0.105 .980 
β Optimism .052 .724  β Perception Branch  .076 .611 
β Appraisal .235 .091  β Facilitation Branch  -.033 .820 
β Utilisation -.105 .428 β Understanding Branch  -.042 .757 
β Social Skills -.087 .437  β Managing Branch  .042 .739 
 Daily experience: Uninspired - Passionate 
R2adj (n=104) .050 Sig. R2adj (n=75) .006 Sig. 
F (4,101) 2.388 .056 F (4, 71) 1.111 .358 
β Optimism .050 .732  β Perception Branch  .017 .906 
β Appraisal .216 .116  β Facilitation Branch  -.135 .342 
β Utilisation .113 .385 β Understanding Branch  -.153 .247 
β Social Skills -.113 .302  β Managing Branch  -.037 .764 
 Intent to stay 
R2adj (n=157) -.005 Sig. R2adj (n=124) .068 Sig. 
F (4,156) 0.815 .517 F (4, 119) 3.238 .015 
β Optimism .054 .639  β Perception Branch  .030 .774 
β Appraisal -.043 .693  β Facilitation Branch  -.275 .010 
β Utilisation .102 .347 β Understanding Branch  -.063 .530 
β Social Skills .045 .631  β Managing Branch  -.047 .622 
Willingness to recommend 
R2adj (n=104) -.011 Sig. R2adj (n=75) .000 Sig. 
F (4,220) 0.714 .584 F (4, 72) 1.008 .409 
β Optimism .132 .377  β Perception Branch  .107 .464 
β Appraisal .018 .899  β Facilitation Branch  -.245 .088 
β Utilisation .024 .859 β Understanding Branch  -.011 .931 
β Social Skills -.146 .197  β Managing Branch  -.053 .663 
 Resignation status (Logistic regression) 
R2 .051 Sig. R2 .053 Sig. 
χ28 14.442 .071 χ
2
8 9.616 .293 
β Optimism 0.013 .977  β Perception Branch  -1.551 .499 
β Appraisal 0.357 .299  β Facilitation Branch  5.493 .054 
β Utilisation 0.010 .976 β Understanding Branch  -4.015 .258 
β Social Skills 0.182 .518  β Managing Branch  -0.529 .860 
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F20: Differences on the total scales and subscales of the SSREIT for job functions that have more 
affective requirements than functions which have more technical requirements 
 
 
Scale 
Affective 
Requirements 
Technical 
Requirements T-Test Effect size  (eta) 
M SD M SD 
SSREIT  n=144 n=112   
Overall EI Score 134.58 13.41 134.04 12.09 t (254)= 0.658 , p = .740 .02 
Optimism 4.30 0.43 4.29 0.39 t (254)= 0.658 , p = .983 .00 
Appraisal 3.93 0.59 3.92 0.55 t (254)= 1.789 , p = .952 .00 
Utilisation 3.91 0.61 3.98 0.56 t (254)= 0.025 , p = .373 .06 
Social Skills 3.94 0.60 3.83 0.57 t (254)= 0.343 , p = .139 .09 
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Table F21: Scores on the total scales and subscales of the MSCEIT, SSREIT and TSI for 
management versus non-management employees 
 
Scale 
Management Non-management T-Test 
Effect size 
M SD M SD  (eta) 
MSCEIT  
(MHS standardised scores) n=102 n=120   
Overall EI Score 89.77 13.37 93.85 12.02 t (210) = -1.446, p = .150 .10 
Experiential Area  93.76 16.11 98.83 14.08 t (210) = -1.496, p = .136 .10 
Strategic Area  90.75 11.98 91.02 8.61 t (212) = -0.108, p = .914 .01 
Perception Branch  93.35 15.76 96.57 12.83 t (212) = -0.976, p = .330 .07 
Facilitation Branch  97.42 16.33 100.00 13.11 t (210) = -0.759, p = .449 .05 
Understanding Branch  92.65 11.94 91.07 9.87 t (212) = 0.633, p = .528 .04 
Managing Branch  92.13 12.30 94.28 9.10 t (212) = -0.841, p = .402 .06 
Faces Task 98.88 22.80 106.55 25.91 t (212) = -1.556, p = .121 .11 
Pictures Task 94.01 13.13 94.29 8.19 t (213) = -0.105, p = .917 .01 
Facilitation Task 103.47 15.77 104.96 14.53 t (210) = -0.448, p = .655 .03 
Sensations Task 93.50 14.64 96.04 12.00 t (212) = -0.834, p = .405 .06 
Changes Task 92.62 11.77 89.54 8.67 t (212) = 1.261, p = .209 .09 
Blends Task 92.02 11.38 91.31 8.59 t (213) = 0.300, p = .764 .02 
Emotion Management Task 93.86 11.71 94.10 8.72 t (212) = -0.101, p = .919 .01 
Emotional Relationships Task 93.06 13.13 95.94 8.25 t (42) = -1.515, p = .137 .23 
SSREIT  n=142 n=140   
Overall EI Score 134.91 12.68 135.98 13.15 t (280) = -0.511, p = .610 .03 
Optimism 4.31 0.42 4.35 0.38 t (280) = -0.711, p = .478 .04 
Appraisal 3.95 0.56 3.97 0.58 t (280) = -0.154, p = .877 .01 
Utilisation 3.97 0.60 3.96 0.51 t (280) = 0.081, p = .936 .00 
Social Skills 3.91 0.57 3.94 0.68 t (280) = -0.269, p = .788 .02 
TSI n=155 n=153   
Legislative 5.04 0.97 4.90 0.91 t (306) = 0.907, p = .365 .05 
Executive 4.75 0.99 4.52 1.10 t (306) = 1.427, p = .155 .08 
Judicial 4.68 1.30 4.55 1.35 t (306) = 0.603, p = .547 .03 
Global 3.80 1.11 4.28 1.24 t (306) = -2.666, p = .008** .15 
Local 4.41 1.12 4.02 1.19 t (306) = 2.158, p = .032* .12 
Liberal 5.04 1.04 4.78 1.16 t (282) = 1.497, p = .135 .09 
Conservative 4.13 1.14 4.06 1.33 t (306) = 0.351, p = .725 .02 
Internal 3.99 1.20 3.90 0.93 t (74) = 0.561, p = .576 .06 
External 5.32 1.15 5.24 1.09 t (306) = 0.423, p = .672 .02 
Hierarchic 5.33 1.16 5.47 1.11 t (306) = -0.767, p = .444 .04 
Monarchic 3.77 1.19 3.46 1.18 t (306) = 1.633, p = .103 .09 
Oligarchic 4.29 1.05 4.08 1.16 t (290) = 1.214, p = .226 .07 
Anarchic 4.61 1.04 4.47 1.07 t (306) = 0.821, p = .413 .05 
***p < .001  **p < .01   *p < .05 
 
